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Abstract
This thesis is concerned with the relatively small section 
of the West African coast between the Gambia and Cape Mount, It 
seeks to reconstruct a picture of that society in the mid-sixteenth 
century, while it was still free of profound European influence.
Such a picture provides the indispensable basis for analysing the 
impact of external forces on the narrow coastal strip, •external1 
being used to embrace not only the Europeans but also influences 
from the hinterland and adjacent coastal areas*
In 1545 > Sierra Leone (the southern portion of the Upper 
Guinea Coast) was subjected to invasions from Africans who were 
called •Manes’. This is the starting point of the study of the 
external forces (Ch.Il), and the purely African influences are 
treated once more in Ch* IX. However, it is the presence of the 
Portuguese (Ch.IIl) and other European traders, which is the external 
factor most in evidence; and the European association with the Upper 
Guinea Coast was based largely on the development of the Atlantic 
slave trade. This latter topic is treated in Chs. IV and X, while 
Ch. VJ; deals with African products other than slaves*
European rivalries as such constitute a very minor theme 
(as treated in Ch. V), for the aim has been to portray European 
activity in this region only in relationship to the African rulers, 
African peoples and African polities* Owing to the great differences
3in European and African culture, and owing to the potency and vicious­
ness of the Atlantic slave trade, the Afro-European relationship 
incorporated violent contradictions, which resolved themselves to the 
detriment of the society of the Upper Guinea Coast, By 1800, the 
littoral society was overwhelmed both from the landward and the seaward 
side by forces set in motion by the Atlantic slave trade.
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Preface
The scholarship on the history of the Upper Guinea Coast 
has faithfully followed the boundaries laid down when the area was 
partitioned between the English, French and Portuguese* Subsequent 
to colonisation in the nineteenth century, there is some rationale 
behind such regional treatment, but to project colonial boundaries 
into the pre-colonial period lacks all justification* To begin with, 
therefore, this study concerns itself with a region which appears to 
be geographically and ethnically a single entity, and which, further­
more, was considered as such by the Europeans who traded there in the 
period under discussion*
A second limitation of the secondary material on the history 
of the Upper Guinea Coast is quantitative in nature* The only 
documented study of the early history of the area that is now Sierra 
Leone was provided by Peter Kup, in A History of Sierra Leone* 1400- 
1787 (London 1961). Since Andre Arcin essayed his Histoire de la 
Guinee in 1911 > nothing else has been forthcoming on that area in the 
form of a general history* In Portuguese Guinea, the scene is 
dominated by a single scholar, A. Texeira da Mota, whose two-volume 
work, Guine Portuguese (Lisboa 1954) is essentially a record of more 
recent years, but which is fortunately deepened by the author*s sense 
of history and intimate acquaintance with historical sources* The 
Gambia, too, has its single showpiece of historical writing relating to
S'
the period before the British administration, that of J.M. Gray, 
published in 1940* managed to spare only 10 pages on the Portuguese
epoch in a book which runs to 497 pages*
While it is true that many areas in Africa are no happier 
than the UGC in the above respects, such paucity is nevertheless 
striking, because the Upper Guinea Coast has been in long and unbroken 
contact with Europe since the middle of the fifteenth century, and the 
records of those centuries survive in considerable quantities - more so 
probably than for any other section of the West African littoral. Since 
the purely documentary evidence was available and untapped, there was no 
need to fraternise with Carbon 14 or tape-recorders; and though every 
opportunity was taken to utilise the insights from archaeology, ethno­
graphy and the like, where these were forthcoming, it remains true that 
this study is extremely orthodox in its methodology. This reliance on 
the European written word is not in itself inconsistent with aspiring to 
the "new orthodoxy” of African history* namely, the writing of the 
history of Africa as such, and not as an appendage to anything else.
There certainly axe limitations imposed by the nature of the European 
sources. Christopher Fyfe, illustrating the Sierra Leone Inheritance 
by selected documents, rightly contends that "a barrier is set between 
us and pre-European Sierra Leone. We can only glimpse it through Euro­
pean eyes, and must infer - not learn directly from unmediated African 
sources - how its people lived1.*. Yet, stumbling over such barriers is 
an occupational hazard for those who seek to reconstruct the history not
6only of Africa*s peoples “but also of all the voiceless millions who worked 
and died*
In choosing Africa as a field of study, I have heen inspired by 
the irridentist masses of the West Indies, who also supplied most of the 
finances (via the University of the West Indies)* The specific choice 
of the Upper Guinea Coast was due to the direction of my tutor, Dr*
Richard Gray of the School of Oriental and African Studies, whose vast 
knowledge of the disposition of archival sources is equalled by his 
teohnical skills as a historian, and surpassed by the personal warmth 
which went into the supervision of my thesis* My thanks axe due also 
to the Central Research Fund Committee of the University of London, whose 
generosity permitted me to consult archival material in Portugal, Spain 
and Italy* Both in England and on the continent, great help(was afforded 
me by a large number of individuals in libraries and archives* Mr*
T.M* Milne, Secretary of the Institute of Historical Research was always 
ready to be of assistance; and I must also single out Senhor Comandante
A. Texeira da Mota, who willingly guided me to relevant material in 
Portugal*
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A HISTORY OF THE UPPER GUINEA COAST, 1545-1800
CHAPTER ONE
THE LARD AND THE PEOPLE*
to
The Land and .the People
The spirit of enquiry and discovery of the Portuguese in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries has imparted a distinct geographical 
flavour to the surviving records of Portuguese activity in Africa in that 
era* Indeed, whatever shortcomings those records possess must he 
attributed to the Portuguese preoccupation with the gathering of geo­
graphical data, to the exclusion of much else. As the early Portuguese 
moved south along the west coast of Africa, their main concern was the 
preparation of navigational aids, necessitating a close attention to 
detail. Frequent soundings were made off the coast and in the rivers, 
and wind and weather conditions scrupulously noted, (l) In 1634» "the 
Conselho da Fazenda approved the payment of a pension to Miguel Albernas, 
who had be>en in their service sis a cartographer on the Upper Guinea Coast.
(2) The result of his work, like the work of so many others relating to 
Asia and Africa, must have been known only to the Portuguese authorities, 
since it was the policy to keep such information out of the hands of 
rivals. Thus, as late as 1607, the English•still had no precise idea of 
the Upper Guinea Coast. (3) The Dutch knew the area around Cape Mount, but 
when Admiral Schouten was in the vicinity of the Nunez in 1615, he was not 
at all certain of his whereabouts. (4)
. 1 . 1 . . . .  ................  1 1 . „ . .  ■ . 1 . 1 . 1 ... . „■ 1, . 1 ,,, j
(1) Damiao Peres (Ed.) s Os mais antigos Roteiros da Guine (Lisboa, 1952)
(2) A.H.U.T Guine, caixa I - Doc.II, Minute of the Conselho, Nov 1634*
(3) Hakluyt Society N° LVI - Voyages of Sir James Lancaster to the East
Indies. William Keeling in Sierra Leone, March I607.
(4) Samuel Purchas:- Purchas his Pilgrims. London 1624, Part II, Book i, p.87
//
The Land and the People
The fifteenth and sixteenth century Portuguese roteiros or charts, 
in spite of their limited objectives, are extremely useful introductions 
to the geography and the history of the Upper Guinea Coast. More sub­
stantial information followed later, as European commercial activities 
intensified, and forced them to look ifiore closely at the land from which
they hoped to reap a profit* Sierra Leone wts particularly favoured,
c
since enquiries were conduced with a view to Portuguese colonisation in 
the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries* Towards the end of 
the eighteenth century, English and French colonisation projects generated 
similar interest* On the basis nf such evidence, and with some recourse 
to more recent and morescientific studies, one can construct a tolerably 
accurate geography of the region between the Gambia and Cape Mount, which 
is the region described by the term "Upper Guinea Coast1* in this study, (l) 
Much that is of purely geographical value will be omitted* The 
purpose here is to provide sufficient of the physical background to make 
meaningful the conduct and pattern of African life in that area during the 
period 1545-1800.
(l) The designations applied to various sections of the coast of West 
Africa varied over the centuries* In this study the three relevant 
geographical divisions will be taken as (i) The Senegambia - between the 
rivers Senegal and Gambia; (ii) The Upper Guinea Coast - from the Gambia 
to Cape Mount; and (iii) The Malaguetta Coast, which coincides with the 
modem state of Liberia.
The Land and the People
Some slight advantage is to be gained by utilising contemporary 
sources as a base for a purely geographical description* Europeans in 
the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries observed the relation­
ship between human endeavour and physical environment in a context of 
technical skills, which, in some respects, differs from what prevails on 
the Upper Guinea Coast to-day* Naturally enough, As Europeans, these 
observers were primarily concerned with whatever features would most 
influence European activity, but often they made specific or oblique 
references to the Africans in relation to the local environment* To 
fathom this relationship is the first essential in an attempt to recreate 
the lives of these peoples - as is the case witi any given group in any 
given locality*
The most striking physical feature of the Upper Guinea Coast is 
its numerous rivers* The Portuguese referred to the region between Cape 
Verde and Cape Mount as "the Rivers of the Guinea of Cape Verde”j while the 
French, viewing the same area from their trade centres in the Senegal, 
designated it "the Rivers of the South"* Flowing in a generally westerly 
or south-westerly direction, more than two dozen rivers reach the sea 
independently on the stretch of coast between the Gambia and Cape Mount*
Of these, excluding the Gambia itself, the most important were the Casamance, 
the Cacheu, the Geba and the Corubal (merging into the Geba Channel), the 
Ria Grande de Buba, the Cumbidjam, the Cacine, the Cogon, the Nunez, the 
Pongo, the Konkoure, the Greater and Lesser Searcies, the Sierra Leone 
(which is really an arm of the sea into which flows the Port Loko Creek
13
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from the north and the Rokelle from the south), the rivers of the Sherbro 
estuary, the Moa and the Mano. These rivers, along with their numerous 
tributaries and streams, constituted a system of waterways, which was of 
primary importance in the life of the region.
The significance of the rivers can best be assessed in conjunction 
with land relief and elevation. With the exception of the Sierra Leone 
peninsula and the region around Cape Verga the whole coast is flat, (l)
Low level plains adjoin the rivers, and away from the immediate river banks 
the ground seldom rises above thirty or forty metres above sea level. A 
single belt of flat littoral plains can thus be distinguished, the width 
of this coastal belt being determined mainly by the tides.
An extensive and shallow continental shelf, out of which rises the 
Bijagos islands and a large number of shoals, is responsible for the fact 
that the tides here are higher and more powerful than anywhere else on the 
West African coast. (2) On an average, the amplitude of the tides between 
Cape Roxo and Freetown is between three and four metres while it is nearly
(1) Early travellers noted the exceptional elevations of the coast.
(a) Th. Monod, A. Texeira da Mota and R. Mauny (ed) : Description de la 
C6te Occidentale dfAfriaue (Senegal au Cap de Monte ArchipelSj par Valentim 
Fernandes (1506-1510) (Bissau, 1951) PP> 56*58,68.
(b) R. Mauny (Ed.) : Esmeraldo de situ Orbis (Cote Occidentale dfAfrique du 
Sud Maxocain au Gabon^par Duarte Pacheco Pereira (vers 1506-1508) (Bissau 
1956) pp. 68,74
(2) A. Texeira da Mota - Guine Portuguesa. (Lisboa 1954) Vol.I, p.57*
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seven metres on the Geba Channel. These powerful tides, along with the 
sunken ria character of the coastline, account for the penetration of the 
sea for considerable distances inland, and the silt deposited in the 
process has helped to build up the alluvial coastal plain. The penetration 
by the sea also accounts for the presence of salt marshes, and permits the 
widespread germination of essentially littoral flora,such as mangrove and 
palm.
The most characteristic vegetation is the mangrove, which, in the 
greater and lesser profusion, lines the river banks to the very limit of the 
tides, (l) The roots of the mangrove have acted as stabilisiers of the 
sediment deposited by the tide, so that this plant is always associated 
with the richest alluvial soils of the ooast. Indeed, the mangrove can be 
taken as the most easily visible symbol of the complex of numerous rivers, 
low plains, marshy land and powerful tides: a complex which decisively
affected all activity conducted on the Upper Guinea Coast.
A few of the principal rivers of the Upper Guinea Coast originate in 
the Futa Djalon mountains. The massif of the Futh Djalon, covering some 
50,000 square kilometres, is an irregular triangle with the base on the 
upper Gambia and the apex just north of the frontiers of the modem state 
of Sierra Leone. (2) But immediately to the south of the Futa Djalon the
(1) Alvares de Almada - "Tratado breve dos Rios de Guine". In Monumenta Miss 
ionaria Africana. Africa 0cidental.2nd. series (Ed. A. Brasio, Lisboa 19^4) 
Vol. Ill, p.280
(2) Unless specifically stated to the contrary, the term "Sierra Leone1* covers 
that portion of the Upper Guinea Coast which extends from Cape Verga to Cape 
Mount.
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country is mountainous, so there is virtually a continuous range, which is 
the watershed from which flow the Senegal and the Niger as well as several 
rivers of the Upper Guinea Coast, (l) Between the Futa Djalon and the 
coastal plain is a region of hills and plateaux. There, the rivers are 
swift and shallow, while the edges of the escarpments give rise to waterfalls. 
The area compares unfavourably with the coast as far as soils and vegetation 
are concerned. Heavy rainfall leads to the erosion of the soil, which is 
carried down to the lower reaches of the rivers. Large sections are barren, 
being covered only with scrub and loose rocks - a landscape which the Susus 
call oulai and the Fulas bowal. (2) These features predominate in the 
hinterland north of Cape Verga, especially in the area known as the Badjar, 
and on large parts of the Futa Djalon itself, while the Sierra Leone hinter­
land is less arid. There one finds open undulating plains, covered with 
tall fclei>htofc grass, and capable of supporting clumps of forest species.
The area which will form the basis of this enquiry comprises the coastal 
plain and the transitional zone between the coastal plain and the Futa 
Djalon. But, from time to time, reference must be made to certain develop­
ments in the Futa Djalon and beyond, which profoundly affected the history 
of the coast.
The Western Sudan forms the deep hinterland of the Upper Guinea Coast, 
but relations between the two areas are often overlooked. In part, this 
7 3 7 7 7  Machat : Guinee Franyaise - Les Rivieres du Sud et le Fouta-Diallon 
(Paris 1906) p.95
(2) Ibid. « p.95 (First Map to follow)
Ijagos
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reflects the fact that descriptions of the Western Sudan paid little attention 
to the peoples of the Atlantic coast* Leo Africanus, for example, simply 
stated that there were fifteen kingdoms known to stretch between the Niger 
and the sea, and that some intercourse was conducted with those who dwelt 
along the sea-coast* When he added that, towards the west, Mali was 
confined by forests which stretched as far as the ocean, this was the closest 
he came to any reference to the Upper Guinea Coast, (l) Secondly, while the 
Sudan generated written records before the arrival of the Europeans, this 
was not true of the UGC; and archaelogical evidence which has so often 
come to the rescue of the African historian, is not available in any volume. 
Such archaelogical finds as have been made, however, indicate that the two 
regions were closely linked*
Numbers of laterite megaliths have been discovered on the Corubal, 
on the Geba, to the north of the Casamance, on the Sine-Salum and in the 
Western Sudan (notably Macina). These megaliths are reportedly contempora­
neous with the rock paints of the Sahara depicting horses and camels. (2 )
In the Geba-Corubal area, ancient gold workings have also been found*
Shafts were sunk sometimes to a depth of twenty metres until the gold-bearing 
strata were reached, and these shafts were then connected by horizontal 
galleries, (j) This exact technique has persisted in large areas of the
(1) Jean-Leon Africain 2 Description de LfAfrique (ed.A. Apaulard, Paris 1956) 
Vol*2,p.466
(2) R. Mauny s La. Prehistoire de L^riqne Occidentale Fran<^ais£ (Paris 1944) 
p.52
(3) Carlos Costa : Unpublished notes. (Cited in Texeira da Mota : Guine 
Portuguesa vol.l, pp.129,130)
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Western Sudan as well as on the Gold and Ivory coasts. Qn the Upper Guinea 
Coast, they were obviously abandoned before the Portuguese arrived, since, 
after diligent enquiry, the latter reported only small quantities of 
alluvial gold. The likelihood is that those gold workings were associated 
with the medieval Sudanese states, (l)
Quite apart from any possible political or economic relations 
between the Upper Guinea Coast and the Western Sudan, the connection between 
the two regions was intimate and fundamental, because the peopling of the 
Upper Guinea Coast was a result of the continuous dislocation of population 
from the interior to the coast - a process that was largely precipitated by 
political events in the Sudanese states.
In the opinion of one anthropologist, Mendes Correia, it was as 
early as the third century that the relatively well-organised states of the 
Western Sudan began to exert the pressure which led to population drifts 
in the direction of the Upper Guinea Coast. (2) Richard-Molard also regards 
the vast majority of the peoples of the Upper Guinea Coast as fRefoulesf - 
driven back from their original positions away from the coast. (3) Indeed, 
the only poiht at issue has been to establish the sequence of arrival of 
to establish 'the- sequence of arrival of the various immigrants. Discussion 
on that question has usually centred on identifying the tribes whose tenure
(1) A. Texeira da Mota: Guine Portuguesa, vol.l, pl35
(2) A. Mendes Correia: Ra^aa do Tmpp-rio (Lisbon 1943) pp.147-14®
(3) Richard-Molard: Afrique Occidentale Fran^aise (Paris 1949) pl08
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on the coast has been the longest? then, recognising that the Mande and the 
Fulas were the latest arrivals, the problem can be posed in terms of which 
groups preceded the Mande and Fulas. (l)
i
Of the tribes which the Europeans found on the Upper Guinea Coast on 
their arrival, those who were the oldest inhabitants were the Djolas, Banhuns, 
Casangas, Papels, Balantas, Bijagos, Bulloms and Limbas. These are generally 
regarded as the * Primitives* • Virtually surrounding them by mid-sixteenth 
century in a large semi-circle stretching from the estuary of the Gambia to 
the coast at Dape Mount were the Mandingas, Susus, Djalonkes, Korankos, Konos 
and Vais (all of Mande stock) interpersed with a few Fulacundas. the small 
settlements of Fulas. The *Pre-Mandingas1 were also contained along with the 
1 Primitives* in this semi-circle. They can be enumerated as the Nalus, 
Landumas, Cocolis, Bag as and Temmes. (2)
(1) J. Machati Les Rivieres du Sud - This author reviews the differing cate­
gories presented by nineteenth century scholars, (pp. 23G>232)
(2) The orthography of tribal names on the Upper Guinea Coast has not been 
standardised, especially wit h regard to the formation of plurals. In 
the "semi-Bantu" languages, the plurals are formed by prefixes and in
the Mande languages by suffixes. Some European writers have preferred to 
pluralise the African singular for both numbers. In this study, the 
English plural is used. On other doubtful points, the rule which will 
be fdlowed is consistency. For instance, the same sound is 
represented throughout by *Djf, as in Djalon and Djola, instead of *Di* 
or *J!, which are possible alternatives.
2-0
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Immediately south of the Gambia, on the coast down to the Cacheu river, 
live a people whom the Europeans originally c ailed the Felupes. The Mandingas 
referred to them as Djolas, a name which they themselves have progressively 
adopted, superceding the local variants by which each section of the t±ibe 
was known. It has been put forward that the Djolas were the first to people 
the region of the Casamance, where they are now centred, (l) but the mega- 
lithic monuments found in the Casamance, as elsewhere in the Gambia and the 
Geba, were associated with ceremonies and a cult of the dead - features which 
are alien to Djola society today - and the sharp difference suggests that a 
completely different people inhabited the area before the Djolas. (2) At the 
same time, it is true that the Djolas have no traditions of origin or movement 
except the memory of purely localised events which occurred during the last 
few generations. This is a characteristic of the so-called Primitives1.
East of the Djolas, forming a parallel belt between the Gambia and the 
Cacheu, lay the Banhuns. The Sengeghu river, which flows southward into 
the Casamance at about longitude 16°, was their approximate eastern boundary. 
They call themselves ' Iagar', and say that the Portuguese gave the name 
fBanhun* to a number of different groups living in that area. (3) Actually 
the Portuguese were aware of the local distinctions among them - JIabundos, 
Iziguichors, Chaos - but it was emphasised that the Banhuns were a single
7 1 7  D*Anfreville de la Salle: Notre vieux Senegal. (Paris 1909) P-251 
(Apud L.V. Thomas: Les Diola (Dakar 1959) Vol.l, p.309
(2) Louis Vincent Thomas: Les Diola (Dakar 1959) Vol. 1, p.309
(3) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine" pp. 288,304
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ethnic and linguistic group, (l)
Only a handful of Banhuns have survived to the present day, a drastic 
decline from their position in the sixteenth century. Two rather 
unconvincing reasons have been advanced to account for this. Firstly, their 
practice of burying their dead in their houses? and, secondly, the mal­
treatment which the young men received during the fanado, the ceremony of 
circumcision and initiation. (2) Neither of these features were peculiar to 
the Banhuns, and their presence elsewhere in Africa has not decimated tribes. 
What must have been decisive was the fact that the Banhuns faced severe 
challenges from the Djolas to the west, and the ^andingas to the north and
east - and they lost both territory and men to these two groups. (3)
The Casangas, the eastern neighbours of the Banhuns, have also suffered 
great numerical and political decline, and they recall their days of
puissance, when the Casanga capital lay at Brucama. (4) This is fully
confirmed by the Portuguese accounts of the Casangas in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. A^ that time, they dominated most of the Casamance, 
and their king did live at Brucama, the word Pruco* meaning "King^ court".
(5) Their decline can likewish be attributed to assimilation by other groups,
(1) Landerset Siiooes: Babel Negra (Porto 1935)
(2) A. Nogueira: "Monografia sobre o tribu Banhun" in Boletim Gultural da 
Guine Portuguesa, Vol.2, No. 8, Oct. 1947*
(3) A. Nogueira: "Vida familiar dos Cassangas do Sedengal" in Incjruerito 
Etnografico (A. Texeira da Mota, Biaaau 1947) PP* 118,119.
(4) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine" p.305*
Andre Domelas: "Relacao em 14 capitulos sobre a Serra Leoa" 1625* In 
"Relacoes do Descobrimento da Coata da Guine". Ms.51“VIII-25.
Biblioteca DfA.iuda
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though in this case, the process has been determined largely by the willingnes 
of the Casangas to submerge their own identity, (l) This is particularly tru€ 
in relation to the iv*andingas ? while a small group, known as the Cobianas or 
Uboi, who live to the south of the Cacheu, are considered to be the product 
of Casanga intermixture with the Papels. (2).
Another large group of very early settlers on the Upper Guinea Coast 
were to be found between the Cacheu and Geba-Corubal. The Papels extended 
from the Cacheu to the Geba, on the coast, and occupied all but one of the 
islands immediately offshore. The only island in the Geba estuary which was 
not inhabited by the Papels was Bolama, belonging to the Beafadas, the tribe 
which occupied a large extent of territory on the banks of the Geba and the 
Corubal, proceeding along the length of both rivers until they came up 
against the Mandingas. They were also concentrated on the shores of the 
deep bay known as the Ria Grande de Buba. Their neighbours on the Geba were 
the Balantas, who covered a considerable area east of the Papels and north of 
the Beafadas.
A caution about nomenclature is necessary at this juncture. The 
literature on the zone between the Cacheu and the Geba yields at least three 
other •tribes1 - the Buramos or Brames, the Manjacos and the ^ancanhas. Only 
two names were in use among the Europeans in the sixteenth century « ’Papels* 
and ’Buramos* • These were considered as a single ethnic group and the
(1) A. Taveira: "Cassangas de Sedengal" Inquerito Etnografico. p. 119
(2) B. Marques: "Familiaridade idiomatica entre Cobianas e Cassangas"
B.C.G.P. Vol.2. p.8. (Bissau 1947)
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names were used interchangeably, (l) Other titles made their appearance 
much later, such as tManjanosl which is of creole origin, and was in use 
at the end of the eighteenth century to describe the inhabitants of the 
island of Jeta, south of the Cacheu estuary. (2) Recent studies have come 
full circle and confirmed the unity of the peoples of this area, all of whom 
speak only slightly varying dialects. (3) Thus, in place of the confusing 
multiplicity of names in the literature of the nineteenth century and for 
most of this century, the term fPapelf will be employed. On a similar 
note, some of the ^eafadas are referred to as Djolas', a name of Mandinga 
origin. (4) This shall not be employed, to avoid confusion with the Djolas 
or Felupes of the Casamance.
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", pp.302,312 
Andre Domelas: "Relapao sobre a Serra Leoa"
(2) Philip Beaveri African memoranda relative to an attempt to establish a 
British settlement on the island of Bulama in the year 1792 (London 1803)
P.127
(3) A.J. Dias Dinis: "As tribos da Guine Portuguesa na historia", Congresso 
Comemorativo do yuinto Centenario do Descobrimento da Guine*" (Lisboa 1956) 
Vol.l, p.253.
(4) Antonio Carreira: 0 Fundamento dos Etnonimos da Guine Portuguesa ('Djola* 
is a Mandinga word without any ethnic significance. In the period of 
Mandinga expansion and dominance, it was used to designate individuals 
under obligation to pay tribute. From this it is easy to see how a number 
of people, ethnically distinct, could be said to be Djolas.)
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The two types of traditions of origin which are recounted by these three 
tribes are those which suggest close family relationshipSj such as the Balanta 
account of descent from a Beafada hunter who acquired a Papel wife?' (l) and 
those which simply s tate that God made them descend to e arth in the region 
where they are now to be found. (2) Yet a number of factors indicate that 
these groups were all littoral •Refoules*, pushed onto the coast, mainly 
through the action of the Mandingas. This can be illustrated by taking as 
a point of departure, the residents of the Bijagos islands.
There are some seventeen islands outside the estuary of the Geba channel 
and the Ria Grande de Buba. Both the islands and their inhabitants are 
known as the Bijagos. The bulk of the population appears to have originated 
from the adjacent mainland, inhabited by the Beafadas in the sixteenth 
century, but still considered as "the patrimony of the Bijagos". (3)
However, all the islands were not peopled by the same tribe, especially those 
of later settlement. Some show close affinities to the Djola$, some to the 
Papels and some to the Nalus. (4) Most important of all is a tradition 
linking the inhabitants of the largest of the islands with the Coniaguis, a 
*Paleo-Negritic1 people of the plateau hinterland of the Upper Guinea Coast. (5
(1) J. Pinto Bull* "Balantas de Mansoa", Inquerito Ethografico. p 140
(2) J. Estevao dos Reis* "Manjacos de Calequisse", Inquerito Etnografico. p.14
(3) Manuel Alvares: "Ethopia Menor e Descrippao Geografica da Provincia de Ser 
Leoa" 1616. Ms.l41-Cl-, Biblioteca da Sociedade de Geografica de Lisboa.
(4) A.J. Santos Lima: Organizacao economica e social dos Bijagos 
(Bissau 1947)
(5) D.A. Gomes Alves* "Bijagos da Ilha Roxa", Inquerito Etnografico. p.134
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Only recently have ethnic groups like the Coniaguis been the object of 
attention and study* Several others have been distinguished - the Hadjaranca 
Bassaris and Tendas}with the last being a Fulani word, referring to peoples wh 
originated from the middle Gambia or to the product of miscegenation which 
occurred during the first Fula occupation (in the fifteenth century).(l)
The Tenda country, as described by Mungo Park at the end of the eighteenth 
century, was still a vast tract of land along the Gambia, between 10° and 14° 
West Longtitude, (2) and, before the arrival of the Mandingas and the Fulas, 
the whole extensive interior plateaux must have been the preserve of these 
'Paleo-Negritic* tribes*
The connection between the Bijagos and the Coniaguif is not the only link 
between the "littoral Refoules" and the "Refoules sub-guineens" (As Richard- 
Molard classifies the ^aleo-Negritics1). Very close linguistic 
similarities have been uncovered between the Beafadas, Tendas, Coniaguis and 
Badjarancas. (3) It has been advanced by A* Texeira da Mot a that the 
existence of these pockets of ^aleo-Negritio* peoples, and their very 
probable connections with the peoples of the coast may well ^e the key 
to the whole problem of origins and affinities of the tribes north of the
(1) A* Carreira: 0 Fundamento dos Etnonimos na Guine Portuguesfea. p9
(2) Mungo Park: Travels in the internnr districts of Africa in the years
1795. 1796 and 1797. (London 1799) (See Maps of Park,s journey)
(3) A.A. Wilson "TJma Volta linguistica da Guine'1 in B.C.G.P. Vol.15 
No. 56, 1959
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Corubal. His very credible hypothesis suggests that the Mandingar 
population movements drove a wedge between the 'Paleo-Negritics1 whom they 
encountered on the higher reaches of the rivers. Some were pushed on the 
coast, and those who were left behind either underwent assimilation or took 
refuge on the inhospitable bowal zones, such as the Badjar. (l)
In the southern sections of the Upper Guinea Coast, the tribal situation 
must have been fairly straightforward (up) until the twelfth century. The 
single dominant element along the coast were the Bulloms, extending roughly 
between Cape Verga and Cape Mount. With the Bulloms were associated the 
Kissi* and the Krim^ the languages of all three being extremely closely related
(2). The Kissis at that time occupied most of the eastern portion of the press] 
Republic of Guinea and the region along the present Sierra Leone-Liberia 
frontier, with the Krimsto their south on or near the coast. In the hinter­
land between the Greater Searcies and the upper Bum lay the Limbas. (3) They 
had entered Sierra Leone at a very early date, pushing the Gbandes eastwards 
into what is now eastern Liberia. (4)
The pattern which confronted the Europeans was considerably different 
from that at the end of the thirteenth century. Several waves of rdugees
(1) A.Texeira da Mot a: Guin£ Pprtuguesa. Vol. 1, pl54
(2) Yves Person: HLes Kissi et leurs statuettes de pierre dans le cadre de
lfhistoire Ouest - Africaine" in Bulletin de l^nstitut Francaise de>
ltAfriaue Noire, tome XX111, Ser B, No. 1, 19&1, pp.1-60 (see p.13)
(3) Ibid: See map showing the distribution of tribes around 1300
(4) Peter Kup: A history of Sierra Leone. 1400-1787.(London 1961) p.124
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had arrived either on tie coast or at positions in the near interior* These
groups, unlike the ’primitives1, conserve traditions of movement, often in 
extremely clear terms*
In the population movements south and south-west of the Futa Djalon, the 
Mande people who played the most significant role were not the Mandingas but
the Susus. Living on the Faleme, they were part of the empire of Ghana when
the Almoravids invaded* They subsequently took up the struggle against the 
Berbers and Islamicised Saracoles, and achieved power in the Susu (Sosso) 
empire in the twelfth century* It was in 1235 that they suffered defeat
at the hands of the ^andingas, and numbers of Susus fled to the west, (l)
Passing through Tenda country on the Gambia, the first Susu migrants 
proceeded south along the west side of the Futa Djalon. But, they faced
hostility from the Badjarancas, and had to move south of the Corubal. Later
Susu travellers avoided the Badjar, and journeyed down the east side of the 
massif. (2)
The Susu migration had multiplier effects in sparking off other populatioi 
dislocations. The Nalu traditions are very precise. Led by Manga Taulia, 
they travelled westwards, making their first settlement at Bigine (near 
Bafata on the Geba). Later they moved on owing to Beafada pressure; and 
forming five sub-divisions, they occupied the region between Ria Tombali
(1) D. Tamsir Nianes "Recherches sur 1TEmpire du ^ ali au Moyen Age", 
Recherches Africaines* No. 1, Jan-March i960, pp 17-36
(2) M. Saint-Pere: "Petit Historique des Sossoe du Rio Pongas", Bulletin du 
Comite des Etudes Higtoriques et Scientifiques 1930, tome XII, pp.26-47*
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and the Nunez, (l) Caught up in the same process were the Bagas, a group of 
whom, known as the Baga Pore, settled in the highlands of Cape Verga, as well 
as in the low swamps of the estuary of the Nunez and the Componi. (2)
The Tyapis and Landumas never reached t hi coast, remaining in the immediate 
hinterland of the ^alus and Bag as. But the final group in this category, 
the Temnes, were to become one of the most powerful tribes on the Sierra Leon 
littoral. Up to the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Temnes were 
still considered as an inland people, (3) but, by the end of that century, 
they had reached the Sierra Leone estuary, and had cut the Bullom tribe into 
two parts, the northern branch of which was subsequently whittled down by 
Temne and Baga pressure.
The waves of migrations always had two aspects: one of displacement and
one of assimilation. Some of the inhabitants of the Put a Djalon were pushed 
on to the coast by the Susus, while others must have remained behind to form 
part of a new ethnic compound. The Futa Djalon was said to have been people< 
at the time of the Susu arrival by the Djalonkes, which is a tautology, becaus 
nke is a Mande suffix, meaning "man of". (4) The tribe which is today known 
as the Djalonkes or Yalunkas, who are considered as closely related to the 
Susus, must represent the fusion of the original stock of the Futa Djalon
(1) J. Garcia de Carvalho: "Nalus de Bedanda", In Inquerito Etnografico p*150
(2) Fernand Rouget: La Guinee. p.146 (Apud M.Saint-Pere,Op.cit.
Note 2.
(3) Valentino Fernandes: La Cote Occident ale d’Afrique p.80
(4) Antonio Carreira: 6 fundamento dos Etnonimos na Guine^ Portuguesa n.10
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with the Susus. It is perhaps not without significance that a large section 
of the Djalonke^s were called ’Soolimas* - men of the sharpened teeth - a 
feature which distinguished the Bagas and Nalus on their arrival on the coast.
In many respects, the Futa Djalon was a crucial transitional zone between 
the Western Sudan and the Upper Guinea Coast. The Susus, in theit turn 
were to be replaced by the Fulas, who first made their entry into the area in 
the fifteenth century.
The advent of the Fulas in the Futa Djalon is generally associated with a 
warrior king by the name of Coli Tenguela who features in a large number of 
traditions collected over a wide area of the Western Sudan, the Senegambia 
and the Upper Guinea Coast. The core of these traditions suggests that Coli 
Tenguela first liberated the Futa Djalon from the rule of the Handinga 
emperor of Mali, and afterwards crossed the Gambia to do the same for Futa 
Toro in the Tekrur, then directly under the sovereignity of the Wolof and 
part of the empire of ^ ali.
Coli Tenguela has been identified with Coli Temala, mentioned in the 
Decadas of Joao de Barros as the king of Tucorol and of the Fulas. De Barros 
wrote that, "the said Temala in those times, lit in those parts the fire of 
war, raising himself from the south, in a district called Futa". (l) An 
imperfect understanding of Joao de Barros led to the dating of the harassment 
of the Mandinga emperor by Coli Temala to a period around 1534? but, in a 
clear exposition, the Portuguese scholar, A. Texeira da Mota, reveals that
(l) Joao de Barros: Asia, Primeira Decada (Ed. Antonio Baiao,
Coimbra 1932) p.117*
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the events to which Joao de Barros was referring, which involved the sending 
of a Portuguese embassy to the Fula king, had taken place in the reign of 
D.Joao II, that is to say, between the years 1481 and 1495* (l)
Texeira da Mot a goes further and draws attention to the fact that other 
Portuguese sources had recorded that there had been a full-scale invasion of 
the Fulas from the Senegambia across the Gambia. Alvares tiftlmada was 
himself familiar with the point on the Gambia where the Fula army had forded 
the river, the spot retaining the name of Passo dos Fulas. The details cf 
the Fula operations were colourfully recorded. "They came determined to 
ferry this army across the river, but having no boats for this purpose, the 
river being at that point one league wide, they filled it with rocks in such 
a way that the whole army crossed. Many aver that the army was so great 
that it was unnecessary for each soldier to carry more than one rock. Be 
that as it may, they blocked the river, and the whole army crossed with its 
baggage, which was great, because they had numerous horses, camels, donkeys 
and cows ... they carried hives of bees, which they let loose upon their 
enemies when the wind was favourable. This was a terrifying army. Never was 
another of equivalent size seen among these nations, destroying and laying 
waste everything, passing through the territory of the Mandingas, Cassangas, 
Banhuns and Buramos, a distance of more than 150 leagues, until they came to 
the Rio Grande, the country of the Beafadas, where the Fulas were defeated!(2\
(1) A Texeira da Mot a: Nota sobre a historia dos Fulas: Coli Tenguela e a 
chegada dos nrimeiros Fulas ao Futa-Jalon (Lisboa 1952) p«59
(2) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", pp.281,282.
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This event was known to Alonso de Sandoval, a Spanish Jesuit at Cartagena, 
who collected information on the Upper Guinea Coast for his publication of a 
treatise on Africa in 1623; (l) and. later in the seventeenth century, the
tradition reached the ears of the Portuguese trader, ^emos Coelho. (2)
It is highly probable that the crossing represented the arrival of Coli 
Tenguela. Writing in 1594 >D<? Almada said that the events occurred about 80 
or 90 years previously. Texeira da Mota argued, with perspicuity, that 
de Almada was likely to have been dating the events from the time he first 
came in possession of the material in the 1560*3 or 1570*s. He thus gave 
the likely period as between 1474 and 1484* Be Almada*s own revision of 
his text in 1596 bears this out fully, for on that occasion, he wrote that 
the Pula army had arrived about a hundred and twenty years earljrer, (3) 
which means about the year 1476. If the conquest of the Futa Djalon was 
carried out at that date, it would have been perfectly feasible for Coli to 
have left for the north and established himself as king of Tucuror by the 
time that D. Joao II sent his envoy. (1481-1495)
The early interpretation of the traditions surrounding Coli Tenguela 
advanced that the Fulas of Massina had revolted in 1512-13 against Askia 
Mohamed; and, after this failed, a migration was embarked upon, led by
(1) Alfonso de Sandoval: Naturaleza ... de todos Etiopes (Seville, 1623) P*38.
(2) Damiao Peres (Ed.): Du as Descricoes Seiscentistas da Guine' de Francisco 
de Lemos Coelho (Lisboa 1953) P»19
(3) Alvares de Almada: "Bios de Guine", p.282 (Editor's note)
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Coli Tenguela. Though it can now be taken that both the Futa Djalon and 
the Futa Toro must have been lost to the emperor of ^ali before the end of 
the fifteenth century, (l) it is not possible to give a clear alternative 
explanation of the origins of the Fula invasions#
The knowledge of this subject rests on traditional histories, which 
have not been successfully unravelled. Andre Arcin felt certain that it is 
impossible for Coli Tenguela to have been the author of all the deeds that 
have been attributed to him, so that several different persons must have been 
presented as a single personality. (2) It has recently been discerned that 
the traditions refer not to an individual but to a dynasty. This dynasty, 
the Denianke, are considered as having originated in Massina, but the Coli 
Tenguela who led the armed intrusion of the Fulas into the Futa Djalon, 
according to two accounts, came from the Boundou (between the upper Gambia 
and the Faleme). From Boundou, Coli Tenguela proceeded to Timbo, Labe, 
Timbi, and finally to Gueme Sangsn, where he built a fort, the ruins of which 
are still to be seen. After Coli left for the north, he never returned. (3&s 
the result of the Fula arrival, there was some displacement of the Susus, 
Djalonkes, Bagas and probably Temnes; and there was also intermixture, as 
word 'Tenda' indicates. But the Fulas did not constitute a significant
(1) French scholars have re-examined the issue, and have acogpted the late
fifteenth century date. (See.D.Tamsir Niane: A propos de Koli Tenguela",
Recherches Africaines. No. 4> Oot-Dec, I960
la
(2) Andre Arcin: Histoire de/Guinee Francaise (Paris 1911) P*67 
(5) D. Tamsir Niane:"A propos de Koli Tenguela" (Op.cit.,Note l)
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proportion of the population of the region. Their military victory was 
accomplished by using the local tribes as their agents, especially the •Paleo- 
Negritics*. Some of the latter even claim descent from Coli Tenguela, thougl 
they were clearly there when he arrived; (l) and it is fairly certain that 
the 'Cocolis1, mentioned very often in sixteenth and seventeenth century 
European texts, were part of the Tyapi tribe which had served with Coli 
Tenguela (2)
Western Sudanese influences passed onto the Upper Guinea Coast not only 
from the Faleme, but also from the Niger itself, via tributaries like the 
Tinkisso. The arrival of peoples from this latter direction affected the 
most southerly and south-easterly sections of the Upper Guinea Coast. Three 
groups have to be considered: the Konos, Vais and Korankos. The first
two are closely r elated. They came from beyond the Upper Niger and settled 
between the Limbas and the Kissis (3) The tradition is that the Konoi'and 
the Vais were the same people when they arrived in what is now the nathem 
district of the south-eastern province of Sierra Leone. They were in search 
of salt which they had heard was plentiful along the coast, but when the Konos
(1) Claude Halle: "Notes sur Koly Nenguella, Olivier de Sanderval et les ruins 
de Gueme-Sangan", Recherches Africaines No. 1, January-March i960, pp.37-4
(2) A. Texeira da Mota: Guine Portuguesa. vol. 1, p. 152
(3) a) Yves Personne: "Les Kissi et leurs statuettes de pierre"
b) Ibid "Un Quete d'une Chronologie Ivoirienne", The Historian in Tronic 
Africa. (Ed* J. Vansina, R. Mauny and L.V. Thomas, London 1964)
p*328.
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saw that there was much game and good farming land on the savannahs, they
decided to stop, while the Vais went to the sea. tt) The Koranko migration 
was a more powerful affair. They too came from a north-eastly direction, 
driving a further wedge between the Limbas and the Kissis. (2)
Finally, of the Mande peoples on the Upper Guinea Coast, special 
consideration must be given to the Mandingas. If (as one would expect) in 
the process of population movement from the Sudan to the Upper Guinea Coast, 
there were periods of greater intensity, then the eleventh century would 
certainly have been such; bringing as it did the Almoravid invasion of the 
Saracole empire. When attempts at Islamisation were made, population 
dislocations resulted. The Mandingas would have been affected by this 
proselytisation, and prompted to move west, away from the centre of the 
Saracole power. On the other hand, when the Mandingas achieved ascendancy,
they continued to move westward, to establish empire. Sundiata, (1230-1255)
the first of the Mandinga emperors of ^ali, was very active in expanding 
towards the west, and his empire reached to the Tekrur and the Gambia; while 
it was under Mansa Mussa (1307-1332) that Mali reached its greatest extension 
westwards. (3)
The Mandingas were well established on the Upper Guinea Coast when the
(1) Robert T. Parsons: Religion in an African society (Leiden 1964) 
Introduction, p. xii.
(2) Y. Person: "Les Kissi et leurs statuettes de pierre" (Op.Cit) p.13
(3) D.T. Niane and J. Suret-Canale: Histoire de l'Afrique Occidentale. 
(Conakry-Paris, 1961) See maps on pp.39>42
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Portuguese arrived in the mid-fifteenth century. There has been a tendency 
to overlook this fact, and to date their arrival in the Gambia-Geba area as 
late as the eighteenth century (l) Yet Cadamosta's chronicle indicated that 
the Mandingas were already on the Atlantic at the Gambia estuary, (2 ) while at 
the beginning of the sixteenth century they were pointdd out on the middle 
and upper reaches of the Casamance, the Cacheu and the Geba. (3) Valentim 
Fernandes had no hesitation in asserting that the Mandingas were the greatest 
people speaking a single language in all Guinea, and he was referring not to 
the interior but to the coast. (4 )
It was only on the Gambia and about Cape Mount that the Mande were 
actually present on the sea-coast, by the middle of the sixteenth century, and 
it is significant that the contacts between the littoral peoples and the Mande 
were very often made on or about the limits of the tide on the rivers. As such,
L .
the latter were well away from the swampland as well as from the heaviest 
forests of the river basins: that is to say, they had avoided the least
hospitable of environments, which are to be regarded as the last refuge of the 
'semi-Bantu' speaking peoples who had been pushed ahead of migrations such as 
those of the Mandingas and. Susus.
(1) Yelez Caroco? Mqiuut» Q Gafru e a sua historia (Bissau 1948) p.104
(2) G.R. Crone (Ed.): The Voyages of Cadamosta, Hakluyt society, 2nd series,
No. LXXX, (London 1937)
(3) a) Pacheco Pereira: Esmeraldo de Situ Orbis pp.6 8,74
b) Valentim Fernandes: La Cote Occidentale d'Afrique. pp.3 6 ,58,68
(4 ) Ibid: p.44
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All the peoples so far enumerated, whether Mande or non-Mande, made 
their contribution to building up the population of the Upper Guinea Coast. 
The corollary to the numerical increase of the population is that the whole 
cultural pattern can only be understood in the light of the continuous drift 
of population from the Western Sudan.
It is usual to classify the peoples of the Upper Guinea Coast as the West 
Atlantic language group. But Baumann, who first employed the categorisation 
West Atlantic, did not intend that it should be viewed simply from a point 
of view of language, ^e accepted the linguistic classification "semi-Bantu1', 
while "West Atlantic" was a cultural definition, best brought out in contrast 
to the "Upper Niger Circle", where the Mande and Fulas had their homes. The 
most characteristic trait of the Upper Guinea Coast was "the initial absence 
of all state organisation and the superior civilisation which distinguished 
the Mande of the interior", (l)
On the coast, the society comprised basically the "Paleo-Negritics" and 
the other "semi-Bantu" newcomers (like the Bagas and the Temnes). Sudanese 
peoples arriving on the Upper Guinea Coast had indeed overlaid the West 
Atlantic culture with a lamina of Mande civilisation, but in the process they 
too had become part of the littoral society, swallowed up by the forest to 
which they had come seeking refuge from the states of the Western Sudan. 
Baumann explains as follows: "In giving this term (West Atlantic) an
(l) H. Baumann and D. Westermann: Les Peunles et les Civilisations de lfAfriq-u 
(Suivi de) Les Langues et 1*Education (Paris 1962) pp.367
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ethnographical connotation, it comprehends not only the Semi-Bantu tribes who 
are recognised as a linguistic entity, and who constitute the kernel of the 
West Atlantic circle, but also those Mandes known as M&nde-fou. These latter 
are a branch of the Mandinga people who dominate the Western Sudan? they have 
penetrated the forests in a southerly direction, and are mixed with the people 
of the West Atlantic type, giving birth to the type known as Mande-fou, but 
whose civilisation is essentially West Atlantic", (l)
The two features implicit in the development of the West A-fclantic 
civilisation are thus, firstly the evolution of a way of life to suit the 
given ecology, and secondly, the accretionary growth about a cultural nucleus, 
resulting from the arrival of newcomers.
By the time that the Europeans arrived on the Upper Guinea Coast, all 
the peoples had passed the stage where they led a semi-nomadic life as 
hunters and fishermen. Such were the circumstances of the earliest days of 
migration, as some traditions recall. Though group conflict was also 
recorded, the fundamental struggle must have been against an environment 
which was strange and hostile. The earliest European accounts indicate that 
the people of the Upper Guinea Coast had evolved a settled way of life in 
response to the land.
Modem investigators have found that there is a basic linguistic and 
cultural unity corresponding to the geographical unit of "the Rivers of the 
South". This unity hinges about the radical, bulom, which in various derived
(l) H. Baumann and D. Westermann: Les Peuples et les Civilisations de l'Afriqu 
(Suivi de) Les Langues et l1Education (Paris 1962 ) p.368.
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forms, appears among all the coastal populations to designate the low lands, 
the stagnant water that accumulates thereon, the processes associated with 
the extraction of salt, the agriculture conducted on swampy soil and the 
human settlements established there, (l) The most obvious example is the 
Bullom tribe in Sierra Leone. They took their name directly from the 
habitat with which they were so intimately associated, and which must always 
be borne in mind when one speaks of the littoral plains. (2) The Papel word 
blom means "low flooded land"? among the toponyms for rivers, estuaries and 
islands feature names such as Buam, Biblama and Bolong? the cultivation of 
inundated rice is carried on in bolanhas t and tradition has it that the 
original inhabitants of the ^ansoa region (between the Cacheu and the Geba) 
were a people called Olonu (3) Perhaps the most significant of the terms 
in this group is the word pulpm, which is applied to the silk-cotton tree. 
(Bombax ceiba) It is significant because these trees are held to be sacred, 
the residence of certain spiritual beings (often called Bloms) and the 
identification of a people with their environment is never close than when 
it is expressed in religious terms.
(1) Richard-Molard: Unpublished manuscript. Cited in A. Texeira da Mot a and 
M.G. Ventim Neves: A habitacao indigena na Guine Portuguesa (Bissau 1948) 
pp. 40,89.
(2) a) Manuel Alvares: "Ethiopia Menor" (Op.Cit).
b) John Barbot: A Description of the Coasts of North and South Guinea 
London 1746) p*97
(3) km Texeira da Mota: Guine Portuguese vol.l, p.330
l^o
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One common and basic reaction to the riverain nature of the Upper Guinea 
Coast was the utilisation of the water routes for transport and communications 
Life was characterised by frequent re-unions for social, religious and 
political purposes, and for these the canoe was the means of transport. The 
Jesuit missionary, Father Baltezar Barreira, was struck by the speed with 
which Sierra Leoneans assembled at any given spot by means of their canoes.(l) 
Moreover, they demonstrated a distinct preference for this form of travel, 
even if it meant porting their canoes overland to make the necessary 
connection b etween two rivers.
Canoes were carried overland across the neck of the Sierra Leone peninsula 
which meant in effect the linking of the water systems immediately north and 
south of the mountainous portion of Sierra Leone. (2) Further north, the 
tributaries of the Gambia, Casamance and Cacheu virtually reached out for 
each other, so that, by a combination of water routes and short land connec­
tions, the whole region became a unit. (3) Naturally the waterways were 
also used for non-pacific purposes* The Bijagos, strategically situated 
close to the Cacheu, Mansoa, Geba and Ria Grande de Buba, used their almadias
(1) Ferhao Guerreiroi Relacao annal das coisas que fizeram os Padres da 
Companhia de Jesus nas suas missoes Vol. 3» 1607-1609 (Ed. Artur Viegas, 
Lisboa, 1942) p.250
(2) Ibid: Vol. 1? 1600-1603 (Ed.Artur Viegas, Coimbra, 1930) p.408
(3) M. Bertrand-Bocande: "Notes sur la Guinea Portugaise ou Senegambie 
Meridionale", Bulletin de la Societe de Geograohie de Paris. 1849> Vol.11, 
pp.265, 350 and Vol. 12, pp.57-93
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or war canoes to terrorise the inhabitants of the region. Without a doubt, 
whether used for good or ill, the rivers were tte autobahnen of the Upper 
Guinea Coast.
The canoe could vary from the tiniest of vessels, barely able to hold 
one person, to relatively sophisticated craft, capable of holding upwards of 
sixty persons and of travelling on the open sea. The first extreme is 
provided by the small canoes used by the Djolas to traverse their flooded 
rice fields, and the second by the almadia or war canoe, which was most fully 
developed by the Bijagos. On his second voyage to Guinea, Hawkins found 
some fifty medium-sized canoes within the Sherbro estuary. Fashioned from 
a single trunk the final proportions were 24 x 3 feet, with a prow in the 
form of a beak, a proportionately raised stem, and an exterior artistically 
carved and painted blue. Each held about twenty to thirty men, but the 
active crew comprised a helmsman and four rowers, using very long oars with 
relatively small blades, (l)
The Bijago almadia was a much larger affair, hewn from the giant silk- 
cotton tree, and measuring about seventy feet in length. A number of boards, 
called falsas by the Portuguese, were added to the sides, and, thus modified, 
each almadia carried twenty-four men and their weapons, and had room for 
prisoners and cattle when returning from their expeditions on the mainland.
Yet its principal advantage was not its size but its seaworthiness. On the 
Senegal, the residents built vessels which allowed them to engage in deep-sea 
fishing, but south of the Gambia it was only the Bijago almadia that
(l) Hakluyt Society, Vol. LVIIj p.17
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traversed the open sea* Thus it was that the coastal peoples were incapable 
of retaliation against the Pijago attacks* One feature which won admiration 
was the way in which the trunk was scooped to leave a thin shell, which at 
tjie sides was only as thick as the thumb, (l) It was also propelled in a 
different manner from the canoes lower down the coast in Sierra Leone, 
according to a nineteenth century reference. All the individuals on board 
were rowers, who squatted at the bottom of the boat, and rose at the 
beginning of each stroke of their short oars, (it) These techniques were the 
Bijagos1 answer to their insular conditions#
At all times, the canoe held its place as an integral and distinctive 
part of the littoral culture. It was not just coincidence that the Bulloms 
were said to inhabit the country "as far inland as one can paddle a canoe" (3) 
Nor is it surprising that in 1620 Richard Jobson found on the Gambia that 
"the country people have no boates or canoos above the ebbing and flowing". (4 
A large canoe was a valuable piece of property, which was not as common as 
the thick forests might lead one tobelieve. ^ts construction was the work 
of specialists, sometimes brought in from outside the tribe, as in the case 
of the Djolas, who employ Mandinga boatbuilders • (5) The importance of such
(1) Manuel Alvares: "Ethiopia Menor"
(2) E. Stallibrass: "The Bijouga or Bissagos Islands", Proceedings of the Rova 
Geographical Society. 1889
(3) Valentim Fernandes: La Cote Occident ale d'Afrique. p.80
(4) Richard Jobson* The Golden Trade (London, 1626) p.20
(5) L.V. Thomas: Les Diola. Vol. 1, p.30
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a specialist is attested toby the proverb "the blood of kings and the tears 
of the canoe-maker are sacred things which mast not touch the ground", (l)
Just as the dependence on water transport was the outcome of the numerous 
rivers of the Upper Guinea Coast, so the manufacture of salt was the 
concomitant of the salinity of the water. Investigation has disclosed three 
methods of obtaining salt in northern Sierra Leone. Firstly, the collection 
of salt deposited on the leaves of the mangrove? secondly, the direct 
evaporation from sea-water? and, thirdly, the extraction from salt-impregnate 
soils.(2) To collect salt from the mangrove leaves must always have been the 
easiest operation, though it could hardly have yielded much. The Portuguese 
had noticed that the salt was prepared with the aid of fire, (3) which 
embraces both of the remaining two methods. The more popular was the
m
extraction from areas of salt marsh. owards the end of the eighteenth 
century, Lieutenant John Matthews, after visiting Sierra Leone, wrote that the 
sun-hardened silt was collected sometime after the biennial flooding of the
(1) A. Pereira Cardoso: "A influencia exercida nos povos da Guine* pelas 
principais culturas que, em epocas pre-historicas, penetraram no 
Continents Africano. "Boletim Geral das Colonias. 1929. No. 44. P.15
(2) R. Glanville: "Salt and the salt industry of the Northern Province" 
in Sierra Leone Studies. No. XVL
(3) (a) Femao Guerreiro: Relacao anual. Vol.2, 1604~1606 (Ed. Artur Viegas,
Coimbra 1931) p.200
(b) Alvares de Alsaida: "Rios de Guine" p.345
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plains at the vernal and autumnal equinoxes. The caked mud was then dissolved 
in water in large earthen pots, and boiled in shallow brass pans. The ihardenec 
silt could only be obtained during the dry season, but where the plains were 
extensive the collection was carried out during the dry season, and huts were 
built for a few old people to boil the salt during the rains, (l)
Matthews' description is incomplete, and gives a too casual picture of 
the. salt industry of the Upper Guinea Coast. Salt manufacture was not tied 
to the biennial flooding of the plains, but was linked to the daily tidal 
pattern. The water of the sea or a nearby river was received into large 
shallow ponds at high tide and permitted to evaporate. The saline crust 
which remained was scraped up with a portion of earth to a depth of a l/4 
inch, and dissolved in warm salt water to which a quantity of wood ash was 
added. The solution was poured into a conical strainer of palm leaves, at 
the apex of which s traw was placed to prevent the earthy matter from passing 
through. Thus, by percolation, the salt water and the soil were separated, 
and the salt finally evaporated to dryness in specially constructed clay 
ovens, covered with tin or iron basins. (2) The operation had very often 
to yield results before the rainy season started in June. This was partly 
because from May onwards the labour force was deployed in agricultural wcrk, 
and partly because the salt was sold during the dry season to obtain basic 
foodstuffs. Thus, in 1728, Senhora Maria, a leading Bullom lady, concentrated
(1) John Matthews: Voyage to the River Sierra Leone. (London 1788) p.37
(2) R.R. Glanville: "Salt and the salt industry of the Northern Province" 
in Sierra Leone Studies. No. XVI
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her attention until late May on the production of salt, canoe loads of which 
were immediately transported to the upper Port Loko Creek and exchanged for 
rice, (l) That it was still found necessary to use the labour of old people 
during the rains, shows that salt making was virtually an all the year round 
activity.
The final product of the evaporation process was of excellent quality, 
in spite of the incomplete separation of soil particles, and it was preferred 
to that procured by boiling the sea water. (2) As already indicated, the 
names of the process associated with the manufacture of salt often derived 
from that very expressive and central term Bulom. Salt manufacture on the
Upper Guinea Coast formed part of a basic geographical, economic and
cultural complex. De Almada had noticed the conjuncture of four factors - 
the limit of the tides on the river was the point where the mangrove ceased,
where canoes became rare, and where salt became really scarce. (3) This
scarcity bred trade.
The ability of salt to generate trade and to attract people over amazing 
distances is well known. The Senegal was involved in the great trade net 
of the Sudanic empires by virtue of the salt obtainable at Aulil, at the 
mouth of the Senegal river. (4) The same cannot be said for the Upper Guinea
(1) P.R.O.f T70/1465* Diary of chief factor, Walter Charles, Bence Island, 
Sierra Leone, 1728.
(2) John Matthews: Voyage to the river Sierra Leone, p.37
(3) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", pp.280
(4) E. Bovill* The Golden Trade of the Moors (London 1958) p.81.
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Coast, hut salt was nevertheless the most important item fostering contacts 
between the littoral and the hinterland.
The Bagas, on the swampy coast where the Pongo entered the sea, were 
particularly important ssLt-producers as far as exports were concerned. It 
was noted in the latter half of the seventeenth century, that, every year, 
three great caravans of Djalonkes (the inhabitants of the Futa Djalon) set out 
for the coast, principally in search of salt. One went north to the Senegal, 
one to the Gambia, and a third to the Pongo, where their preseno© was 
responsible for the existence of the largest market in the region, (l) The 
Susus also resorted in great numbers to the Pongo and the Nunez, and in the 
sixteenth century were acting as middlemen between the Fulas and the coastal 
people. (2) Salt generated similar activity on the Gambia. In the sixteenth 
century, the Gambia salt supplies were shipped upriver and deposited at Cassan, 
where crowds of Mandingas and Fulas were attracted. (3) Up to the late 
eighteenth century, this trade gave great power and authority to the Mandinga 
king of Barra at the Gambia estuary, since he had a fleet of canoes employed 
in ferrying salt upriver. (4)
(1) Lemos Coelho: Duas Descricoes Seiscentistas da Guine. pp.23,61
(The word Coelho used is "Jagancazes". This (along with "Jalungas" used 
Uy Valentim Fernandes) is to be identified with'the people of the Futa 
Djalon.)
(2) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine" p.347
(3) Ibid: p.347 (Be Almada also referred to the 'Putagjes1, who appear to have 
been a section of Susus.)
(4) Mungo Park: Travels p.4
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Of course, it was in the sphere of agricultural production that the 
littoral peoples faced their greatest challenges, having to wrestle, not only 
with the forests, but also with the more intractable swamps. The major 
problems involved in the agricultural utilisation of the swamps were drainage, 
desalination and the protection of the recaptured land from the sea and the 
tides. Even after this, the heavy rainfall and resultant flooding for many 
months of the year automatically eliminated certain crops from among those 
which might have been desired. Indeed, inundated rice was virtually the 
only possibility, and it was to this that the Africans turned to achieve 
agricultural mastery of the marshlands.
De Almada specified that on the Gambia the residents were growing their 
crops on the riverain deposits, and by a system of dikes had harnessed the 
tides to their own advantage, (l) The system of irrigated farming extended 
south of the river Cacheu - that is to say, throughout the territory inhabited 
by the Djolas. The name Baiotes given to a large section of the Djolas, 
means "men of the rice nursery" (the rice nursery being the distinguishing 
feature of swamp rice cultivation). (2) By the early seventeenth century, 
this creole designation was already current, attesting to the characteristic 
employment of a large number of Djolas (2) When an official of the French 
Company of the Senegal travelled through Djola territory in 1685 He remarked 
that there was no house which did not have a rice nursery nearby, while along
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine" p.285
(2) Antonio Carreira: 0 Bundamento dos Etnonimos na Guine Portuguese, p.6
(3) Alonso de =Sanderval: Natureleza de todos Etiopes. pp.6, 38
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the river hanks the landscape had been t ransformed into a pattern of causeways 
with rice plants appearing above the flooded fields* (l)
The Djolas were important vendors, who supplied rice to their African 
neighbours as well as to the Portuguese settlement of Cacheu? preserving 
their role as the main rice producers of the area well into the nineteenth 
century. (2) Their productivity must have been based not on any greater 
area of cultivation but on superior yields, and it is well known that 
quantitatively the yield of 'dry1 rice is far inferior to that of ’wet1 rice. 
This consideration inclines one to believe that there were two other localities 
where swamp rice was grown on an appreciable scale* The first is the Upper 
Port Loko Creek in Sierra Leone* Both the Bulloms of the coast and the 
English of Bence Island were dependent on the Port Loko area for supplementary 
supplies of rice obtained principally in exchange for salt prepared by the 
Bulloms. The fish caught by the Bulloms was also used to acquire rice from 
the Lokos (3) The second region is the estuary of the Nunez, which was 
one of the chief sources of rice for the Portuguese in the seventeenth 
century. The Portuguese (mainly Afro-Portuguese) carried on an extremely
(1) P. Cultru: Premier Voyage df Rieur de la Courhe fait a. 1» Cnate d'Afrique,
en 1685 (Paris 1913) p.209.
(2) M. Bertrand-Bocande: "Notes sur La Guinee Portugaise ou Senegambie 
Meridionelle" (Op* cit.)
(3) Manuel Alvares: "Ethiopia Menor"
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flourishing trade in local products such as rice, salt and kola, (l) The nagag 
and
Nalus were producing rice surpluses which the Portuguese were able to 
redistribute. The only time when dry rice was being prodund in similar 
quantities dated from the late eighteenth century, when the Susus were 
cultivating extensive areas with forced labour. (2)
The creole Portuguese vocabulary provides two words which distinguish 
the change wrought on the marshland by rice fanning. Before its utilisation
the swamp is called a lala: while, subsequently, it is known as a bolanha
Both words appear in the literature on the region since the sixteenth 
century. The transformation from lala to bolanha was a very laborious 
one, requiring, as the first essential, the building of large dams of earth 
and wood along the river banks* These vary in size according to the 
amplitude of the tides in the particular area* At various points, outlets, 
called bombas in the creole dialect and ehungat by the Djolas, were fitted 
into the dikes* To fashion a bomba, a section of the trunk of the cibe 
(Borassus Aethiopium) was selected, which narrowed into a cone at one end.
After being hollowed, the small end was covered with woven straw in such a
way that it acted as a valve opening only towards the exterior. Sometimes 
a small canoe was employed, with a board placed in position to act as a
(1) See below, Uh.Vill^
(2) Lord Stanley: "Narrative of W.C. Thompson’s Journey from Sierra Leone to 
Timbo, Capital of Futah J'allo in West Africa" in the Journal of the 
Royal Geographical Society, I846, p*106
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valve. In both cases, the valves function automatically, remaining closed 
against the pressure of sea-water on the outside, and draining the excess 
of rain-water within the bolanha when this water reached the height of the 
bombas.
The Bolanha was not normally used during the first two or three 
years. During this period, the rain water was allowed to accumulate and 
was di charged several times in the rainy season, thus reducing the salinity
of the soil. The mangrove which remained inside the reclaimed land died and
rotted, and was spread as fertiliser. Smaller interior dams were also 
constructed, dividing the bolanha into property lots. The whole operation 
was lengthy and strenuous. The main dike was sometimes several miles long, 
and in such cases, hundreds of people wereinvolved in its construction. 
Besides, the dikes subsequently required constant care against the crabs which 
bored holes from one side to the other, against the cracks which appeared when 
the mud dried, and above all against the powerful action of the tides, (l)
Although fwet* rice was important, the * dry* varieties were far more
prevalent, and the most widespread form of agriculture practised on the Upper 
Guinea Coast was the itinerant rotational one, which is still prevalent. 
Essentially, this consists in winning from the forest each successive year
(l) (a) A. Marques de Mano: "Visita a Guine", B.C.G.P., Vol.2, No. 6, 1947 
Bo]etim Cultural da Guine Portuguesa.
(b) A. Texeira da Mota: Guine Portuguesa. Vol.l, pp.292-294
(c) L.V. Thomas: Les Diola. pp#lll-ll6 (Description of the highly evolved 
Di#la techniques of rice farming)
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enough ground on which to sow the necessary crops. It was observed that
the Sierra Leoneans were able to distinguish the Pleiades (which the Bulloms
called a-warrang) and, by their position at sunset, could judge when it was
time to prepare the fields for sowing. (2) The period between March and June
was one of great activity, when, by collective effort, certain areas
selected by the tribal authorities were cleared of f orest byycutting and
burning. Naturally, this had to be effected before the rains came, usually
in June. A Jesuit report from Sierra Leone in 1616 recounted that in that
year the rains set in before the work of clearing the forest could begin.
This was attributed by the exponents of the tribal religion to the presence
of the Jesuits, but fortunately for the missionaries and the Christian
converts, the weather cleared up in May. (l)
The bulk of the heavy work of clearing the forest was undertaken by the
men. The smaller trees were cut level with the ground, while the larger
tree-stumps were left to be consumed by termites and fire. (2) The tall
elephant grass which grows in the near interior permitted the flames to
spread quickly. Travellers at that time of the year often commented on the
smoke rising from the forest (3). The groundthus prepared for cultivation 
m  A.T.T. Castorio das Jesuitas 304*56, No. 1, Journey of Francisco Pinto
Pereira to Salvador, Sierra Leone, April 1616
(2) Manuel Alvares* "Ethiopia Menor"
(3) The early Portuguese observers named one of the rivers leading into the 
Sherbro estuary as "the River of Smoke", conceivably because they saw the 
smoke rising from the rice farms, as Peter Kup suggests.
See History of Sierra Leone, p.8
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was referred to by the Portuguese as lugars. Since the term was adoptedby 
the English and the French (modified to lougan) T it is useful to retain it to 
describe this type of agriculture.
In July, when the first rains had already moistened the soil, the 
seeds were sown. It was simple hoe culture. Three types of hoe have been 
recognised in Sierra Leone: a straight-handled, narrow bladed hoej one formed
from an angled stick with a charred point, which was used for drilling; and a 
third broad-bladed hoe, employed for cleaning out weeds# and scraping the 
soil surface. (i) The demands made by this agriculture on the time and 
energies of the people of the Upper Guinea Coast have sometimes beai under­
estimated. Some reports would have it th >t, once sown, the grain was left to 
nature's mercies until the harvest. (2) Closer observation makes itclear 
that this was not the case. The inhabitants of Sierra Leone were absent from 
their homes for three-quarters of the year, during the time that thy had to 
clear the forests, hoe the ground, weed their fields and reap the crop. They 
never bothered to return to their homes during this period, but instead built 
themselves accommodation in huts called chicas. close alongside their 
riugars.(3) The ripening of the grain attracted large flocks of rice-birds
(1) G.C. Dunstan: The Agricultural and Forest Products of British West Africa 
(London 1911) P»17
(2) T. Winterbottom: An Account of the Native Africans of Sierra Leone.
(3) B.R.A.H., Papeles de Jesuitas, tomo 185, No.1343* "Relaqao da Costa 
da Guine", 1606 by Baltezar Barreira.
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and it was the job of the children and the old people to scare these off* 
Every year the whole process was repeated* It was usually some five to 
seven years before any given lugar was cultivated anew, the extensive forests 
offering an easy inducement to this long rotational cycle*
The lugar was the least desirable method of cultivation* It is wasteful 
of the forest species and encourages soil erosion. It is felt in some 
quarters that most of the interior plateaux was wooded, but was denuded over 
centuries by the "cut and burn" lugar methods, (l) But it is - almost certain 
that this system of f armingwas not the only one encountered on the non- 
swampy soils of the Upper Guinea Coast during the period under discussion. 
Modern studies among several tribes have indicated that they possess a 
highly evolved system of agriculture based on multiple crop rotation, and 
the intensive use of fertilisers* None of their processes owe anything to 
European influence, and they all sh<w signs of being the product of long 
evolution. (2)
A number of considerations suggest strongly that relatively sophisticated 
agricultural methods (apart from irrigated rice farming) already existed 
as early as the sixteenth century on the Upper Guinea Coast. To begin
(1) (a) A. Texeira da Mota: Guine Portuguesa. Vol.l, pp*47i48
(b) Th. Monod and H. Schnell: Melanges Botaniques (Dakar 1952) pp#53«54* 
(2 W .  Texeira da Mota: A Agricultura de Brames e Balantas Vista Atraves 
da Fotografia Aeraa (Biasau 1950) PP*135»142.
(b) Ibid: Notas Sobre o Povoamento e a Agricultura Indigena na Guine* 
Portuguesa (Bissau 1951)
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with, some tribes were buyers and others were sellers of the same crp,ps 
which they all produced. Though the amount of cultivable land may have 
varied from tribe to trib^^ the explanation seems to lie, not in the 
amount of land under cultivation, but in the yield, based on differing 
agricultural techniques. Thus, in the same way that the Djolas had large 
surpluses of rice to offer for sale; so the Balantas had quantities of 
prime yams, while the Banhuns produced enough millet to support themselves 
and the resident Portuguese, as well as to supply the slave ships, (l)
All the peoples who today demonstrate superiority in agriculture are 
also livestock breeders. This pattern has long been in existence. Cattle 
had and still have a high religious and social value, aSfi/S&at was not 
reared for everyday domestic consumption, jndt obviously, mixed farming 
made supplies of manure available. The best farmers of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centures - the Balantas, the Banhuns and the Djolas - all had 
cattle and goats, while the remaining peoples of the coast had little or 
no livestock (especially in Sierra Leone), they are never reported as 
having been accustomed to the use of fertilisers on any appreciable scale, 
and they had no great reputations as agriculturalists.
Another prominent feature of the advanced agricultural tribes of the 
Upper Guinea Coast today is that they have gone a long way towards 
transforming and controlling their natural forest environment. Just as 
the inhospitable mangrove lala gave way to the cultivated bolanha. so the
(l) Biblioteca de Ajuda (Ms.51-VIII-25: "Relacoes do Descobrimento da 
Costa da Guine". fl.87, Report on Cape Verde and Guine c.1606.
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thick forest has given way in places to open woodland, where certain species 
useful to man and domestic animals have been carefully preserved. Among 
those species retained are the Parkia biglobosa and the Faidherbia albida 
both important as cattle fodder. This ‘humanisation1 of the landscape is 
considered an unmistakeable gauge to agricultural development, (l) Since 
the beginning of the seventeenth century, Andre Domelas had pointed out that 
Balanta territory was free of heavy vegetation. (2) It was these very 
Balantas who reared the most livestock in the area, and it was they who 
provided supplies of foodstuffs for their neighbours. (5)
It is recognised that the 'Paleo-Negritic* Tendas are remarkable 
agriculturalists, (4) who make the surrounding Mandingas appear shoddy in 
comparison. Even the much-lauded Fula animal husbandry is far less 
scientific and effective than that of many of the littoral peoples.(5)
That peoples who weru far superior producers of food than the Mande and 
Fula are consistently dubbed ‘primitives* is due solely to the contention 
that they did not erect a superstructure of states.
(1) A. Texeira da Mota: Guine ^ortuguesa. Vol. 1, pp.394w303
(2) Andre Domelas: "Relacao sobre a Serra Leoa"
(3) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p*309
(4) (a) Baumann and Westermann: Les Peuples et les Civilisations de l‘Afrique,
P.378
(t) Richard-Molard: Afrique Occidentale Francaise, p.108
(5) A. Texeira da Mota: Guinex Portuguesa. Vol.l, p.275
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It is undeniable that the i-Viande peoples represented the most important 
state-building factor on the Upper Guinea Coast; and this holds good for
i'X
the ande as a whole, because, contrary to Baumann's contention, the Susus 
or Mande-fou were no less developed in their political structure than the 
Mandingas or Mande-tan. Even after the emperor of Mali lost the Futa 
Djalon to Coli Tenguela his authority was still maintained on the Upper 
Guinea Coast through the agency of the Mandingas and Susus.
The central organisational feature of Mande rule on the Upper Guinea 
Coast was the creation of provinces under the rule of a Farim or gaemor. 
(1) In the early sixteenth century, one of the governors was identified 
as Farinbraco. who was resident on the upper Cacheu.(2) At that time, the 
Mandingas called the Gambia region Guabuu (3) and from the accounts at the 
end of the sixteenth century, it turned out that between the Gambia and 
the Corubal there were two main provinces - Brayo and Cabo (or Gabu).
Even to-day the Mandingas retain the name Cabo for a large area stretching 
between the Gambia and the Corubal, while Bra^o is a smaller region to the 
east, between the Casamance and the Cacheu, (4) Farim Cabo ruled over the 
Mandingas who lived to the south of the Gambia, having his capital at 
Cahtor, the greatest trading city on the river. The Beafadas were also 
subjects of this Farim,while the peoples of the Casamance and the Cacheu
(1) This title in the forms far in. fari and far an was to be found all over 
the Western Sudan.
(2) Valentim Fernandes: La Cote Occidentale d 1 Afrique. p.68
(3) Pacheco Pereira: Esmeraldo de Situ Orbis. p.64
(4) Ibid: Editor's Note 121.
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were subjects of the Farim Braco. These two major provinces were themselves 
subdivided into smaller units with a lieutenant of the Farim to be found 
every sixty or seventy miles. Beneath them lay the petty chiefs, so that 
the structure of Mandinga rule on the Upper Guinea Coast was extremely 
hierarchical. Ultimately, all authority was owed to the emperor of Mali, 
though there were further intermediaries between the Farims of Cabo and Braco 
on the one hand and the Mandimansa or Emperor on the other, (l)
South of the Corubal, the Susus held sway. This region, the hinterland 
of Sierra Leone, also had its Farims owing ultimate allegiance to the 
Mandimansa. Farim Concho (or Farim Susu) and Farim Cocoli were the two 
principal governors, and th y were regarded in the same way as Farims Cabo 
and Braco to the North. Beneath them were lesser dignitaries like the king 
of the Bena Susus, who bordered on the Temnes, and the Farim Caput a who held 
authority in the hinterland of Baga country. (2)
Portuguese observers were impressed by the v/ay that the Emperor of Mali 
was revered on thfc^oast, recounting that those who were present when his 
name was called never failed to uncover their heads. (3) However, this was 
in most cases likely to have been the full extent of their homage to the 
ruler of Mali, given the system of delegated authority, which left most 
individuals on the coast virtually under the sole authority of their own 
chief. Yalentim Fernandes stated that the people of the Upper Guinea Coast
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", pp.271 >283*
(2) Andre Domelas: "Relacao sobre a Serra Leoa"
(3) Ibid
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obeyed the Mandimansa perfectly, (l) but this was certainly an overstatement 
which could scarcely have applied even at the height of Mandinga power, and 
would have been less true in the sixteenth century when that power was on 
the wane.
The most concrete aspect of Mande sovereignity was the tribute which 
they received from the subject peoples, but the further one went from actual 
Mandinga presence and power, the less likely it was that any obedience of 
tribute was paid to the Farim. (2) This was to be expected, and it must have 
been particularly true of those people who were away from actual physical 
contact with the Mand.in^aa on the middle reaches of the rivers. Even on 
the Gambia among the Mandingas there was no unity in the seventeenth century, 
and no vital political connection with the Sudan. The reverence which the 
peoples of the Upper Guinea Coast continued to give to the Mandimansa can 
only be taken as evidence of the fact that the past glory of the Mandinga 
emperors continued to live in their minds, and they considered themselves 
subjects of the Mandimansa even when there was no longer a Mandinga at the 
head of a Sudanese empire.
As opposed to the vast, if loosely bound, empires of the Mande, the 
village and the family were the meaningful categories, where the littoral 
peoples were concerned. On the Upper Guinea Coast, the population was 
generally distributed in small to medium-sized villages. Occasionally,
(1) Valentim Fernandes: La Cote Occidentale d 1 Afrique, p.74
(2) Andre Domelas: "Relacao sobre a Serra Leoa"
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there were references to towns with populations of several thousands, such 
as Quinamo, a Bullom or Krim village on the Bum, which was said to have a 
population of 5>000 to 6,000 (l) but the average tillage was not that 
populous. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the following were 
named as the main villages of Sierra Leone: Manguy, village of some
thousand inhabitants; Maguem, village of 300$ Pinto, village of 200; and 
Bop, village of 150. (2)
Village organisation displayed a marked familial tendency, as recent 
studies stress. Among the Mendes of Sierra Leone, the basic social unit 
is the Mawei or farming household, consisting of a man and his wives and 
children, and frequently also, blood and affinal relatives, such as junior 
broihers, unmarried sisters and dependents. Regulation of affairs within 
the Mawei is the responsibility of the Mawei-mui. who is in turn subject 
to the larger group of his kinsfolk of which the Mawei is a part. As a 
rule, this group occupies a number of adjacent Maweisia (pi)-in the form of 
a compound, which constitutes a section of a town or sometimes a whole 
village. The head of this compound or Kmloko is a semi-political figure, 
acting as a representative of the compound on the town council. (3)
Similarly, the Beafadas distinguish between the Unanga-corda who is
\
the head of a group of huts belonging to the same family and the Unahga-riaquaT
rf *
* . •, r
(1) Pacheco Pereira: Esmeraldo de Situ Orbis, p*96 -V1'
(2) Valentim Fernandes: La Cote Occidentale d fAfrique. p.80
(3) M. McCulloch:.Peonies of Sierra Leone (London 194&) PP*13»15
The Land and the People
who is the chief of the whole village, (l) The family thus retained its 
identity within the village and had its interests articulated within the 
village government.
In a Mende village, comprising one hundred persons, using as a point of 
reference one of the sons of the village headman, Little found thirty 
persons who were his paternal kin, taiwho were his maternal kin, and thirty- 
two who were connected with him through marriage* (2) This tight family 
organisation has always been known to be the case among several of the 
littoral peoples. The Balantas had a multiplicity of petty settlements 
consisting of family lineages; (3) while the Bijagos and Beafadas were 
similarly organised. Today, under Mandinga influence, the centralised 
village is usual among the Beafadas, but in the sixteenth century, the 
population was so dispersed that attention was drawn to the fact that the 
Beafadas were an exception to the normal Guinea pattern of the nuclear 
village. Instead, each noble would have his several wives in a number of 
houses grouped under his own protection, and at some distance from the 
nearest such settlement or Anolonia. An Anolonia could be quite large, 
since a wealthy noble could have numerous wives, and in practice it 
approximated to the village type of political organisation, the family head 
ruling with the advice of a council. (4)
(1) 0. Gomes Barbosa: "Breve Noticia dos Caracteres Etnicos dos Indigenas da 
Tribo Biafada", B.C.G.P., Vol.l, No. 2, April 1946
(2) M.McCulloch: Peonies of Sierra Leone, p.15
(3) Bib, de A.juda, Ms.51-Vm-25s "Relacoes do Descobrimento da Costa da 
Guine", fl.87, Report on Cape Verde and Guinea, 1606.
(4) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de $uine", p*352.
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In so far as the size of political organisation was concerned, it is 
obvious that one can maintain a distinction b etween tie littoral peoples, on 
the one hand, and the Mande and Fula^ on the other. But it is an entirely 
different matter to dismiss the one as 'primitive1 and commend the other as 
' superior*, as is the underlying assumption of the categorisations "West 
Atlantic" and "Upper Niger". In part, the dichotomy is based on ignorance, 
and in part on certain entirely unscientific assumptions. Machat, a most 
competent nineteenth century scholar, asserted that the 'primitives' on the 
littoral of the Upper Guinea Coast had no private or public law. (l) Such 
a "state of nature" might perhaps have some value as an abstraction of 
political philosophy, but it obviously exists in no part of the globe where 
human society has been cradled. Modem investigations show the Panels with 
a juridical system based on five categories of property; (2) reveal the 
complexities of Djola law; (3) accredit the secret societies of Sierra Leone 
as powerful law-making and law-enforcing institutions; (4) and are 
addressed to such questions as "Le Droit Prive Coniagui". (5) But the 
studies which reveal such features must be prompted by an awareness that 
such socieities provide a valid and valuable framework for human activities.
(1) J. Machat: Guinee Francaise, p.
(2) Antonio Carreira: Vida Social dos Man.iacos (Bissau 1947)
(3) L.V. Thomas: Les Diola.
(4) M. McCulloch: Peonies of Sierra Leone
(5) J.L. Clavier ?,Resume du droit prive Coniagui", Bulletin de tfX+F.A.N.. 
No. 14. Jan. 1952
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The contention that the "West Atlantic" society is characterised by the 
"initial absence of all superior organisation of states and of all the 
manifestations of a superior civilisation which distinguishes the Mande 
domain of the interior" is also extravagant, (l) It seems to be based 
largely on the contrast between the considerable territorial proportions of 
the Sudanese states as opposed to the smallness of the social units on the 
coast. Linked with this is the belief that the littoral peoples had no 
state superstructure, and thus lived in "societies without states".
As a working definition of a society with a political state, the 
following will suffice: "A state system may be defined as a political 
structure in which there is differentiated status between ruler and ruled*
It is founded not only on relations of kinship but also on a territorial 
basis. The most important index is the presence of political offices, 
i.e., of persons invested with roles which include secular authority over 
others in given territorial aggregations for which there are effective 
sanctions for disobedience. Such political offices must furthermore be 
co-ordinated hierarchically". (2) With respect to all of these criteria, the 
large majority of societies of the Upper Guinea Coast could scarcely be 
termed 'stateless1.
(1) Baumann and Westermann: Les Peuples et les Civilisations de 1' Afrique .p. 56
(2) Jan Vansina, Raymond Maunty and L.V. Thomas: The' Historian in Tropical
Africa (Studies presented and discussed at the Fourth Into mat ional
African Seminar at the University of Dakar, Senegal 1961) (London
1964) p.87
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It is only the Balantas who can he cited as lacking the institution of 
kingship. At any rate, there seemed to have beeh little or no differentiation 
within Balanta society on the basis of who held property, authority and 
coercive power. Some sources affirmed that the Balantas had no kings; (l) 
while an early sixteenth century statement that the Balanta 'kings' were no 
different from their subjects must be taken as referring simply to the heads 
of the village and family settlements. (2) It is possible to exclude the 
Djolas also from the ranks of those who had a political state. Not that the 
Dj^laslack a king, who was in fact a very powerful figure in the early 
sixteenth century, (3) but clear territorial boundaries of authority do not 
exist, and, as in the case of the Balantas, the family is the sole effective 
social and political unit. (4) But, the Balantas and Djolas apart, the 
peoples of the Upper Guinea Coast had erected institutions of kingship and 
chieftainship on the base of the village and the family.
Each locality had its chief, who paid allegiance to tbs king or one of 
the kings of the tribe. Each king controlled a specific area usually a town 
and its environs. In the remaining position of the kingdom, the chiefs 
wielded power over determinate areas. (5)
(1) Manuel Alvares: "Ethiopia Menor"
(2) Valentim Fernandes: La Cote Occidentale dfAfrique; p.60
(3) Ibid: p.62
(4) L.V. Thomas: Les Diola
(5) In this study, 'king* will always refer to a personage, who within the 
given tribe, has no superior; while the term 'chief* will refer to the 
holder of authority within a section of the tribe, but owing loyalty to 
the king.
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A few examples will illustrate the pattern, of organisation of the 
peoples of the area during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Centred 
on the large hay of the Ria Grande de Buba were three Beafada kingdoms of 
Biguba, Guinala and Bissege. The king of Biguba had four chiefs under him, 
the king of Guinala had seven, and the king of Bissege had five, (l) What 
this meant in practice was that the kings had absolute control over the 
towns of Biguba, Guinala and Bissege, respectively^and far lesser authority 
in the remaining areas of the kingdom, which were ruled by the chiefs. The 
Papels were similarly organised. The strongest personage in the wicinity 
of the Portuguese settlement ofCacheu was the king of Mata, with the chief 
of Mompata falling under his jurisdiction. (2) Apparently, the most pa/erful 
Papel leader was to be found at Bassarel in the vicinity of the river 
Calequisse, south of the Cacheu. At any rate, he is still known as the 
"chief of chiefs", being vested with the power to determine in part the 
filling of vacant chieftainships over a wide area. (3) The Sapes also 
followed the same pattern of political organisation. Each one of the 
villages had a chief, one of whom was recognised as the sovereign, called 
Obe Vrig by the Temne* at the beginning of the sixteenth century. (4)
(1) Andre Dornelas: "Relacao sobre a Serra Leoa"
(2) These were the two rulers to whom the Portuguese had to pay rent for 
their occupation of Cahheu. Cf. Documentacao Ultramarina Portuguesa.
Vol. II, "Relacao para el Rey, nos so Senhor do Bispo de Malacd', 1635
(3) J.E. dos Reis: "Manjacos de Calequisse", Inquerito Etnografico, p.149
(4) V'alentimSBernandes: La Cote Occidentale d*Afrique, pp.80,82
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In many respects, the king or chief had no greater power than the 
nobles. Valentim Fernandes emphasised that the Bullom and Temne overlords 
of the early sixteenth century had only nominal authority, but were no 
different from the other chiefs where power was concerned, (l) Be Almada 
reversed the comparison by saying that each Beafada chief was king in his 
own district. (2Nevertheless, kingship had developed its own rich symbolish.
There were a number of items with which th king was presented at his 
coronation without which he could not call himself king. These insignia 
comprised mainly arms and clothes, generally intended as symbols to maintain 
tradition and continuity. Thus, in the island of Bissau, the king's spear 
was like a badge of office, handed down through generations. (3) Other Papel 
kings had bows which served the same function, while the sceptre of the
Sape kings was a sword known as a queto. (4)
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the coronation ceremony of the 
Upper Guinea Coast was the practice of binding and beating the prospective 
king before he was anointed. This practice was found among the Papels, the 
Beafadas and the Sapes, and was always given the same justification; namely, 
that the king had to learn what punishment was like before he could 
administer justice to others in strict fairness to all. (5) This highlighted
(1) Valentim Fernandes: La Cote Occidentale d fAfrique, p.82
(2 ) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.322
(3) Manuel Alvares: "Ethiopia Menor"
(4) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.350
(5) Ibid: p.350.
Antonio Dias (Ed.) "Cren^as e Costumes dos Ingigenas da Ilha de Bissau 
no Seculo XVIII", Portugal em Africa, Vol.II, No.9, pp.150-165 (based on 
missionary reports
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the importance of the judicial functions of the king.
The intimate link between the king and the concept of law is demonstrated 
by the fact that tbs absence of a king, as in the interval between the death 
of one king and the crowning of the next, usually meant disorder and 
lawlessness. When there was civil strife over the succession, an interim 
of disorder for as much as two years could ensue, (l) but, even when the 
succession was not disputed, the Papels, for example, utilised the hiatus 
to commit acts of robbery. (2)
In September 1757 > the resident slave dealer, Nicholas Owen, reported 
that they had had the secret news that the king of Sherbro was dead, "but it 
is not yet spred abroad, according to thier usual custum of keeping their 
disseased kings a good while hid, in order to make a new one before any 
trouble ensues". (3) Whether this was consciously held to be so or not, in 
effect this meant that law existed only through the person of the king, and 
that if the king was dead everything was permitted. According ^o recent 
investigations, there are among the Mendes a large category of crimes against 
public order, which are classified as crimes against the king's dignity, (4)
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.334*
(2) Antonio Dias "Cren^as e Costumes dos In^igenas da Ilha de Bissau, no 
Seculo XVTII" (The Papels indulged in three days of looting and rioting)
(3) Nicholas Owen: Journal of a Slave Dealer (Ed. E. Martin, London 1930)
p. 106
(4) M. McCulloch: Peoples of Sierra Leone, p.24
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in much the same way as the English law contains the concept of the king's 
peace.
^he kings had their courts and their entourages, comprising officials 
whom European observers variously designated as alcaldes, governors, 
ambassadors and generals; and there is one reference to the President of 
the Privy Council of Guinala, (l) and another to the Prime Minister of a 
Sierra Leone kingdom. (2) However inappropriate such European terms were in 
the African content, they undoubtedly point to the existence of the 
political offices which have been consids?ed as the most important index of 
political states.
The fragmentation of the littoral peoples has also been greatly over­
stressed. It should not be overlooked that in some tribes, unity existed 
at a religious level, as in the case of the Djolas, all of whom ultimately 
recognise the authority of a king-priest. (3) But in any event, the coastal 
peoples were perfectly capable of entering into viable relations with their 
neighbours within and without the tribe. The distribution of goods, to take 
a very important facet of social activity, was extremely well organised on 
an inter-tribal basis in the Geba-Casamance area, and one of the groups 
primarily concerned in this were the Balantas, who are often cited as the 
most typical example of the inhibited 'Primitives'.
(1) John Ogilby: Africa, p.336
(2) S.M. Solberry: Fragmens d'un Voyage en Afriqug (Paris 1802)
Vol. 2, p.266
(3) L.V. Thomas: Lqs Diola^ pp.201-204
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In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Portuguese realised 
that the Balantas were the chief agriculturalists and the suppliers of food 
to the neighbouring peoples. The Beafadas and Papels were heavily 
dependent on Balanta produce, and in return, owing to the Balanta refusal 
to trade with the Europeans, goods of European origin reached them via the 
Beafadas and the Papels. The Balantas did now allow foreigners in their 
midst, but they were always present in the numerous markets held in the 
territory of their neighbours, (l)
Markets or fairs were held in the domains of the Cassangas, Banhuns, 
Papels and Beafadas. A market in any given locality was open to the public 
either on a given day per week or once eve:ty eight days, and the system 
was organised to permit a large amount of reciprocal attendance. (2) The 
most important centres attracted a conglomeration of several thousands of 
buyers and sellers from distances up to sixty miles. At the end of the 
sixteenth century, the largest was at Bijorei, in Beafada territory, which 
was said to have been attended by 12,000 people.
At the beginning of the sixteenth century, a typical market in Banhun 
country was described in some detail. Each type of merchandise was 
reserved to a particular section with the exception of wines made from the
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine" p.309
(2) Valentim Fernandes: La Cote Occidentale dfAfrique. p*74
(5) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.290,311
(3) Ibid: p.328
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fruit of the momnataz and from honey, both of which could be sold in any 
part of the marketplace. This concession to the wine-vendors was no doubt 
based on the fact that the market was not solely an economic institution, 
but was also a social Tenue of great popularity, where the local fermented 
drinks were in great demand. The nobles, in particular, being in a 
position to afford it, used the market as a recreational and social centre. 
The vendors took up their places early on the morning of market-day; at 
10.00 A.M. the stalls were opened; and by evening the activities were 
terminated until the following week. Two officials of the king had 
charge of the market. To begin with, they saw to the carrying out of 
the king's prohibition against the presence of weapons in the market-place, 
and they also saw to it that justice was done, especially to foreigners 
in their midst, (l)
A unity of a different sort was found among the peoples south of the 
Corubal. ^n the region of Ria Tombali, the Beafadas gave way to the Nalus, 
and from this point southwards the differences between various groups of 
people were so small, and their affinities w#re so great, as to make them 
into a virtually homogenous society, which went under the generic name of 
'Sapes'. The two principal members were the Bulloms and the Temnes, 
while the Limbas were also an integral element, suggesting that the 'Pre- 
Mandingas* had merged with the earlier Bullom, and Limba stock. The 
Cocolis or Landumas, the Nalus and the Bagas were not always called 'Sapes* 
by European observers, but there is little doubt that substantially they
(l) Valentim Fernandes: La C6te Occidentale d 1 Afrique pp.68,70
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were members of the same group. Here the evidence of de Almada is revealing 
Firstly, he made it clear that the Bagas, Cocolis and Nalus themselves formec 
a group, and secondly, he affirmed that the relationship between them and the 
Sapes was comparable to the relationship between the Spanish and the 
Portuguese. They all dressed alike, had the same system of justice, and 
"Understood each other" - a phrase with more than just linguistic 
significance. De Almada went on to include the Bagas and the Cocolis in 
the Sape community excepting anly the Nalus, because at that time they were 
very much less domesticated, (l) Although today the Cocolis or Landumas are 
separated from the mass of Sapes by the Susus and Fulas, they consider them­
selves related to the Temne. (2) Indeed, the very small tribe of Tyapis, or 
Sapes who are closely related to the Cocolis, may well have been the ones 
who gave their names to the Sape grouping. (3)
Andre Dornelas had this to say about the peoples of Sierra Leone "All 
these nations are Celled in general 'Sapes1, in the same way that in Spain 
several, nations are called 'Spaniards'". However, unlike sixteenth 
century Spain, Sierra Leone lacked the elements of a unitary state. In a 
recent history of Sierra Leone, Peter Kup draws a useful parallel by
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine" pp.341,344>353
(2) Baumann and Westermann: Les Peunles et les Civilisations de 1'Afrique.p.3
(3) This seems to be borne out by a reference to "the Sapes Bagas, Sapes 
Bulloms and Sapes Sapes" in Mateo de Anguiano: Mi si ones Caouchinas en
Africa (Ed. Buenaventura de Carrocera, Madrid 1950) Vol. 2, p.131
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pointing out that while the Sape alliance exercised some kind of loose-knit 
suzerainty, it was in no way comparable to the well disciplined empires of 
the Western Sudan at the same date, (l) It was not political centralisation 
but social homogeneity which caused all observers to identify the Sapes as a 
single family of tribes. In 1507 > when Valentim Fernandes wrote, the 
inhabitants of Sierra Leone were speaking either Temne or Bullom, and, from 
all accounts, no Sape had any difficulty in communicating with any other 
Sape. Another common feature of Sierra Leone society was the presence of 
powerful secret societies, one of which - the Simo - was found among the 
Bagas, Nalus, Cocolis and Temnes. (2)
What prevailed on the Upper Guinea Coast, and was to prove more 
significant than the tribal divisions was the class differentiation, based 
on the distinction between those who had power and authority within the 
state and those who did not. Most of the Europeans on the Upper Guinea 
Coast used the Portuguese term 'fidalgo', when speaking of a noble of the 
region, and they were all careful to distinguish between the king and his 
fidalgos, on the one hand, and the mass of the population, on the other.
The latter were referred to as the olebeus (plebeians), gente comum (common 
people), or words to this effect. (3) Manuel Alvares spoke of the special 
situation created when a fnoblewomanf married a 'peasant1, among the Banhuns;
(4) while an eighteenth century missionary report maintained that in Bissau 
the sons of the kings were fidalgos. but the grandchildren (in a
(1) Peter Kup: A History of Sierra Leone, p.123
(2) See below, Ch.2, p. IZS
(3) Alvares de Almada:"Rios de Guine", pp.323 >324>333 and Valentim Fernandes: 
La Cote Occidentale d'Afrique, p.88
(4) Manuel Alvares: "Ethiopia Menor"
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matrilineal system) were "common mechanics", (l)
It was reported that the Banhun nobility had titles equivalent to 'Dukes* 
and 'Lords1, and each travelled with his train of dependents and hangers-on, 
who went before him, heralding his arrival. (2) These European distinctions 
w0re well grounded in reality, and, judging from both historical evidence and 
modern field studies, they were the type of distinction that the people of 
the Upper Guinea Coast themselves drew. The Papels of the district of Prabis 
divide themselves into seven large classes, the most important of which is 
that of the Jagras or nobles, from among whom the king's and chiefs are 
recruited. (3) The Beafadas and Bijagos also use this term, (4) and though 
it must obviously have passed from tribe to tribe, the borrowing is of no 
recent date. In the sixteenth century, among the Beafadas of Biguba, only 
the Jagras could succeed to the throne; (5) and the title J agar a. applied to 
a Banhun king at the beginning of that century, clearly derived from Jagra.
(6) The same applies to the Jagarefe. who was the most important dignity 
apart from the king, among the Papels. (7) The Banhuns, Papels, Beafadas and
(1) Antonio Dias: "Crenpas e Costumes dos Indigenas de Ilha de Bissau" (Op.cit
(2) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", pp.304>305
(3) Antonio Carreira: Vida Social dos Maniacos. p.104 (He calls them Babucim)
(4 ) Valentim Fernandes: La Cote Occidentale d'Afrique. (See Editors'note 128)
(5) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guin6", p.334
(6) Valentim Fernandes: La Cote Occidentale d'Afrique. p.70
(7) Manuel Alvares: "Ethiopia Menor"
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Bijagos have thus long recognised a class of nobles who transcended tribal 
boundaries. Among the Sapes, the situation was even more straightforward. 
The Sape noble was called a Solategi, and it was a status recognised
throughout all the tribes of the Sape confederation. It was said of the
Solategi in the latter sixteenth century: "And finding himself in any other 
kingdom whatsoever, even though it was not his , he continued to use and 
enjoy his privileges and liberties, as if he were in his own land".(l)
It is striking that the Papel Jagras or nobles are the owners of the 
land, and that everywhere else on the Upper Guinea Coast ethnographic 
studies point to the fact that the political rulers are the heads of the 
land-owning families, whose claims derive from descent from those who first 
settled the locality* The ownership of the land by the kings and nobles 
is limited in the vital respect that they cannot dispose of the land to 
anyone outside the tribe, but they have its usufruct, and rights over its
disposition within the tribe. (2) Among all these people, the regime of
privatd property is firmly established. Only trees growing wild are 
regarded as common property, (3) and here one is reminded of Hawkins1 
observation when he visited Sierra Leone and spoke with the Lane ados, (the 
resident Portuguese traders). "Nothing is common", he said, "save that 
which is unset by man's hands". Indeed, even the common products of the
bush could only be gathered when the nobles gave their approval. (4)
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guinl", p. 351
(2) M. McCulloch: Peoples of Sierra Leone, pp.15,16,25,26,67
(3) Ibid: pp.26,67
(4) Hakluyt Society, No. LVII, The Hawkins Voyages, p.20
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North of the Sapes, the position was the same. Of the Beafadas, it 
was said at the end of the sixteenth century that "the lands belong to the 
fidalgos. to whom other individuals pay rent in the products that they have, 
as among us tithe; but as far as the common people are concerned, they have 
no lands and inherit nothing". When the time came for gathering the fruits 
of the trees that were common to all, they did so at the direction of the 
lord of the land. Any unauthorised picking of fruits met with severe 
penalties; and, of course, it was the nobles and the kings who dispensed 
justice. (2)
Among- the Balantas, who are to be classed as a "stateless society", 
the system of land tenure is different. The Balantas are all small land­
owners, working their lands on the principle of voluntary reciprocal labour. 
Thus, when the Balantas clear new areas of swamp for rice cultivation, each 
one of the working force benefits by receiving a portion of the land 
reclaimed. Not so with the Papels, however, for they have a well-developed 
hiearchy of nobles, chiefs and kings who own the land. In .their case, land 
development can only be achieved through the initiative of a rich 
individual, who can hire the necessary labour; and, since the workers have 
no stake in the final product, it is not surprising that they have no 
incentive to undertake the strenuous and demanding job of clearing the 
swamps. (3) These two contrasting examples indicate that the existence
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", pp.332,338
(2) Ibid: 324,333,548
(3) A. Texeira da Motas Guine Portuguesa. Vol.l, p.312
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of a super-structure of states was associated with the presence of a land­
owning nobility.
As with the ownership of the land, so with the distribution of the 
products - there was a manifest inequality among the vast majority of the 
peoples of the Upper Guinea Coast. At the end of the eighteenth century, 
Winterbottom wrote of Sierra Leone that ”the plantation is cultivated by all 
the inhabitants of the village in common, and the produce is divided to 
every family in proportion to its numbers”. (i) His contemporary, Golberry, 
held that this was true of many parts of Africa but not of Sierra Leone.
”In this country,” he said, ”where teriitorial possessions are known, where 
individuals own lands, the negroes are rich.” (2) Certainly, the principle 
of ”to each according to his need” did not operate anywhere on the Upper 
Guinea coast, where the state structure embodied a class of privileged 
rulers. ”He is the greatest among them who can afford to eat rice all the
year round”, wrote John Atkins, (5) and the botanist Azfelius, who made a
careful survey of Sierra Leone, in connection with the project for the 
colonisation of that area, attests that the "Lower class” (sic) subsisted 
frequently for days together on boiled rice alone, seasoned with some kind 
of pepper. (4) Further north, Mungo Park also found that ”the common class
(1) T. ¥interbottom: An Account of the Native Africans of Sierra Leone, p.52.
(2) S.M. Golberryj Fragmens dfun Voyage en Afrique. p.|4:4
(5) John Atkins 1 A Voyage to Guinea (London 1737) p.49
(4) JB±M* Add. Ms. 12151 (Papers relating to Sierra Leone 1792-96.
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of people is hut sparing supplied with animal food”, (l) Even the limited 
diet of the poor was exhausted in between harvests, and they had to seek out
the tarrafe. growing alongside the river banks. (2)
The difference between the nobles and the plebians was most obvious where 
their dress was concerned* In the sixteenth century, some of the poorest 
members of the society still wore grass skirts, but the majority wore a
small covering of the skin of some animal, usually goatskin. (3) Over this,
the kings and nobles wore ample shirts and trousers of cotton* (4) Their 
ornaments and accoutrements equally reflected the difference in status* For 
instance it was customary for the fidalgo to wear an iron ring on his thumb 
and a jingle in his palm, knocking the two together to give certain commands.
(5) Another possession of the nobles was the Bombalon or telegraph drum.
This is a unique instrument, consisting of a length of tree trunk of 
considerable girth, which is hollowed out through a narrow slit in one side. 
Beaten with wooden sticks, the bombalon can clearly be heard up to a 
distance of nearly ten miles in the silence of the night. (6) The messages
(1) Mungo Parks Travels in the Interior Districts of Africa, p.11
(2) Manuel Alvaress “Ethiopia Menor”
(3) Ibid
Valentim Fernandes: La Cote Occidentals dtAfrique* pp*76,94 (See 
Editors1 note 152)
(4) Ibid: p.94
Alvares de Almada: MRios de Guine”, pp.302,325*347>289
(5) Ibid: p.327
(6) I am grateful to Senhor Antonio Carreira, who showed me various exemplars 
of this instrument, which were being collected for the Museum of Ethno­
graphy in Lisbon. Re also fully explained the function of the bombalon.
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were sent by specially trained players of the bombalon and these had to be 
paid. The time and labour involved in its construction, and hence, presumably 
its high cost, along with the need to pay the players, would have tended to 
concentrate the possession of the bombalons in the hands of the rich, even 
if there was no specific ruling which debarred other members of the society 
from its ownership. In any event, it was recorded that this key technique 
of communications was monopolised by the ruling class, (l)
In their dwellings, as in their dress, one finds the same differentiation 
between noble and plebian. At the beginning of the sixteenth century the 
houses of the poor in Sierra Leone were made of stakes driven into the ground 
and covered with thatch. Those of the rich were made of brick and adobe. 
These latter were beautifully whitewashed with chalk or white clay, while 
the interior was tastefully decorated with fine quality mats and pelts.
Among the furnishing^featured well-made three-legged stools covered with 
ox-hide. (2) The houses had special porches for leisure and relaxation. (3) 
Another illustration of the same nature is the fact that the few horses 
that were to be found north of the Geba were owned by kings, chiefs or noblesj 
while the other alternative animal transport - the castrated ox with its 
pierced nose - was also in the hands of the nobles. (4)
It would be very surprising indeed if these numerous indications of a
(1) Uvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.326
(2) Valentim Fernandes: La Cote Occidentale dtAfrique. PP.92,94
(3) Manuel Alvares: “Ethiopia Menor”
(4) Alvares de Almada: “Rios de Guine », pp.296,327
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well-defined cleavage in the society of the Upper Guinea Coast were not 
reflected in th conduct of moble towards non-noble in many other spheres 
which generally escaped comment by Europeans. On one occasion, the king of 
Bissau wrote the king of Portugal demanding the recall of a Portuguese 
captain-major who had treated one of the Bissau fidalgos with grave dis­
respect. Had any ordinary member of the island society dared to have 
acted towards the fidalgo in that manner, it would have cost that citizen 
his life, averred the king of Bissau, (l) This is a very pertinent insight 
into the way the society emphasised a certain pattern of conduct between 
privileged and non-privileged.
The prevalent communal image of African society may serve to obscure 
the decisive differences between the masses and the nobility. It is true 
that a village chief might be related to most of the residents of the village 
but even though, for certain purposes, he acted as family head, there rests 
little doubt that his level of existence was markedly superior to his poorer 
relations. The noble was a social being apart from the masses of the people 
and a recognition of this fact is basic for an understanding of much that 
occurred on the Upper Guinea Coast between 1545 and 1800. In terms of the 
ancient influences from the interior, new intrusions usually meant change at 
the level of leadership - that is to say, the Mande and FulaSwere partially 
to replace the old ruling class of the littoral. But, even more important, 
in its contacts with the Europeans, the African society of the Upper Guinea 
Coast did not present itself as an undifferentiated entity. The pattens of 
trade often transcended tribal divisions, but never the distinction between 
fidalgo and plebeian.
(l) A.H.U., Maco V, Guine - Anhanheta Co to the king of Portugal^ 
13 April 1753
A HISTORY OF THE UPPER GUINEA COAST. 1545-1800
CHAPTER TWO
THE ERA OF THE MAKE INVASIONS 
1545-1800
Ho description of Sierra Leone in the late sixteenth century and 
during most of the seventeenth century fails to make mention of invading 
peoples, generally called 'Hanes'. There is little agreement either on 
their origins or on the date of their arrival in Sierra Leone, in spite of 
a lengthy historiography. In 1884, the botanist Conde de Picalho, in the 
context of the spread of food crops, considered it possible that there may 
have been a region of instability north of the Congo, from which peoples 
dispersed in various directions, the Hanes being one of these. (i) Some 
years later, Captain Avelot, in a discussion concerned primarily with the 
Jagas of Angola, equated the Hanes with the Temnes, and suggested that the 
invaders must have arrived in Sierra Leone around 1550. (2) In 1919, the 
anthropologist Northcote Thomas, addressing himself specifically to the 
question "Who were the Manes?", dismissed the identification of Hanes with 
Temnes, and also advanced that the Mane migration took place at the 
beginning of the sixteenth century, at the very latest. (5) Since then, 
there have been several other contributions, such as that of a Nigerian 
origin (4) and the view that the Manes of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries are the Mani tribe of today, who live on the Lower Searcies.(5)
(1) Conde de Picalho: Plantas Uteis de Africa Portuguesa (Lisboa, I884)
(2) R. Avelot: "Les Grandes Mouvements de Peuples en Afrique: Jaga et ZimbaS, 
Bulletin de Geographie Historique et Descriptive, Ho.27, 1912, pp.75-191*
(5) N.W. Thomas: "Who were the Manes?" , Journal of the African Society« Vol.
xix, pp.176-168; voi.xx, pp.53-42 (1919,1920)
(4) Peter Kup: A History of Sierra Leone, pp.128, 129
(5) Marcel Moity: "Notes sur les Nani (Guinfce Francaise)", Bulletin de
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This diversity of views is largely a reflection of the ignorance 
and uncertainty of individuals who were the closest contemporaries of the 
Mane invasions* But, the hesitancy and errors of modern scholarship on 
the subject are also products of the failure to utilise the extant 
documentation with due care* (l) By remedying this, and with the help of 
material which has recently become available, it is possible to reconstruct 
an important facet of the history of the Upper Guinea Coast*
The earliest contemporary European observer of tie Mane invasions, 
who has gone on record, was John Hawkins. The people whom he called the 
"Sumboses” had arrived on the river Sherbro in 1561 according to Hawkins, 
but he did not throw any light on the problem of their origins. (2)
The next source which c an be consulted is the work of Alvares de 
Almada. Christopher Fyfe, in a short contribution to the discussion of 
this issue, wrote that ,fAlvares d1 Almada1 s book was published in 1594 > thirty 
years after the events took place. His account is confusing and full of 
inconsistencies: some passages it is hard to make sense of". (5) While it
is true that his book was published in 1594» it is more apposite to point 
out that De Almada, a Cape Yerde mulatto, had been an eye-witness to events 
on the Upper Guinea Coast since the 1560* s, and in I58O he was sent to
(1) Yves Person found it necessary to comment to this effect. See "Les 
Kissi et leur statuettes de pierreH, Bulletin de lfI.F.A*N., Tome XXIII, 
Ser. B, No. 1, 1961, p.20
(2 ) Hakluyt Society, No. LVII, The Hawkins Voyages, pp. 17-21
(3) Christopher I'yfe: Sierra Leone Inheritance (London, 1964), p»43
<3 2.
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Lisbon to advise the Portuguese crown on the colonisation of Sierra Leone, (l) 
Apparently, he had begun the systematic collection of information about the 
"Rivers of Guinea" to aid in the mission. In the prologue of his book, De 
Almada expressed himself as follows: "I wish to write something about the
Rivers of Guinea and Cape Verde because I have seen the greater part of
it, and traded on many rivers, proceeding many leagues inland, and above all 
I have taken great pains to resolve doubtful issues, by consulting both our 
men (the local Portuguese) and the Negroes themselves." (2) Neither this 
statement nor De Almada* s undeniable accuracy in other contexts absolves his 
pronouncements on the Manes from critical assessment, but his awareness of 
the need to clear up dubious points and his striving for accuracy are 
nowhere better seen than in his discussion of the Manes.
De Almada gathered from the old Sapes that the Manes had been coming 
for hundreds of years to make war. This statement probably reflects the 
fact that Sierra Leone had received attacks and migratory currents from that 
direction for a very long time, although the specific wave of invasion which 
brought the Manes was dated about ths middle of the sixteenth century.
De Almada advanced his own conjecture that the Manes were a Mande people, 
giving detailed reasons for his opinion. Drawing upon his knowledge of the 
Mandingas and the Mande empire, which, he affirmed, lay in a vast belt above
(1) (a) Sena Barcelost Subsidios nara a Historia de Cabo Verde e Guine
(Lisboa, 1899) > Part 1, Ch. V.
(b) Alvares De Almada: "Rios de Guine", p. 37?.
(2) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.231
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all the coastal peoples, he noted that the Manes spoke the same or nearly the 
same language as the Mande he had encountered trading on the Upper Gambia, 
and they had exactly the same arms and clothing. The Manes carried small 
bows and arrows, which they claimed were useless to their enemies, while the 
small Mane bow could discharge the large arrows of their opponents. The 
rest of their arms consisted of large shields made of reeds, large enough to 
give complete cover to the user, two knives, one of which was tied to the 
left arm, and two quivers for their arrows. Their clothes consisted of loose 
cotton shirts with wide necks and ample sleeves reaching d own to the knees 
to become tights. One striking feature about their appearance was the 
abundance of feathers stuck in their shirts and their red caps, (l) The 
full significance of this description can be gained by comparing it with 
an earlier description given by De Almada, when he was dealing with the Mande 
trading caravans which arrived on the Gambia. All the members of the trading 
party spoke the Mande language, and the majority were dressed exactly like 
the Mandingas, in short breeches which did not reach their knees; but the 
guards on the caravan, which sometimes numbered 1,000 and more, were dressed 
rather differently. They wore the same type of trousers as the Manes; they 
carried the same weapons, giving the same explanation about the efficiency 
of their enemies' arrows on their bows and vice versa; and they had the 
same profusion of feathers about their person. (2) It is clearly these 
people with whom De Almada equated the Manes.
(1) Alvares de Almada: ‘'Rios de GuineM,pp.360, 361
(2) Ibid., p.279
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The caravans arriving at the Gambia were supposed to have made 
their way along a highway which passed above the nations of Guinea.
De Almada elicited from the traders that the copper which they purchased 
would be sold to non-Islamfcised peoples (cafres), and although it is perhaps 
a coincidence that he added at this point that the emperor of Mandimancau 
under whose orders the caravans travelled, was known as the Great Elephant 
by the Africans near Mina, it is feasible that the six-month journey of 
these Mande traders originated in the hinterland of the Gold Coast* At the 
beginning of the sixteenth centuryj Pacheco Pereira had described the Mande 
trade on the Upper Gambia, stating that the gold which they brought came 
from a country called ^oom1, which was some two hundred leagues away from 
the Mandinga kingdom, (l) Delafosse identified ‘Toom* with Ashanti, which 
the Mandingas call 'Ton1, and this agrees roughly with Pacheco Pereira1s 
estimated distance. (2)
Assuming that the caravan guards were the same people as the Manes, 
then this provides the first slim clue that the Manes were a southern Mande 
people who may have lived in the hinterland of the Ivory or Gold Coasts.
Christopher Fyfe cited as an example of De Almada1 s confusion and 
inconsistency the fact that "he conjectured that the invaders came from an 
inland realm, Mandimansa - but also suggested elsewhere that they came from 
further down the Coast". Since the Mande world stretched across parts of the 
modem Ivory Coast and Ghana, there is no reason why De Almada1 s statement
(1) Pacheco Pereira: Esmeraldo de Situ Orbis. p.64
(2) Ibid.. Editor1s note 130
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that the Manes came from Mande country and that they reached Sierra Leone via
the Malaguetta Coast should he regarded as inconsistent, (l)
De Almada for once seems to have relinquished his judiciousness 
when he asserted that the Manes reached Sierra Leone after passing across the 
Congo. This idea enjoyed great currency in Sierra Leone, nor did it deter 
the counter assertion that the Jagas of Angola came from Sierra Leone. Even 
those who are familiar with the great Bantu travels would marvel at the fact 
that the Bagas of the Pongo were supposed to have dispatched a regiment to 
Benguela in Angola. (2) But not only the sources are to he hlamed. Peter 
Kup cited Barreira: "These people are called Jacas in the Congo, in Angola
Grindas• •. • and here they called them Cumhas, a nick-name for Manes." Taking 
this statement literally, he went on to date the arrival of the Manes in 
Sierra Leone hy events in the Congo. (3) If he had taken due note of the 
passage which reads: "These people are called in the Congo Jacas, in Angola
Gindas, in India Zimhas, and in the Ethiopia of Prester John Galas” (4)* he 
would at least have harboured some slight douht of the physical possibility
of one and the same people appearing simultaneously in such widely dispersed
parts of the Continent as Ethiopia, Angola, Sierra Leone and Mozambique.
The apparent link with these diverse regions seems to lie not so
(1) Christopher Fyfe: Sierra Leone Inheritance, p.43
(2) F.W. Butt-Thompson: Sierra Leone in History and Tradition (London,
1926).
(3) Peter Kup: A History of Sierra Leone. 1400-1787, PpJ29> 130*
(4) Femao Guerreiro: Relacao Anual. Vol. 3> P*255
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much in the Manes themselves but in their cohorts, the Sumbas♦ Most of the 
early writers on the subject distinguished between tbs Manes proper and the 
forces which they drafted into their army on their way to Sierra Leone.
Those forces were said to be cannibals, the word ,Sumbal meaning precisely 
"an eater of human flesh", and it was applied firstly to the anthropophagi 
and more generally to ths whole attacking force, (l) Sincethe Jagas of 
Angola and the Zimbas of Mozambique were both said to be anthropophagi, it 
must be the simultaneous appearance of ths same phenomenon which led 
Portuguese observers to make the identification. It is noteworthy, far 
example, that Barreira, who was the chief exponent of this view, was 
himself in the Congo for a period of fourteen years before he started his 
missionary activity in Sierra Leone. (2), and he would have been very 
familiar with the Jagas, who were at one time employed by the Portuguese as 
auxiliaries.
A far more coherent account than Barreira* s was that of Andre/ 
Dornelas, whose work has recently been re-discovered. Like Be Almada, 
Bomelas wrote his account of Guinea some time after he had witnessed the 
events there. It was only in 1625» after he had retired to Santiago, that 
Bornelas decided to record his fifty years of experience on the Upper Guinea 
Coast. His father, also a Cgpe Verde trader, purchased three Manes in 
Sierra Leone in 1560, naming them Belchlor, Baltezar and Gaspar; and from 
these Andre Dornelas had obtained information even before he first visited
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Ries de Guine", p.565
(2) Feraao Guerreiro: Relacao Anual, Vol. 1, p.539
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Sierra Leone in 1574* Dornelas was an eye-witness not so much to the 
struggles between the Sapes and the Manes as to the internecine fighting 
between the Manes themselves, since by the time of his arrival the conquest 
of the Sapes had been effected and the early history of the Manes was 
receding into the background, guarded only by a few elders*
"The origin of the Manes is reported by their elders as tradition 
handed down from their grandparents, and what they say is that . ..** Such is 
the auspicious beginning of Dornelas* account of the origins of the Manes.
In essentials, the tradition stated that the original chief of the Manes was 
a leading lady in Mandimansa. Ma^arico by name, who offended the emperor and 
had to leave the city. She took withher large numbers of Jfriends, relatives 
and dependants, who were transformed into a conquering army* This army 
overran vast territories and many nations, and. its ranks were swelled with 
recruits to such an extent that for sustenance it was necessary to eat some 
of the defeated peoples. When she reached the Atlantic, Macarico divided
the army into two parts: one of these marched along the sea coast, a second
proceeded parallel to the first, some forty-five miles away, while the third 
was equidistant on the right flank. Each section comprised a vanguard, a 
rearguard, and the main force in the middle, and in this order they marched 
slowly until they reached the Portuguese fortress of Mina. The Manes 
engaged in a few skirmishes with the Portuguese at the fortress, but they 
were discouraged by the artillery and thought better of tarrying there. 
Instead, they regrouped, creating a fourth army and sending it eastwards 
while the bulk of the forces continued westwards along the Malaguetta Coast.
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In the vicinity of Cape Mount they had a serious battle against the Bulloms, 
in which Macarico*s son was killed, and she herself died shortly afterwards 
from grief and old age. The date was then 1545 > and. it was forty years 
since Macarico had set out from Mali. It took another fifteen years before 
the conquest of the Sapes was effected.
The tradition, as recorded by Dornelas, finds support on several 
details. Both De Almada and Manuel Alvares were informed that the original 
leader of the Mane forces was a woman, whom Alvares referred to as fMabete*
1Queen of Guinea*• Their reports also ggree that Macarico died just before 
reaching Sierra Leone, (l) With regard to the identification of the 
Portuguese fort at Mina, Barreira claimed to have been told by Tora, a Mane 
king alive in 1606, that the invading forces had come into contact with the 
Portuguese at Mina. (2 ) But, the only serious confirmation of the invaders* 
route is confined to the Malaguetta Coast, which was generally considered as 
extending from Cape Mount to Cape Ealmas and which, therefore, leaves one 
some distance from the Portuguese at Mine.
Two members of the crew of a Portuguese ship, which was wrecked off 
the Malaguetta Coast, confirmed the direction of the invasion. One of these 
seamen, Paulo Palha, was black, while the other, Francisco Yaz of the
(1)Alvares de Almada: HRios de Guine", pp.561,566. (He had heard that
the original leader was a woman, but his account is that the general of 
the army was called Maparico and it was his sister who was grief-stricken 
at his death.) Also Manuel Alvares: "Ethiopia Menor".
(2 ) Fernao Guerreiro: Relacao Anual, Yol. 5* P»255
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Portuguese province of the Alentejo, was white. These two served the Manes
in the capacity of soldiers until they reached Sierra Leone, (l) While there
is no indication as to exactly where the shipwrecked sail&rs joined the
Manes, one gathers from the activities of Hawkins that the Manes were at 
east
least as far sfinrtebc along the coast as the river Uess, since a Mane king, 
fighting in Sierra Leone, was able to promise Hawkins that if he sailed down 
the coast to the river Cess he would be provided with slaves. (2)
As the traditional account, drawn up by Dornelas and supplemented 
by the writings of other Portuguese contemporaries, moves into Sierra Leone 
itself, it becomes clearer and more precise. The Manes advanced slowly 
northwards, across the Sherbro, Rokelle, Port Loko and Searcies, casting 
their dominion over most of the Sapes. When the Manes appeared before a 
given village, they would send an embassy bearing cloth and arms. To 
accept was to recognise Mane suzerainty; to reject was not only to risk 
defeat in battle but there was the further threat that failure to submit 
would mean for the recalcitrants that their final resting place would be the 
stomachs of the Sumbas. (3) As it was, the reputation of the Sumbas, 
enhanced by rumour, was enough to spread terror and a disinclination to 
resist. It was in this context that the political weakness of the Sape 
confederacy was most obvious. Before a disciplined military f orce, the 
Sapes could only present a spectacle of political disunity and indecision.
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.361
(2) Cited in Peter Kup: A History of Sierra Leone, p.129
(3) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guin^", p.362.
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The principle of action seemed to be that one should fight only when it was 
absolutely necessary; namely, when one’s turn came, and the Manes were 
exactly on the doorstep. So each tribf* each village, submitted or fought 
its own battle, as it thought fit. (l)
In the purely military sphere, the Manes suffered reverses in two 
ways. Firstly, they had little success against the Limbas and Djalonkes, who 
adopted the policy of burning their own homes and retiring to underground 
caves. From these they sallied forth to conduct a species of deadly guerrilla 
warfare. (2) Secondly, the attempt to subjugate the Susus backfired. When 
the usual Mane arms were sent to the Susus, the latter returned them saying 
that those arms were no different from theirs. The Susus expressed a 
willingness to establish peaceful relations with the Manes, on the terms of 
equity and mutual benefit which they had previously maintained with the 
Sapes, but the Manes would not be dissuaded from the attempted conquest.
The decisive encounter between the Manes and the Susus was long 
after spoken of with awe by the people of Sierra Leone. The Mane Army was 
the largest ever assembled in those parts, comprising mainly Bulloms and 
Temnes in the service of their new masters. The Susus, too, boasted large 
numbers, their ranks being buttressed by Fula allies who contributed seven 
horses, a novelty in Sierra Leone. The story &oes -that the Susus prepared 
large supplies of poisoned food and fell back in apparent disorder. The ruse 
worked because the Manes partook of thsL food with resultant mortality. At
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p. 362
(2) Ibid., p.563
<?/
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this juncture, the Manes, contrary to their usual practice, decided to go on 
the defensive, and entrenched themselves. The Susus took the initiative, 
and, led by the Fula horsemen, they stormed the Mane position so furiously 
and gained entrance so quickly that Salvador da Costa, a Portuguese who had 
been enlisted by the Manes because of his skill as a musketeer, was unable 
to reload after firing his first round. The Mane forces fled in disorder, 
but the Susus were familiar with the terrain because of their earlier inter­
course with the Sapes, so they pursued the fleeing Mane forces and decimated 
large numbers, (l)
The dating of the military conquest can be ascertained with 
exactitude, Banreira, writing in 1607> said that the Manes had arrived about 
sixty yeans previously (2), and De Almada says that the invasion began around 
1550* (3) On the latter*s evidence, Person was able to date the arrival of
the Manes between 1540 and 1530. (4) This is confirmed by Dornelas, who
}
stated categorically that the subjugation of the Sapes was effected in the 
fifteen years between 1545 and I56O. Quite unintentionally, Dornelas 
substantiated his claim that the Mane conquest was over by 1560, by pointing 
out that the original Sape kings hadbome the title *Beca*. Two of the *. 
Sape kings, who had escaped on Portuguese ships to Cape Verde and later 
Cacheu, were known as Beca Caja and Beca Boure. But this title had 
completely disappeared in Sierra Leone during the 1560*s and 1570’s, and,
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", pp#369“373«
(2) Ferriao Guerreiro: Relacao Anual. Vol. 3> P* 255
(3) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p. 359
(4) Yves Person: "Les Kissi et leurs statuettes de Pierre", p.21.
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instead, the participants in various struggles bore titles such as 'Farma* 
and fSherer. fFanaaf was obviously a Mande word, having much the same 
meaning as !Farimf (l), while ,Shere* (or ,Serel) is an alterative for 
,Kamara', traditionally the earliest Mande clan in the Western Sudan. (2)
Thus, Avelot!s view that 1550 was the date of the Mane invasion 
is much closer to the truth than that of Horthcote Thomas, who had 
established his chronology by accrediting the evidence of Valentim Fernandes 
(1506) to Pedro da Sintra (1462).
Peter Kup fixed the beginning of the Mane invasion in the early 
1560fs, at a time when the conquest of the Sapes was already over. He cited
the battle in 15&7 between the Mane chief, Sasena, andShere, the king of
Sierra Leone, as an episode at the onset of the Mane invasion. (5) But 
Shere himself was a Mane, the first Mane ruler of the kingdom of Boure.
Where Kup is right is in pointing out that new forces were advancing from the 
Malaguetta Coast. De Almada stated that when one set of Manerrulers of Sierra 
Leone forgot their obligations to pay tribute to the kings and captains who 
remained behind, a new invasion was launched against the defectors. (4)
The Mane generals and captains, on the basis of a clan system, had 
apportioned Sierra Leone among themselves, and proclaimed themselves 'kings'.(5)
(1) See above, Chapter l^p.56
(2) M. McCulloch: Peonies of Sierra Leone, p.56
(5) Peter Kup: A History of Sierra Leone, p.129
(4) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine'1, p.360
(5) Ibid., p.574* Manuel Alvares: "Ethiopia Menor"
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There were four principal kingdoms: firstly, the kingdom of the Bulloms,
which extended from Tagrin Point northwards, and included the Idolos islands; 
secondly, the kingdom of Logos or Mitombo, centred about Port Loko; thirdly, 
the kingdom of Sierra Leone or Boure, which stretched south from the Sierra 
Leone channel until it came up against the fourth kingdom, that of Sherbro. (l) 
Within each of these kingdoms, there were subdivisions, whose rulers sometimes 
wielded great power, as in the case of Tora, who commanded only the islands 
of the Sierra Leone channel but who, by 1605, was the eldest survivor of the 
Manes, anl this gave him the status and authority of a king. (2) though he was 
subject to Fatima, the king of the northern Bulloms. (3)
Strictly speaking, a number of the petty rulers called 'kings* by 
the Europeans should really be regarded as 'chiefs'. It was a pyramidical 
structure of government, very similar to the Mandinga and Susu hegemony further 
north. The chiefs owed allegiance to the local kings, who themselves 
supposedly paid deference to the kings of the 'metropolis' at Cape Mount (4)» 
who in turn paid tribute to an overlord who remained behind.
(1) B.R.A.H.. Papeles de Jesuitas, Tomo 185, No* 1343» "Relacao da Costa da Guire
by Baltezar Barreira, 1606. (He excludes Sherbro from Sierra Leone proper, 
and thus has three kingdoms, plus a forth mentioned in the following note.)
(2) Fernao Guerreiro: Relacao Anual. Vol. 3> P»250 (Tora's was regarded as a
kingdom in its own right).
(3) E.R. Taylor (Ed.): The Troublesome Voyage of Captain Edward FPnton.
Hakluyt Society, 2nd ser., No. CXIII.
(4) Manuel Alvares: "Ethiopia Menor". (The word 'metropolis' is his.)
°lf
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What is needed to clarify the issue is information as to what 
transpired in the adjacent region that is now Liberia. No fir&t-hand 
sixteenth century accounts seem to be available for the Malaguetta Coast, 
but information has survived in late seventeenth century descriptions by 
Barbot, Dapper and Ogilby. (l) Their work was mainly based on the 
observations of Dutch traders resident at Cgpe Mount at the beginning of the 
seventeenth century, and, indeed, these "traders, like Dornelas, must have 
recorded the local traditions of much earlier events. They threw 
considerable light on the question of the Mane invasion, and place beyond 
doubt the fact that events in Sierra Leone were part of a chain of 
circumstances affecting the area as far south as the river Cess.
Barbot repeated old lore, which seems questionable, along with new 
information, which appears to be highly credible. Of the Manes, he wrotes 
"The Portuguese at Congo and Angola reckon these to be of the same race as 
the barbarous Jagos and Galas...and all of them generally supposed to proceed 
from the nations of the Galas Manou, living far up the inland of the river 
Sestro.” The Monou or Manoe were responsible for the conquest of the 
Malaguetta Coast, and all authority was held by the emperor of Monou, to 
whom tribute had to be paid. (2)
The Monou, though a small group, succeeded in imposing their will 
on far more numerous tribes, by using different ethnic groups at different
(1) Ogilby*s work is virtually a translation of Dapper1s. Barbot and 
Ogilby are the two sources which will be utilised here. ,
(2) Barbots Description of the Coasts of North and South Guinea, p.96
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times as their agents • The three groups mentioned in the seventeenth century
sources are the Quojas, the Karos (Krus) and the Folgias. The Folgias, 
apparently a Mande people, attacked the Krus, who lived in the hinterland of 
the river Junk* Flansire, the king of the Eolgias, desired reconciliation 
after defeating the Krus, so he married the s ister of. Flonikerri, king of the
Krus, and appointed Flonikerri as his general in a battle against the king
of the river Cess* Flonikerri distinguished himself in this and other battles 
and, as a reward, he was allowed to attempt the conquest of Cape Mount. The 
Cape Mount region was at that time inhabited by the Vais and the Quojas.
They, in particular, fought bitterly against the Kru armies, which 
represented the interests of the Folgias and the Monou, but, after a series 
of struggles, the conquest was carried to completion by Zyllymanque, the 
brother of Flonikerri.
After the kingdom of Cape Mount had been won, the conquest of 
Sierra Leone was said to have been undertaken by "the young monarch 
Flansire11, possibly not the original Flansire of the Folgias, but a 
successor. The country was divided up among his generals. The area around 
the Sierra Leone channel went to Kandaqualle, the Sherbro was granted to 
Selboele, while the Gallinas (Moa) was ruled by Sytrej all viceroys of the 
Monou. But this arrangement was challenged by one Falma, who expelled 
Kandaqualle from his government. Flansire proceeded down the Moa and up 
along the coast, crossing to the Bananas to take under his protection those 
of his subjects who had fled there from F&lma. With the aid of some
Europeans, Flansire besieged Falma in a village to which hehad retired,
u
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(cutting through the palisades and the double row of trees which surrounded
:it, and setting the place afire. Falma escaped with great difficulty, and
Kandaqualle was re-established. In the meanwhile, the viceroys of Sherbro
and Gallinas had conspired with Gammina, Flansire^ brother, to usurp the
kingdom of Cape Mount. Hastening to return south, Flansire fought and
(defeated his brother at the river Moa. (l)
It is obviously necessary that the account of the events viewed
by
from the Malaguetta Coast should be complemented/and correlated with the 
account of events viewed from Sierra Leone. In the first place, it is to be 
observed that the identification of the Manes with the Monou in no way 
contradicts the substance of earlier Portuguese assertions. Indeed, it 
accords well with the Portuguese claims that only the vanguard of the 
attacking forces had reached Sierra Leone, and that tribute was owing to an 
overlord who remained behind. The name Manow still exists as that of a 
small iviande group in the hinterland of Liberia. On the other hand, there is 
again a definite gap between the river bess and the f ortress of Mina, so that 
that aspect of the Portuguese reports remains unconfirmed.
The second major issue relates to those peoples who had a great 
part to play as agents of the Manes in the conquest of Sierra Leone. It has 
been suggested that the cohorts of the Manes were drawn from around Zaria 
and other parts of the Western Sudan, from cannibal tribes known to the 
Arabs as "Dem Dem". (2) However, if the Manes are to be identified with
(1) John Ogilby: Africa (London, I670), pp.407-412.
(2) Peter Kup: A History of Sierra Leone, p.139
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Monou of Liberia, in the first instance, then one must seek the Sumbas 
along the Malaguetta Coast, en route to Sierra Leone, concentrating in 
particular on the Quojas and the Krus.
When the Krus appear in the literature of Sierra Leone, it was 
because of their skill as sailors, which earned them f requent mention in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Ho wiiter on Sierra Leone or the 
Malaguetta Coast in the sixteenth or early seventeenth centuries appears to 
have heard of the tribe under that name. But, even today, the Krus are 
considered as a heterogeneous group comprising, among others, the Quojas and 
the Queas. (l) The latter also played a prominent role in the Mane conquest 
of Sierra Leone, assuming leadership in the kingdom of Boure, according to 
Manuel Alvares. The ,Queisl, as he calls them, were closely associated with 
the Cubales. This latter name seems to have disappeared, but in the early 
sixteenth century it was given to the inhabitants of the area on the coast 
between the Gallinas and Cape Mount. (2), so that this again emphasises that 
the Mane forces contained a high percentageof peoples drawn from immediately 
to the south and west of the Sherbro.
Not all of the ethnic groups between the Cess and the Sherbro were
taken up as allies of the Manes. The Vais , for example, were said to have
put up a stubborn resistance until they were almost decimated. ($) Then, 
the Galas, who were apparently in the hinterland north-west of Monou in the
(1) Peter Kup: A History of Sierra ^eone. p.145
(2) Pacheco Pereira: Esmeraldo de Situ Orbis. Map facing p.46
(3) John Barbot: Description of the Coarts of North and South Guinea, p.Ill
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middle of the sixteenth century, descended to the coast, playing an 
equivocal role in the struggles of the Krus and the Quo j as. When, for 
instance, Flonkerri, the Kru King, was subduing the Quojas, he had to 
contend with the hostility of the Galas, led by the son of Manimassa, the 
emperor of Monou* (l) From their location, the Galas were likely to have 
been a group of Kpelles or Tomas.
To this already lengthy list of ethnonyms must be added the name 
^ende1, before the picture can be completed* The Mendes are the only tribe 
who presently inhabit Sierra Leone (and Liberia) but .who were given no 
mention whatever in the sixteenth century, implying arrival after that date* 
It is unlikely to be simple coincidence that the subjects of the Monnu 
called themselves *Mendef. (2) On linguistic grounds, Northcote Thomas 
linked the Mendes with the Gbandes and Tomas; and he suggested that 11 in the 
Mende we have the portion of the Manes who drove out the aborigines or 
completely dominated them; in the Loko, a tribe originally of the aboriginal 
stock but brought so completely under Manes influence as to adopt their 
language instead of their own; and that the Temnes are also aborigines who 
were forced to take alien chiefs, but maintained in large measure their own 
culture, and in places won back from the invaders a portion of the territory 
the latter had subjugated”• (3)
(1) John Ogilby: Africa* p.410
(2) John Barbot: Description of the Coats of North and South Guinea* p. 123
(3) Northcote Thomas: ”Who were the Manes?”, J*A*S, t No. XIX, XX.
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Apart from inaccurately ascribing these events to the late 
fifteenth or early sixteenth century, Thomas made a convincing assessment of 
the Manes, which is largely corroborated by the recent researches of Yves 
Person* The latter, however, went much further afield in attempting to trace 
the origins of the Manes, and reconstructed their travels from the oral 
traditions of the Kamara or Dyomande. The Kamara had begun their descent 
from the Niger to the sea in the hinterland of Sierra Leone, making their 
first halt at Kourousa. From there, they moved south-east into the Konian, 
and then down to the Liberian coast* The expansion from the Konian (the 
region around Beyla) involved an attack on Sierra Leone in the middle of the 
sixteenth century, with the Kamara aristocracy leading Mande-fou elements, 
such as the Gbandes and Tomas, in a westerly direction* (l) The prevalence 
among the Mane ruling class of the name ’Shere1 or ’Sere’ which, as mentioned 
before, is an alternative to ’Kamara1, leaves little doubt that this 
identification is correct.
Serious doubt attaches to Person’s conclusions, however, on the 
issue of the ”Kru-Quoja invasion”, which he separates from the earlier Mane 
or Sumba invasion, and places in the third decade of the seventeenth century. 
This date is established from the fact that the Kamara traditions speak of a 
second invasion two or three generations after the first, as well as from the
(l) Yves Person: ”Les Kissi et leurs statuettes de pierre”. Also. "En
Quete d’une Chronologie Ivoirienne”, in The Historian in Tropical Africa,
p.32 6
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late seventeenth century contribution by Dapper* (l) Peter Kup also 
inclines to the view of seventeenth century invasions on the basis of the 
same written evidence* (2) Once more, the utilisation of the sources is 
unsatisfactory.
Person partially established the date of his second Mane invasion 
by calculations which assumed that certainkey personalities were alive when 
Dapper was writing in the late l660’s; and Kup very clearly arrived at his 
chronology by dating certain events from 1670, whan Ogilby put his 
compilation together. Thus, Kup says of Flamburre: "By I67O, christened
Philip by the Portuguese missionaries, he had settled his four brothers as 
rulers along the river Sierra Leone*" (3) In reality, Ogilby (and 
Dapper, whom Ogilby translates) is at this point relying on the reports of 
the Jesuit, Father Baltezar Barreira, as collected by Fernao G-uerreiro and 
translated into French by Jarric. The Flamboere of Jarric and Ogilby, who 
was Flansire’s eldest son, and who was christened Philip by the Portuguese 
missionaries was Fattema or Farma Boure, who was baptised D. Filipe by 
Barreira in 1607. (4) Ogilby is quite explicit on this point. He mentions
(1) The second article cited above slightly modifies the first, one particular 
being’ that the date of the second invasion is shifted from I6OO-I6IO to 
1620- 1630.
(2) Peter Kup: A History of Sierra Leone* pp. 144-148.
(3) Ibid., p.147
(4) Femao Guerreiro: Relacao Anual, Vol. 2, p.204. (Andre Arcin read Dapper’s
*ork to this effect: "Dapper tells us that Sierra i^one in 1607 was
commanded by the chief Fatima". See Histoire de la Guinee Francaise,
p.133.
THE ERA OF THE MANE INVASIONS: 154 5 -1606
that the supreme king of Sierra Leone was a Quoia, who had "left his old 
title Flamboere* and from the Portugals, by whom converted to Christianity,
received the name of Don Philip The people, before the coming of the
Jesuit Barreira, lay wholly drencht in idolatry, but he converted many to the 
Christian faith; and in the year sixteen hundred and seven baptized the 
king, his children, and many others, giving to the king at his baptism the 
name of Philip, as we said before, to which the Portugals flatteringly 
added Don, and because he was king of Serre Lions, called him Don Philip the 
Lyon'1* (l)
Such an understanding of Ogilby leaves unaltered the 16th century 
chronology, which can be built up from Portuguese sources* Ogilby does 
indeed mention a number of Mane kings, who were alive in 1670, but they were 
all born in Sierra Leone* No further invasions had occurred since Domelas 
wrote - to the best knowledge of later 17th century writers* The years 
1620**30 in the history of Sierra Leone are by no means well documented (2) 
but there were Capuchin missionaries in Sierra Leone about the middle of the 
century, who never hinted at an invasion only twenty years earlier, while the 
Jesuits hadbeen informed of the first Mane arrivals fifty to sixty years 
previously* Besides, there is one detailed monograph on Sierra Leone,
(1) John Ogilby: Africa* p*575
(2) In this period, there were English and Dutch traders on the rivers 
leading into the Sierra Leone and Sherbro estuaries, but the English 
provided no references to local events, while the Dutch sources are not 
yet fully explored#
10 2,
THE ERA OF THE MANE INVASIONS: 1545Q1606
written in l669> which lends no support to a later ,fKru-Quoja,f invasion*
This was a description of the Upper Guinea Coast by Lemos Coelho, a Guinea- 
horn trader who hah visited Sierra Leone regularly between 1646 and I658.
He, too, referred to the Mane invasions as something long past - r*ninety 
years ago1' was his estimate* Coelho was very unlikely to have overlooked new 
developments of magnitude in the decade I62O-I65O. Not only did he gather 
information from Afro-Portuguese traders who were b o m  in Sierra Leone, but 
he was personally acquainted with a Mane ruler named Sherabola, who resided 
on Sherbro Island* Coelho knew him as a very old man, reputedly more than 
one hundred years old, and understandably,so, because Captain Fenton had met 
him fighting there in 1584• (l) li is almost certain that Sherabola is the 
same ’Selboele* of Barbot and Ogilby, who was said to have given his name to 
the Sherbro, because the same claim is advanced for Sherabola* (2)
A further enquiry into the way that certain source materials were 
generated, though seemingly pedantic, is essential to establish clearly that 
the Mane or Sumba or •Kru-Quoja* invasions all occurred in one spate in about 
twenty years after 1545* Once Ogilby moved south of the Sherbro, his sources 
changed. He could no longer use Jarric, since the Jesuits did not know the 
area south of the Sherbro* He then utilised records provided by Butch 
traders* Possibly, these were acquired at the very beginning of the
(1) Hakluyt Society, 2nd* ser*, No. CXIII - The Troublesome Voyage of Captain 
Edward Fenton.
(2) Lemos Coelhos Buna Bescriyoes* pp.72, 250.
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seventeenth century, when the Dutch had a fort at Cape Mount, (l); possibly, 
they were acquired later; but they certainly were not eye-witness accounts 
of sixteenth century events. The Dutch traders, therefore, when they gave 
a chronicle beginning in the first half of the sixteenth century and 
stretching across several reigns, were, like Dornelas, recording African 
tradition. Treating their material as traditional history, one can seek to 
establish a link with a precisely dateable occurrence, involving the 
Europeans on the coast*
It will be recalled th:b Flansire had subdued the region between 
the Sierra Leone estuary and the Gallinas, leaving Kandaqualle as viceroy of 
the provinces of Sierra Leone. That arrangement was disturbed by an attack 
by Falma on Kandaqualle, forcing Flansire to return to Sierra Leone to 
re-establish the -latter. Flansire sought the aid of the Europeans to 
besiege Falma in a heavily fortified town, which was eventually taken, though 
Falma himself escaped. None of the names were the same, but the struggle 
between Sasena andShere in 1567-68,.in which John Hawkins played a part, 
fits the circumstances in all essentials, if for Sasena one reads Falma and 
for Shere one reads Kandaqualle.
Hawkins calls Shere "king of Sierra Leone", and he was asked by 
Shere and "the king of the Castros" (the river Cess) to help dislodge 
Sasena and Seterama, two other Mane kings, who had fortified themselves at
(l) Fernao Guerreirot Kelacao Anual. Vol. 2, p.211.
it>sr
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Bonga, on the south side of the Sierra Leone channel* (l) From the state of 
the fortifications and the large number of inhabitants of the town (about 
ten thousand), it was obvious that Sasena had effectively challenged and 
usurped Shere, who was the first Mane king of Boure, on Domelas’ authority, 
and who was at that juncture waging a counter offensive for the recovery of 
his kingdom. Hawkins lent his assistance to Shere in January 1568, on 
condition that •‘as many negroes as by these wars might be obtained, as well 
of his part, as of ours, should be at our pleasure”. After considerable 
casualties, including- several of the one hundred and twenty men whom Hawkins 
had contributed, the town was eventually taken, though Sasena escaped - as 
Falma is said to have escaped.
Hawkins ends his account by castigating Shere for not handing over 
those captives which the latter had taken, and the English ships sailed away 
with the two hundred and fifty that they themselves had seized. (2)
According to be narrative of anotha: crew member, Hawkins was told by his 
former allies, as the latter departed, that he should send to the Cess and 
captives would be made ready for him. (5) Again, there is an exact 
correspondence between the Hawkins episode and the tradition. Shere was
(1) B.M. f Cotton Ms., Otho E viii, fls. 27- • For Shere*s ally, Kup reads
“king1 of the (?Casseti)“, while Basil Davidson renders it “king of the 
Castros”. The latter can be verified because it appears twice in the 
document.
(2) Hakluyt Society, No. LVII, The Hawkins Voyages, pp. 71 > 72
(5) B.M. T Cotton Ms., Otho E viii, fl.
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helped to re-establish his authority in Sierra Leone in precisely the same 
manner as Kandaqualle* had been: namely, by troops moved up from the
Malaguetta Coast* Furthermore, the traditions (via Dapper and others) 
relate that Flansire returned to the Cess to discipline other dissidents, so 
that he would have been in a position to make a promise to Hawkins to provide 
further captives from that area.
Years later, De Almada recalled the incident of the siege of Bonga, 
pointing out that some Portuguese had fought on the side of Sasena (l), a 
fact to which Job Hortrop, a member of Hawkins1 crew, had drawn attention. (2) 
There is no recorded incident even vaguely resembling this one, and direct 
European intervention of this sort was uhlikely to have passed unnoticed.
Given that it was Kandaqualle whom Hawkins had helped to place once mode in 
power, then the "Kru-Quoja invasion1’ must have taken place prior to 1568.
The two Jesuit missionaries, Baltezar Barreira and Manuel Alvares, 
both testified to tie presence of the Quojas (Coyas) in Sierra Leone, during 
their stay on that part of the coast between 1606 and 1616. (3) The Quojas 
and Queas, who are part of the heterogeneous Kru people, must indeed have 
been in Sierra Leone for a considerable period before the Jesuits wrote, 
because two things are clear from the latter's lengthy reports: firstly,
the Jesuits were not contemporaries of any invasion from the Malaguetta Coast?
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine”, p.375
(2) Richard Hakluyt: Voyages, Vol. 3> PP» 487>488
(3) Barreira was in Sierra Leone between 1606 and 1610, and Manuel Alvares 
from 1608 to 1616.
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and secondly, all invasions from that direction had come to an end many years 
previously. By 1594? all "t*16 invaders were held to he naturaes (‘'locally 
born") and in many instances indistinguishable from the Sgpes. (l) By 1616, 
nothing had intervened to change this. Commented Alvares: "It is difficult
to speak of the Manes of Sierra Leone b ecause of their assimilation into the 
life there. Such genuine Manes about whom one could speak arefew and fast 
disappearing."
The authentic Manes who were still to be found were the Queas,
Quojas and Cubales. These formed the elite which ruled the province of 
Sierra Leone and Boure. They claimed to have fought alongside the father 
of 'Filamanqua'5 and, even allowing for the fact that similarity of names 
canbe notoriously misleading, this 'Filamanqua* seems to be the 'Zyllmanque* 
of Ogilby. Reverting again to the traditions contained in the European 
chronicles, one finds that the father of Zyllmanque was the Kru kii^, who 
put up a desperate resistance to the Folgia invasion. He was succeeded by 
his son, Flonikerri, who in turn was succeeded by his brother, Zyllymanque. 
’Filamanqua' was mentioned by Alvares in the context of the pedigree claims 
put forward by the Queas, who considered themselves superior to the Aperme, 
who were "half-slave and half-free" - the offspring on one side of 
conquered peoples. By inference, therefore, Filamanqua or Zyllymanque 
lived at least a generation earlier; and since he preceded Flansire, he 
would in fact have died before 15^8, the date which is advanced here for the 
re-conquest of Sierra Leone by Flansire.
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p. 575
THE ERA OF THE MAKE m A S IO N S : 154 5 -1606
108
It is possible that personalities like Zyllymanque and Flansire go 
back well before 1568 - to the original invasion of Sierra Leone by the Manes 
in 1545* This would mean that the invasion of the Toma-Gbande directly 
westwards across the Bullom^Kissi hinterland to the Rokelle and Port Loko was 
contemporaneous with and part of the *Kru-Quoja invasion". After all, this 
is what the weight of evidence suggests: namely parallel fronts approaching
Sierra Leone along the coast and in the sertao. But whether or not the 
Krus were part of the 1545 invasion, their political control of Sierra Leone
ante-dated the end of the sixteenth century by some forty years at least.
It is necessary to stress once again that the forces that mattered 
numerically as far as the Mane Invasion of Sierra Leone was concerned came
from close by. When the Manes fought the Susus, Limbas and Fulas (in what
appears to have been the upper Searcies region), they did so using primarily 
Bulloms and Temnes. (l) Similarly, it is to be expected that when they 
attacked the Bulloms and Kissis of the Sherbro and Gallinas, their main 
troops were drawn from the neighbouring Malaguetta Coast. The supposed 
cannibalism of some of the invading forces has provided a false trail, 
leading to the Bern Bern of Northern Nigeria. (2) *Dem Bern* or ’Bemdemeh* is 
a generic Arab term meaning f cannibals1, the existence and location of whom 
are extremely vague, and the whole idea is established mainly on rumour and 
myth. (5) Both among the Sapes and the Europeans, the notoriety of the
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.375
(2) Peter Kup: A History of Sierra Leone, p.139
(3) Basil Bavidsons Old Africa Rediscovered (London, 1961), pp.66, 67
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Sumbas probably far outstripped their performance. It was said that they 
would sometimes appear brandishing a human joint for effect - and the effect 
was terrifying, (l) They were also said to have eaten of the flesh of their 
enemies ”for courage and ferocity”, and for the psychological effect it would 
have on their future opponents - being deliberately encouraged by the Mane 
elite, although the latter themselves refrained from any such practice. (2) 
These comments suggest more a ritual than a way of life.
Whatever the origin of the various s trands of th. invasion, the 
importance of the overlying Mande influence must be recognised. It was 
said that all new soldiers who were enlisted were not only trained in the 
use of Mane arms but were also inculcated with a new sense of loyalty. The 
recruits were chosen as young men, who, after training and indoctrination, 
were said to have been puffed up with pride at being among the Mane ranks. (3) 
The arms and clothing were clearly Mande, and the language, too, showed 
pronounced Mande characteristics, which today set the Manles and the Lokos 
apart from the Temnes, Bulloms and Kissis.
All of the Mande leaders of the Manes could have descended onto the 
Malaguetta Coast directly from the interior, along the routes suggested by 
Yves Person. Geography and verisimilitude are on the side of such an 
interpretation. Yet, one must take some cognizance of the insistence of 
sixteenth and seventeenth century reports that the origins of the Manes can
(1) Femao Guerreiros Rglacao Anual« Vol. 3» P*255
(2) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine”, p.359
(3) Ibid.
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be traced as far away as the hinterland of the Gold Coast*
*
As late as 1669, Lemos Coelho mentioned that the Manes had attacked 
the Portuguese fortress of Mina, after which they took ten years to reach 
Sierra Leone, (l) In part, the Portuguese must have deduced from the 
information that they received that the Manes had attacked the fort of Sao 
Jorge de Mina, but, unless there was a deliberate invention on the part of 
the Portuguese traders and missionaries, the Mane traditions themselves 
mentioned contact with a European fort. Barreira elicited this information 
in person from Tora, a Mane king: flHe told me that they were ten years on
the march, because of the wars which they waged wherever they passed, and he 
still remembered the castle of Mina, and the shots with which they were 
met." (2)
On the whole stretch of coast between Sierra Leone and the Gold 
Coast, there were no forts in the sixteenth century, so that, once the Manes 
did come into contact with a European fort, this suggests that they had 
reached the coast at a point east of Cape Ttjree Points. At any rate, there 
could have been among the Manes individuals who had arrived on the Malaguetta 
Coast after a circuitous journey from the hinterland of the Gold Coast, 
merging with those who descended to the Atlantic from the region around Beyla. 
This would not be contradicted by the general picture of population shifts on 
the Gold Coast and its hinterland during the fifteenth and sixteenth
(1) Lemos Coelho: Duas Descricoes. p.72
(2) Femao Guerreiro: RPlacao Anual, Vol. P«255
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centuries, (l) Above all, to construct a theory of the origins of the Manes
without a single reference to evidence of this sort (if only to reject it) is
a serious historiographical omission. Northcote Thomas was particularly 
judicious in his conclusions on this issue. Of Tora,s evidence, he had this 
to say: "We can hardly suppose that the chief was aware of the Portuguese
name of the place; and it is unfortunate that his exact words are not 
available." Then, having drawn attention to the possibility of the Manes 
having travelled from the Niger to Mina and then on to Sierra Leone, he added; 
"I must not be understood to argue that the Manes actually came by this route, 
or by any other, from beyond the Niger; I am merely exploring possibilities. 
Certain data have to be accounted for." (2)
In the final analysis, the most relevant aspects of the Mane
invasions are not the origin of these people but their impact upon the 
situation in Sierra Leone itself. This aspect has already been touched on in 
the suggestion that the Mendes and the Lokos were products of the Mane 
invasions - a suggestion that seems well founded.
Today, the Mendes are one of the largest tribal groups in Sierra 
Leone. They are clearly the product of an intermixture on a Bullom base, 
and with an upper strata showing distinct Mande traits. Anthropometric 
measurements of some seven hundred subjects suggested that there were among 
the Mendef both a Mande type and a type indigenous to the forest region. (3)
(1) J.D. Fage: Ghana* A Historical Interpretation (Madison, 1961), pp.28, 29.
(2) Northcote Thomas: "Who were the Manes?", op.cit.
(3) K. Little: The Mende of Sierra Leone (London, 195l)» p«21 (citing
Migeod).
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Certain cultural divergencies, such as the presence of "both matrilineal and 
patrilinaal patterns of inheritance, support the idea of cultural fusion.
Mende tradition distinguishes between the earliest settlers and invaders who 
came from the north. The leaders of the invasions set themselves up as 
chiefs, but difficulties over boundaries brought them into constant conflict 
with each other, as well as with any of the original rulers who were able to 
withstand them, (l) All this sounds remarkably similar to the comments of 
the Portuguese on the Mane invasions.
It was only late in the eighteenth century that the Mendes were 
recorded as making attacks on the Sherbro Bulloms, and they are in fact 
relatively recent arrivals in the modern state of Sierra Leone as far as 
numbers md influence are concerned. (2) In this situation, one must draw 
a careful distinction between the arrival of the conquering forces and the 
formation of new tribal entities. The Manes overran all of the Sherbro 
Bulloms, but their greatest impact was made around the Gallinas and Cgpe 
Mount, and at some distance inland following the line of the Toma invasion# 
Here, therefore, the Mende 1 tribe* can be said to have emerged, moving deeper 
into Sierra Leone proper during the eighteenth century.
It can similarly be maintained that the Lokcs'were a product of the 
Mane invisions. Person argues that they stem from the section of the Toma- 
Gbande force which took an inland route across the hinterland of the Sherbro
Bulloms. In reality, the Portuguese spoke not only of coastal movements but
(1) K. Little: on. cit.« p#28
(2) Peter Kup: A History of Sierra Leone, pp.155-157
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of roughly parallel fronts in the aertao or hinterland, (l) They also made 
it clear that the region around Port Loko (or Logos, as it was then called) 
was one of the most important centres of Mane power within Sierra Leone.
Farmi, the first Mane king of.the area, was also addressed as "Emperor of 
the Sapes", a title retained by his successors* (2)
As far as the Portuguese were concerned, Farmafs subjects were 
Temnas, and today the Temnes retain traditions concerning their great king,
Bai Farma, who came from the east. (5) As would be expected if the Lokos 
were part of the Mane invasion, the Lokos and Mendes are regarded as being 
divisions of the same people (4), though the Lokss display marked Temne 
characteristics in their speech, setting it apart from fpuref Mende. These 
characteristics are held to have been acquired when the Lokos traded with the 
Temnes(5)» but it seems far more likely that the situation is to be explained 
by the fact that the Mendes represent the Mane fusion with the Bulloms and 
Kissis, while the Lokos represent the same Mane elements fused with Temnes. 
Today, the Limbas still call a Loko Gbande, while the Gbandes themselves say 
that their brothers left them at an early date to fight a war in the west. (6)
(1) Andre Domelas: "Relacao sobre a Serra Leoa".
Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p. 5^5*
(2) A.P.F. - Lettre Antichi, YOl. 248, fl. 57, "Declaration of king Farma,
emperor of the Sapes, in favour of Fr. Seraphim de Leon", 15 Sept. 1654*
(5) C.F. Schenkler: A Collection of Tenrne Traditions, Fables and Proverbs
(London, 186l), p.$.
(4) M. McCulloch: Peonies of Sierra Leone, pp.l, 5
(5) Peter Kup: on. oit.. p.124
(6) Ibid, p.124
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The name Mane itself fell rapidly into disuse, except in the 
Searcies. By some curious chance, it was this section of the invaders, 
furthest removed from their origins on the Malaguetta Coast, who were still 
being called Manes later in the seventeenth century, while to the south there 
was a reversion to the name 'Bullom*. (l-J The Mane or Mani people of the 
Sherbro are almost certainly products of these sixteenth century occurrences.
While the creation of new tribal entities was essentially a long­
term process, there were a number of ways in which the Manes made their 
presence felt immediately. The state-building Mande element was in a 
minority, but the forces were numerous, providing an example of an unusually 
powerful invasion in the history of the region. From the accounts of the 
Jesuits, the direct consequences were felt until 1606, when the death of 
Farma, king of Port Loko, marked the end of an era.
The defeat of the Sapes at the hands of the Manes was explicitly 
attributed to the lack of fighting spirit among the former, and their 
virtual ignorance of the arts of war, in contrast to the Manes. Mane methods 
of warfare won the admiration of Domelas, who rated them as better warriors 
than the Senegal Wolofs, for whom he had the highest reppect. Barreira 
praised the Sapes for their intelligence and their ability to learn, but he 
conceded that they had "weak and effeminate minds". (2) Before him, De 
Almada had said much the same things. He claimed that the Sapes were "given 
to feasts and pleasures, which they continually have, because the land gives
(1) Lemos Coelho: Duas Descricoes. p.72
(2) i'emao Guerreiro: Relacao Anual, Vol. 1, p.409
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everything in abundance, and they do not use arms like other nations"• .(l)
This last statement is obviously exaggerated, b ecause early in the sixteenth 
century the Sapes were said to have had their war captains, and to have 
organised war by sea and by land, (2)
The traders and missionaries who had knowledge of both peoples 
stressed the change which came over the Sapes by the end of the sixteenth 
century. ’’These Sapes who inhabit Sierra Leone and its vicinity were a weak 
and cowardly people? now with the discipline of the Manes they have become 
excellent soldiers and are good captains'* was one assessment (3)j "The 
continuation of the war with the Manes has made them soldiers" was another. (4) 
The Bulloms, who had previously been regarded as the most aggressive of the 
Sapes, came into closest contact with the Manes, and were subsequently 
considered as the most expert in the use of Mane arms and Mane methods 
of warfare. (5) Throughout Sierra Leone, the arms, military strategy and 
fortifications had been profoundly influenced by the Manes. The bows, shields 
and knives described as being in the possession of most of the inhabitants of 
Sierra Leone in the early seventeenth century were exactly the same as those 
which distinguished the Manes on their arrival. After service, both for and 
against the Manes, the people of Sierra Leone had learnt to fight in formation,
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.356
(2) Valentim Femandes: La C5te Occidentale d fAfriquet p.94
(3) Alvares de Almada: on. cit.. p.374
(4) Femao Guerreiro: on, cit.. Vol. 1, p.409
(5) Andre Domelas: "Relacao sobre a Serna Leoa".
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using squadrons of archers and bowmen carrying the large Mane shields. The 
Mane entrenchments, known as atabanka were in general use. These consisted 
of three or four fences of stout palisades, with a ditch on the outside. Tall 
towers and garrison posts were built on the walls, within which the older and 
less energetic archers remained, (l) Planning encirclements and breaking 
out of sieges had become commonplace in Sierra Leone befofe the end of the 
sixteenth century. (2)
As far as military matters were concerned, the Sapes emerged the
1
better off after passing through the Mane ordeal, but this was small recompense 
for the oppression, disruption and destruction which were the main features 
of the period. The Sapes were sold to the Europeans in thousands, they were 
forced to labour for the new ruling class, their trade with the interior was 
interrupted, and their very creativity was severely impaired.
When John Hawkins made his second slaving expedition to Sierra 
Leone in 1564, he found that the island of Sherbro had been transformed into 
a veritable granary. The Manes were using Sape labour to produce an abundance 
of millet, rice, root crops and palm wine. (3) The Sapes were harshly used, 
and in some cases they made efforts to throw off the yoke, if only by flight.
In 1572) some Sherbro Bulloms staged a revolt which their Mane chief, Shere 
Mambea, was unable to quell single-handedly, and he left to seek the help of
(1) Andre Domelas: "Relacao sobre a Serra Leoa".
(2) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.374* (For a description of methods 
. of warfare in Sierra Leone, see Peter Kup: A History of Sierra Leone.
pp.165-171)
(3) Hakluyt Society, Ho. LVII, The Hawkins Voyages, pp.17, 18
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hie confreres. In the meantime, his Bullom subjects, who were grouped in one 
large village, withdrew in a body to the bush. When Domelas saw the site in 
1574> everything was still intact - houses, agricultural implements, pottery, 
pe3tles, etc. The number of people involved in this escape was 1,000 adult 
males, apart from women and children. Many other Sapes were successful in 
making their escape. With the help of the Portuguese, some made their way 
to the Cape Verde Islands and to Cacheu. Frequent mention was also made of
a 1 tribe* called Tagunchos or Dagunchos. They had fled from the Manes, and
had settled down in a hilly and relatively inaccessible section near to the 
Great Searcies, (l)
Mainly on the basis of their salt manufacture, the Sapes had been 
able to attract trade from the Futa Djalon. At one end of the trade routes, 
the Fulas and Djalonkes supplied white doth, cattle and gold. This was 
passed on through the Susus who added iron and dyes. The caravans had 
usually followed the Pongo to the coast, and the Portuguese lancados had 
entered the transit coastal trade which allowed the goods from the interior 
trade to find an outlet further north (on the Nunez) and the coastal 
distribution southwards had to stop. Fortunately, by the end of the 
sixteenth century, conditions had become settled enough to permit a 
resumption of commerce on the Pongo. (2)
One of the most disastrous results of the Mane invasion was the 
destruction of the skills of the Sapes. In the early sixteenth century, the
(1) Andre DomelasJ Alvares de Almada: flRios de Guine11, pp.546>555
(2) Alvares de Almada, op.cit., pp.547> 575
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Sapes had great reputations as artists and craftsmen, working in ivory and 
raffia# Both Pacheco Pereira and Valentim Fernandes praised them in the 
highest terms. What they found most striking was the ability of the Sapes to 
carve to European specification items such as spoons, salt-cellars, and 
dagger hilts# Vaientim Fernandes wrote: 11 the men in this country are the
cleverest Negroes where manual art is concerned; they make salt-cellars and 
spoons of ivory# And also it does not matter what work one sketches, they 
will carve it in ivory*" (l)
In his hook, Afro-Portuguese Ivories. William Fagg established the 
identity of a number of ivory objects - spoons, forks, salt-cellars and 
horns,- carved for European use and to European design, but fashioned by 
African artists in a style of their own. He was unable to identify the area 
of provenance, but considered the Slave Coast very probable. A.F. Rider, 
basing his conclusions mainly on an account book of the Portuguese Casa da 
Guine for the year 1504-1505> and on the remarks of Pacheco Pereira, pointed 
out that Sierra Leone was the area from which the majority of these hybrid 
art specimens must have originated# He also warned that one could easily be 
misled by "negative tradition", since Fagg had considered Sierra Leone an 
unlikely region on the grounds that no tradition of carving in ivory survived 
there. (2) That neither skills nor tradition survived is due to the ^ane 
invasions.
(1) Valentim Fernandes: La C6te Occident ale dfAfrique, p. 104. (Also pp. 76, 96) 
Pacheco Pereiras Bsmeraldo de Situ Orbis. pp# 80,84
(2) A#F.C. R^der: "A Note on the Afro-Portuguese Ivories", The Journal of 
African History. Vol. 5* 1964 > No. 3> pp.363-65.
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After the Manes had arrived and settled in Sierra Leone, objects of 
high artistic merit were still to be seen# In the same vein as the early 
sixteenth century writers, Manuel Alvares commented on the ivory spoons, the 
handles of which had carved on them various adornments such as the heads of 
animals, birds, and krifi (l), ’’with such perfection that when one has viewed 
them one has seen everything*1# Unfortunately, many of the items he observed 
must have been carved at an earlier date and were no longer beingproduced.
The Mane destruction of the Sape skills was made explicit - "It is the fault
of these foreign kings that the country is so poor, because they have
captured so many master craftsmen, and have committed so many vexations on
the indigenous people that these latter have become less and less concerned
and have given up the exercise of their arts#'* (2)
It is also clear that a number of stone figures found in modern 
Mende country were associated with a pre-Mane culture. These anthropomorphic 
carvings, called Nomoli by the Mendes and Pomta by the Kissis, are not integral 
parts of the culture of the people who live there today, and were often turned 
up accidentally in agricultural operations# (3) They exist all over a 
region which would have been the original home of the Kissis, and the art of 
carving them was obviously lost in the face of a substantial invasion which 
entirely overran the area - almost certainly that of the Manes. Objects 
fashioned to European specification were but an insignificant part of the
(1) Krifi is a generic term for spirits# See-below.
(2) Manuel Alvares: f,Ethiopia Menor"#
(3) Stanley Brown: "The Uomoli of Mende Country", Africa# vol#18, Jan# 1948*
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artistic output of the peoples of Sierra Leone* Art was functional - expressed 
in articles of domestic use, such as wooden howls, pottery, stools and mats, 
and, above all, in the creation of ancestor images. Anthropomorphic ancestor 
images carved in wood were known among the Sherbro peoples in the early 
sixteenth century (l), and the Nomoli are said to have required much the same 
tools and techniques as wood. (2) More than an art form would have been 
involved in the disappearance of the Homoli. since the religious and 
ontological framework in which they functioned would inevitably have been 
affected. For the coastal peoples the encounter with the Manes must indeed 
have been a traumatic experience.
In at least one respect the Manes made a positive contribution to 
the domestic skills of the Sapesj and that was in the working of iron.
Again, Manuel Alvares furnished precise informations "Of the mechanic arts
they have not a single office, with the exception of ironsmiths; and in the
understanding of this they far surpass the naturals of Sierra Leone."
Turning to the records before the Mane invasions, one finds confirmation of 
the Sape limitations in the working of iron. In the early sixteenth century, 
they were reported to havemanufactured their own weapons, but they could not 
temper the iron properly and the product was brittle. (3)
Possibly, techniques of weaving cotton could also have been brought 
by the Manes. Most of the cloth on the Sierra Leone littoral before the era
(1) Valentim Fernandes: La C8te Occident ale d !Afriquet p.88
(2) Yves Person: "Les Kissi et leurs Statuettes de Pierre".
(3) Valentim Fernandes: on. cit.. p.76.
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of the Manes arrived by way of the Fulas and Susus, and the art of weaving was 
also introduced from the east and north* In the early nineteenth century, 
Major Laing noted that the manufacture of cloth among the Temnes was very 
limited, and tint the techniques had been acquired from th Koranko to the 
east. He added that "as the traveller advances eastward, he finds the natives 
improve both in the texture of the cloth and size of loom. In the country of 
Sangara very handsome and large cloths are manufactured... .and form an 
important article of trade among the interior nations. I have seen cloths 
similar to those of Sangara on the Ivory and Gold Coast”, (l) Obviously, 
therefore, the Manes could have made their contribution from the south-east. 
Today, the Mendes use a smaller loom than the Mandinga model originating in 
the north (2), and it is probably significant that the section of Temne 
country where weaving is practised is called Ro Mende. (5)
Both cotton and iron working fuither emphasise the Mande 
characteristics of tie Manes. As far as craftsmanship in iron was concerned, 
the Manes were displaying the superiority of all the Mande peoples over the 
littoral tribes. Iron mining, smelting and refining were associated with 
the Susus and Mandingas, who had special clans or castes specialising in t his 
craft. Such clans, like the Kante, often held positions of the highest 
authority within the tribal polity. On all these details the Manes conformed 
to the Mande pattern, for among them the craft of ironworking,.was open only
(1) G. Laings Travels in the Timannee, Kooranko and Soolima Countries 
(London, 1825)> P*81
(2) M.C. E^smon: ”Sierra Leone Country Cloths”, in British ' Empire ExhibitionZ 
(Sierra Leone Section) (London, 1920).
(5) N.W. Thomas: "Who were the Manes?” (Op.cit.)
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to a privileged few. (l)
There were othrr changes which had to do with cold steel and warfare, 
hut which ramified into sectors which at first sight appear far removed •• 
namely, the religious and the metaphysical. One of the principal Xinas (2) 
or spirits of Sierra Leone in the early seventeenth century went under the 
name of Mane Mane. Physically, this comprised a pile of rocks with a sheaf 
of leaves placed in the centre. To this site the usual food offerings were 
made, but iron was the favourite item of oblation because the spirit which 
resided there was one to whom appeals were made on matters of honour and 
revenge, and iron was the instrument for this purpose. (3) Besides this 
particular spirit, a whole range of Medicines' for war seemed to have been 
brought by the Manes and accepted by the Sapes; no doubt because the 
success of tb Manes would have been attributed in part to the efficacy of 
the means which they had at their disposal for ensuring the intervention of 
superior forces on their behalf.
Among the Manes, women played a special role in the preparation of 
war ’medicine1, and as a result the Mane invasions may well have strengthened 
existing female secret societies among the Sapes, and may perhaps have led to 
the formation of new ones. In the early sixteenth century, both male and
(1) Manuel Alvares: "Ethiopia Menor".
(2) Europeans often referred to the Xinas as 'fetishes1. In reality, the word 
referred to spiritual beings who resided in determined places or material 
objects.
(3) Manuel Alvares: op. cit.
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female secret societies were known to the Portuguese as existing in Sierra 
Leone, (l) By the end of that century it was made clear that the female 
societies were concerned mainly with the training of young girls who had 
reached the age of puberty. All the young girls of a given area who were to 
be initiated were placed in a large house isolated from other residences, 
remaining there for a year or more under the guardianship of an old man with 
the reputation of having led a virtuous life. During the period of seclusion, 
the girls were given new names, were sustained by food supplied by their 
parents, and underwent training which prompted the Portuguese to regard the 
institution in which they were housed as a convent. On graduating, they 
dressei in their best garments and attended feasts and dances, where the 
nobles and the young men had the opportunity of selecting their wives. These 
initiates were called Mendas. (2) Almost in every detail, this description 
fits the Sande and Bundu female secret societies as they have survived into 
the twentieth century.
It is unlikely that the Manes brought about any fundamental change 
in the pattern of female education and initiation, but they seemed to have 
added to the power of women. For instance, the Manes established a large 
village exclusively for women, who could only be visited by men under certain 
circumstances. Their main function was the manufacture of •medicines’, 
especially for war, and every king had one of these ’priestesses’ in his
(1) Valentim Fernandes: La Cote Occidentale d’Afrique. p.88
(2) Alvares de Almada: ”Rios de Guine”, p.352.
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service, allowing her wide privileges♦ (l) Another contributory factor in 
this context was th political power which a woman of high birth could wield 
in ^ ane political circles* Mobora, the sister of Farma Boure, was one of the 
most outstanding political figures in Sierra Leone during the early seventeenth 
century. Her authority was attributed partly to the fact that, had she been 
a man, she would have been king, and partly to her own personal qualities. (2) 
*e calling that the Mane movement was at the outset supposedly led by a woman, 
it could be that behind the Mane kings there was a female figure in the 
capacity of "Queen Mother", but, whether there was any such institution or not, 
very high status was obviously accorded to some Mane women, which would have
strengthened the female secret societies, as well as allowing them to play
some role in the preponderantly male societies. Today, the office of Eabola 
in the Poro society, which is held by a woman, commands the highest respect 
and has an integral role in the ceremonial life and purpose of that 
organisation. (3)
In the case of the male secret societies, the evidence also suggests 
that the Manes gave a great impetus to institutions that were already 
established. Only the most obvious externals were described in the sixteenth 
century. Women could not enter the lodge of the male societies, nor were they 
permitted to pass nearby when the deliberations or prayers were going on. (4)
(1) Manuel Alvares: "Ethiopia Menor".
(2) Femao Guerreiro: Relacao Anual, Vol. 3> P*259
(3) K. Little: The Mende of Sierra Leone, p.164
(4) Valentim Fernandes: La Cote Occidentale dfAfrique. pp. 84, 38
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The plehians were told that on certain days a powerful spirit walked abroad, 
requiring that they should shut their doors and keep off the streets* What 
happened at this time was that tie king and the nobles ran naked in the 
streets, making a great commotion* If any outsider came across their path, 
he was either killed or made a member* (l)
By the beginning of the seventeenth century, the situation 
described was recognisably the same as that which exists today. There were 
three important socieities, called the Pero, the Benle and the Cymo - which 
must clearly have been the Poro, the Ragbenle and the Simo, not only because 
of the close similarity of names, but also because the details which are 
supplied make the identifications possible. The Cymo, for instance, was said 
to have operated among the most northerly of the Sapes-Manes, and today it 
is indeed confined to the Nalus and Bagas. In the case of the Benle, it is 
striking that Manuel Alvares should have considered it as a very exclusive 
association, because the restricted nature of the Ragbenle is one of the 
characteristics to which modem scholars have drawn attention* (2) As far as 
the Poro is concerned, mention was made by Valentim Femandes of a secret 
society with a female mascot called Pere, which could have been the Poro. (3) 
Manuel Alvares thought that the Poro was a Mane institution, but even if this 
was not so, it must certainly have fallen into the hands of the Manes after 
the conquest.
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.551
(2) M* McCulloch: Peonies of Sierra Leone* p.68
(3 ) Fernandes: La Cote Occidentale d!Afrique« p.84
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The question of the spread of tbs secret societies of Sierra Leone 
has long been of interest. Butt-Thompson suggested that the Poro was 
introduced by the Temnes as an adaptation of the Simo which they had known in 
the area that is now the Republic of Guinea, but the Temne traditions say 
that the Poro was borrowed by them from the Sherbro Bulloms, while the Mendes 
claim to be its originators, (l) This latter claim is interesting in the 
light of Alvares1 opinion that the Poro was a Mane introduction, but, if 
anything, it would have belonged to the Bullom-Kissi peoples who were overrun 
in the south of Sierra Leone and who were incorporated into what is now the 
Mende tribe. The female organisation, the Bundu, which is widespread in Temne 
country, is also felt to have been derived from the Sande of the Mendes. (2)
When the strength of the secret societies is viewed in relation to 
the geography of the Upper Guinea Coast, a certain pattern emerges. From the 
Gambia southwards to Cgpe Verga, there are to be found associations for 
circumsicion and initiation, but no all-powerful secret societies comparable 
to the Poro. Powerful secret societies were part of the cultural make-up of 
all the Sapes; and moving from north to south among the latter the strength of 
the institution grows. It is well entrenched among the Sherbro Bulloms, and 
even more so in Liberia. The Vais in Liberia have the most elaborate form of the 
Poro (3)» and it seems feasible that they and other early inhabitants of 
Cape Mount, playing an important role in the Mane conquest, would have
(1) M. McCulloch: Peonies of Sierra Leone, p.30.
(2) Ibid., p.69
(5) Ibid., p.93.
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contributed to the increased authority of the Poro, Sande and the like, as 
they moved northwards.
Another issue of importance hinges on the political power of the 
secret societies, in relationship both th the local tribal authorities and to 
the rulers over large areas of country. In a comprehensive review of the
Poro, Little concluded from historical data and from the results of field
enquiries that there were “inner councils" of the Poro, who were the 
effective government in the chiefdoms, but it is doubtful whether there was 
a centralised supreme council, (l) On both these points, sixteenth and 
seventeenth century contemporary contemporaries yield some information.
The secret societies are all hierarchically organised in grades, 
and the highest grade or inner circle was obviously the seat of power within 
the tribe. This “inner council” was described by the Portuguese as the “old 
menfs Cymo", its members making public appearances only at important 
functions such as the death of a king. (2) These old men or nobles or
solategis, as they were called, met in the Funco or “Palaver House” in the
centre of the village to conduct the business of government and law. When 
Hawkins was in Sierra Leone he learnt from the resident Portuguese traders 
that in the Funco the nobles made their decisions concerning peace and war, 
about the harvesting of the grain, and about the time for tapping the palm
(1) K. Little: “The Political Function of the Poro”, Africa, Vol. XXV, No. 4>
October 1965* PP*350~364> Vol. XXXVI, No. 1, Jan.1966, pp.62-72*
(2) Manuel Alvares: “Ethiopia Menor”.
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wine, (l) At a later date these were all known to he decisions within the 
province of the Poro, .and in the sixteenth century De Almada considered 
the nobles or solategis as being identical with those members of the secret 
society who had the right of parading in company with the guardian spirit at 
times when the 'plebeians1 (sic) had to be indoors. Furthermore, these 
solategis wore masks and costumes when they appeared in the Funco. It was 
speculated that they were disguised when defending clients so as to be able 
to speak their minds frankly before the king, but the mafeks were the 
distinguishing mark of the secret societies. In the sixteenth century the 
masks were called axons (2), which is the name retained within the Ragbenle 
society. (3)
More pertinent to the coming of the Manes is the debatable point
about the extent to which the activities of all the local lodges were
centrally controlled and directed. In recent times, this facet of the 
organisation cf the secret societies seems to have declined, but there have 
been hints of a "Grand Poro" with wide cross-chieftain powers for making wars 
and settling disputes. (4) Such powers were wielded in the early 
seventeenth century, and they emanated from a centralised institution. The 
Poro 'University* (sic) was sai-d to have been situated just beyond Cape 
Mount. Students spent four years there, during which time they were equipped
(1) Hakluyt Society, No. LVII, The Hawkins Voyages. pp*17> 18•
(2) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", pp.348-351*
(3) M. McCulloch: Peoples of Sierra Leone, p. 69
(4) Ibid.. p. 30
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to conserve the peace and deal with homicides and revolts* (l)
One cannot be certain that the ’University* was founded by the 
Manes, but if it had existed before their arrival they had good reason to 
strengthen it* It was a logical solution to the difficulties which the 
dispersed Mane ruling class would have faced in trying to govern so wide an 
area. Apart from common training at Cape Mount, the Mane kings met from time 
to time in what were very likely to have been Poro councils. For instance, 
when Farma, the first Mane king of Port Loko, died in 1606, his funeral was 
attended by important persons from ’’beyond Cape Ledo on the Malaguetta
Coast”. (2) Those persons would have been members of the inner circles of
/•
the secret organisations, since Farma was important enough to warrant their 
presence at his ’cry1 or funeral ceremony* Besides, a fcryr could be held 
at certain intervals after burial had taken place, and this was sometimes 
used as a pretext for a political convention* On one occasion, a Mane king 
was anxious to hold a ’cry*, ostensibly on behalf of an ancestor, but the 
gathering was regarded primarily as an important political conference, where 
a subject of importance to the Manes as a whole was to be discussed. Rulers 
from -all over Sierra Leone were ready to attend, though the success of the 
venture was jeopardised by the intransigence of Tora, the oldest of the Mane 
kings, then ruling over Temne subjects. (3) Such a gathering could hardly 
have been contemplated outside of the councils of the secret societies or
(1) Manuel Alvares: "Ethiopia Menor”.
(2) Farnao Guerreiro: Relacao Anual, Vol. 3 1 P-259*
(3) Ibid., p.250
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of "the cult of the masks" (l); and it is to he reiterated that the inter­
tribal feature was a logical concomitant to the super imposition of the Mane 
ruling class.
By 1623, the phrase "Sapes Manes" was used to describe the ethnic 
situation in Sierra Leone. (2) There were areas where the Mane element was 
more pronounced, as in the former Bullom-Kissi country in the Gallinas and 
the former Temne country on Port Loko Creek, giving rise to the Mendes and 
Lokos, respectively. Elsewhere, the Manes were completely assimilated, and 
even though there were references to wars between the Manes and the Sapes 
in the third quarter of the seventeenth century, the distinction between the 
two people had long worn thin. As far as the Upper Guinea Coast itself is 
concerned, the Mane penetration and its consequences are useful pointers to 
the sort of process which must have occurred when the Mande met the "Semi- 
Bantu" speakers of the Put a Djalon, when the Fulas merged with the Volofs in 
the Senegambia, and when the Mande and Fulas met the "Paleo-Negritics" of Cabo. 
The Mane invasions also constitute a typical episode in the spread of the 
influence of the Mande in West which is recognised as one of the
(1) K. Littles "The Political Function of the Poro". He cites Harley to 
the effect that the pinnacle of power may not have lain within the Poro, 
but rather within the cult of the masks of which the Poro was the most 
highly developed form for manifesting the power of tbs ancestors towards 
the people.
(2) Alonso de Sanderval: Natureleza de Todos Etiopes, p*40
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most important themes in the history of West Africa. (i) And, to generalise 
even further^ as J.D. Fage has done with reference to similar occurrences 
in Ghana, "this process of the eventual mergence of small groups of state- 
forming conquerors with tbe more numerous populations of the conquered would 
seem to be the key to a great deal of African history”. (2)
(1) J.D. Fage: Ghana, A Historical Interpretation, p.26.
(2) Jan Vansina, R. Mauny and L.V. Thomas: The Historian in Tropical Africa,
pp.90-93.
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Cape Blanco was discovered "by Nuno Tristao in 1441 > Cape Verde was passed 
by Diniz Dias in 1444» and the hills of Sierra Leone were sighted from the north
by Alvaro Fernandes in 1446. For a few years there was no progress. Then, in
1460, Diogo Gomes and Antonio Noli discovered the western islands of the Cape 
Verde archipelago. (1) After Pedro da Sintra surveyed the Coast of Sierra Leone 
in 1462, the outlines of the Upper Guinea Coast were known to the Portuguese.
It was the Cape Verde archipelago, rather than the mainland, which first 
provoked direct..action on the part of the Portuguese crown. After the death of 
Prince Henry in I46O, the five islands of Santiago, Fogo, Maio, Sal and Boavista 
passed to his cousin, Ferdinand of Braganza by a royal decree of December I46O.
By a similar decree of September 1462, the remaining seven islands of Brava, Sao
Nicolhao, Sao Vicente, Rasa, Blanca, Santa Luiza and Santa Antao also passed
into the possession of the same prince. (2 ) PrinGe Ferdinand!s widow and his son 
Diogo, held the islands until 1484 > after which possession reverted to the 
Portuguese crown. (3 )
(1) The claim has been put forward that it was Cadamosta who 
discovered the Cape Verde Islands, but this finds little 
support. See The Voyages of Cadamosta. Hakluyt Society,
2nd Series, No. LXXX (ed. G.R. Crone) pp.xlv & 159*
(2) A. Texeira da Mota: Cinco Seculos de Cartografia das Ilhas
de Cabo Verde (Lisboa 196l) p*l
(3) Joao Barreto: Historia da Guine'! (Lisboa 1938) pp«63> 64.
D. Manuel I held the islands for several years before he 
actually became kirg in 1495*
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Colonisation and settlement were not dominant motives in the early 
phases of the Portuguese quest in Africa, hut it is noteworthy that where islands
offered convenient intermediary points for trade with the coast, the Portuguese
did pursue a policy of colonisation. This was true of the Cape Verde islands 
as it was of S&o Thome and other islands in the Bight of Benin. Prince 
Ferdinand divided Santiago, the largest of the Cape Verde islands, into two 
captaincies, one of which was bestowed on the discoverer, Antonio Noli, while 
the other was granted to Diogo Afonso, Auditor of the Exchequer of Madeira.
Noli it was who, with the help pf Prince Ferdinand, set up the first European 
settlement, and Diogo Afonso soon followed suit. The experience gained in the 
settlement of Madeira was put to good use, and the Santiago colony grew 
quickly, (l)
By the early sixteenth century all the Cape Verde islands had been 
settled, and all but Sal, Santa Luiza and Sao Vincente had churches, the 
presence of a church being presumably a sign that the population was both 
sizeable and permanent. (2) However, apart from Santiago, only Fogo and Maio 
had their own administrative machinery, and this provides a better index
(1) Joao Barreto: Historia da Cruine\ p.67* Madeira served as the
pattern for the Cape Verde settlements in many respects. See
Antonio Brasios Monumenta Missionaria Africanaa Africa Occidental
(1500-1569). 2nd series, Vol. II - No. 115, Royal, grant of several 
Cape Verde islands to D. Joao Pereira, 22 Oct 1545* p#381»
(2 ) Antonio Brasio: 2nd series, Vol. II - No. 28, Manueline 
legislation on trade, 28 June 1514* P*®9*
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than the church to the relative importance of the various islands, (l) Pogo 
was second in importance to Santiago, and was the principal centre of cotton 
cultivation* The orchilla. , which grew wild, and the indigo, which was 
planted, provided the remaining raw materials for a cotton manufacturing ■ 
industry in the sixteenth century* The cotton industry and livestock breeding 
were the principal occupation of the Cape Verde community. Apart from the 
cattle, horses, donkeys, mules and pigs which were reared, there were a 
considerable number of wild cattle and goats in several of the islands. (2) 
These were hunted and their hides exported. Sal, as the name implies, had 
valuable deposits of salt, and was thus a boon to the preservation of the 
hides, as well as being a popular port of call for passing ships.
The agricultural and trading activities of the Cape Verde islands were 
made possible by the transportation of Africans from the neighbouring mainland 
to provide slave labour. In 1582, the combined population of Fogo and 
Santiago was given as 1,608 whites, 400 freed slaves and 13,700 slaves. (3)
This numerical dominance of the slaves was extended to many other spheres 
of Capa Verde society, largely because the ties with Africa and African 
customs were never broken. The African slaves provided not only the labour
(1) Antonio Brasio: 2nd series, Vol. II - No. 15, Royal revenues from the
islands of Santiago, Fogo and Maio, 23 Oct. 1510, p.41«
(2) Antonio Brasio: 2nd series, Vol. II - Documents No. 4,6,15, relating to
the years 1504, 1506, 1510.
(3) Antonio Brasio: 2nd series, Vol. Ill (1570-1600) - No. 42, Account of the
Islands of Cape Verde by Francisco de Andrade, p.99*
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for the cotton and dye industries, but also the techniques. The Cape Verde 
islands specialised in the manufacture of "country cloths", using the same 
small loom that the Africans introduced from the mainland. A-^ the same time, 
the Portuguese provided the organisation for a large-scale industry, and 
experimented with new fibres brought from Europe. a) The nett result was a 
cotton industry whose products enjoyed the highest esteem among the peoples 
of the Upper Guinea Coast, being preferred to the cloth imported directly from 
Europe.
Slavery was the basis of the Cape Verde society in yet another sense*
The Portuguese settlers were not only interested in the import of slaves for 
their own labour force, but they also regarded the re-export of slaves as a 
priority. Cloth, dyes, hides and livestock were exported to Europe and the 
New World, but the profits from these must have been trifling compared with 
what could be expected from the slave trade. (2) The Cape Verde planters, 
therefore, concentrated on selling their own products on the mainland for 
slaves, and then selling these latter to Efurope and the Americas.
As early as June 1466, the Cape Verde settlers received their first 
charter from the Portuguese crown; allowing them to have a judiciary and 
revenue department, giving them absolute rights over the Africans, and granting 
them axclusive licence to trade on the adjacent mainland. The Cape Verde 
sphere of influence on the coast extended officially between the Senegal,
(where the commercial zone of Arguin came to an end), and Cape Mount, (where
(1) See below, Ch. VII, p. 3
(2) See below, Ch. VII, p. 4-3 4-
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the monopoly of Pemao Gomez took effect)* (l) However, in the second half 
of the sixteenth century, the Senegambia was a very marginal portion of the 
Cape Verde monopoly* It remained very popular with individual Portuguese 
and Cape Verdeans, but competition from the French, Dutch and English had 
reduced the Portuguese nationals to the status of agents for rival European 
powers•
In reality, therefore, the area which was effectively the preserve of the
Cape Verde traders in the second half of the sixteenth century lay between the
Gambia and Cape Mount - that is to say, the region which is considered here as 
the Upper Guinea Coast. (2) The gortuguese very often termed it "the Guinea 
of Cape Verde", and with justification. To begin with, Santiago held the 
reins of administration for the Cape Verde archipelago as well as for the 
Upper Guinea Coast. At least this was so from 1550 onwards, after the 
appointment of Jorge Pimentel as captain major of Ribeira Grande, Santiago. (3) 
During the first half of the century policy had vacillated between the
(1) The text of the charter is to be found in J.W. Blake: Europeans in West 
Africa. Hakluyt Society, 2nd series, No. LXXXVI, pp.64-67
(2) For J.W. Blake, the term "Upper Guinea" embraces the Senegambia, but he 
3tates that "after the middle of the sixteenth century, the Portuguese were 
forced to abandon the greater part of their trade with Senegambia, owing
to competition and strife with English interlopers, and they then began 
to concentrate upon the development of the trade of the region south of 
the Gambia". (Europeans in West Africa, p.37, Vol. i)
(3) Joao Barreto: Historia da Guine, p.77
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alternatives of direct royal administration and the farming of the revenues.
In 1550, the compromise was reached whereby a royal factor was permanently
resident in Santiago, while the commerce of Cape Verde - Guinea was leased 
under contract, (l) In religious matters, too, the Senegambia did not lie 
under the jurisdiction of Santiago since the diocese of Cape Verde - Guinea 
created by Pope Clement VII in 1533, extended between the Gambia and Cape 
Palmas. (2) But, quite apart from playing a key role in secular and 
ecclesiastical arrangements which the Portuguese crown made for the Upper 
Guinea Coast, the Cape Verde islands were important to the mainland in that 
their population provided the majority of settlers of European extraction who 
were to be found on the Upper Guinea Coast.
Consistent with the Portuguese partiality towards islands, the 
Bijagos were seriously viewed as possible sites for Portuguese colonisation.
In 1532, king Joao III gave the Bijagos islands (then known as the islands of
Buam) to his brother Luis, to be held during the latter1 s lifetime. (3) Two 
years later, an attempt was made to encourage settlement by giving them the 
same privileges as the Cape Verdeans. (4) There was, however, one difficulty: 
most of the islands were peopled. In the original grant, it was stated that
(1) Georges Schelle: La Traite Negriere aux Indes de Castille Vol. I (Paris 190$
(2) Antonio Brasio: 2nd series, Vol. II - No. 80, Erection of the Diocese of 
Cape Verde, 31 Jan, 1533, p.246
(3 ) Ibid: No. 72, Royal letter to the Prince D. Luis, 27 March 1532, p.226
(4 ) Ibid: No. 84, Settlement of the islands of Buao, 5 Sept 1534, P*263
IV?
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war could "be waged against the indigenous population if they proved intransigent, 
and they could then he sold as slaves* D. Luis sent a force under Gomes 
Baleiro of Santiago to attack Ilha Roxo, the largest and most attractive of 
the Bijagos islands. The expedition was a dismal failure, very few of its 
msmbers surviving* The result of this was that for several years the Bijagos 
refused to trade with the Portuguese, and dealt harshly with any Portuguese 
vessels which were shipwrecked on the dangerous dioals of that section of the 
coast* (l) Some time later, trade with the Bijagos was resumed - possibly 
before 1550, when D. Luis succeeded in disposing of his grant of the Bijagos 
islands for a sum of 15,000 cruzados. (2)
While settlements on all offshore islands was encouraged by the 
Portuguese, stringent measures were adopted in attempts to prevent any whites 
from settling on the mainland. The bogey of the Portuguese authorities was 
the lane ado or tangomao, terms used to describe the private trader on the coast# 
The former takes its origin from lancar, "to throw1*, and refers to the fact 
taat these white residents had **thrown themselves" among the Africans. (5)
(1) Alvares de Almadas "Tratado Breve dos Rios de Guine", p*319*
(2) Antonio Brasio: 2nd Series, Vol. II - No. 72 Royal letter to Prince D#
Luis, 27 March 1532 (Rubric added by Damiao de Goes, guardian of the Torre
do Tombo) p.229
Cruzado - writing in 1918, Dames gave the value of the Portuguese cruzado 
in 1510 as nearly ten shillings in the English currency of his day. A 
century later its value had more than halved. See M.L. Dames: The Book of 
Duarte Ba.rbnsa.r Hakluyt Society, No.1918. Cited in B. Davidson: Black 
Mother, p.135
(3) Antonio Brasio: 2nd series, Vol. II - No. 28, Manueline legislation on
trade, 28 June 1514, P*89*
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A tangomao was defined as a white trader who had gone to the extreme of adopting 
the local religion and customs, and who had his body covered with tribal 
tattoos, (l) A^ other times it seems that the term was applied only to the 
African-born auxiliaries of the white lancados. (2 ) It is very likely, there­
fore, that there was in the lingua franca of the Upper Guinea Coast some slight 
distinction between a lan^ado and a tangomao, based probably on the closer 
attachment of the tangomao to the Africans, either by birth or by choice. (3 )
But the Portuguese administration regarded them both in the same light: they
were private traders who resided in Guinea against repeated prohibitions, 
providing a ready means whereby the attempted Portuguese monopoly of trade 
could be evaded.
Illustrating the spirit of the times, the Portuguese, on the discovery 
of the African coast, asserted the right to a monopoly of vhatever benefits were 
in store. Quite apart from the defence of these claims to monopoly at an 
international level, the Portuguese crown found it necessary to enact a mass 
of codes, regulations and statutes applicable to its own citizens; and the 
lane ado, by his presence and his trading activities on the Upper Guinea Coast, 
contravened many of these. The 1514 Manueline codification of legislation
(1) Fem a o  Guerreiro: "Relacao Anual. Vol. I, p.400
(2) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.326 and
John Ogilby: Africa, p.366
(3) Tangomao may possibly be derived from a certain category of priests in
Sierra Leone, known as tangomas. See Valentim Fernandes: La Cote
Occidentale dfAfrique, p.102
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relating to the trade of West Africa revealed the main points of Portuguese 
policy. To begin with, it was a capital offence to go to Guinea without a
royal licence. Secondly, it was illegal to send or carry ^ ny trade goods to
Guinea, unless one was a licensed trader. Thirdly, except in .an emergency, no
ship which was bound for a given port was allowed to touch at any other point
on the coast. When a ship did lend at an authorised port, it was the captain1s 
responsibility to see that the crew returned on board. His failure to do so 
could lead to severe financial penalties and exile to Ceuta. Finally, it was 
specifically stipulated that nno person, irrespective of rank or station, , 
should throw himself with the Negroes, nor, under any circumstances, remain 
with the said Negroes, on pain of death, (l)
This legislation clearly implied that apart from those ships which 
were trading illegally, the licensed vessels also accounted for numbers of 
the private traders who were to be found in West Africa. The Upper Guinea 
Coast was the area where the problem of the renegade private traders was most 
in evidence. In January 1508 a decree was issued against the lan^ados of 
Sierra Leone. This ordered the sequestration of the goods of all such 
individuals, and the donation of the proceeds to the All Saints' Hospital in 
Lisbon(2) That Sierra Leone should have been singled out for mention is 
significant. The Upper Guinea Coast was an area better suited for small-
(1) Antonio Brasio: 2nd series, Yol. II - No. 28, Manueline legislation on 
trade, 28 June 1514# P«89
(2 ) Sousa Viterbo: M0s Portugueses e o Gentio", in 0 Instituto, Vol. 43#
No. 3 (Coimbra 1896)
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scale rather than large-scale trading, and this was particularly the case with 
Sierra Leone. The area between Cape Verde and the bays of St. Ann was 
regarded as the ideal resort of*K the 1anyado. and, in the early sixteenth 
century, poor men went nowhere else but there. "Sierra Leone was the refuge 
and shelter of many, and the haven of those who had arrived as nobody and came 
out as men." (l)
Towards the end of tie second decade of the sixteenth century, the 
measures against the 1 any ado grew more harsh and determined than ever. By a 
decree of the l6th December 1517# various restrictions were imposed on the 
trading rights of the Cape Verdeans, prohibiting them from conducting* trade in 
the ports of Sierra Leone, forbidding them to purchase more slaves than were 
indispensable for the conduct of agriculture in the islands, and limiting 
their possibilities of trade solely to goods produced in the Cape Verde 
islands. (2) Very shortly afterwards on the 18th January 1518# Cape Verde 
trade with the Upper Guinea Coast was completely outlawed. All who contin­
ued trading to the mainland were liable to imprisonment, and the 
los3 of their goods and vessels. (3)
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", pp.355#356
(2) Antonio Brasio; 2nd series, Vol. II - No. 45 - Instructions to the chief 
magistrate of Santiago, 16 Dec 1517# P«159»
Also cited in J.W. Blake Europeans in West Africa. Vol. I, p.124
(3) Antonio Brasio: 2nd series, Vol. II - No. 45# 46, Royal edicts on the
trades of Guinea in 1518» pp.l44”148»
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The reason for these restrictions on the livelihood of the Cape
Verdeans was vaguely given as "the harm that the residents of Cape Verde have
inflicted upon the trades of Guinea", but the ferocity of these measures is
only explicable in terms of the problem of the lane ado. This legislation
represents an attack on the Cape Verde islands as the place where lanyados
were principally recruited. If CaP© V0rde ships no longer went to Sierra
Leone or to the rest of the Upper Guinea Coast, then the physical opportunities
for private traders lancing themselves on to the mainland would be considerably
reduced. D. Manuel also had further threats in store for those lancados 1----
who were already on the coast in large numbers. On the 15th March 1518# he
commissioned Bemadim Gomes to sail to Guinea and superintend the removal
of the 1 any ados. Those who returned to Europe would be pardoned, although half
of their goods would be confiscated, and each would be made to contribute ten
cruzados to the All Saints* Hospital in Lisbon. Those who refused to embark
for Europe should be executed by the local kings. Gomes was instructed to
offer the African rulers the goods of the lanyados and whatever gifts were
necessary to assure their complicity in this matter, (l)
None of the above moves were successful. To all intents and 
♦
purposes, the Cape Verdeans continued to trade freely on the mainland, and the 
numbers of lanyados continued to increase. This is clearly inferred in the 
letter of appointment of Afonso Lopes de Avila to the post of factor of 
Santiago in 1520. He was cautioned not to allow metropolitan Portuguese to
(l) Antonio Brasio* 2nd series, Vol. II -
No.46, Edict on the trade of Guinea, 1? March 1518, p.147
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proceed to the mainland along with the Cape Verde residents; while to stop 
the latter from taking up permanent residence in Guinea, it was proposed that 
all who left Santiago for the coast should deposit security* Captains were to 
deposit two hundred cruzados, pilots one hundred and fifty cruzados, and 
ordinary seamen one hundred cruzados, (l)
That the punitive measures against the lancados should have assumed 
a less ferocious aspect by 1520 must have been due largely to their proven 
inefficacy. At the same time, the idea of settlers on the Upper Guinea 
Coast gradually became a matter of sympathetic concern to the Portuguese 
authorities during the course of the sixteenth century. Religious 
considerations caused the lanyados to be viewed in a more favourable light.
The diocese of Santiago was responsible f or sending a 'Visitor* periodically 
to the mainland to see to the spiritual welfare of the Portuguese, but when 
such a priest did arrive, he invariably engrossed in trading ventures, 
according to Jesuit report. (2) Three missionaries of the order of the 
Discalced Carmelites visited the Geba area around 1584# and the need for a 
substantial mission was emphasised. (3) In 1598, a priest was appointed to 
serve Cacheu, and the king of Spain and Portugal urged the establishment of a 
Jesuit mission, "both for the doctrine and salvation of the Portuguese, his
(1)  A. nras io i  2nd s e r ie s ,  Vol.  I I  -  n o . 52, In s t ru c t io n s  to the trade  
f a c t o r  o f  Santiago, Afonso Lopes de A v i la ,  13 Jan 1520, p . 159
(2) A..R.S.I. - Lusitania 83, fl. 316, Report from the Jesuit mission in
Santiago, 30 May 1627#
%
(3) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.330.
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subjects, who dwell in those parts, as well for the conversion of the pagan 
inhabitants", (l)
More important, was the realisation by the authorities that some 
settlers on the coast were necessary to facilitate the Cape Verde trade. In 
1535, mention was made in official correspondence, of the "factory of Sao 
Domingos" on the Cacheu river, and though there was no royal factor appointed, 
it had already assumed a semi-official status. (2) The port of Guinala on the 
Ria Grande de Buba was similarly referred to in 1558* (3) By November 1605, 
the settlement of Cacheu was granted a municipal charter by the crown. For 
some reason, this was not accepted, but the offer itself is clear evidence of 
royal approval for settlement on the coast. (4) Indeed, during the wholeof 
the second half of the sixteenth century, there was no hostile legislation 
aimed at the lanyados.
(1) Femao Guierreiro* Relayao Anual. Vol. I, p.399 (This was based on a 
decision of the Mesa da Consciencia, made on the 27th April 1596; that is
to say, by the spiritual council of the monarch. See A. Brasio: Vol. II,
9.385.)
(2) Antonio Brasio* 2nd seriesi Vol. II - No. 89 - Certificate from the Casa 
de Mina to the superintendent of cotton on the island of Fogo, 10 Sept. 
1535, P.275.
(3) Antonio Brasio: 2nd series, Vol. II - No. 143, Voyage from Santiago to 
Guinea (report by the royal treasurer in Santiago), 19 May 1558, p.4^7*
(4) A.H.U.. Guine, caixa I - No. 74, copy of municipal charter granted to
Cacheu on 15 Nov. 1605. (For a discussion of this issue, see C. &a Silva 
Texeira: "Companhia de Cacheu, Rios e Comercio da Guine (documentos para
a sua historia)", in Boletim do Arquivo Historico Colonial Vol. I, p«88 
(Lisboa 1950).)
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On. the Upper Guinea Coast during the sixteenth century the power of 
the European nation state was hardly f&lt. Yet the number of Portuguese 
living in the region was appreciable. On the Malaguetta Coast, in contrast, 
there were no resident Europeans; while on the Gold Coast, Europeans seldom 
ventured far outside the walls of their forts. The Upper Guinea Coast and 
the Senegambia were unique in that the Africans there had living amongst them 
in their villages throughout the region numbers of European newcomers with 
whom they had to work out basic day to day relationships, (l) To appreciate 
the nature of Afro-European contacts on this section of the coast, one must 
piay careful attention to the status and role of the 1 any ado within the local 
societies, from the time of hisarrival until, his departure or death. (2)
Indeed, it is worthwhile to ascertain his social identity before his arrival 
in Africa.
The social selection of the lanyados obviously depended in large 
part on the social character of the Cape Verde settlers. Surprisingly 
little seems to have been recorded on the early colonisation of the Cape Verde
(1) Within and around the forts on the Gold Coast, close working relations 
existed between the Africans and the Europeans, but these were of a type 
different from that on the Upper Guinea Coast where the Europeans were 
dispersed.
(2) The fact that the 1anyado role was of central importance has been 
acknowledged before. See, for example, J.W. Blake: Europeans in West 
Africa, Vol. I, pp. 28,39 and A. Texeira da Mota: Contactos Culturais 
Luso-Africanos na "Guine do Cabo Verde". (Lisboa 1951)
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islands. Apparently, apart from Portuguese from the metropolis and from 
Madeira, some Spanish and Genoese were involved, (l) Among the colonists were 
several individuals who were relatively high up on the Portuguese social 
scale, and several plantation and slave owners of wealth. (2) It has been 
said that of Santiago that "white society on the island was feudal, aristo­
cratic and, sometimes corrupt". (3) However, the vast majority were poor 
members of the Portuguese community, and the lanyados were mainly drawn from 
the impoverished section.
In the seventeenth century, after the settlements on the mainland 
gained official sponsorship, it was the usual practice to augment the 
perpetually inadequate white population by sending miscreants whose offences 
were punishable by exile. This element must have been present in the CaP© 
Verde islands and on the Upper Guinea Coast from the earliest days. Captain 
George Fenner reported in 1566 that the Cape Verde population comprised mainly 
those who had been sentenced to exile for a period of years. (4) In 1591, 
Richard Rainolds claimed that the majority of the lanyados of the Gambia and 
elsewhere were banished men or fugitives who had committed "most heinous
(1) J.W. Blake: Europeans in West Africa, Vol. I, p.27
(2) Antonio Brasio: 2nd series, Vol. II - No. 19, Petition from the people
of the island of Santiago to the king of Portugal, 24 Oct 1512. (They aver
that the population contained "squires, knights and even nobles".)
(3) J.W. Blake: Europeans in West Africa. Vol. I, p.27
(4) Richard Hakluyt: Voyages, Vol. Ill, p.60
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crimes and incestuous acts", (l) This was a gross overstatement. On 
occasions in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuriew, when the crimes of the 
degredados or exiles to Guinea were placed on record, they included the 
offence of having marked playing cards; while the majority were civil 
offenders. (2) Gensally speaking the lanyados were mord likely to have been 
victims of social oppression in Portugal than vicious men.
A significant proportion of the lanyados were victims of another 
kind of oppression - anti-Semitism. Large numbers of whites in the Cape 
Verde islands and on the coast were either gente de nayao or christaos novos. 
that is to say, either Jews or forcible apostates to Christianity. A report 
of 1544 refers to a multitude of christaos novos being present in the Cape Verde 
islands. (3) At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the traffic of 
Portuguese Jews to Cape Verde and the Upper Guinea Coast seems to have 
increased, many of them arriving via Flanders. (4)
(1) Richard Hakluyt: Voyages. Vol. Ill, p. 192
(2) A.H.U., Guine', caixa I - No. 35, Minute of the Conselho, 5 Sept. 1644*
(some serious crimes are mentioned here, including murder.)
Guine, maco II - Memorandum of the Conselho Ultramarino, 1765*
(3) Antonio Brasio: 2nd series, Vol. II - No. 112, Letter from the captain
of Santiago to the king, 30 Oct 1544, P«372.
(4) Bib, de Aiuda - Ms.51-VIII-25, fl*97> copy of a letter to the king on the 
fort of Cacheu, unsigned and undated, but written by Sebastiao Casao 
around I6O7.
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That some of the Jews used the opportunity to practice their 
religion can he seen from the fact that in the seventeenth century there were 
synagogues in Ale and other ports of the Senegambia, (l) while, as late as 
September 1672, the long arm of the Inquisition reached out and seized a few 
persons in Santiago for taking part in Jewish rites. (2) But, as was the 
case with the Christians, the religion of the Jews was not generally in 
evidence. It was their physical presence as Europeans and traders that 
mattered.
The Lancpado of the sixteenth century was almost invariably a 
Portuguese, but he is best regarded as a phenomenon - the private European 
trader, living among Airican tribesmen - and as such he could be of any
nationality, Barreira found a Greek and an Indian in Sierra Leone5 (5) in
1686, Be la Courbe found a Spaniard from Cuba wielding' great influence at 
Hareges; (4 ) in the 1750*8, a Genoese was the most prominent laneado on the 
river Geba. (5) Besides, there were Dutch, French and large numbers of 
English traders who fell into this category. However, the English arrived 
in appreciable numbers only during the seventeenth century, and in fact up to
(1) Lemos Coelhoi Duas Describes. p.7, and A.H.U. t Guine, caixa I - Ho. 27,
25 Dec. I64I, Joao Corte Real
(2) A.S.V. - Nunziature Portogallo, Vol. 27, f1.174, 9th Sept. 1672
(5) Ferriao Guerreiro: Rpla<pao Anual* Vol. II, p.202, Vol. Ill, p.252
(4) P. Cultrus Premier Voyage de Sieur de la Courbe. p.207
(5) A.H.U... Guine, maco V - Memorandum of the Conselho Ultramarino, cerca
6 April 1755.
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the middle of that century, it is the Portuguese lanc^ado upon whom attention 
must be focussed.
Allied to the lan^ado was the grumete, another Portuguese term best 
left untranslated. Originally, it meant a sailor*s slave, but it was applied 
to a large category of African helpers of European traders. Some were 
purchased as slaves, some were paid what amounted to a wage, and others were
virtually affinal relatives of the white traders, (l) The grumetes were at
all times a significant part of the resident trading community led by the 
lancados. (2)
Of course, the phenomenon of the lan^ado could only have arisen after 
a certain minimum of contact between the Africans and the Portuguese had led
to the establishment of trust as a basis for trading relations. In the Sene-
gambia and on the Upper Guinea Coast, this occurred at an early date, since, 
when Cadamost* sailed in 1456, organised trading had already taken the place 
of the earlier manhunts of Nunez Tristao, and it was on account of this 
evidence of the possibilities of peaceful commerce that Pernao Goeses was 
given his grant in 1469* (5)
The main business of the lancados was slaving. This will be 
treated in detail later, but it can be briefly considered here in so far as 
it helps to establish a typology of Apro-Portuguese and Afro-European relations*
(1) See below, Ch. VIII, p. 4.^4.
(2) English traders retained the word in a slightly distorted form, namely, 
grommeto.
(3) Joao de Barross Asia. Primeira Decada, p#65
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Basil Davidson writes that “the general run of the Atlantic trade can belaid 
to fall into three stages, of which the third was the most important. These 
were slaving by piracy, by warlike alliance, and by more or less peaceful 
partnership.” (l) In the first of his stages, he recognises the very brief 
phase of direct attacks by the Portuguese on the Africans in the mid-fifteenth 
century. (2) He then cites the activities of John Hawkins as typical of the 
second stage. But, what Hawkins represents is not so much a new and 
definitive stage but an abenation and an anachronism. His methods were typical 
of the first phase which the Portuguese had long left behind. He made direct 
attacks on unsuspecting villagers on the Upper Guinea Coast and, he seized 
slaves whom the Portuguese merchants had purchased through “peaceful partner­
ship”. Only on his third trip when he found that the Africans were prepared 
and that violence on his own initiative was not paying dividends, did he enter 
into an alliance with local kings (Manes) who were waging war. (3)
This does not detract from the substance of Davidsonfs thesis 
concerning the partnership which marked the Afro-European trade. The 
qualification is simply that the all important stage of “more or less peaceful 
partnership” followed directly after the initial suspicion and hostility of 
the fifteenth century had declined. The Mane warfare was coincidental, and 
in the absence of those wars, Hawkins, like other European captains after him, 
would have had to do business with the African ruling class through the inter-
(1) B. Davidsons Black Mother (London 1961) P*88
(2) Ibids p.54
(3) See above, Ch. II, p*/o</-
PORTUGUESE AC TIV ITY
mediary of the lancados; as Captain Fenton found in 1582, (l) and as Sieur 
de la Blanc testified for the more northerly section of the Upper Guinea 
Coast on the basis of observations made around 1592. (2)
' To understand the nature of the trade on the Upper Guinea Coast and 
the role of the lan<pado it is essential to appreciate the effect of topography 
and physical conditions as a limiting factor on European activity. On the 
Upper Guinea Coast, there were very few ports of call for sea-going ships.
The river Sierra Leone had the best harbour, capable of berthing the largest 
vessels of the day. This fact, together with the availability of fresh 
water and citrus fruit made it the favourite port of call for ships bound for 
the southern Guinea Coast or for India. The limited nature of the port 
facilities can be gauged from the fact that in 1641* the master of a 400 ton 
vessel refused to risk taking it into the port of Cacheu, at that time the 
busiest on the Upper Guinea Coast# (3) Fortunately, the sea-going vessels 
calling at the Sierra Leone estuary, at the island of Bissau and at Cacheu 
were themselves tiny, ranging from 100 to 250 tons. Commerce on the Upper 
Guinea Coast settled down into a pattern dominated by the lanyados. Their 
job was to scour the rivers and the creeks in small boats and make the 
produce available in the seaside ports.
(1) E.R. Taylor (ed): The Troublesome Voyage of Captain Edward Fenton, 
1582-83. Hakluyt Society, 2nd series, No. CXIII.
(2) Vincent le Blanc: Les Voyages F^meux de Sieur Vincent -le Blanc 
(Paris I648), Part III, “Voyage de Guinee,f#
(3) A.H.U., Guine, caixa I - No. 24> Memorandum of the Conselho Ultramarino, 
Oct. I64I.
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Like the Africans, the lanyados found that transport was almost 
entirely dependent on the riverain character of the region. Their first 
problem was to obtain the necessary small craft. The canoe came to play an 
important role within the framework of the trade generated by the arrival of 
the Europeans. On the Gambia, the Mandinga almadias could transport upwards 
of ten tons of trade goods, (l) For the 1anyado. though, the canoe was not the 
principal means of transport. Whenever boats could be bought from European 
ships the lancados availed themselves of the opportunity. For example,
Captain Fenton was offered 600 bushels of rice and 400 pounds of ivory by 
Portuguese lancados in Sierra Leone as the price of a small three-masted 
vessel, (2) In 1622, the governor of Cape Verde reported that the 1anyados 
were primarily interested in purchasing iron and launches from the French. (3) 
But, in the main, it was the self-reliance of the 1 any ado which allowed him 
to achieve mobility on the waterways.
The 1 any ados built most of their boats themselves. All the 
building materials were at hand. In Sierra Leone, there was a plant which 
yielded an-excellent fibre for caulking, while hawsers and ropes were also 
made from it. (4) The cabopa tree yielded planks which were resistant to
(1) P. Cultrus Premier Voyage de Sieur de la Courbe. p»193
(2) E.R. Taylor: Voyage of Captain Edward Fpnton.
(3) Sena Barcelos: Subsidios para a Historia de Cabo Verde e Guine, Ch. VII
(1622-40) p.221.
(4) Fernao Guerreiro: Relayao Anual. Letter of Andre to the king, Sierra 
Leone 1606, Vol. II, p. 211.
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worms; and only the masts of the ships were said by De la Courbe to have 
presented difficulty, (l) though, much earlier, Andre Domelas had pointed to 
the tall straight trunk of the cabopa for this purpose also. (2) Domelas 
had obtained the timber for his coastal vessel from Balola in Beafada 
territory, while Coelho resorted to the island of Bulama for his. (3) When 
Cacheu was at the height of its prosperity in the early part of the seventeenth 
century, a sizeable proportion of its inhabitants seem to have been boat- 
builders. (4) At Cacheu and elsewhere, these boatbuilders were mainly 
grumetes who had been trained to do such jobs.
The inventiveness of the lanyados. and their consequent mobility, 
contrasts with the dependence which theservants of the Royal African Company 
showed on London, and their consequent incapacity. Numerous letters were 
despatched to the Company1s directors by the agents in the Sierra Leone and 
Sherbro rivers, emphasising the necessity for sloops and launches. Boats and 
naval stores were always slow in forthcoming, and to make matters worse, the 
local agents were carsLess with respect to Company property. (5)
On the other hand, those private English traders who followed the 
Portuguese in Sierra Leone in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were 
just as adaptable as their Portuguese forerunners, and they were actually in
(1) P. Cultru: Premier Voyage de Sieur de la Courbe. p#227
(2) Andre Domelas: "Relayao sobre a Serra Leoa"
(3) Lemos Coelho: Duas Descriyoes. p.51
(4) Manuel Alvares: “Ethiopia Menor”
(5) See below, Ch. VI, p.
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a position to hire their boats to the Royal African Company, (l) In the 
latter part of the eighteenth century, when these English private traders 
were slaving intensively in the Rivers of Guinea, they set up impressive 
facilities for building and careening boatsj (2) demonstrating once more that 
water transport was an absolute priority on the Upper Guinea Coast.
River travel was not easy. The Geba channel was formerly called 
the Rio Grande because of the width of its estuary, but, within this, there 
were several islands, sandbanks, mudbanks and the occasional rock, between 
which the current flowed swiftly. (3) European ships usually had a choice 
between three or four alternative entrances to the same river, but each was 
equally dangerous. New dangers were encountered in the channels themselves. 
Allowance had to be made for the volume of the water which varied daily with 
the tide, and seasonally with the rainfall, so that what might have been a 
considerable river under optimum conditions, at other times either shrunk to a 
trickle or disappeared entirely. (4) In addition, some of the channels were 
continually shifting. An important example of this was the Casamance, about
which it was impossible to give any definite navigational instructions, since
(1) See below, Ch. VI, p.
(2) See below, Ch. X,
(3) Pacheco Pereiras Egmeraldo de Situ Orbis. p*70«
(4) Carrington da Costa: Fisiografia e Geologia da Provincia da Guine,
(Porto 1946) p.33. The highest water levels are between August and 
December, and the lowest between May and June*
— —  ■ "I
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the channel was so unstable* (l)
The navigation of the rivers was dependent upon the tihs, above all 
else. (2) In the parlance of the coast, expressions such as ”on the next 
tide” and “a tide’s distance away11 became very common. The ebb and flow of 
the water in each particular river was carefully noted. On the Geba, the up- 
tide consisted of three powerful waves, each of which could have filled a 
boat. One surge came each hour, and, after these, the tide ebbed for nine 
hours. (3) On some rivers the current was so powerful that it gave rise to a 
macareu or water-spout, which was another hazard. (4)
The rivers determined not only the pattern of movement, but also 
the pattern of settlement on the Upper Guinea Coast* At almost every estuary 
a trading nucleus was tobe found, sometimes in direct contact with Cape Verde 
and the world outside, and, at other times, serving as intermediary clearing 
houses for Cacheu, Bissau and Guinala. A trade centre, equal to the one at the
estuary was to be found at the furthest navigable point on each river, these
were used to tapethe produce of the sertao of hinterland.
For this pattern to emerge, the laneados usually chose the most
(1) Pacheco Pereira: E^meraldo de Situ Orbis. p*70
(2) For example, Mungo Park, travelling on the Gambia at the end of the 
eighteenth century, explained that his boat had to anchor wherever the 
tide failed. (Travels into the Interior Districts of Africa. p*6)
(3) Alonso de Sanderval: Natureleza de Todos Etiopes. p.39
(4) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine11, p.345*
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convenient African village in which to settle. Sometimes, they pioneered 
settlements. On the upper Cacheu, for example, the lan^ados had a village 
of their own, which the Mandingas called Tubabodaga, nthe whiteman*s village”,
(l) This was usually referred to as Farim, because it was in the territory of 
the Farim Brayo. The presence of the lan^ados enhanced the importance of a 
site or village, and attracted Africans to live there. In 1594> there was a 
port on an estuary of the Pongo, which had a population of 5>000 Africans, 
probably all Bagas. It had its origins in the efforts of a Sao Thome family, 
which had established itself there two or three generations earlier. (2) After 
1591> the Papels resorted to the fort of Cacheu, and, during the course of the 
seventeenth century, they had overflowed the walls and were to be found 
dwelling outside the perimeter of the stockade. In Sierra Leone, the Manes 
became quickly aware of the advantages of residing at the waterside in 
villages already favoured by the lan^ado presence and European commercial 
activity. In 1608, D. Pedro, a recent convert to Catholicism, moved from 
his inland capital!*: and took up residence on an island near the Sierra Leone 
estuary. The move was ostensibly occasioned by the desire to live among 
the Christians1, for which one can read "Portuguese traders". (5) In the 
late eighteenth century, there was a reversal of this process, because the 
ferocity of the slave trade made proximity to the European factories a very
(1) Lemos Coelho: Duas Descriyoes, p.56
(2) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.546.
($) Fernao Guerreiro: Rplapao Anual. Yol. Ill, p.253*
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perilous matt r. (l) But, in the sixteenth century and for much longer, the 
European ships and lanyados acted as magnets in drawing he African population 
of the Upper Guinea Coast even closer to the waterways and especially to the 
estuarie3.
The above process was essentially one involving local population 
movements, and is not to be confused with the migration of peoples from the 
interior to the coast. The Susu and Pula descent to the coasts was largely 
motivated by the desire to make contacts with the Europeans on the waterside, 
but these occurred during the late seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Before that time, it was the Portuguese who took the initiative 
in probing inland. The Portuguese were first drawn to the Mande people in 
their determination to tap the reported wealth of the Western Sudan.
Some time in the 1480fs or 1490*s a three-man delegation journeyed via the 
Gambia to the city Mali, where they spoke to the Mandimansa. In 1534> a 
Portuguese ambassador was again despatched along the Gambia to Mali. (2)
Several official Portuguese attempts to reach the Western Sudan were 
also made using the Senegal river. (5) The last of these apparently took 
place in 1565 > only record of it is a letter to the king of Portugal
from Diogo Carreiro, reporting his arrival in the Senegal, and his resolution
(1) See below, Ch. VIIJ;p. Z/-7?
(2) Joao de Barros; Asia. Primeira Decada, pp.115,116.
(5) Ibid: p.116.
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to make his way to Timbuctu. (l) But Before and after this date there must 
have been several unofficial and unrecorded journeys made into the deep 
hinterland of the Upper Guinea Coast, since both De Almada and Dornelas made 
mention of lan^ados who were familiar with the Mandimansa and the Pula king 
of Futa Toro, (2) while, further south, the lan^ados had penetrated into Susu 
territory, and, at the end of the sixteenth century, they were well 
established in the court of the king of the Bena Susus. (5)
The Portuguese did not find the fabulous riches that they had 
hoped for, but they quickly came to realise that the Mande peoples offered 
profitable trade in gums, ivory, hides, civet, dyes and slaves, as well as 
small amounts of gold; and the lan^ados were prepared to journey inland for 
these products. The points of greatest lanpado penetration inland were very 
often in Mande territory. Cantor, some 250 miles up the Gambia, was the seat
(1) A. Brasio: 2nd series, Vol. II - No. 158, Letter from Diogo Carreiro to 
the king, 29 March 1565? P* 524; and-
J.W. Blake: Europeans in Vest Africa, p. 54
(2) For example, De Almada mentions Joao Ferreira, a Jew, b o m  in Crato, 
who married a sister of the Fula king. (’Rios de Guine", pp. 255
254)
(3) Femao Guerreiro: Relacao Anual (Vol. II includes a letter written
to the king of Portugal in 1606 by Andre a Sierra Leone
trader who was familiar with the court of the Susus of Bena on the 
Searcies. Vol. Ill contains the report which Father Barreira made on his 
trip to the Bena Susus, mentioning the influence of the lan^ados there.)
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of the Farim Cabo, and marked the limit of the lancado settlements on that-----------------------------   j-----
river. The town of Farim, the residence of the Farim Braco. was more than 
100 miles up the river Cacheu; while the important trading centre of Malampana 
or Geba, about 70 miles up the Geba river, was also in Mandinga territory. 
Concentrations of 1anyados on the Casamance, the Corubal and the Nunez were in 
areas where the local population were under Mandinga influence: namely, among
the Caaangas, the Beafadas and the Cocolis. On rivers such as the Pongo, the 
Konkoure and the Searcies, the terminal points for European settlement fell 
within Susu country. Thus it was that when the 1 any ados selected or formed 
settlements on the middle and upper reaches of therivers, they not only 
achieved complete coverage of the littoral peoples, but they effected a 
meeting point with the Mande, and encouraged the latter to look towards the 
sea.
De Almada claimed that the Africans on the Upper Guinea Coast did 
not have the capacity for handling the despatch of European ships with cargoes 
in bulk. Were it not for the lanyados. he said, only local coastal products 
would have been brought to the ships, while the products of the hinterland 
remained untapped, (l) This generalisation is not completely tenable, but it 
does highlight the principal role of the 1anyados - a role which is very 
similar in some respects to that of the pombeiros of Angola; who made sure 
that the European ships on the coast were well-provided for, no mattr how far 
inland it was necessary to proceed to secure the human and other merchandise. (2)
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.252
(2) James Duffy: Portugal in Africa., pp.60f10$ (many of the pombeiros were 
of European descent.)
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It was to be expected that the arrival of the Europeans would have 
given a new significance to the Atlantic, and would have caused the Africans to 
look more towards the coast. The east-west connections between the river 
estuary and its source were thus emphasised. What was less obvious was that 
the north-south links along the length of the Upper Guinea Coast had also been 
considerably reinforced. Before the arrival of the Europeans, the loose 
association which existed among the Sapes gave some semblance of unity to the 
area between the Cogon and Cape Mount. Between the Gambia and the Cogon, 
there was also a degree of unity exemplified in the trade between the Banhuns, 
Casangas, Baafadas and Balantas. But the only common bond between the Sapes 
and the peoples to the north was provided by the Mande empire. The Europeans 
opened new vistas by linking the coast from the Gambia to Cape Mount by sea- 
routes. The Cape Verdeans made long journeys directly to the rivers of Sierra 
Leone; 1anyados travelled from Cacheu to the river Searcies on the well- 
established kfcla trade; the Cahheu-Nunez run for dye-stuffs was equally 
frequented; (l) and, for a variety of purposes, the lanyados travelled from 
estuary to estuary along the coast, helping to transform the rivers of the 
Upper Guinea Coast into a single entity - "The Rivers of Guinea"*
The 1anyados were not evenly dispersed over the Upper Guinea Coast, 
because the idea of trade with the Europeans and the acceptance of the 
European presence did not find a universal and simultaneous welcome. Indeed, 
some tribes displayed dironic hostility towards the Europeans. The Djolas 
were in this latter category. At the end of the eighteenth century, Mungo
(l) For kola and dyes, see below, Ch. VHI ^ £ 3
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Park still considered them "a wild and unsociable race", (l) So too were the 
Balantas. They did not encourage their neighbours to enter Balanta territory; 
and they were more adamant and hostile as far as the Europeans were concerned. 
The belief was widespread among the Europeans on the coast that the Balantas 
killed all white men that they caught. (2) The Bijago islgnders also had a 
reputation for ferocity, and the unsuccessful attack on Ilha Roxa in 1550 did 
not help Portuguese-Bijago relations. When diffeiences of opinion with the 
Portuguese traders arose in the seventeenth century, the Papels of Bissau 
often had recourse to this sarcastic barb - "If you do not like it here, then 
perhaps the Balantas or the Bijagos would be more to your liking." (5) It is 
to be noted that these three groups, who were slowest to forge relations with 
the Europeans were the least developed as far as their state structure was 
concerned, especially the Djolas and the Balantas. (4)
All the remaining tribes harboured greater or lesser numbsjs of 
lancados. and treated them with varying degrees of consideration. Many 
Europeans dwelt among tin Bagas in the sixteenth century because of the profits 
to be made, although European lifd was not very safe. Some of the lanyados 
received adequate protection, but in other instances they were likely to be
(1) Mungo Park: Travels into the interior Districts of Africa, p. 15
(2) P. Cultru* Premier Voyage de Sieur de la Courbe. pp.256,257; a^d
P. Mateo de Anguiano: Mi si ones Capuchinas en Africa. Vol. II, p. 145
(5) A.H.U., Guine, caixa II - No. 268, Rodrigo Fonseca, 22 March 1699
(4) See above, Ch. I, p.
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ambushed in the forests, (l) On the other hand, among the Casangas,
Portuguese life and property were virtually sacrosanct, (2) while other tribes
fitted in between the two extremes.
In spite of the above variations, once the brief initial phase of
hostility was over, certain common patterns of behaviour were to be found
throughout the region where the lancados were welcomed by the Africans.
The Europeans dealt always with the kings, chiefs and nobles of the
region. One English trader in the mid-eighteenth century explained that "to
keep as far as possible from these people as we can, we seldom get so far
engaged with any black as to involve ourselves in quarrels, always siding
with the great men of the country who defends us in case of quarrels or
disturbance". (5) Each resident trader in fact placed himself under the
and
protection of an African ruler;/between the two, there was an understanding 
on mutual rights and obligations. In the eighteenth century, the English 
traders were referred to as 1 strangers*, and the ruler with whom they dealt was 
known as their ’landlord*. The European 1 stranger* entered into contract 
with his African ’landlord’ for the protection of his life and property. He 
could also rely upon his ’landlord* to act as broker, assuring that the 
required local produce was available for purchase, and taking responsibility 
for any debts incurred by the trader. In return, the European ’stranger*
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.543
(2) Andre Domelas: "Relayao sobre a Serra 'Leoa"
(5) Nicholas Owen: Journal of a Slave Dealer, p.62
IQj-
PORTUGUESE A C TIV ITY
made certain financial payments, (l) The Portuguese termed all their European 
rivals on the Upper Guinea Coast as estrangeiros or ’strangers*, and the 
Africans, coming first into contact with the Portuguese adapted this word to 
designate whites other than Portuguese.(2) The Portuguese used the word 
hospede (meaning either ’host* or ’guest1, according to context) to refer to 
both the African chief and the -lanyado. (5) and for the sixteenth century, it 
is important to consider the model cf Afro-Portuguese relations as that of 
"host and guest" rather than the more impersonal "landlord and stranger".
Even in the eighteen th century, the obligations which tie chiefs 
discharged towards the resident European traders, went beyond what would 
normally be implied in a business arrangement between landlord and stranger; 
and, in the sixteenth century, the warmth and personal element of the 
relationship was marked. The comfort and well-being of his guests was the 
responsibility of every ruler; who welcomed the Portuguese among his people. 
Among all the Sape tribes, the custom was to welcome the lane ado with a hot 
bath. He was then allowed to choose one of th chief’s wives, with whom he 
co-habited for the remainder of his stay among that particular people. If
(1) V.R. Dorjahn and C. Fyfe: 'Landlord and Stranger - change in Tenancy 
Relations in Sierra Leone", Journal of African History, Vol. Ill, No. 3
(1962), pp. 391-397.
(2) A.W. Lawrences (Ed.) A Series of Uncommon Events which befell Captain 
George Roberts (London 1930), p.106; and see below, Ch. V I I p .
(3) Manuel Alvares: "Ethiopia Menor"
Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", pp. 299> 343 > 348*
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the trader were to leave and return, he would take up residence with the same 
woman, and his duties towards her were clearly defined. Fidelity was demanded 
of hin, and any failure in this respect made him culpable before tbs African 
law, and liable to lose all his goods. He was obliged to clothe her and their 
offspring, (l) To all intents and purposes, the lane ado was thus legally 
married.
At the beginning of the seventeenth century, a Portuguese trader in 
Sierra Leone mentioned that the equivalent of the word hospede or ’guest* was 
used not only for the Portuguese but for Africans who came to visit with 
friendly intentions. When that trader advised the king of Sierra Leone to 
take action against two African visitors from Cape Mount, he was told that the 
latter were the guests of the king and could not be harmed. (2) This was the 
code of conduct which frustrated the designs of the Portuguese king in 1518 
to have the 1 any ados surrendered to him or murdered. In other words, since 
hospede or ’guest1 could be either African or European, and since the latter 
was the newcomer, the Africans were obviously extending to the Portuguese at 
the outset those norms of hospitality which they were accustomed to apply 
among themselves.
The Bijagos from any given island engaged in hostilities with fellow 
tribesmen from other islands once they were at sea, (3) but this was not the 
case with visitors to the islands themselves, who were welcomed as "friends
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", pp.347j 348
(2) Fernao Guerreiro: R0layao Anual, Vol. II, p.210
(3) Manuel Alvares: "Ethiopia Menor"
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and guests", (l) Another curious example bears out the above contention that 
the Africans reacted to the Portuguese within the context of their own mores 
of hospitality. The Beafadas prohibited the killing of ;any bird perched in a 
tree close to Beafada homes, "because they say that the birds are their guests, 
to whom they can do no harm". (2) Theoretically, it is difficult to imagine 
that the Africans of the Upper Guinea Coast could have reacted to the 
Europeans by using s tandards which were inconsistent with or derived from 
outside their own culture, though their norms were not unique. Mannoni found 
that "when the coloniser first appears, it isnot £as an enemy but as a stranger, 
as a guest. In Madagascar he is called vazaha, an expression which means as 
nearly as possible, ’Honourable stranger*. (3) This was precisely the 
situation on the Upper Guinea Coast when the Afro-European contact was first 
made.
Hospitality has always been a dominant theme in the social conduct 
of the Africans of the Upper Guinea Coast, as elsewhere on the continent.
Above all, hospitality was a duty attached to kingly office, (4) and it was 
the ruling class with which the lanyados dealt directly. It is noteworthy, 
for instance, that the Portuguese, while sympathising with the Sapes, lost
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.317*
(2) Ibid: p.328
(3) 0 . Mannoni: Prospero and Caliban (Trans. New York 1964) P*®6
(4) T. Winterbottom: An Account of the Native Africans of Sierra Leone.
(He advances that the honour of reigning was sometimes rejected because 
of the expense involved.)
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no tim e  in  becom ing  th e  g u e s ts  o f  th e  M anes.
The records indicate that the 1anyados were paying guests, making 
various payments in kind, which were called 'gifts* or 'presents'. A gift, 
in legal terms, is a voluntary transfer of property without consideration. On 
the Upper Guinea Coast, and elsewhere on the West African Coast, it was used 
in a variety of contexts, where it implied an obligatory transfer, with 
something given in return. For instance, 'gifts' had to be given to the 
Bui lorn chief of the bay of Sierra Leone to obtain water; (l) 'gifts* had to 
be offered to the Banhun chiefs to allow wax to be collected in their 
territory; (2) and 'gifts* were periodically handed over to the king of Cacheu 
to countenance the presence of a Portuguese fort. (3) These were, of course, 
the equivalents of purchase price, taxes and rent.
Yet, the fact that they should all be termed 'gifts' is 
significant, because it stems from the African concept of hospitality which 
incorporated the exchange of gifts. European traders were quick to put all 
'gifts' which they gave to the Africans on the debit side of their accounts, 
but, rather less often one comes across an admission that the African chiefs
(1) Nicholas de Vallault: Relation des Costes d'Afrique. p.62 (section 
relevant to Sierra Leone is reproduced in Christopher Fyfe: Sierra Leone 
Inheritance, pp.55-58)
(2) See below Ch. VI, p.3 4-i
(3) See below, Ch. V, p.
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were in the habit of offering presents to the Europeans, (l)
At times, the exchange of presents seemed indistinguishable from 
barter trade and exchange for profit. As Manuel Alvares put it, when the 
Africans gave a chicken, they expected a goat in return; and, if they gave 
a goat, they expected a cow. By the mid-eighteenth century, if not before, 
this exchange of presents was a standard procedure known as 1 service', and 
the African rulers clearly looked forward to a profit. When the Europeans 
did not reciprocate a gift, this led to a 'palaver*. (2) However, it is 
highly probable that, at the outset, the question of the compulsory return of 
a gift with a view to profit did not enter into the consideration of the 
Africans. In 1621, the Englishman, Richard Jobson, conducted an expedition 
on the river Gambia. As he travelled on tie upper stretches of the river, 
he found that the demands he had to meet grew less and less. "We payd a 
kind of poore custome, which in the mouth of the river, where the Portingall 
hath used, is not onely greater, but perremptorily demaunded, whereas above 
it is lesse and rather taken as a curtesie presented, which morall kindnesse
(1) R--R-Q., T70/14 - Greenaway, 26 Jan. 1703* (Having received a directive 
from the London officials not to engage in trade on his own account 
and not to receive 'presents', this agent protested that it was the 
custom of the Africans to give gifts to all white newcomers, and 
subsequently the agents received presents which had nothing to do with 
trade)
(2) Nicholas Owelhs Journal of a Slave Dealer, p. 74
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requires all strangers, comming in the way of amity." (l)
The duty of hospitality, particularly as far as the rich were 
concerned, also led directly to a situation where the 1anyado was expected 
to share out small gifts from time to time, especially if a local ceremony 
such as a 'cry1 demanded such action. The Portuguese continually complained 
that they were pestered for small items by the Africans, (2) and no other 
Europeans were free from this. The English trader, Nicholas Owen, 
stressed that the articles requested were small - an old hat, a meal, a t o m  
shirt - but their nuisance value was high. Prom the viewpoint of the 
1 any ado or any other type of European trader, there must have been a few 
items which were not given to the Africans in pursuance of trade, whether 
those items were called 'gifts' or not; but it is likely that for many of 
the Africans such demands did not fall within the bounds of trade - they 
were legitimately to be expected as acts of hospitality from rich 
individuals.
Very broadly speaking, the lanyado was asked to fit into the 
African way of life. Not only the concepts of hospitality, but the laws and 
customs of society as a whole were also applied to the Portuguese, and had to 
be respected. Every time that a 1 any ado breached a local prohibition, this 
was cause for annoyance, anger or hostility, depending on the circumstances 
and the magnitude of the offence. There was a single word for such
(1) Richard Jobson: The Golden Trade, p.64
(2) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p327-
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offences in the lingua franca of the Upper Guinea Coast - chai. (l) A chai 
always meant a 'palaver1, that is to say, the matter went into the local 
courts. The customary law of the Upper Guinea Coast was not so foreign to 
the experience of the Portuguese that they could not understand it* To fell 
timber in many areas of Europe would have been an offence, so that, on the 
Upper Guinea Coast, to fell trees which had not only an economic value, but 
also tremendous religious significance, was obviously going to bring the 
Portuguese into conflict with the Africans. (2) Even when a custom was 
unfamiliar to European experience, the 1anyado was not being taxed for 
ignorance - not after long years on the Upper Guinea Coast. The Beafadas 
had a special bird which was taboo, since it was supposed to contain the soul 
of the Beafadas. The European traders of experience knew the seriousness of 
this matter, but they would nevertheless shoot and eat this bird, if they 
thought they would not be detected. (3) Most offenders against the law 
share this optimism.
The 1anyados and all other categories of European traders took 
greatest exception to those African laws which had a direct bearing on 
European property. One such law, followed by all tribes of the littoral, was 
that any ship which ran aground in their jurisdiction was legitimately theirs. (a)
(1) P. Mateo de Anguianoi Mi si ones Capuchinas en Africa. Vol. II, P. 144
(2) A.H.U., Guine, maco XI - J. Antonio Pinto from Cacheu, 28 Dec 1809* (A War 
started with the Papels because the Portuguese cut down dome trees.)
(3) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.327; and see below
(4) A. Brasio: 2nd series, Vol. II - No. 143 > Voyage from Santiago to Guinea, 
r2port of the treasurer of Santiago, 19 May 1558> P-4&7
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According to a report of 1558, the African rulers considered that it increased 
their prestige to have the hulk of a vessel on their foreshore, and so were not 
prepared to help refloat ships which ran aground, (l) Besides, in most cases, 
the crew were held for ransom. (2) On the treacherous coats of the region, 
there wa3 plenty of scope for the application of these African laws of 
salvage, and it is also interesting to note that these practices had a close 
parallel in the rights which the ruler of a district claimed if an animal fell 
dead in his domains, after having been wounded outside of his territory by 
hunters who were not his subjects. (3)
Perhaps the most galling imposition, from the viewpoint of the 
lancados. was the fact that when any of them died, the African ruler, in 
whose country he resided, inherited his goods. Indeed, the African rulers 
laid hold of all the goods in the possession of the laneado at the time of his 
death, not taking into account that he might have been keeping trade goods on 
behalf of other individuals. (4) One explanation of the origins of this law 
was that a laneado had made a king his heir, and this was afterwards taken to 
be the rule. (5) However, it is far more realistic to view the rule as the
(l) A. Brasio: Monumenta Missionaria Africana. Africa Ocidental. 2nd Series, 
Vol. II - No. 143f Voyage from Santiago to Guinea, 19 May 1558, p.467.
(2) Ferriao Guerreiro: R^lacao Anual. Vol. Ill, p.2835 and
Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.319*
(3) Valentim Fernandes: La Cote Occidentale dfAfrique. p.96
(4) Fernao Guerreiro: Relacao Anual. Vol. Ill, p.283
(5) Lemos Coelho: Duas Descricoes. p.192.
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extension to the Europeans of the normal practice of African society. At 
the "beginning of the sixteenth century, the powerful Djola king, •Mansa 
Felupe", was the only ruler who, apart from inheriting the goods of all who 
died in his own domains, was able to demand the goods of his own subjects who
died in foreign lands, (l) From this, one can infer the customary law of
inheritance in instances of this sort#
Very often, though the Portuguese and other Europeans objected to or 
offended against African custom, they looked to this same customary law for 
their own protection. The lane ado was not only the object of charges of
_chai, but he could also bring a 'palaver* against an African, and have his
case decided in open court. (2)
The word 'contract* can rightly be applied to certain unwritten 
agreements between the Africans and the Europeans, because many of these 
agreements were based on oaths which were binding under the customary law* 
Experienced traders learnt to insist that arrangements made with the Africans 
were sworn on some 'medecine1. There was a special ceremony practised by 
the Banhuns and the Papels on the river Cacheu. Firstly, the blood of a dog 
was offered to their Xina; then two chickens were made to sink to the bottom 
of the river by tying rocks to their legs; and finally an oath was arom.
For their security, the 1 any ados on the Cahheu had this oath repeated annually.
($) Even the fearsome Bijagos were the most reliable of friends once they had
(1) Valantim Fernandes: La C6te Occidentale d'Afrique, p.64
(2) Fernao Guerreiro: Relayao Anual, Vol.
(3) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.312.
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performed a ceremony of welcome; (l) while in matters such as calling a halt 
to hostilities or the ceding of lahd; the African rituals were the only 
guarantee of validity. (2)
Call the Afro-Portuguese relationship that of "host and Guest", 
"partnership", or "contract", the fact remained that the 1anyados had to 
recognise the laws of the land, and the will and sovereignty of the local 
rulers. The latter half of the sixteenth century was a period of crisis for 
the Afro-Portuguese understanding on the Upper Guinea Coast, during which the 
lancados made strenuous attempts to change the nature of the agreements, and 
to escape, in one way or another, from the authority of the African rulers. 
Both the causes and the consequences of the attempts are of the utmost 
importance.
The first indication of the crisis came in the region between the 
Casamance and the Cacheu. Throughout the sixteenth century, this area was a 
popular market for the Cape Verde traders. The Banhuns and Casangas were 
skilled weavers and dyers, and provided a ready market for raw cotton from the 
Cape Verde islands. (3) Banhun agriculture was also in a flourishing state, 
and provided amply for resident Europeans, as well as supplying food to the
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.317
(2) Manuel Alvares: "Ethiopia Menor" (a Papel ceremony marked the end of the
hostilities in I691)
(3) Valentim Fernandes: La Cote Occidentals d'Afrique. pp.5$> 68 (and see
below, Ch. VI, p.^37 )
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slave ships, (l) These advantages accounted for the presence of large numbers 
of lancados on the right bank of the Cacheu, especially in the Banhun town of 
Buguendo, which the Portuguese called Sao Domingo. (2) There was a marked 
deterioration in the treatment which the Banhuns accorded the Portuguese 
during the latter part of the sixteenth century. The ruling class was said to 
have ceased to extend their protection to their guests, and the rest of the 
population adopted an unfriendly attitude. The Portuguese were particularly 
irritated that their hats and swords were liable to be seized from time to 
time, frequently to the accompaniment of a few clouts, thus offending both 
their persons and their dignity. Important robberies were also committed, 
and, occasionally, some whites lost their lives. (3) A similar situation 
prevailed at Hereges, south of the Gambia, where some 1anyado3 met their 
deaths at the hands of what was a predominantly Banhun population. (4)
The crisis in Banhun-Portuguese relations came to a head in the 
1570fs. Towards the end of that decade, the lanyados at Buguendo invoked the 
aid of Masatamba, king of the Casangas, to force the Banhuns to ameliorate 
conditions. Masatamba launched an attack on Buguendo, and was reportedly 
victorious. (5) Nevertheless, when the captain-major of Santiago journeyed.
(1) Biblioteca de Ajuda, Ms. 51-VIII-25: "Relayoes do Descobrimento da Costa da 
Guine", fl.87, Report on Cape Verde and Guinea, c.1606.
(2) Andre Domelas: "Relacao sobre a Serra Leoa"
(3) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", pp.303> 304
(4) Ibid: pp.285,286.
(5) Andre Domelas and Manuel Alvares.
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to the mainland in 1580, he found that thv conditions under which tha lane ados
dwelt at Buguendo were still untenable, and he arranged with Masatamba for
the transfer of th inhabitants to Sarar, a Casanga settlement, further up
the Cacheu river, (l)
Less than three years after the abandonment of Buguendo, the
lanyados found themselves at loggerheads with some of their oldest friends
on the Upper Guinea Coast - the Beafadas. The Beafadas had been particularly
were
accommodating towards the Portuguese, and there/settlements throughout their 
domains. At this date there were more than 100 whites at Guinala on the Ria 
Grande. (2) In that port events were moving in the same direction as in 
Buguendo. As a result the lanyados withdrew to a fortified place not far from 
Guinala, The fortifications were ostensibly set up as a protection against 
French pirates, and the site was subsequently known as Porto da Cruz. (5)
In the meantime, the Sarar settlement had not been very successful*
The centre of lanyado activities on the river Cacheu shifted to Papel 
territory on the left bank of the river. It turned out that the exchange of 
Banhun for Papel masters brought no better deal for the langados. They 
claimed to have suffered abuses in the Papel village where they lived in 
theory "under the word and protection of their hosts". Goods were stolen and 
lives were lost. In 1589 > the Portuguese of Cacheu ddcided to set up their
(1) Andre Dornelas and Manuel Alvares, and Alvares de Almada "Rios de Guin^*,p3Q5
(2) A. Brasios Monuments Missionaria Africana, Africa Ocidental, 2nd Series, Vol. 
Ill, No. 42, Relayao of Francisco de Andrade on the Islands of Cape Verde,
26 Jan. 1582, p.105
(3) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.329*
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own stronghold, following the Porto da Cruz precedent. Firstly, Chapala, the 
ruling Papel king of Cacheu, was approached with a request to allow a fort to he 
built near the estuary of the river to provide defence against the attacks from 
pirates. These latter did present a threat, so permission was granted to 
build a stockade dnrwhich several pieces of artillery were mounted. Next, the 
Portuguese argued that some houses had to be built within the stockade for 
those who were to man the artillery. This request was also granted. Finally, 
the Portuguese withdrew en masse from Chapala1 s town and took up residence 
within the fort, (l)
At this juncture, Sierra Leone was passing through a very unsettled 
period, occasioned by the Mane conquest, and this had interrupted the develop­
ment of Afro-Portuguese relations. Of the tribes who were continuously conduct­
ing trade with the Portuguese on the Upper Guinea Coast for most of the 
sixteenth century, only the Casangas remained friendly. What happened among 
the Banhuns, Beafadas and Papels is, therefore, sufficient basis for 
generalisation. The generalisation made by De Almada, himself personally 
involved for about twenty-five years, was that the 1 any ados had been on the 
Upper Guinea Coast long enough for the residents to become familiar with and 
contemptuous of them. He emphasised that it was after long intercourse 
with the Portuguese, and after the Banhuns had become versed in the Portuguese 
language that they reacted so unfavourably to their guests. (2) The Papels and
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", pp.299>300
(2) Ibid., p.304.
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the Beafadas likewise, were fluent in the Portuguese language (l) that is to 
say, in the "Creole Portuguese" which was spoken on the Upper Guinea Coast. (2) 
The model of "host and guest", therefore, is only a point of 
departure. The period of its historical existence is ascertained 1 argely by 
the laments of the Portguese themselves at the end of the sixteenth century, 
that things had been fine up to a few decades before the fort of Cacheu had to 
bn built in 1591* But relations could never have been static, even in the 
first half of the century, because the Africans and tbe Portuguese were 
reacting to each other’s differences and adopting new positions. Evidently, 
the barter with the Europeans was initially conducted in a guileless manner 
by the Africans of the Upper Guinea Coast, but with time this was abandoned.
The ruling class in particular came to place a very high priority on 
European imports, and sought to acquire such goods by a variety of means. A 
•gift 1 , as Jobson found, was changing from something' which was not requested 
and the receipt of which gave pleasant surprise, to something which was 
demanded and, when it was not forthcoming, this was a unpleasant surprise about
which steps would be taken. (5) The process of change, which was observable on
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", pp.325 and 326 and Manuel Alvares
"Ethiopia Menor"
(2) For a linguistic assessment of "Creole Portuguese", see Bertrand-Bocande:
"Notes sur la Guinee Portugaise ou Senegambie Meridionelle", Bulletin de la
Societe de Geographie de Paris, 1849> 7ol. XI, pp.265-350 snd- Vol. XII,
PP.57-93; and A. Wilson "Uma Volta Linguistica da Guine Portuguesa", Boletim 
Cultural da Guine Portuguesa.
(3) Once again Mannoni offers an intriguing psychological analysis. See 
Prosuero and Caliban, pp. 42 et seq
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the middle and upper Gambia in 1627, lad taken place long before on the coast 
itself*, which was more exposed to European trade. By the 1560*s the Africans 
of the Upper Guinea Coast were acting in a manner which the lanyados considered 
intolerable enough to warrant the use of force on their part. This would seem 
to be the explanation of :he genesis of the breakdown in the understanding 
which existed between the Portuguese and all but one of the principal trading 
peoples on the Upper Guinea Coast, north of the Sape ethnic group.
The results of the Portuguese actions are not in doubt* The Cacheu 
episole sparked off a full-scale attack by the Papels, which the Portuguese 
lan^aios beat off, inflicting heavy casualties upon the Papels, and suffering 
none themselves, (l) Shortly afterwards, the combatants came to a modus 
viviendi« which permitted the return of some traders to the African villages, 
while numbers of Papels went to live within the stockade. The reaction of the 
Beafalas of Guinala to the Portuguese entrenchment in Porto da Cruz was less 
violent but more effective. This was how the consequences were reported:
"After we grouped ourselves together under the shelter of the fort, we bought 
our slaves and other goods at higher prices. Formerly, ww were separated, 
lodged in the houses of nobles, with more than a league and a half separating 
each trader. Then we gained more trade, we did not compete with each other, 
and our persons were protected by our hosts and their relatives. Today, if 
we go beyond the confines of the fort the Negroes treat us badly - by •badly*
I mean that if we or our servants are involved in any dispute, the Negroes 
are uncompromising, so that violence occurs, resulting sometimes in deaths,
(l) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de GuinO", p.300.
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something which never happened when we were living among them., (l)
The withdrawal of the Portuguese from Buguendo,- and their construc­
tion of forts at Cacheu and Guinala were conscious attempts to opt out of 
the old arrangement of "host and guest", and it was so interpreted by the 
A-pricans. The new conditions which the Portuguese hoped to create entailed 
the ultimate use of force to flout the authority of the local rulers. This 
was not tolerated by the latter. In Guinala, apart from the higher prices 
and ill-treatment which resulted from the Portuguese actions, there was an 
interesting conflict over the Beafada laws of inheritance, as applied to 
lancada property. The construction of the fort of Porto da Cruz offered an 
opportunity to transfer the seriously ill and their belongings to the strong­
hold, where the local rulings could be resisted. (2) However, it was a 
losing battle on the part of the resident traders, since the Beafadas in 
turn made a point of placing a guard on the property of the sick, (3)*
The laneados simply could not deploy sufficient force to make their 
independence a permanent reality. They had built and armed the two 
garrisons of Cacheu and Porto da Cruz entirely at their own expense, but 
they could not maintain them. By a curious twist, the Portuguese artillery 
had to be used to defend both themselves and the Beafadas from the attacks of 
the Bijagos, when these intensified at the beginning of the seventeenth 
century, and both the Portuguese and Beafadas had to flee from the foreshore.
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.330
(2) Ibid., p.334
(3) Fernao Guerreiro: Relayao Anual. Vol. Ill, P*283
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of the Ria Grande de Buba.(l) But, without this extraneous factor, the 
maintenance of the fort would have been beyond the 1 any ado s. The Cacheu
experience demonstrates this clearly.
It was in Cacheu that the seventeenth century Afro-Portuguese 
relations were to be most clearly seen, and All the evidence indicated that 
the buildings of the fort did not effectively emancipate the 1 anyados from 
African control.
At the beginning of the seventeenth century, Cacheu had a 
population of 1,500 of whom about 500 were white, while the Africans there 
were closely attached to the Portuguese interest. The town was divided into
two sections: Villa Fria and Villa Quente. In the former - the cooler part
of the city - resided the rich merchants; while the hot district was the 
home of "the ordinary people, ... who live by their labour and daily 
earnings, some workers in the careening yards, others sailors". The 
bourgeoisie in Villa Fria lived well, and Cacheu bustled as the main centre 
of the Hispano-Portuguese slave trade at that time; but this lane ado
(l) A.R.S.I.. Lusitania 74» FI. 78 - Letter from Mangali, king of Bissege to 
the king of Portugal, 20 April 1607J and from Emchabole, king of Biguba,
24 April 1607. The king of Guinala, Bamalla, writing on the 1st May 1607,
also mentioned that the Portuguese had left during the rule of his 
predecessor, Campecho, but that he had provided the conditions for their 
return. This could mean that, as happened in Cacheu, a normalisation of 
relations came about when both parties realised that complete alienation 
was unprofitable.
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settlement was not a citadel against the Papels, After the war of 1591, 
the fid ilgos were said to have invented new chais, that is to say, not 
breaches of local prohibitions with deontological significance, but pretexts 
to mulct the laneados by ‘palavers* and fines, (l) Any time that the king 
of Mata, who controlled Cacheu, needed money (or purported to be in need) he 
sent a noble to inform the Portuguese. This noble arrived with a large 
retinue, and took such liberties that uone would have imagined that the 
Portuguese were his slaves1*, alleged Barreira. The lanyados did not dare 
deny him what he wanted, and the more he was given the more he wanted. (2)
In reality, viewed against the petty scale of these demands, the Portuguese 
complaints were grossly exaggerated, but the halcyon days of their relations 
with the coastal people were certainly over, except where they were still 
forging new contacts with the Mane ruling class to the south.
The 1anyado attempt to wrest sovereignty from the Africans on the 
Upper Guinea Coast in the late sixteenth century had failed, and, in the 
process some of the gilt had been rubbed off the Afro-Portuguese relationship. 
But, the partnership still had much substance. The African ruling class were 
eager to maintain a relationship which meant trade goods, provided that 
their own sovereignty in their own estimation was not threatened. The 
favourable terms extended in Sierra Leone to European ‘strangers* up until the 
nineteenth century provided evidence of this desire. To the north, the 
African ruling' class was no less avid to have Europeans reside in their
(1) Manuel Alvares: "Ethiopia Menor"
(2) Femao Guerreiro: Relayao Anual, Vol. Ill, p.285.
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territory. At the end of the eighteenth century, it was a common saying 
north of the Geha that "all white man rogue, all white man witch'*, (l) "but, 
nevertheless, hoth the Bijago fidalgos and those of the Beafadas were 
convinced that "so long as white man lived near they would lack nothing, 
hut if white man does not live here we shall want everything, (2)
Using hindsight in an attempt to see to what extent the early Afro- 
Portuguese relations had set the pattern for the future, it must he stressed 
that the arrangements for the lane ados should he viewed differently from the 
connection with the visiting ships. These latter, trading privately or 
under the aegis of state orprivate company, brought individuals, who, like the 
lancado3 in the late sixteenth century, sometimes attempted to challenge the 
power of the African ruling class* In fact, as the resident traders them­
selves and their descendants grew more Africanised culturally and ethnically, 
they moved closer to and eventually penetrated the local power structure, (5) 
Other Europeans, therefore, had cause to struggle against the new 'Afro- 
Portuguese* class, which was allied to the African fidalgos. For three 
centuries after 1600, the social formations which wielded power and authority 
locally, successfully resisted attempts at European domination, when these were 
made. Though for the sake of peace, self-preservation and profits, the 
Europeans generally accepted the status quo.
(1) Philip Beavers African Memoranda R0lative to an Attempt to Establish a 
British Settlement on the Island of Bulama in the Year 1792. (London I8O5)
p.200
(2) Ihids pp. 72,105
(5) See below, Ch. VIII, p. 4 &Q
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SLAVE TRADING. 1562-1640
The Upper Guinea Coast had a lengthy association with the Atlantic 
slave trade. Together with the Senegambia, it was being exploited for slaves 
in the 1460’s even before the southern sections of the West African coast had 
been charted by the Portuguese. 400 years later, the Atlantic slave trade
was still being prosecuted in the area. Over this span of centuries, the
Upper Guinea Coast was involved in all the phases of the slave trade. At 
first it supplied Europe; then, when labour was required for the mines of 
Central and South America, the Upper Guinea Coast made its contribution; and, 
when slaves were needed on the Caribbean and North American plantations, the 
Upper Guinea Coast was not to be left out. In the late eighteenth century, 
it was Sierra Leone that was chosen as the site for the first settlement of 
freed slaves in West Africa; yet, in spite of this memorial to freedom, and
in spite of the British navy, the slavers were still present on the
estuaries and rias of this region until the second half of the nineteenth 
century. Thus, though the Upper Guinea Coast is not as notorious as the 
Congo and the Bight of Benin, it is in many ways a classic area for the study 
of the Atlantic slave trade.
The growth of the Atlantic slave trade on the Upper Guinea Coast and 
the Senegambia illustrates how rapidly the ’trickle* became a ’flood*, (l) 
Fifty years after these shores had been seen by the Portuguese, the latter
(l) The terms are Basil Davidson*s. See Black Mother, Part two.
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were shipping abroad, ”when the trade of the country was well ordered”, more
than 3,500 Africans every year, (l)
Captives taken were mainly destined for the nearby Cape Verde 
islands and the Iberian peninsula, with Madeira and the Canary Islands 
providing secondary markets. (2) Sometimes, captives from this section of 
the coast were procured by passing ships, and became galley slaves - as, for 
example, in 1504, when the East Indies fleet of Alfonso de Albuquerque obtained 
70 Negroes at Santiago* (3) This may also have applied to ships bound for 
the Americas. The Cape Verde islands were situated on the route of the 
sailing vessels proceeding from Portugal to Brazil, and it is not unlikely 
that small numbers o f Africans from the Upper Guinea Coast made their way to 
Brazil at an early date to serve as slaves.
It was the Spanish market which ultimately held out the greatest 
prospects. After the famous pleas of Las Casas, Charles V granted to a 
courtier the right to furnish 4,000 slaves to the Antilles, and the deal was 
eventually carried through by Genoese merchants who made their purchases in 
Lisbon. (4) A great portion of these slaves were said to have been obtained
(1) Pacheco Pereira: Bsmeraldo de Situ Orbis, p.90
(2) A. Brasio: Monumenta Missionaria Africana, 2nd series, Vol. II - No. 19, 
Petition of the People of the island of Santiago, Oct. 1512, p*54*
(3) Ibid: No. 14, Privileges to the residents of Santiago, May 1510,
P*39
(4) D.P. Mannix in association with M. Cowley: Black Cargoes. (London
1963), p.3.
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through Cape Verde enterprise, (l) In 1512, a royal edict had declared that 
all Guinea slaves should go directly to Lisbon. (2) The Cape Verdeans 
^protested that in that event no ships from Madeira, the Azores, the Canaries 
or Spain would visit the Cape Verde islands, (3) and they may have broken this 
strict provision. In any event, many of the slaves on the Lisbon Market 
would have been acquired on the Upper Guinea Coast and in the Senegambia. 
Indirectly, therefore, the Upper Guinea Coast was in touch with the market in 
the Spanish Indies since the second decade of the sixteenth century. By the 
second half of that century, the Spanish Indies had become the principal 
destination of captives from this area.
The close connection between the Upper Guinea Coast and the Spanish 
Indies can be seen from the Spanish records of the registration of slave ships. 
The principal administrative device which the Spanish developed to organise 
the importation of slaves into the Americas in the sixteenth century was the 
registro. This was a licence, which, on payment of a fee, was issued to a 
ship’s captain, authorising him to transport an agreed number of slaves from 
a given point in West Africa to a specific port in the Americas .(4)Registros
(1) J. Barreto: Historia da Guine1. p.73
(2) A. Brasio: Op.cit., No. 18, Edict on the. Trade of Guinea, 24 Oct 1512, p.51*
(3)lbid No. 19, Petition of the People of the island of Santiago, Oct.
1512, p.53.
(4) In 1624, the Portuguese were asking 40 ducados per registro.
See A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa I - Petition of Francisco Rodrigues Serra, 
1624.
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were obtainable in Tenerife (Canary Islands) and Lisbon, but by far the 
most important office of issue was the House of Trade in Seville. The House 
of Trade first issued registros in 15&2, and from then until 1593, the vast 
majority of the licences named Cape Verde - Guinea as the area of provenience 
of the slave cargoes, (l) After 1595, the licences did not specify the sectioi 
of the West African coast where the slaves were to be procured, but, from 
other sources, it is clear that Upper Guinea remained a key region for the 
supply of slaves to Spanish America for another four decades, until the 
political break between Portugal and Spain in I64O. Thus the period 1562- 
1600 represents the kernel of the Hispano-Portuguese slave trading partner­
ship.
During the height of the registro system up to 1595, there seems 
to have been no standard number oflicences issued every year, and the number 
of 3laves which each captain was allowed to carry varied considerably.
Some licences authorised the transport of more than 600 slaves, while others 
related to less than 100. (2) Nevertheless, it is possible to arrive at 
soma conception of the overall volume of slave exports in this period. Both 
Alvares de Almada and Andre Domelas left the firm impression that the years 
of trade which they experienced from the 1560*s and 1570*s to the end of the 
century were years of boom and prosperity for the slave traders. Domelas
(1) H. and P. Chaunu: Seville et 11Atlantiqne, Vol 3, 1561-1595
(Paris 1955)
(2) A.G.I., Casa de Contratacion - No. 2875, Registros de Esclavos,
1584-1599.
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found on one occasion in the port of Guinala eight boats belonging to Cape 
Verde traders, ten belonging to the lan^ados. and two ships with registros 
for slave cargoes for the Indies. (£) A report to the crown in 1582 
claimed that it was usual to have twenty to thirty vessels at a time in the 
Ria Grande de Buba, mainly loading slaves. (2)
The size of the vessels used in the Atlantic slave trade was quite 
small. Even in the eighteenth century, they seldom went above 300 tons, 
while crafts of only 60 toms were known to make the Atlantic crossing. (3) 
However, the size of the ships belied the number of slaves transported.
Dornelas remarked that it was not unusual to find 200 ’pieces* of humanity 
packed into a small coastal boat, and the ships which made the Atlantic 
crossing- carried at least twice that amount. At the onset of the registro 
system the slave ships to the Spanish Indies carried 400 to 500 slaves each 
(4) and this was later increased. Under these circumstances, it is not 
surprising that the average annual export of Guinala alone was reported to 
be close to 3,000 slaves. (5)
(X) Andre Domelas "Rela^ao sobre a Serra Leoa"
(2) A. Brasio: Monumenta Missionaria Africana. 2nd series, Vol. Ill - No. 42, 
Relacao of Francisco de Andrade on the islands of Cape Verde, 26 Jan 
1582, p.105.
(3) See above, Ch. Ill, p./5"2, Mata
(4) Thomas Mercado: .Tra.tos y Contratos de Meroaderes (Salamanca I569)
p.66.
(5) Andre dornelas: op. cit.,
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On the other side of the Atlantic, the Spanish authorities were 
having great difficulties in regulating the inflow of slaves in such a way 
as to collect revenues# It appears that the registered ships usually carried 
more than their stipulated complement. In 1590, the House of Trade in 
Seville, having received reports that the customs of Cartagena were being 
systematically defrauded by the arrival of vessels with large:numbers of 
slaves beyond the amount authorised by the registros, demanded a complete 
account of slaves entering the port for the preceding five yeans# The 
Cartagena officials were bent on denying their own complicity in 
irregularities, and claimed that the ships seldom ever arrived with more slaves 
than they were licensed to carry# In their accounts, the Cartagena officials 
expected the House of Trade to believe that ships licensed to carry, say 
159 of 511 slaves, arrived in America with exactly that number on board.(l)
Not only was this highly improbable, but whatever numbers arrived in the New 
World represented a considerable reduction of those who were embarked. In 
1569? Thomas de Mercado estimated the mortality of slaves shipped from the 
Cape Verde islands to Spanish America as at least 20^ and much higher in some 
individual cases# He cited one example which had occurred shortly before he 
wrote, where 500 out of 500 slaves died on one vessel bound from Cape Verde 
(Santiago) to Mexico. (2) Thus, it is clear that the registro system was not 
being complied with in terms of the numbers of captives taken on board on the 
African Coast. Indeed, at the outset, the regulations struggled to replace
(1) A.G.I., Casa de Contratacion - No. 2877 > Registros de Esclavos, I6l0-l6l6.
(2) Thomas Mercado: Tratos y Contratos de Mercaderes (Salamanca 15&9) P*66#
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what the Portuguese regarded as ’interloping* and acts of piracy by Spanish 
ships, (l)
The extent of the defrauding of the Spanish and Portuguese 
revenues and more realistic figures of slave exports were given in a report 
to the crown by the governor of Cape Verde in 1622. It appears that since 
1595 the Atlantic slave trade from the Upper Guinea Coast to Spanish America 
had been standardised to permit four slave ships to call on the Upper Guinea 
Coast every year. Reports from time to time suggested that the number of 
ships was not exceeded. (2) But the agreed cargo was usually between 100 and 
200 si ives end this was completely disregarded, ships being packed with 
cargoes of 800, 1,000 or more slaves. The object of the captains of the 
slave ships was to defeat the revenue provisions on both sides of the
(1) A. Brasio: Monumenta Missionaria Africana, Africa Ocidental, 2nd Series, 
Vol. II - No. 152, Spanish Trade in Guinea, 15 May 1563, p.501, and
No. 155» Directive from the King of Spain to the mayor of Seville,
17 May 1565, p.506.
(2) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa I-No. 27, Nicolhao de Castilho, 27 Jan 1616; 
(There had been twelve registered ships clearing the port of Cacheu over 
the past three years.) No. 99, Baltezar Castel Branco to Antonio 
Francisco Luas, holder of the contract, 15 April 1617. (He reported that 
in 1616, four ships were sent from Cacheu to the Spanish Indies,
and three or four to the Cape Verde islands. That year, the arrange­
ment was to be the same.
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Atlantic, robbing the Portuguese coffe .rs in Guinea and the Spanish coffers
i/
in the Americas, because they paid duty only on the number inscribed on their 
registros, at the rate of 28 cruzados on every slave to the Portuguese and 
40 ducados (44 cruzados) to the Spanish, (l) It is very likely that these 
practices were prevalent not only in 1622 and in 1590 when the House of Trade 
made enquiries in Cartagena, but since 1562 when the registro system began. 
Certainly, in the 1560*s there were instances where ships obtained slaves even 
without registros. (2) so it would not be surprising if the registered ships 
made the most out of their title to legality.
Pour ships annually carrying between 800 to 1,000 slaves, as 
reported in 1622, would have placed the Cacheu exports well over 5,000 per 
year. The Conselho Ultramarino was appraised in 1643 that the Cacheu exports 
previously averaged 5>000 per annum. (5) In arriving at a total for the whole 
of the Upper Guinea Coast, one must take into account that the primacy of the
(1) Sena Barcelos: Subsidios para a Historia de Cabo Verde e Guine, Ch.
VII, p.221, Report of governor Francisco de Moura, 1622. A similar 
report had been made by the Jesuit Superior in Santiago, P. Sebastiao 
Gomes around 1620. He indicated that each registered ship declared 200 
slaves or less as their cargo, and thus robbed the Portuguese revenues of 
payments on 500 to 600 slaves. See A.T.T., Jesuitas 504* 56 > Ho. 7*
(2) Thomas Mercado: Op. cit., p.66} and Brasio, p.501.
(5) A.i.U.. Buine, caixa I - No. 28, minute of the Conselho Ultramarino,
20 Nov. l643«
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slave trade in this zone passed from Guinala to Cacheu at the beginning of 
the seventeenth century, and that both of them served as entrepots, whose 
trade nets were spread over all the rivers of Guinea. At no time, however, 
would Guinala or Cacheu have been the sole point of despatch for slaves to the 
Americas, nor would the Santiago and Lisbon authorities have accounted for 
slaves sold to Europeans other than the Spanish, though privateering voyages 
were becoming more and more frequent in the last few decades of the sixteenth 
century. As a rough estimate in the light of these considerations, 5,000 
slaves per annum would seem to be a reasonable figure for the volume of the 
Atlantic slave trade as conducted on the Upper Guinea Coast between 1562 and 
I64O; that is to say, during the period of registros corresponding to a 
substantial Spanish interest in African slaves, but preceding the extension of 
plantation slavery in the Caribbean and North America, as well as the full 
development of the asiento agreements.
It is clear that the Spaniards identified the Atlantic slave t rade 
with the Upper Guinea Coast. Thomas Mercado mentioned Sao Thome, but his
brief discussion of the slave trade is entitled "Concerning the Trade in the 
Negroes of Cape Verde"; and he refers specifically to the Sapes, Beafadas 
and Wolofs, (l) which indicates that the zone from which the captives were 
taken included the Senegambia and Sierra Leone, though about this time the 
Senegambia was declining in importance, as far as the Portuguese were 
concerned. (2)
(1) Thomas Mercado: Tratos y Contratos de Mercaderes, pp.63-68
(2) See above, Ch. Ill, p«
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According to another Spaniard, the Jesuit, Alonso de Sandoval, 
who was in close contact with slavers and slaveowners in Cartagena in the 
early seventeenth century, the slaves of the Upper Guinea Coast were the most 
popular in the Spanish Indies, and were referred to as escravos de ley, (l) 
This expression, probably stemmed from the fact that the slaves were brought 
under special contract, namely, the registroj (2) but it came to mean that they 
wsre slaves of the highest quality. The escravos de ley of the Guinea of 
Cape Verde were said to have been diligent, keen, intelligent, good-natured 
and happy; and they never lost an opportunity to play their instruments, 
xingxxs. sing and dance. They were also quick to learn the Spanish 
language, adopt the Spanish dress, and follow the fiesta a la Espanola. To 
this already imposing list of virtues (from the slave owners’ viewpoint), 
the Conselho Ultramarino added that the slaves of Cacheu were known for their 
fidelity. (3) 'Keen','intelligent’, ’good-natured’ and 'faithful* are dubious 
compliments, likely to have been gratuitously thrown in once it was clear 
that the slave was working and not attempting to rebel or escape at euery 
opportunity; but there seems to be some truth in the report that the slaves
(1) Literally "slaves of the law".
(2) Assuming that the Spanish and Portuguese usage was the same, then there 
were two categories of goods which could be imported into a colonial area. 
Some commodities were livres (free) and could be imported by any private 
person, while others were de lei and were the preserve of the government 
or specially authorised agency. See,- e.g., A. Lobato: Evolu^ao Adminis**
trativa e Economica de Mozambique. 1752-1763 (Lisboa 1957) P-251
(3) Alonso de Sandoval: De Natureleza de Todos Etiopes. pp.39>41>51
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from the Upper Guinea Coast adapted themselves rapidly to the New World 
situation, with a heavy emphasis on forms of amusement. The resort to song 
and lance constitutes perhaps the most important survival technique of 
Africans enslaved in the Americas. ^
Some scholars have felt that the specific provenance of the slaves 
has 3ome significance for New World studies, (l) However, quite apart from 
the likelihood that many of the alleged tribal characteristics were misleading 
stereotypes, what is relevant from an African viewpoint is whether the 
reputation of a given tribe or locality was sufficiently decisive to affect 
the conduct of the slave trade with r espect to that tribe or locality.
Sandoval held that the preference for the Negroes of the Upper Guinea Coast 
meant that the Spanish American buyers paid more for them than they did for 
other slaves* Later in the seventeenth century, there is some corroboration 
of this. Barbot said of the Upper Guinea Coast that "the slaves purchased 
by Portuguese and others in these parts of the continent and the neighbouring 
islands, especially those called Bijagos, are the ablest and most serviceable 
of any throughout North Guinea, and are valued at Mexico and Cartagene beyond 
those of Benin and Angola"; while Ogilby stated the difference in prices to 
have been ten reales on an average. (2) In 1678, the chief factor of the Royal 
African Company in the Gambia indicated that he could not possibly buy slaves
(1) See, e.g., Henri Dumont: Anthropologia y Patologia Comparadas de los 
Negros Esclavos (Ed. Fernando Ortiz, Havana 1916)
(2) John Barbot: Description of the Coasts of North and South Guinea, p.84;
and John Ogilby: Africa, p.363
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at Cacheu because the Spanish were offering thrice the amount with which a 
slave could normally be secured, (l).
There is the possibility that the Spanish preference for escravos 
de ley was affecting the volume of slaves exported from the Upper Guinea Coast, 
In 1643 > the Portuguese Conselho Ultramarino stressed the importance of 
preserving Cacheu, because of the quality of the slaves, and because "it was 
from there that the greater part of the slaves needed in the Spanish Indies and 
the mines of Potosi were obtained. Furthermore its loss would ruin the sugar 
estates of Bahia and Rio de Janeiro". (2) The reference to Bahia and Rio de 
Janeiro is quite perplexing, as the Conselho should have known that Angola and 
the Congo were supplying the Portuguese demand for labour in Brazil. Between 
1575 and 1587, Luanda exported an average of 2,500 slaves per annum and'over 
the next four years this yearly average tripled. (3) The most that can safely 
be advanced is that, firstly, the element of preference affected the destina­
tion rather than the numbers of Africans taken from the West African Coast; 
and, secondly, since the total of victims; taken from West Africa was not as
(1) P.R.O., T70/10 - Thurlow, 15 March 1678.
(2) A.H.U., Guine, caixa I - No. 28, Minute of the Conselho Ultramarino, 20 Nov
1643* When the Conselho had been informed in I64I of the importance of
Cacheu, they lad at the same time been told that Angola produced more slaves.
See the Consultas of the Conselho, Cod.30, fl.l07> Christovao da Cunha
Trist&o to the Conselho, 11 Sept I64I.
(3) J* Duffy: Portugal in Africa. p*50 (These figures do not include covert 
commerce from informal ports of embarcation.)
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tremendous in the sixteenth and early seventeenth century, then the few 
thousanls per annum transported f rom the Upper Guinea Coast were relatively 
more significant, especially in the Spanish Indies.
The figures .produced by the Cartagena trade officials in the context 
mentioned above, though underestimates of the totals, were probably an 
accurate representation of the relative proportions of the slaves obtained 
from various parts of West Africa. Of the 6,884 slaves said to have been 
imported between 1585 and 1590, all but 507 originated from Cgjpe Verde - 
Guinea. At the same time, the Upper Guinea Coast was also exporting slaves 
to Tierra Firme (Panama), Nueva Sspana (Mexico), La Guira (Venezuela) and Rio 
de la Plata (Argentina).
To obtain even a few thousand captives per year from this small 
stretch of coast was a major undertaking, providing a clear example of the 
organisition which went into slaving activities on African soil and the 
disorganisation which resulted within African society. How were such 
numbers of Africans made available for shipment to the New World? The great 
debate on the slave trade in the late eighteenth century and in the nineteenth 
century led to keen attention being paid to this issue. Lists and tabulations 
of slaving methods were produced in an effort to £how whether or not the 
Atlantic slave trade was vicious. This particular question no longer needs 
debating, but the categorisation of slaving methods is still useful. A 
modern history of the Atlantic slave trade states that "African natives became 
merchantable slaves in any one of five ways. They were criminals sold by 
the native chiefs as punishment; or they were individuals sold by themselves
i<n
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or their families in time of famine; or they were persons kidnapped either 
by European slavers or, more often, by native gangs; or they had been slaves 
in Africa and were sold by their masters; or else they were prisoners of war",
(l) This list can serve as a basis for the discussion of the conduct of the 
slave trade on the Upper Guinea Coast, with the exception of the category who 
were supposedly slaves in Africa, since this requires fuller investigation at 
a later stage. (2)
When John Hawkins sailed to Sierra Leone for the first time in 15&2, 
he took 300 victims, "partly by the sword and partly by other means". (3) From 
his own account, and from the complaints of the Spanish, this means that he 
either came upon the Africans, unawares or he seized them from Portuguese 
slavers. As argued earlier, such methods were anachronistic, and had been 
rejected as the dominant mode of obtaining slaves since the early years of 
Portuguese activity. (4) Up until the end of the ara of slave trading, a
ship’s captain would occasionally risk kidnapping a few Africans from the
shore, but such forays did not really pay, since they could entail casualties 
to the ship’s crew. Besides, no regular or seasoned trader would resort to man- 
stealing either by trickery or by force, because it harmed European commerce 
as a whole. At the time of Be Almada*s writing, the Nalus on the Cogon had 
for several years been hostile to all Europeans. This hostility came about
(1) D. Mannix and M. Cowley: Black Cargoes, p.40
(2) 3ee below, Ch. f-5~~lLh
(3) iakluyt Society, No. LVIII, The Hawkins Voyages
(4) 3ee above, Ch. III^ ^  / 5~/.
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after a European ship, which was loading ivory at the Cogon, sailed away with 
a dozen Nalus on board. De Almada referred to the ship as being manned by 
"individuals who had no experience of trade in those parts", (l)
Given that, for the most part, the Europeans paid for their human 
cargoes, then the main issue relates to the methods by which the Africans 
were made available for purchase. In times of famine, it is said that they
volunterred themselves. Occasionally, such instances are documented, usually
with reference to the Senegambia, where famine was produced by locust plagues.
John Barbot and Mungo Park for example, reported famines in the Senegambia
giving a fillip to slave exports. (2)
However, to cite famine as a major contributor to the Atlantic slave
trade is a gross distortion, and to add that "most of the tribes had no means 
of storing food for long periods" (3) is to introduce cobwebs. Food shortages 
wers not unusual on the Upper Guinea Coast (among certain tribes). When 
there was a period of scarcity preceding1 the reaping of the crop, those persons 
who were not rich enough to have food supplies all the year round had other 
means of supplying their wants until the main grain crop had been reaped. fH 
It would have taken not only the failure of the staple crop but also the 
failure of subsidiary cultivation and the disappearance of most of the other
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.340
(2) John Barbot: Description of the Coasts of North and South Guinea. pp.33>47>
and Mungo Park: Journal...1805. p.18
(3) D. Mannix and M. Cowley: Black Cargoes, p.43
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supplementaries of the sea and the forest before famine could he said to have 
struck. Only a serious locust plague did this, and for most of the West 
African coast they were rarities.
The first record of a locust attack on the Upper Guinea Coast is 
provided by a captain-major of Cacheu, who reported that there was a famine in 
the area in 1629-41, which was occasioned by locusts, (l) In 1750, there was 
the possibility of another swarm. Fears were expressed that since locusts 
were reported in the hinterland that year they would descend to the coast. (2)
Shortly afterwards, the locusts were at the estuary of the Gambia spreading
desolation, (3) and they may conceivably have arrived on the coast south of 
the Gambia, Of course, these may not have been the only such occurrences, but 
from 1750 onwards the chronicling of events on the Upper Guinea Coast was more 
continuous and more complete, and yet one does not hear of another locust 
plague until 1841-45, (4) and then again in 1895* (5) Thus, locust attacks, 
though dramatic, were most infrequent on the Upper Guinea Coast, and the same
a).- A.H.U., Guine, caixa I - No. 27, Paulo Barradas da Silva,
18 October I64I-
(2) Nicholas Owens Journal of a Slave Dealer, p,87
(3) M. Adamsons A Voyage to Senegal (Paris 1789)
(4) Lord Stanleys "Narrative of Mr. W.C. Thompson’s Journey from Timbo,
capital of Futa Jallo in West Africa", Journal of the Royal Geographical 
Society, I846, pp.106-138,
(5) Christopher Fyfes A History of Sierra Leone, pp.221,506.
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can be said for most of the slave trading areas of West Africa, (l)
Africans, in the main were not captured by Europeans, nor did 
individuals rush to sell themselves - they were forcibly brought to the 
Europeansbuyers by other Africans. 'Wars1 are admittedly the most prolific
agencies for the recruiting of captives. When the Manes led the invasion
into Sierra Leone in 1545> they sparked off a period of unprecedented 
slaving. The Portuguese seized upon the opportunity to profit from the rout 
of the Sapes. The ocean-going' slavers remained in the coastal bays and 
estuaries, while the boats of the 1anyados hovered like vultures in every 
river, waiting to take hold of the victims of the struggles. So numerous 
were the unfortunates that the boats sometimes rejected further offers of 
slaves after they had gorged their fill. (2)
The Sape peoples were restless under the Mane yoke. (5) After 
recuriting some Sape youths to train as soldiers, the Manes were prepared 
to sell as many as possible to mdse the population manageable. Whenever a
(1) The difference between the Senegal and the areas further south seems 
to be that the former is exposed to frequent attacks from the Desert 
Locusts which breed in the Sahara, while the species which attacks the 
West African coast are the African Migratory Locusts which have their 
home in the middle Niger, and only occasionally swarm and disperse in
various directions. See P.J. Pedler: Economic Geography of West Africa
(London 1956) p. 19*
(2) Alvares de Almadas "Rios de Guine", pp.565,564*
(5) See Above, Ch.
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ship needed slaves, the Sapes were the ones to he sold. Farma, the first Mane 
overlord, was a ruthless ruler, whose tyranny was only ended by poison. He 
was said to have been 130 years old when he died in 1606, and, during his 
long regime, conditions were such that it was not unusual to have 20 or 30 
vessels loading slaves at any given time in the ports of Sierra Leone, (l)
In his investigations of African regional origins of Cuban Negroes, Fernando 
Ortiz encountered the term ^apes* in many of the older documents, but had 
difficulty locating it in Africa. (2) Almost certainly, this referred to the 
Sapes of Sierra Leone, since the Spanish orthography was usually 1Zapes1. (5) 
The Mane example illustrates one extreme of the inter-relationship 
between tribal wars and the slave trade. The origins of the Mane-Sape wars 
were entirely independent of the presence of the Europeans, but, as a by­
product, they filled the holds of the slave ships. It was certainly 
unfortunate for the Sapes that the Mane affliction should have coincided with 
the presence of slave-buying Europeans. Inevitably, the Manes came to look 
upon the supply of slaves to the Europeans as an end in itself. English 
slave traders in the 1580*s reported that Farma would obtain 300 or 400 slaves
(1) B.R.A.H. r Papeles de Jesuitas, Tomo 185, No. 1346, Report of P. Baltezar 
Barreira on the slave trade of the Upper Guinea Coast, despatched from 
Sierra Leone 1606.
(2) Fernando Ortiz: Hampa Afro-Cub ana (Havana 1916)
(3) See, e.g., Mateo de Anguiano: Missiones Canuchinas en Africa.
Vofc. II, p.131.
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on request, by embarking on, a campaign, (l) This was one indication of what 
was largely true of the Upper Guinea Coast in the era of slave trading; 
namely, that most of the inter-group hostilities were motivated by and 
orientated towards the Atlantic slave trade. The melee of peoples on the 
river Cacheu - Banhuns, Casangas, Djolas, Papels and Balantas - was 
regarded by the slave traders as a paradise. (2) Indeed, the whole of the 
Upper Guinea Coast offered ample opportunities for conflicts between ethnic 
groups. Sometimes, captives were sold to the Europeans as incidental by­
products of tribal wars, but, more often, localised wars were fought 
specifically to procure slaves for export.
One primary source of slaves on the Upper Guinea Coast lay in the 
antagonism which existed between the Bijagos islanders and the residents of 
the adjacent mainland. The whole Bijagos society was geared towards the 
conduct of war. While the Bijago women cultivated the land, built the houses, 
gathered sea-food and fished, the Bijago men dedicated themselves to building 
almadias and waging war. They attacked indiscriminately all the peoples of 
the adjoining mainland - Djolas, Papels, Balantas and Nalus - and the 
residents of one island preyed upon those of other islands, once they were on 
the sea, for the sea, they said, had no king. The Bijagos were excellent 
sailors and swimmers and disciplined soldiers. Their weapons were handled 
with a dexterity b o m  of assiduous practice; and tremendous prestige
(1) G.R. Taylor (ed.): The Troublesome Voyage of Captain Edward Fenton,
Hakluyt Society, No. CXIII.
(2) Alvares de Almadas "Rios de Guine", p.307»
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resulted from success in the use of arms. Women took initiative in 
choosing their husbands, and they chose only warriors with fine reputations,
(l) A Successful combatant acquired many wives and almadias. and this in 
turn led to more wealth, especially since the owner of the almadia was 
entitled to one-third of the spoils from any expedition.
The Bijago assaults on the mainland had all the elements of 
cinematographic spectacle. The warriors anointed their bodies with red
ochre, coal and white clay; stuck feathers into their hair; and hung 
horses* tails on their breasts, attaching little bells to them. An elaborate 
ceremony was presided over by a priestess, whose final duty was the breaking 
of an addled egg on the stem of each almadia. Then, with a dip of paddles, 
the almadias went scudding off at a rate that the Europeans found amazing. 
Their journey was timed so that they arrived on shore during the hours of 
darkness. Surrounding a given village, they quickly set fire to the 
thatched huts. If the occupants came out fighting, they were cut to pieces 
by the expert Bijago warriors, and, mord often than not, they were prepared 
to surrender.
The sordid reality behind these bizarre episodes was that the 
Bijago activities had been considerably stimulated and enlarged on account of 
the European slave traders. It is true that some Portuguese traders on the 
mainland opposed the Bijago tactics. Sebastia Casao, a prominent trader in
(l) This observation made by Manuel Alvares was confirmed by modem field 
studies. See A.J. Santos Lima: Organizayao Economica e Social dos
Bijagos, (Bissau 1947)> P*98*
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the Geba - Ria Grande area, was in the forefront of a move to enlist the 
aid of the Portuguese government to put down the Bijagos, because they were 
decimating the Beafadas, among whom he traded. On the whole, however, the 
more important consideration for the Portuguese was that they could buy 
slaves from the Bijagos, and the more frequent and ferocious the attacks, the 
better were the slave merchants pleased. Up to 1594» De Almada seems to 
have been quite happy with the fact that the Bijago attacks yielded large 
numbers of Beafadas and Papels as slaves, (l) Later, in 1669, another Cape 
Verde trader with long experience on the coast, provided a lengthy descrip­
tion of trade among the Bijagos. Ne waxed ecstatic over the capacity of 
the small Bijagos islands to provide slaves. In 25 trips over a period of 
years in his own boat, Coelho had personally acquired well over 1,000 slaves, 
apart from large quantities of other merchandise. (2)
The extent of the Bijago response to the European demand for slaves 
can be measured by the development of unity among the different islanders, 
with respect to the pursuit of slaves. By the early seventeenth century, 
each island decided to put aside insular jealousies in favour of joint cam­
paigns against the mainland, amassing fleets of almadia.s for this purpose. (3)
(1) This information on the Bijagos comes from three sources: Alvares de
.Almada: "Rios de Guine", pp.315-520; Manuel Alvares: "Ethiopia Menor"; and 
the letters of Sebastiao Casao to be found in the Bib, de A.juda. Ms. 51“ 
VIII-25 and A.R.S.I., Lus.74, fls. 79-87.
(2) Lemos Coelho: Duas Descriyoes. pp.42-45*
(3) A.R.S.I.. Lus.74> fl.78 - Emchabole, king of Biguba to the king of 
Portugal, 24 April I607.
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As the century progressed, the Portuguese talk of defending the coast from 
the Bijagos was no longer heard. They and the other Europeans traders 
concentrated whole-heartedly in exploiting the potential of the Bijago market. 
When slavers arrived at the Bijagos, and found few or no slaves, they would 
reproach the islanders, insisting that this was a stain on the latter1s good 
name. Other Europeans, they said, would ignore the Bijagos on hearing that 
these famous warriors had become decadent. Such appeals to the Bijagos* 
sense of honour, accompanied by the liberal distribution of alcohol, usually 
achieved the purpose of the Europeans of inciting the Bijagos to go out and 
bring in more victims for the slave merchants, (l)
The Beafadas were particularly exposed to the Bijago attacks, but 
they in their turn were active slave raiders who spread terror in the seriao.
(2) Similarly, the Papels, especially those on Bissau, organised slave 
expeditions against the Balantas, Beafadas, Bijagos and Nalus. The Bissau 
Papels had the direct assistance of the European traders. Like the ships* 
captains, the resident traders did not usually undertake slave raiding on 
their own initiative. However, there were exceptions, the most important 
being the 1 any ados and grumetes on the island of Bissau. In 1686, three 
Spanish Capuchins carrying1 out missionary work on the Upper Guinea Coast 
prepared a description of the conduct of the slave trade. They reported 
aggrievedly that the Bissau lanyados and their descendants not only
(1) Mateo de Anguiano: Misfliones Capuchinas. Vol. II, p.135*
(2) Manuel Alvares: "Ethiopia Menor".
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engineered hostilities, hut had demanded of the missionaries that they should 
bless the slave rading expeditions, threatening to hang them if they did not 
comply, (l)
No tribe was free from involvement in these hostilities. The Nalus, 
Balantas and Djolas did not take an aggressive stand, but they were liable to 
attack from other tribes: the Nalus from the Beafadas, Papels and Bijagos;
the Balantas from the Papels and Bijagos; and the Djolas from the Mandingas. 
This last instance - that of the Djola-Mandinga confrontation - had the same 
piratical overtones as the Bijago attacks on the mainland. Sailing’ south out 
of the estuary of the Gambia in their almadias, the Mandingas fell upon the 
Djolas as they gathered sea-foods in large parties upon the coast. A-fc first, 
the Djolas were taken unawares, but, obviously, they soon began to prepare 
themselves for these attacks, and many Mandingas in turn were made captive. (2 
None of these ’wars' were fought to gain territory or political 
dominance; few of them arose out of tribal animosities. This was the view 
consistently maintained by Catholic observers like Thomas de Mercado in 15&9> 
the bishop of Cape Verde at the end of the sixteenth century, (3) and Baltezar 
Barreira and Manuel Alvares in the early seventeenth century. Even though 
their eye-withess reports on slaving on the Upper Guinea Coast in the era
(1) Mateo de Anguiano: Mls-Lonea Capuchinag, Vol. II, p.141
(2) Alvares de Almada! "Rios de Guine", p.288.
(3) Thomas Mercado; Tratos .v Contratos de Mercaderes-, pp.63-68; and Fernao 
Guerreiro: Relayao Anual. Vol. I, p.400. (For the protests of the Cape
Verde Bishop, D. Fr. Brandao, see below^
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of the registros were usually as brief as they were condemnatory, the picture 
can legitimately be filled in by evidence taken from later in the seventeenth 
century, which was also generated by Catholic missionaries: namely, the three
Capuchins mentioned above. They were resident on the coast for a few years, 
they had nearly forty years of intermittent Capuchin activity on the Upper 
Guinea Coast behind them, and they fully corroborated comments made in the 
previous century and earlier in the seventeenth, while adding further details 
and illustrations.
One of the things about which the Capuchins were quite definite was 
that all the conflicts which they heard termed 'wars1 were nothing more than 
robberies and man-hunts. The expression caer guerra ("to wage war"), which 
was commonly in use among the laneados, referred to the raids deliberately 
undertaken with a view to procuring slaves, (l) The coastal lingua franca was 
rich in such words, denoting the violent seizure of persons for sale into 
slavery. Amarrar was one of these, being the Portuguese word for "to bind"; 
panyar was another, derived from apanhar ("to seize"); while tomadia was yet 
another meaning "a captive expedition", and derived from the Portuguese word 
tomada ("capture").
With the incentive of European goods, slave rading became a 
profession, with persons dedicating themselves entirely to the service of the 
slave trade. The heir to the throne of Bissau in 16.06 was one such
(l) Also the expression ir a la guerra - See Mateo de Anguiano: Misiones
Capuchinas, Vol. II, pp. 137>141>144*
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individual, (l) In 1663, the Franciscan, Andre de Faro, encountered (and 
baptised) a noble on the river Nunez, who had a retinue of over sixty servants, 
all employed solely in man-hunting. His name was Salim, but the Portuguese 
called him Salteador ("Highwayman"). (2) Such professional slave hunters 
were called gamnisas in the Beafada language. It was their custom to 
acquire with the purchase-price of their captives some wine or food, which 
was offered to the captives. This, apparently, was a sop to the gampisas. (3) 
The Portuguese found it cheaper to baptise the slaves.
There was thus no real distinction between persons kidnapped by 
"gangs of natives" and those who were "prisoners of war". Bracketed together, 
those categories undoubtedly constitute a very considerable proportion of the 
Africans on the Upper Guinea Coast who were sold to European slavers. Equal 
in importance to the methods of force were the 'legal1 methods which produced 
'criminals1 for sale. Just as there were veiy few tribal wars which supplied 
victims to the slave ships in a purely incidental manner, and just as the 
slave trade gave rise to the violence upon which itin turn battdned, so the 
'criminals' who were transported to tte Americas were more often than not, the 
creation of the slave trade.
By the end of the sixteenth century, the individuals who could be 
deprived oftheir freedom by process of law were those condemned to death, 
those who administered poisonto or placed a fatal fetish on others, adulterers
(1) Femao Guerreiro: R^lacao Anual. Vol. 1, p.4H
(2) Andre de Faro: Peregrinacao. p.83
(3) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.337-
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with one of the king's wives, and those who solicited war against the king or 
asked the Xinas to bring about his death, (l) To these it must be added that 
debts often led to slavery, and the same can be said for the variety of 
offences which came under the term chai, namely, the failure to comply with 
prohibitions or taboos. (2) The slaves obtained in these several ways could be 
considered in one sense as criminals, since they were duly convicted by the 
law of the land. JLj. the same time, it is clear that customary law on the 
Upper Guinea Coast was functioning in a radically different way during the slave 
trade era than it did before and after.
Many of the charges which resulted in enslavement were complete 
fabrications. "Subversive plots against the local government became 
surprisingly common in seacoast towns off which the slavers dropped anchor.
The king almost always discovered a number of dangerous conspirators, and they 
naturally had to be sold." (3) However, most of the 'crimes' were of a more 
prosaic character. Adultery, as many observers realised, was one of the 
charges which offered great scope for fraud. Marital infidelity was a common 
affair in the polygamous societies of the Upper Guinea Coast, where the kings, 
chiefs and nobles had dozens of wives, many of whom were simply domestic 
servants. (4) If in the normal course of things enough accusations were not 
made, traps were set by husbands, with the complicity of their wives, so that
(1) B.R.A.H., Papeles de Jesuitas, tomo 185, No. 1346, Barreira 1606.
(2) Matea de Anguiano: Misiones Canuchinas. Vol. II, p.134
(3) D. Mannix and M. Cowley: Black Cargoes, p. 41
(4) Mateo de Anguiano: op. cit., p.136.
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‘’woman palavers/ could "be raised.
Above all, the allegations relating to the deaths of individuals 
were the ones which gave opportunities for chicanery. Crimes were essentially 
of two sorts: those which were concretely discoverable (such as murder,
theft, or adjultery) and those which were discoverable because sickness or 
death had come about, (l) Many deaths, whether resulting from disease or 
accident, were attributed to evil influences. In most cases, this evil 
influence was said to have emanated from a feticeiro. He was sought out and 
charged with the offence of ’’eating the spirit” of the deceased. (2) Some­
times, the evil was conceived of as residing in the deceased himself; whose 
death was constructed as proof of and punishment for his misdeeds. The 
Africans were prone to come to this latter conclusion when death resulted from 
an accident or a stroke of fate.
Clearly, offences in the above category had to be detected in a 
manner that was quite different from that of ordinary crimes. It was the 
interrogation of the dead person by the priest or .iambacouce. which yielded 
the information as to whether a given person had died because of a fatal 
’fetish* being placed upon him or not, and it was the .iambacouce who 
ferreted out the guilty party, though ostensibly, it was the dead man who 
acted as the accuser. The possibilities f or fraud in these cases were 
infinite. It was not that every death was attributed to a feticeiro - at 
least things had not deteriorated to that extent before the end of the
(1) L.V. Thomas 1 Les Diola. Vol. 2, p.496
(2) A.I.S.I.. Lus.83, fls. 349-552, Manuel de Barros, 19 April 1605.
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sixteenth century when De Almada was writing, hut when the interrogation led 
to 3omeone being branded as a feticeiro, this had all the appe&asances of a 
deliberate plot, with the slave trade as the incentive, (l) Travelling in 
1822, in a section of Temne country where the slave trade had been stamped 
out, Major Laing was witness to the interrogation of a dead girl. On that 
occasion the answer was that nobody was responsible for her death, but, as 
Laing remarked, ,fhad the slave trade existed, some unfortunate individual 
might have been accused and sold into captivity". (2).
W&en anyone was successfully arraigned on a charge, his family and 
dependants often followed him into slavery - as though he had committed 
Adam’s original sin, reported the Capuchins. (3) This was always the case 
with feticeiros. and sometimes a whole settlement or apolonia could be wiped 
out in one sale. (4) In part, this was a safeguard for those who were 
responsible for enslaving others, since they were freed Irom the possibility 
of vengeance being taken by the victims* families. (5) In some cases, 
however, it was the family alone who were sold, because the supposed feticeiro 
was already dead. If, as outlined above, accidental death was held to be 
proof of evil dealings, then the person’s family was also liable to penalties. 
De Almada was at the court of Masatamba, the Casaggg king, in 1570, when a
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.295
(2) A.G. Laing: Travels, p.85
(3) Mateo de Anguiano: Misiones Capuchinas, p. 136
(4) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", pp.263,295>332.
(5) B.R.A.H., Papeles de Jesuitas, tomo 185, Ro* 1346, Barreira.
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man fell from a palm tree and died. Immediately, the officials of the king 
went to the house of the dead man; seized his wives, children and relatives; 
and sold them all. (l) This was not .can isolated instance. By the end of 
the sixteenth century, it had become the law on the Upper Guinea Coast that 
a fatal fall from a palm tree was a ’crime*, the punishment for which was 
that the deceased’s family was automatically sold. (2)
From the above example, it can be discerned that, in the slave 
trade era, not only was there scope for fraud on the basis of the pre-existing 
law, but that the customary laws were themselves changing, especially with 
respect to the penalties imposed. This is the aspect of the situation which
stands inineed of the greatest emphasis. One is presented with the picture
f
I
on the Upper Guinea Coast of sale into slavery becoming the punishment 
meted out for a greater and greater number of crimes, descending to the most 
trivial, so that even when a charge was not spurious, there was a ludicrous 
disparity between crime and punishment. Before exemplifying this, it is 
necessary to lay bare the nature of legal punishmait on the Upper Guinea Coast 
as far as they can be discerned in operation when the factor of slaving had 
not intruded.
Perhaps the assumptions of savagery which were long current in 
relation to the "Dark Continent" may lead to the belief that, slavery or no 
slavery, the system of punishment on the Upper Guinea Coast may have been 
cruel. This is far from the truth. Valentim Fernandes reported in the
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine”, p.295
(2) Ferriao Guerreiro: Rela.can AnufyL, Vol. I, p.405.
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opening years of the sixteenth century that only murder was punishable by 
death among the Bulloms, while the Temnes had no capital punishment, (l) 
Indeed, on the whole West African coast, capital punishment was a rarity in
distinct contrast to Europe at that date. (2) The only other punishment was
in the form of fines. Adultery, for instance, was easily resolved, by the 
offending male paying the husband agreed damrges. (3) Deprivation of liberty 
seems to have been entirely unknown as a form of punishment. (4) Yet, with 
the advent of the Atlantic slave trade, the Africans of the Upper Guinea Coast 
were led to become parties in plots which resulted in the lifelong deprivation 
of the liberty of their fellows.
Chais were understandably very common on the Upper Guinea Coast.
When the 1 anyados committed chais, they were subject to fines, and they 
claimed that every pretext was used against them. (5) Some of the Africans 
themselves were open to the same kind of exploitation, with the vital
difference that they suffered slavery as a consequence. (6) The treatment
of debtors is another example of the severity and ruthlessness introduced.by 
the Atlantic slave trade. To borrow and fail to repay the most trifling
(1) Valentim Fernandes: La Cote Occidentale d’Afrique, p.96
(2) For the Gold Coast, Mannix cites Bosman to this effect. See Black 
Cargoes, p.38.
(3) Valentim Femandes: La Cote Occidentale d’Afrique, p.96
(4) See below, Ch. X,
(5) See hbove, Ch. III^ ft -
(6) Mateo de Anguiano: Misiones Capuchinas, Vol. II, pp.134,142.
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item in the seventeenth century on the Upper Guinea Coast was sufficient
warrant for arrest, conviction and execution of sale, (l) That people should
have been sold for debts may seem plausible in the light of the imprisonment 
of debtors in Europe, but it must be reiterated that it was by indigenous 
standards that the punishment of offences by slavery was lop-sided and vicious.
For the fabricated charges to have been successfully carried, and 
for the scale of penalties to have been so radically altered, the local courts 
obviously had to be parties to the travesties of justice. The procedure of 
the courts appears to have undergone alteration in the interests of injustice 
and the slave trade. The judges, along with the king, usually gave their 
decisions on the basis of the evidence. (2) However, there were certain 
ordeals to which the accused were subjected in doubtful cases. The use of the 
hot iron on the tongue or in the palm of the hand, with a few leaves placed
beneath it, was the most common of these ordeals, and was used in simple cases.
(3) One seldom hears of this method as the seventeenth century progressed. 
Instead, the most dreaded ordeal, that of the "red-water" was the most 
prominent. This test consisted in the drinking of the bark of a certain tree 
infused into water. (4) The innocent party was supposed to escape with his 
life after drinking* the poisonous solution. But the court was in a position
(1) Mateo de Anguiano: Misiones Capuchinas, Vol. II, p.145
(2) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", pp.348,349
(3) Ibid: p.262; and Manuel Alvares: "Ethiopia Menor".
(4) The tree in question appears to have been sasswood (Erythronhleum guineense) 
See Peter Kup: A History of Sierra Leone. p.l60
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secretly to vary the strength of the infusion, as well as to add other 
ingredients, which could act as anti-toxins or emetics, so that the guilt or 
innocence was pre-determined - and it was usually guilt, (l) In many 
instances the accused preferred to refuse the test, and accept being sold; 
while, alternatively, if the accused died drinking the "red-water”, his 
relatives were still available for enslavement.
The Djolas and Balantas were hostile to the slave trade, and 
did not indulge in preying upon each other by using the various dodges and 
stratagems just outlined. (2) On the other hand, the Casangas and the 
Beafadas were prolific in producing criminals for the benefit of the 
Portuguese lanyados and European slavers. (3) Perhaps this may lie at the 
basis of the charge which the neighbours of the Beafadas levelled at them, 
and that is, that it w§s the Beafadas who introduced slavery into the world.
(4) On the Upper Guinea Coast, taken as a whole, during the period cf 
intensive trade with the Spanish Indies, the victims produced as alleged 
criminals were substantial in number. No lengthy list of slaving methods 
is required. The two overwhelming forms of conducting the slave trade were 
force of arms (wielded by Africans) and the chicanery of a warped system of 
(ffi) Femao Guerreiro Relacao Anual, Vol. I, p.404
(2) For the Djolas, see De Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.290; and for the
Balantas who were said never to have preyed on each other, see J.B. Labat: 
Relation
IfeiLafcxoax Nouvelle/de l’Afriaue Occidentale. Vol. V, p.200.
(3) Fernao Guerreiro: Relacao Anual. Vol. I, p.404
(4) Lemos Coelho: Duas Descricoes, p.55
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. customary law.
Prom the methods of the slave irade there sprung certain 
consequences. Since some tribes were more predatory than others, it is 
possible very broadly to assess the results of slaving on individual tribes. 
The small Bijagos islands appear to have held a unique position in being 
largely cushioned from the effects of slaving. To begin with, the main­
land peoples did not counter-attack the Bijagos in their island homes; 
and in the second place, the Bijagos were not favoured as slaves by the 
Europeans. De Almada claimed that the Bijago children made good slaves, 
but adults (especially the men) were not good bargains, as they were able to 
wish death upon themselves and frequently did so. (l) Lemos Coelho pin­
pointed the Bijagos of the island of Permosa as being prone to committing 
suicide, because of the belief that if they died abroad their spirits would 
return home. (2) It is indeed true that the inhabitants of Fermosj believe 
that the spirits of the initiated return to an adjacent islet. (3) In any 
event, the Portuguese on the coast steered clear of the Bijagos as fax as 
securing slaves for service on the coast was concerned, and the Bijago 
reputation in the Americas was equally bad. Labat, who was a well-informed 
commentator on the American scene, said that the Bijagos were noted for 
rebellion on the slave ships, and that they were sold with great difficulty
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.318
(2) Lemos Coelho: Duas Describes, p.45
(3) J* Faria Leitao: "Bijagos da Ilha Formosa", in Inquerito Etnografico,
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in the Caribbean because of their natural ferocity and tendency to escape.
They would not work except under the whip, they wounded themselves, and they 
frequently committed suicide, (l) The Bijagos, therefore, could scarcely 
have qualified as escravos de ley.
A few other tribes may also have escaped with relatively slight 
losses from the slave trade in the period under discussion. Be Almada felt 
that the Djolas were increasing in numbers because they did not indulge in the 
slave trade. This is not difficult to believe, because though the Djolas were 
raided, from all accounts, they were quite capable of defending’ themselves. (2) 
The 3ame can be said of the Balantas, (3) so that relatively few of these 
tribas must have appeared on the market.
The Upper Guinea Coast was unfortunate in that it comprised so many 
petty polities offering scope for inter-group conflicts? and it was doubly 
unfortunate in having the powerful Mande peoples as its neighbours. When the 
Portuguese reached the Gambia in 1455 > their reputation as dealers in human
(1) J.B. Labat: Nouvelle RQlation de l!Afrique Occidentale, Vol. V,
3*198
(2) See below, Ch. X, p.^y? for counter-attacks against the Mandingas. In 1780, 
the Djolas also gave an excellent display against a European attack. See 
J.M. Grays A History of the Gambia, p.270.
(3) Vhen the Balantas were provoked by Bissau slave expeditions into counter­
attacking the prapa of Bissau, they made successfor sorties right under the 
walls of the fort. See A.H.U., Guine', maco V - Relacao of 2nd Nov 1778
(4 )
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kind had already preceded them from the Senegal, and the Mandingas would have 
nothing to do with them, (l) However, the very next year, the Mandingas 
accorded a friendly welcome to the Portuguese, and, for the remainder of the 
long period of pre-colonial trade, they were the chief collaborators with the 
Europeans on the Upper Guinea Coast. In the light of the Mande inclination 
towards trade, it was not surprising that the Europeans and the Mande should 
have forged strong trading relations. If human beings were the most saleable 
objects, then the Mande were willing to provide them. Not only were they 
willing, but they were also able, on the basis of their military superioriiy 
and the political control which they still maintained over several of the 
littoral groups in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. (2) It was no 
accident tint the Mandinga Farim Cabo was the biggest slave dealer in his part 
of the world, and he obtained his victims by raiding. (3) The Mandinga sea 
raids on the Djolas have already been cited, and Mandinga attacks were also 
carried out on land in the area around the Hereges river. The Mandinga ruler 
of Hereges, known as the Emperor of Fogny, was still attempting in the 
seventeenth century to exercise dominion over the Djolas and the Banhuns and 
to collect tribute from them. He attacked them when they refused to comply, 
and sold large numbers as slaves. (4)
Not only the Mandingas, but tribes who had come under close Mandinga
(1) Valentim Fernandes: La Cote Occidentale dfAfrique, p.34
(2) See above, Ch. 1^ f-SC.
(3) Mateo de Anguiano: Misiones Capuchinas, Vol. II, p.136; and P. Cultru:
Premier Voyage de Sieur de la Courbe. pp.25G~252.
(4) J.B. Labat: Nouvelle Relation de l!Afrique, Vol. V, p. 19,20
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influence, took the initiative in raiding their neighbours to provide slaves 
for the European traders. The Casangas were outstanding in this respect, and 
their ready supply of slaves and exceptionally favourable treatment of the 
lancados J^ ade Casanga territory a haven for the Portuguese. That the Casanga 
king should have been in the habit of bestowing on his Cape Verde friends who 
came to visit him gifts of at least ten or a dozen slaves attests both to the 
amicable relations with the Portuguese as well as his ability to produce this 
particular merchandise, (l)
The powerful position of the Casanga king was due in part to the role 
which he played within the Mandinga system of hegemony over the littoral peoplea 
He was directly under the Farim Brayo. and other subject peoples of tie Farim, 
such as the Banhuns and the Balantas, paid their tribute to the king of 
Casanga. (2) In the latter half of the sixteenth century the Banhuns were 
vigorously rejecting the supposed Casanga sovereignty, and this was 
associated with a serious conflict between the two tribes in the 1560*s. When 
the Casanga king Masatamba, chose to dictate on what terms the lancados should 
reside in Banhun territory, this led to further violence, and the powerful 
Casanga king overran Banhun territory in 1580. (3) Thus the Banhuns must 
have featured prominently among the victims whom the Casanga king offered to 
the Europeans.
The Cocolis were another tribe who were agents of Mandinga
(1) Andre Domelass "Relapao sobre a Serra LeoaM
(2) See above, Ch. I, p 5 l
(3) See above, Ch. I I I ^ - H ^
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expansion on the Upper Guinea Coast. They played a key role in the Nunez 
slave trade. The Portuguese and Spanish traders, seeking to fill the quotas of 
their registros. proceeded up the river Nunez through Nalu country until they 
arrived at Kagandy among the Cocolis. (l) Kagandy was a great slave mart and 
the slaves must have beendrawn mainly from within the domains of the Farim 
Cocoli. Right up to the middle of the nineteenth century, the Cocolis were 
still in the forefront of slave trading in that district. (2)
Unlike the Mandingas, the Susus and Fulas did not wield political or 
military dominance over the coastal peoples in the sixteenth century, hut one 
effect of the Mane invasion was to set the Bulloms, Teenies and Lokos at odds
with the Susus and Fulas. (3) Once conflicts flared, the captives invariably
found their way into the holds of the slave ships. The Susus themselves 
began to move closer to the sea after routing the Manes. By the mid­
eighteenth century they had found an outlet on the Atlantic between the Pongo 
and the Searcies, largely at the expense of the Bagas. (4) By this time, the 
Susus and the Fulas had joined the Mandingas as the most active agents of the 
slave trade on the Upper Guinea Coast, but long before that the Susus and Fulas 
had begun to abandon their former peaceful trade with the coast. During the 
second half of the seventeenth century, the majority of the slaves shipped from
(l)Alonso de Sandoval: De Natureleza de Dodos Etiopes, p.40
(2) William Shreeve: Sierra Leone (London) 1847)
(3) See above, Ch. I I } ^  ?<?
(4) See below, Ch.
SLAVE TRADING
Sierra Leone were provided by these two tribes, (l)
The greatest victims of the slave trade may well have been not the 
peoples of the littoral fringe, butthe 'Taleo-Negritics11 who occupied the 
interior plateaux and parts of the Futa Djalon. The Tenda country, as 
described by Mongo Park, was a vast tract of land along the Gambia between 10° 
and 14° West Longitude. (2) All this was under the rule of Mandinga chiefs 
and Farims from the earliest European reports, but a few discerning observers 
in the seventeenth century had noticed that the supposed Mandinga population 
was not homogenous. Jobs on, for example, found that above Baracunda on the 
Gambia the men wore hides instead of cloth, the women were heavily tattoed, 
and a different language was spoken, though Mandinga was understood Mby the 
better sort". (3) Lemos Coelho was also able to point out that the 
population of the Gambia and Cabo was Mandinga only in the s ense that t his 
tribe had come to dominate the original inhabitants in every cultural sphere. 
The Mandingas had become 1 naturalised1, and the indigenous people had taken 
the name of the Mandingas. (4) Thus, many of the slaves who may have been 
described as Mandingas must have been Tendas or fPaleo-Negriticsf in the 
process of assimilation. Apart from these, Coelho also specified that the
(1) Mateo de Anguiano: Misiones Canuchinas. Vol. II, p.132; and P.R.O.,
T70/14 - Greenaway, 26 Jan 1703.
(2) Mungo Park: Travels#.1785-1787. See accompanying map.
(3) R. Jobsons The Golden Trade, p.128. (Barracunda is around 13°30 
West Longitude.)
(4) Lemos Coelho: Duas Descricoes. p.117.
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Bassarels, a distinct Tenda group, were the principal captives sold hy the 
Mandingas; (l) and some years later De la Courbe found that the slaves on the 
Gambia had become merchantable because of war, crimes, sorcery or the fact of 
•belonging to "a subject race". (2) The latter could hardly have been other 
than the !Paleo-Negriticsf.
To circumstantiate the above claim, two pertinent parallels can be 
drawn. Firstly, the Manes considered themselves as licensed to exploit and 
sell the populations that they had conquered; and, secondly, the Fulas, in the 
latter part of the eighteenth century, practised a similar opporession over 
groups that they had defeated. (3) It seems very probable that after having 
established their dominance over the middle Gambia and the plateaux of Cabo, 
the Mandingas would have asserted similar rights over the various groups of 
Tendas who dwelt there. It is to be noted in the cases of the Mane and Fula 
empires that these supposedly sovereign tribes had to resort to violence on 
every occasion on which they wished to lay hands on the auctoctones for sale 
to the Europeans. The very likely pattern in the intermediary zone between 
the coast and the Futa DJalon, therefore, was one where the submerged groups 
were continually fighting for their existence in the face of dominant tribes 
such as the Mandingas, who were being spurred on by the European demand for 
slaves.
(1) Lemos Coelho: ^uas. Lescriyoes.pp. 25,134*
(2) P. Cultru: Premier Voyage de Sieur de la Courbe. p.l94«
(3) See below, Ch. IX, p and Ch. X, f  S'* <4 •
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For the period 1562-1640, the great slave raiding tribes on the 
Upper Guinea Coast were the Manes, the Mandingas, the Casangas, the Cocolis,the 
and^  to a lesser extent, the Susus and the Fulas. It is therefore accurate 
to represent the littoral non-Mande peoples of the Upper Guinea Coast as being 
to a considerable degree encircled and exploited by their Maude neighbours of 
the interior in the interests of the Atlantic slave trade. One principal 
result of the slave raiding was to emphasise and prolong the harassment of 
those ethnic groups who had sought the Upper Guinea Coast as a refuge from the 
political turmoil and subjection of the Western Sudan. Thus, when the 
lanpados met the Mande on the ’’mangrove line” of furthest river travel they 
forged a slaving partnership which boded evil for ths peoples of the Upper 
Guin3a Coast.
With respect to intra-tribal slaving operations, it is equally 
imperative to seek out the aggressors and the aggrieved parties. The slave 
trade exacerbated personal rivalries of all sorts, and no section of the 
society was exempted from these. There must have been conflicts among nobles, 
and among individuals in the lesser ranks of society, bearing in mind that 
every act of violence and every piece of chicanery perpetrated in the interests 
of the slave trade oftenbrought on its own train of vengeance and retribution. 
But superimposed upon these personal struggles, and indeed upon the inter­
tribal conflicts also, there was a definite pattern of class exploitation, 
with the ruling class as the offending party.
(1) Mateo de Anguiano: Misiones Capuchinas. Vol. II, p.132
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The "ruling class" must be taken to mean the kings, chiefs and
nobles, (l) At times it appears possible to draw a dividing line Ibetween the
king and his nobles. The slave ship offered a most convenient vehicle for 
the disposal of rivals to the king's authority, and the noble was obviously 
a profitable target for plots leading to the sale of his numerous family and 
dependants. De Almada stated that the persons who died after submitted to 
the ’red-water1 ordeal in Casanga territory were the rich ones whom the king 
wished to kill. (2) But the king of Casanga was unusually autocratic. The 
typical king or chief of the Upper Guinea Coast was simply -primus inter pares 
as far as the other nobles were concerned. The possibility did not exist
for the kings or chiefs to victimise their principal subjects at will. Only
with the substantial support of tbe nobles themselves can one envisage the 
king taking measures against one of their number. In the latter sixteenth 
and the early seventeenth century, the ruling class in Sierra Leone was not 
ethnically homogenous, and the Mane element was bent on the extermination of 
the Sape nobility. Elsewhere, how.ever, there is no evidence to suggest 
divisions between king1 and noble or between noble and noble, leading to any 
significant export of the privileged class.
It is necessary to recall, firstly, the nature of most of the 
tribal societies of the Upper Guinea Coast, as discussed previously, and to 
re-emphasise that there was a definite cleavage between those who held
(1) See above, Ch. I ^ ^  l I
(2) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.294*
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authority in the society and those who did not. (l) Secondly, it must he 
borne in mind that when the Europeans arrived they dealt with the Africans 
through the ruling class. Only the ruler of a given area could grant the 
lan^ados permission to reside and trade there, and only he could extend 
protection to them subsequently. (2) The responsibility for the slave trade, 
as far as the Africans themselves bear part of this responsibility, lies 
squarely upon the shoulders of the tribal rulers and elites. They were in 
alliance with the European slave merchants, and it was upon the mass of the 
people that they jointly preyed.
The law of the land was the king's law. It was a law administered 
by the king and his judges, all of whom w ere drawn from the nobility. When 
this law was made into the handmaiden of the slave trade, this could only have 
come about because the ruling class wished it to be. It was only the king 
and the nobles who stood to benefit from the perversion of justice. Another 
examination of the question of adultery will illustrate this. Though poly­
gamy was theoretically possible for all, it was wealth which determined how 
many wives a man possessed. Only the nobles had dozens of wives, and thus 
plenty of opportunity to encourage "woman palavers". Besides, the very 
definition of adultery depended upon class considerations. Actual copulatioh 
constituted adultery when the wife of a Beafada commoner was involved; when 
the wife of a noble was concerned, physical attempt was sufficient for a
(l)See above, Ch. I ) yO n  t
(2) See above, Ch. Ill, fl-il>^
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charge; while an indelicate proposal to one of the king's wives was enough to 
convict, (l)
VAs with adultery, so with every other cyarge - the ruling class were 
the ones who instituted them, and the common people w£re the victims. 
Contemporary European observers had no difficulty in discerning this. Ogilby, 
for example, affirmed that individuals became slaves either through war "or 
else under tte pretext of some imperious and arbitrary laws by the kings and 
great men of the country". (2) The Capuchins were very explicit on this 
latter point. "The crimes for which innumerable men, women and children are 
condemned to slavery usually consist of deceits, frauds and acts of violence 
of the powerful men; these latter are the judges, plaintiffs and witnesses, 
and in the end the unfortunate poor who cannot resist them are enslaved. (3)
The same observers added that "the rich and powerful enjoy the privilege of 
making captives, because there is nobody to resist them. They (the nobles) 
look upon so many persons with dislike, and when they feel so inclined, they 
easily exercise their privilege, because their own interests are not harmed by 
their greed. The king proceeds with the same licence." (4)
Apart from the unlikely possibility of being sold by the king, the 
noble could be certain that the law offered him protection. In Sierra Leone, 
in the mid-eighteenth century, the rich still paid only fines if they were
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", pp.524,555*
(2) John Ogilby: Africa: p.363
(3) Mateo de Anguiano: Misiones Capuchinas, Vol. II, p. 134
(4) Ibid, p.136.
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guilty of crimes, except where the offender transgressed any basic rule of the 
Poro. (l) Where slave raiding was concerned, the noble remained to a large 
extent invblate, because if captured, he was almost always returned to his own 
people, on payment of a ransom. Even the fearsome Bijagos were prepared to 
offer captured nobles for ransom in return for two commoners or five oxen. (2) 
Up to the end of the eighteenth century, the ruling class on the Upper Guinea 
Coast continued to follow this practice of ransom for their own security. (3)
If the noble was actually sold to the Europeans, he still had an 
excellent chance of recovering his freedom. In June 1622, the residents of 
Cacheu complained to the Governor of Cape Verde and to the Conselho da Fazenda 
in Portugal that the trade factor in Cacheu had been so foolhardy as to seize 
(amarrar)a noble, related to the king. (4) The consequences of the factor's 
actions were not stated, but other incidents of a similar nature indicate that 
the Cacheu traders ahad good cause for complaint. For instano©, in June 1680, 
the chief factor of the Royal African Company in Sierra Leone reported that two 
English private traders had stolen a noble from the Nunez, and the residents 
had threatened to kill all the Englishmen who 'fell into their power. 
Fortunately, the private traders carried the noble to the Company's factory at 
Sherbro, and the chief factor thought it wise to purchase the individual in
(1) Nicholas Owen: Journal of a Slave Dealer. p.4&
(2) J. Labat: Nouvelle Relation. Vol. V, p.134
(3) See below, Ch. X
(4) Boletim do Arquivo Historico Colonial. Vol. I, Doc. No. 28.
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question and make sure that he was returned to his homeland, (l) It therefore 
seems to have been the convention that nobles were not to suffer servitude, and 
that every effort should be made to secure the release of any noble who inad­
vertently fell into the hands of the slave traders. (2)
The noble suffered a minimum of disadvantages because of the 
degeneration of the customary law and the rise of slave raiding, and if he was 
sold he stood a very good chance of regaining his freedom; the commoner was 
the target of all the abuses of the law, he was the victim of the sLave raids, 
and when he was sold his position was desperate. In the early years of the 
seventeenth century, in the Cacheu-Ria Grande area, there was a tacit agreement 
between the kings and the Portuguese buyers that when a king knew that one of 
his subjects captured in a raid was about to be sold to the Portuguese, he 
should make no protest. According to Barreira, this was "because they (the 
kings) prefer to see their subjects in the hands of the Portuguese, rather than 
in the hands of the Bijagos, who would eat them if there were no buyers". (3)
The cannibalism ascribed to the Bijagos is only a red herring, because Barreira 
himself says that the agreement held good for the tribes other than the Bijagos, 
bribes against which the spurious charge of cannibalism was not levelled.
The agreement really seems to point to a harmonisation of the 
cupidity of all who stood to gain. In the first place, the 1 anyados could 
purchase any captive without enquiring after the ’title1 by which he had been
(1) P.R.O. T70/1 - Edmund Pierce, 5 Jan 1681, fIs.77,78
(2) See below, Ch. X ^ f> - 5 ^ 0  *
(3).B.R.A.H.. Papeles de Jesuitas, tomo 185, No. 1346.
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acquired, and with the assurances that they were not to he perpetually challeng 
to return human purchases on the grounds that the individuals concerned had bee 
3tolen. Such an arrangement was obviously essential if thel anyados were to 
trade simultaneously in the territories of the Casangas, Banhuns, Djolas, 
Papels, Beafadas and Bijagos, all within a limited compass, and each one 
sailing its neighbours. When De Almada said that the river Cacheu was a 
slaver's delight, (l) it must have been made so, not only by 'Balkanisation*, 
but by the conjoint action of the ruling groups in each tribe to allow the 
laneados to buy persons freely, irrespective of how they were acquired. In 
the second place, Barreira*s report that the kings of the Cacheu-Ria Grande 
area did not challenge a sale when any of their subjects was involved implies 
that the several tribal rulers on the coast had come to a reciprocal under­
standing to equalise their greed. King 'A1 had no fear of turning a blind eye 
when he saw his subjects being sold by king 'B*, because perhaps tte very next 
day the positions would be reversed.
There was another reciprocal agreement between the laneados and the 
African ruling class of the Upper Guinea Coast, which militated against the 
ordinary individual who sought to escape after being sold. When a captive 
escaped from a lanyado, the latter tarns d to the nearest chief or noble (with 
a ’gift1) and asked him to announce on his bomb ad on that such and such an 
individual had fled. (2) Such communications were the exclusive preserve of 
ths ruling class, and, without their co-operation the 1anyados could not have
(1) See above, Ch.
(2) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.326.
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coped with the frequent escape of captives for whom they had already paid. 
Later, the Royal African Company also found it necessary to pay neighbouring 
fidalgos to return fugitive slaves, (l)
It is an obvious and well recognised fact that the African chiefs 
and kings were actively engaged in partnership with the European slavers all 
along the coast. (2) But the impression given of inter-tribal conflicts has 
usually seemed to outweigh that of internal struggles. (3) On the Upper 
Guinea Coast at least, one is forced to give much more attention to the way 
that victims were produced for the slave ships from within individual tribes. 
As Basil Davidson points out, throughout the history of slaving all over the 
world, the distinction between selling people of a given in-group (such as an 
ethnic group or religious community) and those who were outsiders was not 
rigidly maintained# (4) The same applied on the Upper Guinea Coast, where 
the kings were just as likely to rob their own people as to attack their 
neighbours. The isolated exceptions only serve to reinforce this generalisa­
tion; because it could scarcely have been simple coincidence that the Djolas
(1) P.R.O.tT70/560, Bence Island Accounts
(2) See, e.g., Basil Davidson: Black Mother# where the idea of partnership
is a constant theme.
(3) D. Mannix and M. Cowley: Black Cargoes, pp. 12,13
(4) Basil Davidson: Black Mother, (p.107, however, suggests that the African 
chiefs on the coast seldom obtained the slaves from their own ranks. This 
holds good only after the Atlantic slave trade was pushed further and 
further inland.)
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and the Balantas, who produced the least slaves either by raiding or by preying 
upon each other, were the very tribes with an amorphous state structure from 
which a well-defined ruling class was absent, (l)
Tribal divisions were not then the most important* When the line 
of demarcation is clearly drawn between the agents and the victims of slaving 
as it was carried on among the littoral peoples, that line coincides with the 
distinction between the privileged and the disprivileged in the society as a 
whole. The Atlantic slave trade was deliberately selective in its impact on 
the society of the Upper Guinea Coast, with the ruling class protecting itself, 
while helping the Europeans to exploit the common people. This is of course 
the widespread pattern of modem neo-colonisation; and, by the same token, the 
period of slave trading in WQst Africa should be regarded as proto-colonial*
On the one hand, there was no semblance of European political control over the 
African rulers; but on the other hand, it was the Europeans who were 
accumulating capital*
In thd midst of lamenting the trials and tribulations of the lane ados 
Barreira related that one day a Mandinga arrived at Cacheu, having journeyed 
there to resolve a doubt which was besetting him. He asked the Muslim imam 
of Cacheu: "Why is itthat the whites are free, and the blacks are their slaves'
The reply was that God made tte whites first and the blacks afterwards, and he 
decreed that the latter should serve their elder brothers. (2) This was an 
imaginative portrayal of the colonial relationship.
(1) See above, Ch. •
(2) Fernao Guerreiro: Relayao Anual. Vol. 3, P*283
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Indirectly, via European testimony, the African rulers made it 
manifest that they regarded the slave trade as an imposition, but were prepared 
to pay that price for European goods. On this point, the Capuchins offered 
evidence which they elicited by questioning the African rulers on their 
attitude to the Atlantic Slave trade. They found, as Barreira before them had 
done, that the African slavers recognised their profession for the evil it was, 
(l) but contended that they indulged in man-stealing because the whites would 
purchase no other goods. (2) In the long run, the terrible logic of this 
situation caused the African chiefs to cling to the Atlantic slave t rade as 
their staple economic activity, even after it had become an anachronism within 
the capitalist system.
The European assessment of the Atlantic slave trade is quite 
unmediated as far as the historical sources are concerned, and thus it is all 
the more surprising that this is usually hopelessly misrepresented.0.A. Sherrard 
in treating the questionc£ "the slave and his emancipation", provides a typical 
example. "It is a notable fact," he wrote, "that riddled as negro slavery was 
with every form of wrong and oppression, no one ever proposed its abolition 
until the trade had fallen into British hands. It is the more notable, because 
the Indian slavery, which went before it and out of which it sprang, had aroused 
misgivings in many persons who could, had they wished, have crushed it in its 
first beginnings ... Yet, as soon as Negroes had replaced the Indians, authority 
both civil and ecclesiastical, dropped the subject and with it their
(1) Femao Guerreiro: Relacao Anual. Vol. p. 411*
(2) M. Anguiano* Misiones Capuchinas. Vol. 2, p.141
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hesitations#•. Almost overnight, negro slavery became, like the slavery of the 
pre-Christian world, an accepted fact - a mere matter of trade, which was of 
no interest to polite societies or to powerful hierarchies, or even 
philosophical academies... For rather mere than one hundred and fifty years 
this state of indifference continued; and then, as England entered the trade 
and the facts of slavery began to seep through, the English conscience was 
stirred; and with that stirring, hope for the slave was bom." (l)
There is no need to quarrel with this author's chauvinism, only with 
his purported facts. Clarkson's history of the abolition movement, as 
distinct from his observations on the contemporary scene, has been paid little 
attention. He gave a lengthy discourse on the early opposition to the Atlantic 
slave trade, a discourse which wobbles somewhat when he introduces Elizabeth I 
of England as an opponent of the slave trade, but which also highlighted the 
very real debate between Dominicans and Franciscans, which Pope Leo X resolved 
in f avour of the anti-slavery party, by declaring that "not only the Christian 
religion, but that nature herself cried out against a state of slavery". (2)
The literature on the Upper Guinea Coast has numerous references to clerical 
debate along these lines.
The Spanish, Portuguese and Italian Catholics who opposed the 
Atlantic slave trade couched their arguments mainly in theological terms.
(1) O.A. Sherrard* Freedom from Fear, the Slave and His Emancipation 
(London) p.97
(2) Thomas Clarkson: History of the African Slave Trade (London 1808)
Vol. 1, p.38.
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They agreed that by doctrinal writ it was possible for an individual to be 
'justly1 enslaved, and that capture in war, for example, provided a "just 
title" for enslavement, if the process was incidental. But, they then proceede< 
to demonstrate that the Atlantic slave trade bore no relationship to this 
theoretical model, because the 'wars' themselves were products of the slave 
trade, (l) Even Alonso de Sandoval, who adopted a pro-slavery stance, did not 
deny that the captives from the Upper Guinea Cdast and elsewhere in Africa were 
victims of "unjust wars", but he gave solace to those slave captains in 
Cartagena, who were nauseated and morally discomfited by their participation 
in the trade, by telling them that when they purchased slaves in Santiago or 
Cacheu, those Africans had already passed through the hands of two or three 
intermediaries, and it would therefore have been impossible to ascertain by 
what 'title' a particular slave was acquired. (2)
A few Catholic observers did not share Sandoval's nimble conscience. 
Mercado, for instance, felt that all who had anything to do with the slaves 
purchased in Santiago were morally contaminated and guilty. He expressed 
scepticism that the matter had really been thoroughly investigated by the
(1) Manuel Alvares: "Ethiopia Menor". Here the question is discussed at
length, ^e cited Justinian law to the effect that one "just title" was 
provided when an individual over twenty years old voluntarily sold himself. 
Leviticus, Ch. 25 gave him reason to believe that poor fathers could in 
extreme circumstances sell their children. Crime was also another 
possibility.
(2) Alonso de Sandoval: Natureleza de todos Etiones. pp.65-72.
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Mesa da Consciencia cf the Portuguese kirg, and he mentioned that a number of 
letters on the subject had beendespatched to Lisbon, (l) In actual fact, the 
awareness of the methods of the trade and the protests against the slave 
trade on legalistic grounds led imperceptibly to a position of total condem­
nation. To contend that a 'just1 slave was a rarity on the Upper Guinea 
Coast, as Manuel Alvares insisted, and to complement this by saying t hat the 
European traders should accept only those persons who had been 'justly' 
enslaved was in effect to call for the abolition of the slave trade.
Apart from citing the opinions of learned theologians, and pointing
to the vicious discrepancies on the African coast, the Catholic priests 
involved in this protest waged their campaigns around the question of baptism. 
As Barreira had found, and as Sandoval admitted, the Spanish and Portuguese 
slave traders seldom bothered to baptise the slaves, or alternatively they 
were allowed mass baptism, a whole shipload being admitted to grace in one 
fell swoop. (2) D. Frei Victoriano Portuense, bishop of Cape Verde in the 
last years of the seventeenth century, was a vigorous campaigner against 
the failure to baptise slaves. The statements of thn bishop were quite 
forthright. "Knowing the manifest injustices by which people are made slaves 
in Guinea the only excuse (and even this is not sufficient of an excuse) is
(1) Thomas de Mercado: Tratos y Contratos de Mercaderes. p.68
(2) Fem&o Guerreiro: Relay ao Ariual. Vol. 1, p.400. In most of the letters t>
his Padre Provincial. Barreira registered some protest against the slave 
trade. He also advocated that all Cape Verde slaves who served well 
should be manumitted. See A.R.S.I., Lusitania 74*
237
SLAVE TRADING
to say that these gentiles are being taken out to receive the light of the 
church." But the slave trade as it was then conducted made no provision for 
the salvation of the blacks, and was indeed the greatest danger to the souls 
of white folk. D. Victoriano Portuense claimed that B. Frei Pedro Brandao, 
who held the see one hundred years earlier, was so disgusted with the injustice 
of the Atlantic slave trade that, failing to put a stop to it, he relinquished 
the bishopric of Cape Verde-Guinea, and returned to Portugal. "My scruples
are not so great that I condemn totally this trade, seeing that it is
tolerated by so many men af letters and great theologians", added D.
Victoriano - perhaps with a humble tongue in his cheek, (l)
On the subject of the slave irade, only one letter of the 
redoubtable D. Frei Brandao appears to have survived, but it is enough to bear 
out the truth of Portuense*s report. Written about 1598, it contains a 
scathing attack on the leading role of the Portuguese in the traffic of human 
flesh, and he proposed to the king that all blacks should be baptised and then 
declared free by virtue of this baptism and reception into the Faith. (2)
(1) A.H.IT.. Cabo Verde, caixa VI - the remarks quoted were in a letter to the
Conselho on the 13th June 1700. Apparently, the correspondence on this 
question was going on for at least a decade. D.Frei Victoriano Portuense 
received a directive from the Conselho on the 23 Jan I69O that no slaves 
should be shipped without being baptised. Other letters of his survive
dated 4 June 1696 and 17 June 1697* His real name was da Costa.
(2) Av J * Brasio: Monumenta Missionaria Africana. Africa Ocidental 2nd series, Vol.
Ill - No. 110, Letter from the bishop of Cape Verde to the king, pp.442-445* 
The editor notes that Brandao left Santiago in 1694 after spending six 
years there. He relinquished his mitre in 1606.
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Quite obviously, civil and ecclesiastical authorities had not droppe< 
the subject of the Atlantic slave trade, as Sherrard would have us believe.
The opposition of soms Catholics to the Atlantic slave trade (and also to 
slavery in the Americas) was not carried on in obscure places. Such views 
were consistently placed before tie highest civil and ecclesiastical 
authorities. Even at a glance, without pretending to come to grips with 
the views of all the priests in the New World or in parts of Arica otbr than 
the Upper Guinea Coast, it is clear that this subject was one of the most 
important pre-occupations of those who saw themselves as the guardians of 
the European conscience, and who came into contact with the harsh realities 
of the Atlantic slave trade. The records of the Propaganda Fide, the 
central, co-ordinating b ody for Catholic missionary endeavour, show that this 
was the case, with letters ofprotest arriving from various parts of Africa 
and AmerL ca; but the reply of the Sacred Congregation of the Propaganda 
Fide was that slavery was inevitable if the plantations were to survive, (l)
The protests constitute a noteworthy epic in themselves, as well as
(l) A.P.F.. Acta, Vol. 54, No. 19, fl* 19 - Report on the abuses of the
slave trade in the Congo by the Procurator General of the Congregazione 
dei Negri. 6 March 1684; Vol. 55, No. 26, fl. 35, Capuchins in America 
and Africa complain about slaving in Africa, treatment of slaves on board 
ship and in America where they were overworked and underfed. (Dated 12 
March 1685); and Vol. 56, No. 15, fl.12, report on abuses of slave 
trading and slavery, 11 Jan 1686, with comments by the Sacred 
Congregation of the Propaganda Fide.
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indicating (as one might reasonably have assumed) that Europeans were fully 
cognisant of the monstrosities of tbe Atlantic slave trade. Those who did not 
know were those who did not want to know. The question was posed "What price 
profits?", and the answer was that no moral price or human suffering was too 
high to pay for monetary gain from the trade in slaves and from the extension 
of capitalist production into the Hew World.
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PART I - "PORTUGAL AND HER EUROPEAN RIVALS"
Flourishing though the Atlantic slave trade may have "been, 
the Portuguese crown faced serious problems in attempting to secure for 
itself the major profits of the trade of the Upper Guinea Coast, just as 
the Spanish authorities struggled to cut down on the revenue leakages 
connected with the import of slaves into the Americas, (l) In the first 
place, the Portuguese monarch had to take into account the interests of the 
Cape Verde settlers, to whom some of the profits had to accrue. In the 
second place, though the lan^ado at the end of the sixteenth century was not 
the hunted outlaw he was at the beginning of that century, he still defied 
the provisions of his sovereign in many respects, making it difficult 
for the Portuguese treasury to collect revenues on the trade of the area.
The fiscal arrangements for the Cape Verde islands and the 
adjacent coasts involved the division of the mainland into districts or 
* trades1. The Upper Guinea Coast itself was considered as two districts - 
that of '’Sierra Leone" and that of the "Rivers of Guinea". (2) The 
boundary between the two was as far south as the river Searcies, which, 
because of its kola supplies, was an integral part of the Cacheu trade. (3) 
The various •trades' between the CaP© Verde peninsula and Cape Mount were
(1) See above, Ch. IV, p•iqo
(2) J.W. Blake; Europeans in West Africa, Vol. 1. p.37
(3) See below, Ch. VIII, p.
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leased sometimes separately and sometimes conjointly# At any rate, the 
same merchant or group of merchants often leased more than one simultaneously; 
and after 1521 it appears that one group of contractors generally enjoyed 
sole rights of trade on the coast between Beziguiche" (Goree) and Sierra 
Leone, (l)
In 1535 > the Cape Verde Guinea contract was worth 8,000 cruzados 
per year; (2) a bid of 25>000 for a three-year period was offered in 1551?
(5) while in 1607* the value was 27,000 cruzados# (4) Sometimes, the 
contract was sold for six years, as in the case of Alvaro Mendes de Castro, 
who leased it in 1586. (5) Frederic Mauro, in his study of "Portugal and the 
Atlantic in the seventeenth century” provides a list of the Cape Verde-Guinea 
contract holders from 1589 to 1643 > indicating the prices at which they 
obtained it# The price of the contract shows a marked decline from 27*000
(1) J#V# Blake: Europeans in West Africa, Vol. 1, pp.37>38
(2) Ibid: p.141
(3) Ibid: p#179
(4) Luciano Cordeiro (Ed*): Estabelecimentos e Restates Portugueses na Costa
Occidental de Africa em 1607. nor urn Anonymo. p*12 (At 5s to the cruzado,
the value of the contract in 1607 would have been £6,750*)
(5) A.G.I*, Casa de Contratacion, No. 2875> slave registers from 1584 to
1599* Mendes de Castro was followed by Simon Ferreira jimbrosio in 
1592.
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cruzados in 1607 to 9 >4-00 cruzados in 1637) (l) though the records which 
establish these figures are not perfectly clear.
There were three main clauses in the contract - apart from a 
minor stipulation that the contractors should discharge charitable 
obligations to churches and hospitals in Portugal and maintain the clergy in 
Santiago, Firstly, the lessee was obliged to send at least twelve ships 
during his three years of control^ preferably, four each year# These were to 
proceed to the African coast via Santiago# Secondly, he had to confirm to 
the general commercial regulations, which prohibited the sale of certain items 
(chiefly weapons) to the Africans# Finally, the contract protected the 
rights of Cape Verde settlers, guaranteeing that they could trade freely on 
the mainland in their own produce, and that they were able to import enough 
slaves for their own use. (2)
While, in the early part of the sixteenth century, the 
Portuguese government lad at times considered it necessary to limit the role 
which the Cape Verdeans played in the trade of the Upper Guinea Coast, (3) 
when the Atlantic slave trade increased in volume and became a joint Hispano- 
Portuguese concern, the crown sought to buttress Santiagofs position as the 
entrepot of all overseas trade with the UpperGuinea Coast. All ships bound
(1) Frederic Mauro: Le Portugal et l^tlantique au XVII6 Siecle. 1570-1670. 
Etude Enonomique (Paris i960) p,l6l
(2) A#H#U.T Cabo Verde, caixa I - Copy of the CV-Guinea contract signed with 
Gaspar da Costa, Jan 1637*
(3) See above, Ch# III, p, 11+%.
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to and from the mainland had to stop and pay duties at Santiago, and the 
fiscal machinery for the recovery of duties was to be found in that island* 
On the mainland, the factors* were really agents of the holders of the 
contracts.,(l) and it was only in I614 that a single official of the crown 
was app ointed to serve on thd mainland. (2) In theory, there was no need 
for trade officials to be stationed at Cahheu and other points on the coast^ 
since Santiago was a compulsory transit point for all trade to and from 
the Upper Guinea Coast; but, not surprisingly, the registered vessels seizec 
the opportunity to load on the coast and by-pass Santiago.
In the early seventeenth century, it can clearly be seen 
that it was the rule rather than the exception for the registered vessels
to flout the commercial statutes. In September 1608, the municipality of 
Santiago petitioned for an end to the practice of ships proceeding directly 
from Spain and the Canaries to the Upper Guinea Coast. (3) In June 1615,
(1) J.W. Blake: Europeans in West Africa: p.38 and Bib, de Aluda. Ms.51* 
VIII-25, fl.87 - Description of Cape Verde and Cacheu by Sabastiao 
Casao, 1607•
(2) A.H.U. r Guine, caixa I No. 1, Letter of appointment given by Nicolhao 
Castilho, governor of Cape Verde, to Joao Tavares de Sousa, who was to 
become "captain of infantry, factor and receiver of the royal revenues” 
in Cacheu and the other rivers of Guinea. 29 Dec 1614* (Published in 
Boletim do Arquivo Historico Colonial. Vol. 1, p.203)
(3) Bib, de A.iuda Ms. 5I-VIII-48, f 1.182, Consultas of the Conselho da 
India, 1603-1609. Petition of Sept. 1608.
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the governor of Cape-Verde - Guinea had cause to repeat the same request*
(l) while, in the following year, he complained that more than 2,000 
Negroes had been despatched from Cacheu to the Spanish Indies, but only 
half of these had teen entered in the books of Cahceu, and hardly any had beei 
transhipped via Santiago. (2) In July 1619, the crown republished a decree 
of 1608 by which all vessels were to trade with Guinea only through Santiago 
or suffer penalties* (3) Apparently, the effects of the second publication 
were as null as the first and those which went before it, because in 1627 
the Casa da India was informed that for many years they were defrauded and 
nothing was accruing to the royal revenues* (4) In March 1634» there was a 
report that Alvares Gonsalves, a prominent 1anyado, had been imprisoned in 
Cacheu for procuring slaves fof export to the detriment of the royal 
revenues. However, he escaped and was practising his profession as middle­
man trader at Joala in the Senegambia. (5)
The comphints of the Cape Verdeans against the violation of 
their privileges received legislative support, while the counter-claims
(1) A.H.U.. Cabo Verde, caixa I - No. 31, Nicolhao Castilho to the Conselho, 
2 June 1615*
(2) Ibid: No. 67, Nicholhao Castilho, 30 June 1616.
(3) Ibid: No. 45, Treslado of 10 July 1619* (A treslado was a copy of a 
royal edict, which was transcribed into the books of the local 
authorities and signed by the notary.)
(4) A.H.U,. Guine, caixa I - No. 5, Minute of the Conselho, 1627*
(5) Ibid: No. 12, Minute of the Conselho, 22 March 1634*
FREE TRADE v s  MONOPOLY
which were presented, asking for the freeing of the coastal trade from the 
necessity of proceeding via the Cape Verde islands, met with no sympathy. In 
June 1610, Joao Soeiro, the then holder of the contract, petitioned the 
Conselho da India in a vain attempt to reverse the restriction imposed on 
the registered ships, (l) In reality, this trader was seeking official 
sanction for what he was already doing, and failure to obtain it did not 
deter him. Subsequently, he and his agents were asked to answer charges of 
breaking the contract and defrauding the royal revenues, (2) but this did 
not help to preserve the Portuguese monopoly on the Upper Guinea Coast.
Here, as one governor of Cape Verde lamented, nothing could b e done to stop 
ships trading on points of the mainland because of the attitude adopted by 
the resident Europeans and the African chiefs. (3)
Most of this period of intensive slaving, accompanied by 
inadequate revenue collection, was taken up by the union of the Spanish and
Portuguese crowns, which lasted from 1580 to I64O. Some historians -
Portuguese scholars in particular - have judged harshly the consequences of 
the Iberian union on Portuguese imperial fortunes. For them, this was an 
interregnum of alien rule. "The decline of Portuguese influence and commerce 
on the Upper Guinea Coast was a simple consequence of the incapacity and 
disorientation of the Kings of Castille and their representatives in
(1) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa I - No. 88, petition of 5 June 1610.
(2) Ibid: No. 22, Minute of the Conselho, 9 Sept 1614.
(3) Ibid: No. 27, Nicolhao de Castilho, 1 Jan I615.
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Portugal", writes Joao Barreto, (l) This thesis has at its base the 
erroneous contention t hat 1580 was a significant turning point in the 
pattern of events on the West African coa3t - the date after which Portugal's 
possessions became subject to attacks from Spain1s European enemies. There 
was no such sharp change on the Upper Guinea Coast. Throughout the sixteenth 
century, there had been breaches of the Portuguese monopoly of trade on the 
Wast African coast by French, English and Dutch ships; and it was around the 
middle of the sixteenth century that English voyages to West Africa began in 
eimest, and if the Upper Guinea Coast was not touched during the well- 
known voyages of Lok, Wyndham, Towerson etc., it was mainly because 
navigational conditions induced the ships1 captains to make their first 
landfall at the river Cess on the Malaguetta Coast. (2)
On the Upper Guinea Coast itself there were a number of English 
voyages in the two decades before 1580. John Hawkins made three trips to 
the Upper Guinea Coast in 1562, 1594 and 1587? while Francis Drake made his 
second voyage to those parts in 1578, when he attacked and seized a ship in 
the harbour of Ribeira Grande, Santiago. (3) Curiously enough, the 
Portuguese prince, Antonio, Prior of Crato, who was a rival of Philip II, 
was himself responsible for encouraging commercial ventures on the Upper 
Guinea Coast in the 1580* s, from his place of refuge at the English
(1) J. Barreto: Historia da Guine. p.85
(2) J.W. Blake: Europeans in West Africa, Vol. 2
(3) A. Brasio: Monuments Missionaria Africana, 2nd series, Vol. Ill - No. 35,
Relayao of the pilot Nuno da Silva, 20 May 1579, P*82.
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court. (l) In so doing, he gave some fictional title of legality to the 
English ships which Philip II and his Portuguese administration would have 
regarded as 'interlopers*. In any event, the issue was not fundamentally 
one of international law. Growing mercantile capitalist states in Europe, 
such as England, the Dutch provinces, and France, were prepared to challenge 
the Iberian pretensions to a monopoly of world trade whether or not Spain 
and Portugal were hanging together. To the extent that there was an 
increase in the frequency of arrival of Portugal's rivals on the Upper 
Guinea Coast after 1580, this can scarcely be attributed to the union with 
Spain.
The Spanish monarchs and their representatives in Portugal 
were indeed incapable of putting an end to European infringements of the 
Portuguese monopoly of the commerce of West Africa. In October 1591, the 
governor of Cape Verde-Guinea wrote to the Conselho da India urging that a 
fleet should be sent to clear the rival European powers from the Upper 
Guinea Coast. (2) To this and similar pleas, the response was the 
proclamation of empty edicts. (3) But, such complaints were nothing new.
a) J.M. Gray: A History of the Gambia, pp. 17,18
(2) A. Brasio: Monumenta Missionaria Africana, 2nd series, Vol. Ill, No. 80 
Memoranda by Bras Soares de Melo, Captain of Cape Verde, 7 Oct 1591*
(Cited by J. Barreto: Historia da Guine- . p.85)
(3) Ibid: No. 83, Royal letter to the Captain of Cape Verde, 18 Oct 1592.
(in this instance, two frigates were promised and may have been
despatched, but even this gesture was an empty one, since hundreds of 
miles of coastline could not be blockaded.)
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In June 1542, to cite one of many examples, Jorge Vas, clerk of Cape Verde, 
wrote to King L. Joao III as follows: "At the time when the ships were 
captured in the island of Foguo, I wrote to Your Highness to tell you how 
needful it was that the coast should "be guarded during the months; of 
February, March, April and up to May, and that the contractors should be 
given authority to defend the coast, because otherwise Guinea would be lost, 
and there would be no trade”, (l) No doubt, he would have been answered 
eventually by a royal decree forbidding Portugal's European competitors from 
sailing in African waters.
Another facet of the charge against the Spanish is that the 
abuses of the registered ships had created indiscipline and anarchy on the 
Upper Guinea Coast. (2) In this connection, an important point to recall 
is that the first registros were issued at Seville in 15&2. The Spanish did 
not impose the system on the Portuguese after the union of the two crowns.
On the contrary, the latter had themselves issued licences in Lisboa. 
Besides, in 1615, after the a?,egistro system had fallen into disuse, the 
Cape Verde administration was pressing for its return, realising that its 
replacement meant a decline in shipping. (3)
One particularly misleading suggestion from the ”anti-Spanish
(1) A. Brasio: Op.cit., Vol. II - No.103, Letter from Jorge Vaz to the king 
10 June 1542, p.345* See also J.W. Blake: Europeans in West Africa, 
pp.170-174 (translation of the above letter)
(2) J. Barreto: Historia da Guine, pp.82-84 (Supporting a view first 
expressed by Sena Barcelos.
(3) A.H.U.. Cabo Verde, caixa I - No. 54, Nicolhao Castilho, Dec. 1615.
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school” is that the problem of the lane ados and their encouragement of rival 
Europeans was in any way a product of the period of joint monarchy, (l) In 
carrying out his function as middleman, the 1anyado made no distinction with 
regard to the nationality of those with whom he traded. This was to have 
been expected. The resident traders seldom started with much capital. They 
took trade goods on credit from European ships, and, with these, they obtainec 
the slaves and other items from the Africans. Their self-interest lay in 
trading with as many ships as possible, regardless of whether or not a given 
ship was considered by the Portuguese authorities as a threat to their 
monopoly. This was the principal reason why the crown waged its legislative 
war against the lanyados, The legislation failed because there were no 
means of putting it into operation, and because it cut across the realities 
of the economic situation, Portuguese prices were very often »ea?e competit­
ive, and their range of trade goods was limited. The Portuguese from the 
metropolis and the Cape Verde islands were actually forced to desist from 
trading in the Srniegpambia because the 1anyados facilitated the trade with
w
the English and French, which obviously offered them more profits. As early 
as 1568, because of this commercial competition, and because of piracy, 
Portuguese ships no longer thought it worthwhile to attempt trading north of 
the Gambia river. (2)
(1) Leite de Magalhaes: "A Costa de Guine", in A Rpstaurayao e o Imperio 
Colonial Portugues. (Agencia Geral das Colonias, Lisboa 1940)*
(2) See above Ch. Ill, p./37
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South of the Gambia, the situation in the latter sixteenth 
century and early seventeenth was somewhat different from that to the north. 
The laneados did maintain contacts with European ships other than Portuguese 
and Spanish, especially since they needed to purchase iron from the Dutch, 
English and French, (l) The Dutch were more prominent, and had a trade , 
house at Cacheu. (2) In Sierra Leone, the European competition was much 
greater; but, for the most part, the resident traders of Portuguese 
extraction on the Upper Guinea Coast did not find it necessary to do extensive 
business with Portugal1s rivals. This was due largely to the Hispano- 
Portuguese partnership. The Spanish were able to provide the capital and the 
trade goods which the Portuguese lacked, and a ready and profitable market 
for slaves was provided in the Spanish Indies at a time when plantation 
slavery had not yet come of age.
As late as 1620, the Englishman, Richard Jobson, was in a 
position to refuse to engage in the slave trade in the Gambia, "We were a 
people," he said, "who did not deal in any such commodities, neither did we 
buy or sell one another, or any that had our owne shapes." (3) This widely 
quoted statement is as inaccurate as it is pious. The English had been 
trading in slaves during the sixteenth century with the full sanction and
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guin£, p.286; and see below, Ch,VIII, p.
(2) A.H.U.. Guine, caixa I - No.27* Joao Pereira Corte Real to the Conselho, 
Dec 1641*
(3) R* Jobson: The Golden Trade, p.120,
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participation of their queen. Yet, it does indicate that slaving had not 
assumed the priority for the English (and the French) in the sixteenth 
century as it clearly had in the case of the Portuguese. This was a 
further reason why the Portuguese monopoly of the commerce of the Upper 
Guinea Coast was not seriously challenged by rival powers in the sixteenth 
century.
The real challenge to the Portuguese would come, not in the 
form of voyages by 1interlopers1, but when a rival European power or 
trading company sought to set itself up on the mainland or even to visit 
those shores on a regular basis. This would have presented no difficulty, 
because the Portuguese position on the Upper Guinea Coast was extremely weak. 
Arguin, Goree, Sao Jorge de Mina and Luanda were either to the north or to 
the south of the Upper Guinea Coast, where the only point of Portuguese 
concentration was Cacheu, a site of negligible strength, which had been 
fortified on the initiative of the local traders to resist the Africans, 
not the artillery of European ships. Sierra Leone, to the extreme south of 
the Cape Verde trading zone, was the must vulnderable area. Its connections 
with the fiscal centre at Santiago were tenuous indeed. It seems that when 
Sierra Leone products were not sold to rival European ships, they 
reached Portugal or the New World, as the case may have been, after being 
shipped northwards to Cacheu in small coastal vessels,
European ships of all nations called at the Sierra Leone 
estuary without hindrance, and their captains inscribed their names at the
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watering place of the bay of Sierra ^eone. (l) The patent grantSd by the 
English crown to Thomas Gregory in 1592, authorising him to trade between the 
Nunez and the Sherbro for ten years, (2) was a direct affront to the 
Portuguese, but nothing of consequence spring from this concession. After 
a single voyage to Sierra Leone, Gregory seems to have lost interest. (3) 
Before another venture of this sort could be launched, the Portuguese sought 
to strengthen their precarious hold on Sierra Leone*
The Portuguese crown had made a veiy early attempt to establish 
itself in Sierra Leone, with the construction of a fort near the Sierra 
Leone estuary some time during the reign of D. Joao II (1481-95)* But, 
this was abandoned and demolished before the reign was over. (4) When interes 
in Sierra Leone was renewed in the sixteenth century, the idea proposed was 
that of white colonisation. The initiative, as in so many matters relating 
to the mainland, came from the Cape Verde settlers. In 1580, the residents 
of Santiago had elected Alvares de Almada as a delegate to treat with the 
administration in Lisbon for permission to colonise Siera Leone. The 
enthusiasm behind this request can be gauged from the fears expressed by the
captain major of Santiago that permission to settle in Sierra Leone would lead
to the depopulation of the Cape Verde islands; (5) as it was, the project
(1) E.R. Taylor (Ed.): The Troublesome Voyage of Captain Edward FPnton; and 
Andre Domelas: "Relayao sobre a Serra Leoa".
(2) Richard Hakluyt: Voyages« Vol. 3> P*195
(3) Peter Kup: A History of Sierra Leone, p.41*
(4) Pacheco Pereira: Esmeraldo de Situ Orbis. p.80
(5) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.377
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was shelved for more than twenty-five years#
The representations of de Almada must have had some effect - 
perhaps more so after 1594 when he placed his observations on the Upper 
Guinea Coast on record. Besides, there were other advocates for the colonis­
ation of Sierra Leone. The Jesuits were in favour of the idea, (l) and in 
1606, Bartolemeu Andre, a Sierra Leone trader, wrote to the crown, 
describing the prospects for European colonisation in glowing terms. (2)
In that same year, Pedro Alvares Pereira, a Councillor of State, was given 
Sierra Leone as a doacao. This grant was said to have been based on that 
made by D. Sebastiao to Pablo Dias de Novais in Angola in 1574* (5) Pedro 
Alvares undertook to build up a white community on the coast between the 
river Searcies and Cape Mount. Emphasis was placed on settling artisans; 
and, over a period of fourteen years, two forts were built for the protec­
tion of the colonists. (4) This plan was to be carried out in conjunction
(1) Fernao Guerreiro* Relayao Anual, Vol. 1, p.408
(2) Ibid, Vol. 2, pp.209-211
(3) James Duffy: Portugal in Africa. p#50 (Reference to the grant given to
Novais) The comparison was made in what appears to be a memorandum of 
the Conselho da India, written around 1610. See B.R.A.H., Papeles de 
Jesuitas, tomo 185, No. 1348#
(4) Luciano Cordeiro: Estabelecimentos e Resgates Portuguezes na Costa
Occidental de A-prica em I607t p*12; and Sousa Viterbo: Os Portugueses
e o Gentiou, 0 Institutor Vol. 43> No. 3> Uoimbra 1896.
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with Jesuit missionary work among the Africans, and Father Baltezar 
Barreira was appointed logal agent for Pedro Alvares. (l)
Barreira carried on his proselytisation; hut nothing came 
of the colonisation scheme after the f irst ship bringing men, building 
materials and munitions was ensnared by the French. (2) Within a few years 3 
the crown became anxious to direct the activity itself, with Pedro Alvares 
being willing to renounce his rights for a compensation. The Hispano- 
Portuguese Conselho da India outlined an ambitious scheme which referred to 
settlement, defence, trade, exploration and Christianisation. The main 
activities were to have been sugar cultivation and the export of slaves.
Once the sugar plantations and factories had begun to show a profit, the 
attempt would then have been made to proceed inland in search of gold, etc.
(3) Here again there was plenty of promise, but no performance.
With the failure of the Portuguese attempts to organise the 
settlement of Sierra Leone, or even to set up forts or factories with 
officials of the crown, Sierra Leone remained the home of the lanyados. 
who collected slaves, ivory, camwood and wax for export overseas, while 
doing a flourishing business by sending kola, dyes and slaves to the rivers
a )  A.R.B.I., Lus.74> fl«64> letter from Barreira on 4 March 1607*
(2) An account of this incident was given by Lemos Coelho, who mistakenly 
referred to Pedro Alvares Pereira as Pedro Alvares Cabral. See Duas 
Descriyoes Seiscentistas da Guine. p.73> and Peter Kup: History of
Sierra Leone, p.65.
(3) B.R.A.H.. Papeles de Jesuitas, tomo 185, No. 1348*
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further ncsfch. It meant, too, that the coast waw clear for rival Europeans 
to make their dehut, as soon as they felt so inclined. When they took up 
the option during the course of the seventeenth century, Portugal did not 
bother to make even verbal pretensions to Sierra Leone.
It was the Dutch and the English who moved into the vacuum 
created by Portuguese weakness in the southern portion of the Upper Guinea 
Coast. A roteiro of the coast of Guinea, prepared in 1635 for the benefit 
of important Spanish officials, indicated that the English and the Dutch 
had several trade factories in Sierra Leone, and they had installed themselve 
comfortably in Europe an-style houses. Between them, the Dutch and the 
English despatched ten to twelve ships per year, loaded with ivory, camwood, 
wax, gold and other goods, (l)
In the opening years of the seventeenth century, the Dutch 
built a fort at Cape Mount, which served to protect the terminus of a
substantial gold trade which had its origin in the hinterland of the
Malaguetta Coast. They were so well entrenched that they b ^ n  the 
cultivation of sugar cane. The king of Sierra Leone, prompted by a 
Portuguese 1 any ado, counselled his Mane ’brother1, the king of Cape Mount, 
to be very careful, because the Dutch were taking away his land. This 
warning spurred the king of Cape Mount to expel the Dutch. (2) However, it 
appears from the account of Manuel Alvares in 1616 that the Dutch were still
(1) Documentayao Ultramarina Portuguesa. Vol. 2, "Relacion para el Rey, Noss 
Senhor do Bispo de Malaca", 1635*
(2) Pernio Guerreiro: R^layao Anual. Vol. 2, pp.209-211.
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in that area, (l) if not under the same conditions, and it is significant
that such scarce information as has been preserved about conditions around
Cape Mount has come mainly from Dutch sources. (2)
In the Sherbro area, the English held sway. Evidence in 162*.$ 
indicated that a London firm, Wood and Company, had been trading in the 
Sherbro region for about twenty-five years. They had obtained a grant from 
the local king, and wore mainly concerned with the export of camwood. (3) 
Sherbo was one of the two nuclei, around which the English chartered 
companies trading to West Africa in the mid-seventeenth century were based, 
as the following recommendation during the Commonwealth regime shows:
"the council states their opinion that 20 leagues on each side of the two 
chief factories, or residences by the sea coast, the fort of Cormantin, and 
the river Cerberro, near Sierra Leone, may be granted to the present 
Adventurers". (4) The ’Adventurers1 referred to were the Company of 
Merchants Trading to Guinea.
The Sierra Leone estuary was the scene of both English and 
Dutch activity. Following upon the voyages made to Sierra Leone in the 
late sixteenth century, by captains like Hawkins and Drake, the English 
preserved their interest in this region. They were said to have been 
particularly favoured by the French, who were friendly with the Temnes to the
(1) Manuel Alvares: "Ethiopia Menor"
(2) See above, Ch. II, p.jr^
(3) See C. Fyfe: .Sierra.,Laflne Inheritance., pp.59-62.
(4) Peter Kup: A History of Sierra Leone, p.66.
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south* When the Frenchman, Villault, of the French West India Company, 
visited Sierra Leone in 1666, he had to pay deference to an Englishman, 
by the name of Abrahams, who for many years lived on one of the islands of 
the Sierra Leone estuary, and who was "loved and protected" by the Bullom 
king. Abrahams was serving as factor of the Royal Adventurers, incorporated 
in 1662, and the Bulloms thought enough of him to effect his ransom for nine 
hundredweights of ivory, when he was captured by Villault. (l)
The Portuguese trader, Lemos Coelho, wrote in 1669 that the 
Dutch had two houses made of timber and two turrets for defence at a spot 
near the confluence of the Port Loko Creek and the Rokelle. (2) Both nations 
were primarily concerned with the ivory trade, but it was European rather 
than local trade rivalry which brought them into conflict. The Dutch 
Admirals, De Ruyter and Meppel carried out a successful attack on Tarso 
island in I664, the main English factory being stationed there; (3) and 
that converted Sierra Leone into a minor theatre of the Anglo-Dutch wars.
The rapid decline of Dutch trade in Sierra Leone over the following decade 
was probably a reflection of external conditions, related to the commitments 
of the Dutch in Europe and the East Indies.
(l) Nicholas de Villault: Relation des Costes d’Afrique, p.62; and
Christopher Fyfe: Sierra Leone Inheritance, p.55*
(3) Lemos Coelho: Dnaa Descriyoes Seiscentiatas da Guine, pp.74,234*
(3) John Cgilby: Africa* p.376; and Sierra Leone Studies* (Old series)
No. 19.
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When the Gambia Adventurers received a lease from the Royal 
Adventurers in 1672, they had a relatively clear field in Sierra Leone as 
far as competition from other Europeans was concerned. They traded 
profitably in Sierra Leone, (l) but the company as a whole was never placed 
on a sound financial footing and gave way to the Royal African Company in 
I678. This latter continued to trade in Sierra Leone until 1728> and in the 
Gambia until the middle of the eighteenth century.
While in Sierra Leone the English had ousted the Portuguese 
almost without any opposition, to the north, Portugal had some semblance 
of control over the Geba - Gambia area, and after the ’Restoration1 of I64O, 
the Portuguese crown fought bitterly against rival European encroachments in 
the region. Indeed, for a brief while, using Cacheu as a base, the 
Portuguese mounted something of a commercial counter-attack on the English in 
Sierra Leone. The events in this northern sector of the Upper Guinea Coast 
during the period I64O-I7OO offer an opportunity to analyse the trade 
rivalries at greater depth. The question of Free Trade vs Monopoly was 
never simply one of the confrontation of European powers. On the Upper 
Guinea Coast, the lane ados usually added another dimension to the problem; 
while, the Africans, as everywhere else on the coast, were always actively 
involved. How did the issue of Free Trade vs Monopoly fit into the African 
conception of the partnership with the 1anyados and visiting European tradorsl 
To answer this, one must embark on a fairly close and detailed narrative of 
events in the main centres of trade on the Upper Guinea Coast in the seven­
teenth century: namely Cacheu and Bissau.
(l) P.R.O.T T70/10 - Edmund Pierce, 4 Aug 1679» fl.53*
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PART IX - FREE TRADE TRIUMPHS (CACHETO 1640-1684)
As soon as Portugal reverted to the status of an independent 
monarchy, steps were taken to assert the national interest on the Upper 
Guinea Coast - as elsewhere. The national int.-rest was construed as being 
essentially antagonistic to that of Spain, so that the first measures of 
the new Portuguese a^ime aimed at terminating the partnership which had 
been established between the Upper Guinea Coast and the Spanish Indies.
Shortly after his accession as monarch in his own right, D. Joao IV issued 
a decree prohibiting Santiago and Cacheu from dealing with Spanish 
registered vessels unless these deposited securities in Portugal. At the 
same time, all Spanish vessels in Guinea and Cape Verde ports were to be 
embargoed, (l) A few Spanish vessels were caught in the net, but this 
offensive was most ill-advised. The Spanish were capable of providing the 
varied imports to which Africans had become accustomed, while Portugal was not 
in that position; and the attempt to impose a monopoly without the ability 
to supply the market was bound to bring the Portuguese authorities into 
conflict with the Africans.
The authorities in Portugal, in Santiago and on the Upper 
Guinea Coast had also to reckon with the opposition of the laneados to any 
policy which would have limited trade and profits. As middlemen, the 
1 any ados had a vested interest in the arrival, of as many ships as possible 
bringing goods at competitive prices. As argued earlier, the lanyados had 
not found it necessary to do extensive business with foreign traders on the
C D  A.H.U.. Cabo Verde, caixa II - Royal decree of 20 Dec. I64O.
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TJpper Guinea Coast, precisely because the Spanish were buttressing the 
Portuguese. As a result, the 1anyados were firmly pro-Spanish, (l) Then 
too, there were a number of Spanish citizens who had settled on the Upper 
Guinea Coast to help organise the export of slaves to the Spanish Indies. (2) 
Their position in relation to the new stringency of the Portuguese would 
have been in no doubt.
The residents of Bissau, Guinala, Geba and Cacheu sent 
affirmations of their fealty to D. Joao IV in I64I, but Luis de Magalhaes, 
the then captain-major of Cacheu, in an accompanying letter, also took the 
opportunity to register their grievances. (3) Hardly any ships were calling. 
The Spanish were temporarily refraining from conducting any commerce because 
of the embargo, and no Portuguese ships had replaced the Seville registered 
vessels, so that trade was virtually at a standstill. The Portuguese 
citizens on the Upper Guinea Coast apologised for sending their congratu­
lations to D. Joao IV in November I64I, nearly one year after the 
auspicious event of independence fromSpain; but in that time they had seen 
no Portuguese ship, and, they added, with a fine touch of irony, it would 
hardly have been becoming to have sent the message in a Spanish ship. The
(1) A.H.U.. Guine, caixa I - No. 150, this report of I648 stated that most
of the Portuguese residents were on the side of the Spanish patacas. 
the silver coins of the Americas.
(2) A.H.U., Guine, caixa I - No. 27> Joao Pereira Corte-Real, 23 Dec I64I.
(3) A.H.U.T Guine, caixa I - No. 23» Luis de Magalhaes, 30 May I64I.
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Portuguese merchants emphasised that they had so far been obedient to royal 
provisions, but they wondered whether the price of loyalty was to be 
starvation. For them this was no flippant abstraction, for famine had 
actually prevailed upon the coast for two years, between 1639 and I64I, 
because of locust attacks, (l) Nor did the sale of a limited amont of 
relief supplies from Cgjje Verde at black market rates make the Cape Verde 
authorities any mord popular.
It appears that after a brief hiatus in I64I, the Spanish 
ships began to return along with other European ’interlopers*. At Cacheu, 
they were welcomed by both the 1 any ados and the Papel chiefs. The Papels 
of Cacheu, having control of a major port, were deeply involved in the 
trade with the Europeans. No ships meant no imports, no customs duties, 
no perquisites. This put the Papels into an ugly mood, because, according 
to Joao Pereira Corte-Real, one of the two local advisers to the Conselho 
Ultramarino, the Papels regarded the European articles as ’necessities’.
For this reason, he said, they were desperate enough to threaten to kill 
the white inhabitants of Cacheu if the captain-major did not allow free 
trade. (2) This threat was almost certainly a bluff because the chiefs 
desired the presence of the Europeans, but the Papels could gain their ends 
by other means. Since its construction by subterfuge in 1589» the fort of 
Cacheu had been deliberately refused its own water supplies. Water had to
(1) A.H.U.. Guine", caixa I - No. 27> Paulo Barradas da Silva, 18 Oct I64I;
and see above, Ch. IV, p.2.«o
(2) A.H.U.f Guine, caixa I - No. 27* Joao Pereira Corte-Real, 23 Dec I64I.
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be obtained from a stream and a fountain some small distance outside the 
stockade. Ag soon as a ship was sighted, the Papels encamped around these 
spots as a guarantee that trade would be permitted, (l)
In one grim respect, the famine of l639**41 Lad been useful to 
the Papels; namely, by decimating the numbers of Negro ’slaves* who were 
kept by Cafaheu merchants, not only for purposes of trade, but also for 
defence. (2) Besides, the coercion of the captain-major into permitting 
free trade was not something against which the traders within the stockade 
were likely to take arms. On the contrary, the Portuguese residents 
instigated this course of actionby the Papel chiefs, so that the captain- 
major had no option but to disobey the injunctions of his sovereign and 
permit all comers to trade freely in the port of Cacheu. (3)
The term of office of captain-major Luis de Magalhaes was due 
to expire in May 1642. He did not actually leave until 1644* Whether it 
was because he had to spend the extra years on the fever-ridden coast, or 
whether it was because he grew tired of the unequal battle against the 
laneados and the African chiefs, Magalhaes compromised himself with the 
Spanish. Complaints reached the Conselho from the governor of Cape Verde 
that when Juna Perez, a Spanish master boat builder of Cacheu had indulged 
in seditious vituperation against the king of Portugal, Magalhaes had simply
(1) A.H.U.. Guine", caixa I - No. 124, Review of the history of Cacheu presen­
ted to the Conselho, 26 Sept. I67O.
(2) A.H.U.. Guine", caixa I - No. 23, Luis de Magalhaes, 30 May I64I.
(3) A.H.U.. Guine, caixa I - No. 27> Joao Pereira Corte-Real, 23 Dec I64I
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jailed him for a few days; and that the captain-major was making no attempt 
to stop trade which the Spanish slavers were openly carrying on in Bissau,
Geba and Cacheu* (l) Furthermore, Magalhaes was said to have been co-operating 
with Alfonso Villa Real, the most experienced Spanish trader in the region* (2) 
The governor of Cgpe Verde advised the recall of Magalhaes, and when the 
latter did return to Portugal it was as a prisoner, accused of the crime of 
lese majeste. (3)
It had not been the intention of the Conselho to leave Magalhaes 
in office for so long. In I64I, the Conselho Ultramarino had nominated Paulo 
Barradas da Silva as captain-major of Cacheu, a post in which he had already 
served twice. (4) However, Da Silva wrote the Conselho intervening on behalf 
of one of the owners of a Spanish registered ship which had been sequestered, 
and recommending the resumption of trade to the Spanish Indies. This was 
hardly calculated to gain confidence in his willingness and ability to enforce 
the policy of monopoly, and, to make matters worse, there came reports that 
Da Silva, who was in Santiago at the time, was far too friendly with English 
traders. (5) As a result, the Conselho turned once more to Gonyalo de Gamboa
(1) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa II - governor Serrao da Cunha, 14 Oct 1643 
and 4 April I644
(2) A.H.U., Guine", caixa I - No. 36, Minute of the Conselho, 22 Aug 1644
(3) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa II - Joao Serrao da Cunha, 28 Jan 1645
(4) A.H.U., Guine'", caixa. I - No. 54* Letter patent of 26 Oct I64I
(5) A.H.U., Consultas of the Conselho Ultramarino, Cod.30, fls.107 and 219-23
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de Ayala, who had been nominated in 1638, but for some reason had not taken 
up the appointment, (l)
Some time late in 1643* the Conselho received word from Jorge 
Castilho, the second of its two advisers on the Upper Guinea Coast.(2)
Castilho made several recommendations. Firstly, he urged that Ayala should 
be sent out immediately, along with sixty soldiers. Secondly, he returned to 
stress the need for a proper fort at Cacheu to replace the mangrove stockade 
which was in existence. (3) He advised that the fort should be built on the 
site of the fountain, where (apart from the obvious advantage of a water 
supply) there were stones which could help in the construction. Other building 
materials and artillery were to be brought out from Portugal. The finances 
for this scheme could, in his opinion, be met by utilising a sum of money which 
had long been kept for erecting a cathedral in Santiago, and had never been 
touched. To this could be added tha. goods seized from two Spanish ships 
consequent upon, the embargo order of D. Joao, and the securities deposited in 
Santiago by a Dutch ship which was given permission to load slaves for Bahia,
but carried them to Pernambuco instead. He also felt that Paulo Barradas da
(1) A.H.IJ.. Guine, caixa I - No. 22, Letter patent of 16 Aug. 1638.
(2) Joao Pereira Corte-Real and Jorge Castilho, the two advisers to the Conselb 
on the Upper Guinea Coast, were both former governors of Cape Verde.
(3) A.H.U.T Guine, caixa I - No. 28, information from Jorge Castilho
utilised by the Conselho on the 20th October 1643*
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Silva would be the best person to superintend the building of the fort, 
because of his experience on the Upper Guinea Coast. The Conselho acted 
upon these recommendations. The governor of Cape Verde was instructed 
to make available from the Cape Verde treasury 10,000 cruzados towards the cost 
of constructing a fort in Cacheu - that being the sum accruing from the 
several sources mentioned by Castilho, (l) At the same time, Paulo Barradas 
was placed in charge of the funds, and the stage seemed set for a new era on 
the Upper Guinea Coast.
The creation of a fort was regarded as an absolute priority for 
the double purpose of defense against rival Europeans and against neighbouring 
Africans* This was explicitly stated in the letters of appointment of Da 
Silva to the post of treasurer of the finances of the fort. (2) The Portuguese 
had an obsession that they were to be deprived of Cacheu. On one occasion, it 
was rumoured that the Dutch were planning to take Cacheu. (3) More frequent, 
however, were the fears expressed about an impending Spanish attack. Reports 
came from the adiisers on the Upper Guinea Coast, from the captain of Cacheu 
and from the governor of Cape Verde, all preoccupied with the danger from 
the Spanish. (4) In 1647» the Conselho itself discussed a supposed plot by
(1) C. da Silva Texeira: "Companhia de Cacheu, Rios e Comercio da Guine" 
(Documentos para a sua Historia)" in Boletim do Arquivo Historico Colonial.
Vol. I, (Lisboa 1950) p.91
(2) A.H.U.. Guine", caixa I - No. 34> Letter patent of the 30 July 1644*
(3) A.H.U.. Guine, caixa I - No. 58, Gamboa de Ayala, 29 June 1647
(4) E.g., A.H.U.. Guine, caixa I - No. 27* Jorge Castilho, 1 July I642 and No.
52, Gamboa de Ayala, May 1647*
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the Spanish* Four or five frigates were said to have been preparing to sail 
from Cadiz for the Upper Guinea Coast, where they were to be supported by the 
Soanish citizens and the disaffected Portuguese lanyados. The Spanish 
monarch had even appointed a provisional captain-major of Cacheu in the person
of Manuel da Costa who had relatives who were important traders on the Upper
Guinea Coast, (l) Nothing came of the Spanish scare, but that and the ever 
present Cacheu Papels provided the justification for the proposed construction, 
Paulo Barradas da Silva proved an unfortunate choice as treasurer 
of the funds of the fort. The greater portion of the finances was in the for* 
of goods which had to be disposed of to realise the money and building materia] 
required. Da Silva appeared to have been indulging in wholesale peculation, 
especially with regard to the sale of cotton. Ayala decided to withhold the 
6v/o duty on the goods, which should have been Da Silva’s due by way of salary, 
and force had to be used to recover goods in the latterfs possession. (2) 
Cacheu, therefore, remained largely dependant on the goodwill of the Africans, 
goodwill which had to be procured by making European manufactures available*
Captain-major Gamboa de Ayala brought new vigor and determination 
to the job with his arrival late in l644« was quick to appreciate that it
was essential to win the co-operation of the African rulers* One of his 
earliest requests was that the king of Portugal should write letters to the 
important rulers of the area, since this had been done in the time of the
(1) A.H.U*. Guine, caixa I - No. 60, Minute of the 24 Dec 1647
(2) A.H.U.. Guine, caixa I - No. 49* Barradas da Silva, 12 Oct 1646
(3) A.H.U*, Guine, caixa I - No. 5$, Oamboa de Ayala, 29 June 1647
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Spanish monarchs, and had become part of the protocol, which was necessary 
for the successful conduct of tra.de. (l) More important were the supplies of 
wine, cotton and cruzados, which he requisitioned to woo the neighbouring 
Papel leaders, namely, the king of Mata and the chief of Mompatas. It would 
appear that in slack periods of trefle, such as the one which would have results 
from the exclusion of Spanish ships from Cacheu, the Papel ruling class could 
be temporarily mollified by compensatory payments made by the captain-major 
and residents of Cacheu* Magalhaes had already reported in I64I that he had no 
option but to increase the ’gifts* to the neighbouring rulers. (2) In the era 
of official Spanish trade, the tribute which was paid to the Cacheu rulers was 
very trifling. The king of Mata received one pipe of wine (105 gallons), one 
barrel of bread, four strings of garlic, a similar quantity of onions, and two 
boxes of marmalade. The king’s lieutenant was given one peruleira of wine 
(about five and a half gallons); while the chief of Mompatas received half a 
pipe of wine, along with the same items listed for the king of Mata. (3)
This of course would have been supplemented by various irregular payments, 
once trade was in progress. With Cacheu trade on the decline, Ayala, like 
Magalhaes, agreed to pay the Papel leaders seven and a half pipes of wine,
(1) A.H.U., Guine", caixa I No. 38, Gamboa de Ayala, Oct 1644
(2) A.H.U.. Guine, caixa I - No. 23 > Luis de Magalhaes, 30 May I64I.
(3) Documentayao Ultramarina Portuguesa (Centro de Estudos Historicos Ultra- 
marino, Lisboa) Vol. 2, MS 3015 of the Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid -
Roteiro of the coast of Guinea, 1635> prepared for the bishop of Malaga.
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forty hundredweights of cotton, and one hundred and eighty seven cruzados.
This subsequently became the standard fixed payment which the two Papel poten­
tates of Cahheu expected, and which the Conselho Ultramarino was prepared to 
pay. (l)
This diplomatic policy must have worked, because Ayala excluded 
the Spanish from Cacheu, and yet no violent encounters with the Cacheu Papels 
were reported. Ayala also claimed to have won over the chief of Baorilla, in 
spite of 1anyado competition for the favours of this ruler (2) When Ayala had 
need to negotiate with the king of Bissau in 1647> he obtained the services of 
the chief of Baorilla as a go-betbeen. (3) It was at this very juncture, how­
ever, that Ayala must have become convinced that the policy of peaceful 
persuasion was doomed to failure. He had attempted to apprehend two Spanish 
vessels, which fled to Bissau. There, Ayala wrote, the king of Bissau gave thei 
full protection and all facilities, contrary to his former promises. Ayala 
suggested that this king should be severely punished, not only for his own lack 
of good faith, but as an example to others in Guinea. (4) As was to have been 
expected, there were limits to the extent to which the African rulers could be 
persuaded against their own best interests to co-operate in a policy of 
Portuguese monopoly of the commerce of the Area. In Cacheu, Portuguese bribes 
appeared to have had some effect during Ayala’s term of office, but elsewhere i1
(1) A.H.U.Z Cabo Verde, caixa IV - Antonio Galvao, 15 April 1665
(2) A.H.U., Guine, caixa I - No. 52 Gamboa de Ayala, 25 Feb. 1647
(3) A.H.U.. Guine, caixa X - Ibid
(4) A.H.Uf j Guine"", caixa I - Ibid.
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is clear that the African chiefs were availing themselves of the opportunity 
to trade freely with all-comers*
V/ith the 1anyados» Ayala followed the same policy of trying to win 
support if possible. °n the occasion on which he asked the Conselho to write 
personal letters to the Papel ^ rulers, he also asked that they should do the sam 
with regard to the lane ados on the Geba and Gambia* This was the first step 
of a very important policy designed to control the activities of the lanyados« 
by concentrating them in areas where it was not too difficult to keep an eye on 
them, and the substance of the letters must have been a request that the 
lanyados on the Upper Guinea Coast should live on the Cacheu river. Since 
Portuguese authority was strongest on the Cacheu, the lanyados had been 
using the rivers both th the north and to the south, especially the Gambia and
the Geba, to do business with the Spanish and other European rivals to the
Portuguese. The settlement of the Geba was a notorious centre of disobedience 
The question of its disobedience had been mooted before in Magalhaes1 time, but 
he claimed that the task was beyond him. (l) North of the Cahheu, the traders 
had set up a line of communications leading across the Casamance to the Gambia 
by way of Buguendo and Bichangor, two villages in Banhun territory. (2) In 
fact the majority of the Spanish citizens had removed from Cacheu after the 
restoration of the Portuguese king and had set themselves up on the Casamance.
(3) Again, Magalhaes had confessed that he could do nothing although the
(1) A.H.U.. Guine^ , caixa I - No. 23, Luis de Magalhaes, 30 May I64I
(2) A.H.U*. Guine, caixa I - No. 58, Gamboa de Ayala, 29 June 1647
(3) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa II - Serrao da Cunha, 14 Oct 1643
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Casamance was quite close to the Cacheu. Ayala, therefore, inherited all these 
problems.
It was proposed that the Geba settlers should be transferred to 
Farim on the upper Cacheu, with the obvious advantage to the Portuguese 
authorities that, with the captain-major controlling the estuary of the river, 
’illicit* commerce on the upper reaches of the river would be difficult.
Ayala, in return for a nominal annual tax of 8 or 9 slaves, offered the Geba 
residents a monopoly of the trade of the upper Gacheu to compensate for the 
loss of their commerne on the Geba. (l) In spite of strong opposition, Ayala 
scored a success; and he was doubly fortunate that his principal opponent on 
this measure, the powerful Geba trader, Christovao de Melo Coelho, later 
became Ayala’s most trusted lieutenant. Several years afterwards, the 
Conselho recognised the services of Christovao Coelho, noting that he had to 
his credit a successful peace mission to the king of Bissau in I648, and the 
arrest of some Portuguese dissidents in Sierra Leone. (2)
The trade outlet to the Gambia presented Ayala with a more 
difficult problem. In I646, two frigates were requested to blockade the Gambij 
estuary. (3) Two ships did arrive in 1648, but it is doubtful whether they 
achieved any effect, since a blockade would have meant stationing them on
(1) A.H.U.,Guine7. caixa I - No. 52, Gamboa de Ayala, 25 Feb 1647* (This issue
is also discussed in Lemos Coelho: Duas Descriyoes da Guinea, pp.36,49-51)
(2) A.H.U.. Guine, caixa I - No. 108, Minute of 4 June 1668
(3) A.H.U.. Guine, caixa I - Ho. 47* Gamboa de Ayala, 12 Sept. 1646.
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the lookout over a period of time, and Portugal lacked the resources to 
deploy naval forces on the Upper Guinea Coast. The Portuguese officials on 
the Upper Guinea Coast continued to keep the Conselho informed of developments 
in the Gambia. They reported the struggle there in I65O between the Parliam­
entarians and the Royalists led by Prince Rupert, (l) they kept a close watch 
on the activities of the Duke of Courland when he tried to build a fort in the 
Gambia in 1652, (2) and they were most :nxious with regard to the formation of 
the Company of English Adventurers Trading to the Gambia. (3) Goelho lamented 
toat the exports of the Gambia went to the English, Dutch, Bench, Courlanders 
and Spanish; and he urged the building of a fort. (4) But the Conselho 
S3emed to accept that the Gambia had passed out of the effective Portuguese 
sphere of influence, and even an invitation by the Mandinga kings of Barra and 
Fogny who controlled the Gambia trade failed to induce the Conselho in 1697 
to re-assert its position there. (5)
The traders who remained in Cacheu kept in contact with ’contra­
bandists' elsewhere, especially in the Gambia. Ayala told the Conselho - 
perhaps on a note of desperation - "his majesty does not have three loyal
(1) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa I - No. 108, Minute of 4 June 1668.
(2) A.H.U.r Cabo Verde, caixa II - Mesquita de Castel Branco, 15 June I652.
(3) A.H.U.. Guine, caixa I - No. 90, Minute of 24 Dec 1660
(4) Lemos Coelho: Duas Descriyoes da Guine, pp.12;28
(5) A.H.U. j Guind', caixa II - No. 249 > Letters from the kings of Fogny and 
Barra, forwarded by captain major Castanho* 9 Nov 1697*
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subjects here", (l) Like the African chiefs, the 1anyados were unlikely to 
accept a monopolist policy whidh reduced trade, though they did try to remain 
in good standing with the Portuguese crown if it were possible. In 1647* a 
number of Portuguese merchants of Cacheu despatched a strong complaint to the 
Conselho directed against the captain-major. (2) They rejected the accusation 
that they were traitors, and claimed that Ayala, instead of giving them credit 
for the useful work that they had always done to preserve the praya of Cacheu, 
was treating them worse than he treated the Spaniards. He was enforcing 
absurd customs duties and killing trade. They cited one trader who had made a 
journey which cost him 80 ’Negroes’ in taxes. (3) Already, they informed the 
Conselho, no Portuguese fidalgo would come to Cacheu, and now they had reached 
the end of their tether, and were demanding the recall of Ayala.
However, the petitioners received little sympathy, and it is clear 
that the Conselho supported Ayala’s "tough line?. It was typical of this 
policy that when in ^anuary 1647* three Spanish Capuchins arrived in Cacheu 
with the intention of conducting missionary work on the Upper Guinea Coast, 
Ayala branded them as commercial agents of the Spanish and promptly shipped 
them off to Santiago. -^ e claimed that they arrived on a Spanish vessel 
trading illegally on the Gambia, and that they had made enquiries after 
Sebastiao Rodrigues, formerly of Cartagena, and at that time resident at
(1) A.H.U., Guine", caixa I - No. 58, Gamboa de Ayala, 29 June 1647
(2) A.H.U.. Guine, caixa I - No. 52, Petition of residents of Cacheu, June 1647
(3) 80 ’Negroes’ here means the value of 80 prime slaves. (See Below, Ch.VIII, 
P#4/6)
X7+
FREE TRADE vs  MONOPOLY
Bichangor. (l) In the same vein, Ayala recommended that eight of the 
principal merchants should he imprisoned. The Conselho must have given him 
authority, because these traders are next heard of in 1651, petitioning for 
their release from gaol in Santiago, where Ayala had sent them for sake-keeping 
after sequestering their goods. (2) They included Fernao Mesquita, the most 
powerful trader on the coast, said to have had substantial capital in Spain.
(3)
For his services in Cacheu, Ayala was rewarded with governorship 
of Cape Verde-Guine. (4) Yet, he had after all achieved very little, except tc 
reveal the limits of Portuguese power and authority on the Upper Guinea Coast. 
Spanish ships may have avoided Cacheu, but they still traded on the Upper 
Guinea Coast, especially on the Gambia. Besides, as early as I64I, Magalhaes 
reported one Spanish ship which had by-passed Cacheu and went to Sierra Leone,
(1) A.H.U., Guine', caixa I - No. 52, Gamboa de Ayala, 25 Feb I652. Evidence 
relating to this incident is to be found in A.P.F. Letters Antichi, Vol.
97> fls. 130,147-1505 Vol. 248, fIs.26-40 and in B.N.M. 3818, Misiones de 
Capuchinos en el Congo y Cumana, fls. 11-13* 29-33* 63-64. See Also Mateo 
de Anguianoi Misiones Caouchinas en Africa. Vol. 2, pp.62-67
(2) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa II - Mesquita de Castel Branco, 17 June I65I
(3) Ayala died in June I65O, only four months after taking up his appointment 
as governor of C^e Verde. See Joao Baneto: Historia da Guine".
p. 262.
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so there is a possibility of an increase in the number of slavers who traded 
directly with Sierra Leone, (l) Most important of all, the volume of trade 
carried on by the Europeans other than the Spanish was on the increase. In 
1644> an English slave ship sailed tch the Geba, using three launches to speed 
up the recovery of its cargo. The governor of Cape Verde wrote that, to the 
best of his knowledge, this was the first time that an English ship had traded 
on the Geba. (2) The French too were entering the area south of the Gambia
for the first time, and in March 1645, the Conselho protested to the English
and French ambassadors in Lisbon against the activity of their nationals on the 
Upper Guinea Coast. (5) This of course was to no avail. In February 1647» 
the Conselho examined a memorandum from the Visitor to Guinea, in which he 
asserted that the French, English nd Butch imported annually more than 12,000 
quintals of iron and more than 80,000 cruzados worth of glass, atoer 
various types of cloth, tin, bronze, copper, knives, etc. With this they 
purchased more than 10,000 hides and pelt3, more than 4*000 quintals of wax 
and ivory, close to 20,000 quintals of camwood, some gold and some ambergris
(1) A.H.U.r Guine, caixa I - No. 25, Luis de Magalhaes, 50 May I64I.
(Lemos Coelho was with his uncle, Christovao de Melo Coelho in 1646, 
when the latter apprehended a Spanish slave ship off the Baga coast:
Duas Descricoes. p.205.)
(2) A.H.U.t Cabo Verde, caixa II - Serrao da Cunha, 28 Jan 1645*
(5) A.H.U.f Cabo Verde, caixa II - Minutd of 24 March 1645*
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apart from slaves, (l) As always, the attempt at monopoly was encouraging 
the growth of Contraband1 trade.
It was impossible for the Portuguese to overcome growing commercial 
competition by exchanging diplomatic notes in Lisbon; and it was equally 
impossible to convince the African rulers and the lanqados on the Upper Guinea 
Coast to adopt a course of action which was contrary to their own economic 
interests. In the light of these considerations there were always those who
advocated brute force, in the form of forts and armed patrols to keep the
Europeans at bay and to discipline the Africans and the lan^ados. (2) This was 
a dream never to be realised as far as the Portguese were concerned, and in 
order for them to survive on that section of the coast they had to evolve some 
serious commercial policy which was more in accord with reality.
The Conselho was urged in I64I to send an assurance in the royal
name to prevent the Portuguese traders from embarking on any trading 
opportunities that were offered them. (3) The only practical assurance would 
havs been the substitution of Spanish enterprise by Portuguese. ^he 
Portuguese authorities did make some attempt to tackle the problem of a market 
for the slaves of the Upper Guinea Coast. During the period of joint monarchy
(2) A.H.U., Guine, caixa I - No. 51, Joao de Almeida, 5 Feb 16475 and 
No. 45, Serrao da Cunha, 15 April 1645*
(1) M 3 L ,  Guine, caixa I - No. 51, Joao de Almeida, 5 Pah 1647* The word I
Quintal* was often used interchangeably with 1hundredweight1, but strictly
speaking a quintal was 100 lb#
(5) A.H.U.. Guin/, caixa I - No. 23, Luis de Magalhaes, 30 ^ay 1641* I
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it seems that the Portuguese in Lisbon were already dissatisfied that the 
slaves of the Upper Guinea Coast were destined for the Spanish Americas instead 
of their own possessions in Brazil* It was with reluctance that the Conselho
da Pazenda granted permission in 1635 bo a Lisbon trader who wanted to sail fo: 
Guinea to procure slaves for the Indies, its reluctance being due to the fact 
that he was not carrying any slaves to Brazil, (l) The seizure of Luanda by 
the Dutch in I64I also made the Upper Guinea Coast trade to Brazil more 
important as fan as the Portuguese were concerned, and at the same time it 
forced a modification of the procedure by which Upper Guinea Coast slaves 
destined for Brazil went via Angola. (fi) The Conselho for a few years in the 
early 1640*s tended to conceive of the Upper Guinea Coast as an instrument for 
the preservation of Brazil* It is certainly only within the context of the 
loss of Luanda and the tremendous importance attached to Brazil that it could 
have made a statement to the effect that the loss of Cacheu would mean the end 
of the sugar plantations of Bahia and Rio de Janeiro. (3) 
a )  A.H.U., Guine", caixa I - No* 17-18, Minute of the Conselho da Fazenda,
18 July 1635.
(2) A.H.U., Guine’, caixa I - No* 40, 24 Nov 1644* (The numbers of slaves 
from the Upper Guinea Coast to Brazil were probably small, and must
have been collected by ships bound for Angola and Brazil in much the same 
way as some English ships in the late seventeenth century acquired a few 
slaves at Sierra Leone before proceeding further south for their main 
complement. See below, Ch. VI, pp. 0^ 7 1
(3) See above, Ch. IV, p. 7 9 6.
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Some Upper Guinea Coast slaves probably did go to the Portuguese 
possessions in Brazil during the period immediately after the restoration*
In I64I, Paulo Bar_adas reported that a ship had just left with 600 slaves for 
Irazil. (l) Two years later, Fernao Mesquita petitioned to be allowed to 
carry slaves to Portuguese Brazil. The Conselho not only conceded permission, 
but was also willing to allow the duties on the slaves to be paid at Cacheu 
instead of at Santiago, making it unnecessary for ships to be delayed at the 
latter port. (2) Legal provision to this effect came about in November 1644*
As a result, the administrative establishment in Cacheu was statutarily 
increased in 1644 by the addition of a purveyor, a factor and a notary. (3)
All these preparations were made with a view to encouraging trade with the 
Portuguese possessions in Brazil, and Ayala wrote that Cacheu would be able to 
supply 2,000 to 3,000 slaves per year to this new destination. (4) However, 
the possibility of a genuine diversion from the Spanish Indies to Brazil did 
not materialise; because ships left the Upper Guinea Coast with Bahia or Rio 
de Janeiro as their ostensible destination and went elsewhere, either to the 
Spanish Indies, or to the Butch at Pernambuco. (5) For example, Fernao
(1) iyyj., Guine, caixa I - No. 27, Barradas da Silva, 18 Oct I64I
(2) A.H.U., Guine", caixa I - No. 37, Minute of 27 Sept 1644
(3) In fact,this administrative decree was not fully implemented. The captair 
major of Cacheu was officially designated as "captain and factor", and it 
was only in 1676 that the two posts were separated.
(4) A.H.U., Guine, caixa I - No. 52, Gamboa de Ayala, 25 Feb 1647
(5) A.H.U.. Cabo Verde, caixa II - Serrao da Cunha, 4 April 1644*
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Mesquita, who claimed to have been willing to carry slaves to Brazil, was a 
Spaniard and the leader of the laneados at the time. His imprisonment by 
Ayala suggests that any shipments made by him might have been diverted to a 
different destination.
Apart from the fact that the business connection between the Upper 
Guinea Coast and the Spanish Indies was very strong and the probability of 
higher prices, Mexico and Cartagena could not have been ousted by Bahia and 
Rio de Janeiro because of a lack of Portuguese shipping. Magalhaes had urged 
that all ships proceeding from Lisbon to Brazil should call at the Upper Guinea 
Coast, (l) Whether by design or inability^ the Conselho took no heed of this 
advice. Indeed, it must have been inability, because th© Portuguese were 
constrained to risk licensing Dutch ships to go to Bahia though it was known 
that the cargo was likely to end up at Pernambuco. It meant, thhrefore, that 
the question of substituting Brazil as the principal or exclusive market for 
the slaves of the Upper Guinea Coast remained largely theoretical*
Within the Portuguese camp, the advocates of trade with the Spanish 
had not been silent* Some of them, like the lan<pados. were not of course in
good standing with the Conselho, and even officials like Magalhaes and da Silva
aroused suspicion when they sought the renewal and legalisation of the trade 
as it had existed prior to I64O. But Corte-Real, a trusted adviser, had 
expressed the belief as early as December I64I that permission to trade should 
be given to the Spanish registered vessels, because then they would at least
be liable to the payment of duties* (2) His colleague, Jorge Castilho, suggests
(1) A.H.U., Guine. caixa I - No. 25. Luis de Magalhaes. 50 Mav l6ll
(2) A.H.U.. Guine, caixa I - No. 27, Pereira Corte-Real, 23 Dec I64I.
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another expedient* Ne felt that permission should he given to the English 
or the Dutch to trade in the area and carry slaves to the Indies# Before they 
sailed, they would lodge securities in Cacheu, and on their return they would 
pay duties out of the silver they obtained from the Spanish# (l)
When the Conselho Ultramarino finally decided to reconsider the 
question of commercial relations with Spain, the decision was based primarily 
on the need to- obtain gold and silver. In December 1645, the Conselho 
proposed to D. JoaJ> IV that his subjects in Africa should be free to carry 
slaves to the Spanish Indies, because there they would receive gold and 
silver. The American products brought to Europe via Lisbon, such as hides, 
indigo, ginger, cochineal and dyewoods, paid 23*fo duty on entry into Lisbon as 
well as duty when they were re-exported. All this meant supplies of silver 
and gold which could be used to trade with India and China. In turn, the 
black cloths from India would find a market in Angola and Guinea. The king 
saw the wisdom of this global imperalist strategy, and concurred in January 
I646. (2) Those persons who wished to ship slaves to Spanish America had to 
be approved by the Conselho, and were obliged to carry at least one-third of 
their slave cargo to Brazil*
With the encactment of the above regulations, the old rivalry
(1) A.H.U., Guine", caixa I - No. 27, Jorge Castilho, 1 July 1642.
(2) A.H.U.. Guine", caixa I - No. 40, (The first proposal made along these 
lines was rejected.) No. 44 is a similar proposal of the 22 Dec 1645 Ly 
the Conselho. The kir£!s signature was appended to this document the 
following January.
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between the Cape Verde islands and the mainland broke out anew* This rivalty 
had been muted while both parties sought the resumption of Spanish trade* In 
Santiago, the Spanish trade was looked upon as being virtually indispensable, 
because the island had a monetary economy based on the influx of Spanish coin,
(l) Now they successfully demanded that the resumed Spanish trade should be 
conducted via Santiago, as was supposed to have been the case during the 
earlier phase of the trade. But, as happened before, the Upper Guinea Coast 
traders and the visiting slavers concentrated on by-passing Santiago in 
practice, while striving to obtain legislative sanction for so doing. In June 
1647, the Conselho considered a request by the principal traders in Cacheu 
seeking the privilege of shipping directly to the Spanish Indies, having the 
security lodged in Cacheu and the duties paid there (as Castilho had suggested 
before). The Conselho, however, was of the opinion that Cape Verde could not 
maintain itself without the mainland, so that the Upper Guinea Coast had to 
remain "the Guinea of Cg^e Verde"* (2)
By the middle of the seventeenth century, the Portguese, having 
reversed the logical commercial pattern of the period before I64O, decided to 
take a timid step towards re-establishing that same pattern. Events in 
Santiago show a marked similarity during the 1650*8 and l660*s to the opening 
years of the century. Ships from Cartagena started to return. An occasional 
Spanish vessel tried to do business without seeking the permission of the
(1) A. Lereno: Subsidios para a Historia da Moeda em Cabo Verde 
1640*1940
(2) C. da Silva Texeira: "Companhia de Cacheu" (0p*cit.) p.96.
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Conselho, and in 1652 one such ship had its good* seized, (l) But whether or 
not they had the consent of the Portuguese Conselho Ultramarino to trs.de on the 
Upper Guinea Coast, the slave ships managed to avoid paying duties in Santiago#
(2) In I664, it was lamented that for nearly three years no Spanish ships had 
traded at Santiago, and complaints about lack of specie substantiated this. (3) 
HowBver, though this might have been suggestive of a decline in the numbers of 
Spanish ships on the Upper Guinea Coast, it did not mean that than were no 
ships calling at the ports of the mainland, but simply that contraband trade 
was the order of the day.
In 1655, the Visitor to Guinea indicated that there was one Spanis 
ship which had lodged securities in Santiago as stipulated before trading at 
Cacheu, but elsewhere trade was being carried on illegally*. (4) Early in 
1657, a Dutch ship chartered by four Spaniards, arrived at Cacheu with 8,000 
bars of iron and a considerable amount of wine and spirits from the Canary 
Islands. When Portuguese ships turned up shortly afterwards their cargo wa3 a 
dead loss, partly because the small market could easily be glutted, but also 
because the Portuguese could not offer the goods such as iron and alcohol which 
were top priorities. (5) Neither the lancades nor the Africans intended to
(1) A.H.U.. Cabo Verde, caixa II - Mesquita de Castel Branco, 15 June 1652
(2) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa II - Mesquita de Castel Branco, 9 Aug 1652.
(3) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa III - Antonio Galvao, June 1664
(4) A.H.U., Guine, caixa I - No. 76, Minute of 20 Dec 1655
(5) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa III - Pedro Barreto, 8 May 1657* (For a 
discussion of iron bars, see below, Ch. VII, pp.430)
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wait upon the arrival of ships under the flag or sanction of Portugal. When
a French ship carried 1,000 bars of iron to Bissau in 1661, the lan^ados did
not hesitate in purchasing this cargo - or, more correctly, in accepting it wit] 
the intention of exchanging it for slaves at a commission, (l) The Conselho 
continued seeing the answer to such situations in military terms. Indeed, 
ev3n with the benefit of hindsight, a modem Portuguese historian still avers
that "the real remedy would have been to mobilise naval forces". (2)
The Cacheu merchants were dissatisfied with the legislation of 
1647, which still left the trade to Spanish America in trammexls as far as they 
were concerned. With the Spanish slavers presumably in the same frame of mind, 
the Portuguese officials continued to live in fear of a Spanish attack, which 
would be welcomed by the disloyal Portuguese subjects on the Upper Guinea Coast, 
The Conselho considered evidence in December 1649 that two Spaniards of conse­
quence D. Juan Morfeo and D. Francisco de Medina, at the instigation of several 
residents of the Spanish Indies, and with the approval of the House of Trade in 
Seville, had decided to take Cehheu and install a garrison of at least 200 
soldiers. As a result, the Conselho ordered the despatch of two caravels, eac] 
with fifty men and two or three pieces of cannon. These ships were to carry oi 
the new captain-major, Joao Carreiro Fidalgo, along with supplies of arms. 
Fidalgo arrived in I65O, and, like Ayala, one of his principal tasks was to see 
the construction of a strong fort at Cacheu - this time with the aid of Gaspar 
Vogado, vicar of Santiago, who had been appointed treasurer of the funds after
(1) A.H.U.T Guine, caixa I - No. 95> Fonseca Dornelas, 25 May 1661
(2) G. da Silva Texeira: "Companhia de Cacheu" (Op.cit.) p.98
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the death of Paulo Barradas da Silva in 1647* (l)
Gaspar Vogado complained in June I656 that tbe Africans could not 
he persuaded to work on the building of the fort. All that they turned up foi 
was their ‘giftsf. It seemed to have come to him as a great discovery that the 
Papels were "very self-interested people". (2) Besides, he stated, to build a 
proper fort it was necessary to get materials from Papel territory and to 
acquire more land so as to enclose the water supplies. (3) The Papels did not 
concede any of those things in Vogado*s time. They never did. When captain- 
major Manuel Dias Quatrim arrived in December 1657> he found the praya in a 
state of dilapidation, with the artillery lacking carriages and embedded in 
the ground. (4) In 1661, the Papels invested the water supplies and 
threatened to set fire to the settlement. (5) In other words, the same old 
themes were being played out.
With the lancados and the Africans holding fast to their free 
trade position, and with European ships willing to break Portugalfs fragile 
monopoly, the balance between these two positions became to g great extent 
dependent on the personal character of the captain-major of Caheu, and the 
quality of the other lesser officials like the factor and purveyor of Cacheu, 
and the factors in places like Geba, Bissau, Farim, Zeguichor and Bolor.
(1) C. da Silva Texeira: "Companhia de Cacheu" (Op.cit)pp.* 97,98
(2) A.H.U.. Guine, caixa I - No. 78, Gaspar de Vogado, 24 June 1656
(3) A.H.U.t Guine, daixa I - No. 80, Gaspar de Vogado, 25 June 1656
(4) A.H.U.. Guine, caixa I - No. 87, Manuel Dias '^ uatrim, Dec 1657
(5) A.H.U.» Guin6, caixa III - Minute of 1 Sept 1655
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A man like Ayala was an outstanding exception, and most of his successors 
lacked either honesty or resourcefulness or both, as far as the service of 
the Conseho was concerned. Ayala was rewarded with the captaincy of Cape 
Verde. His successor, Joao Care^ira Fidalgo retired to prison in Santiago 
in 1654* Presumably, the sum of 650:080 reis which he remitted as the duty 
he had collected during his four year term of office was judged inadequate.
CD-
Little was said of Fidalgo!s immediate successor, Manuel de Pa^os 
Figueroa. The next captain-major who projected a clear image was Manuel Dias 
Quatrim, who served from December 1657 to about the beginning of 1662. He was 
pre-occupied with the question of the state of fortifications, and with the 
need to garrison Cacheu. His own suggestion was that exiled couples should 
be sent out to the Upper Guinea Coast. (2) One my conclude from this that 
^uatrim was diligent in the service of the Conselho, and, conversely, he 
appears to have been over-zealous as far as the Africans were concerned. In 
February 1662, Antonio Fonseca Domelas arrived to find that relations betweer 
the Papels and the captain-major had deteriorated to the point where the Pape] 
were resorting to their old tricks with regard to the water, and the king of 
Mata was threatening to set fire to the settlement. (5) Quatrim was also 
involved in hostilities with the Djolas of Bolor. Lemos Coelho reported in 
I669 that these Djolas or Baiotes, as that section of the tribe was called,
(1) A.H.U.» Cabo Verde, caixa III - Antonio Galvao, 5 July 1663
(2) A.H.U., Guine', caixa I - Ho. 89, Manuel Dias Qnatrim, 1659*
(3) A.H.U.. Guine, caixa I. - No. 9$> Fonseca Domelas, 6 March 1662.
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killed all whites upon whom they could lay their hands subsequent to burning 
of some of their villages by Quatrim. (l)
After settling the dispute with the Papels, which he found on his 
arrival, Dornelas embarked on a term of office full of intrigue. Within a 
short while, reports were reaching the governor of Cape Verde and the 
Conselho that Domelas was indulging in peculation and was consorting with 
interlopers. (2) One specific charge was spelt out in great detail. On the 
15th February 1662, a Spanish ship arrived in Cacheu with a cargo of 1,200 
iron bars, 200 pipes of wine, a large quantity of silks and twills, some speci 
and worked silver, and other small items. All that Dornelas entered in the 
books of Cacheu were 4 bars of iron, 50 pipes of wine, 40 y&s serge, 10 yds 
of bombasine $a twill) and 1 lb of ribbon. When the ship sailed on the 20th 
June 1662 it took 700 slaves, but only 170 were recorded and made liable for 
duty. There were also other charges that three ships were admitted by 
Domelas without the permission of the Conselho and he had pocketed the 
profits. Not content with this, Domdas allowed his greed to arouse the 
anger of the Papel rulers. He refused to pay them the agreed annual rent, 
though he made up his accounts as though he had done so. He also committed 
the cardinal error of selling four Papel nobles, each for 130 pieces of silver
(3) Not surprisingly, a warrant was issued for his arrest in 1664. (4)
(1) Lemos Coelho: Du as Describes, p. 33
(2) A.H.IJ., Cabo Verde, caixa III - Antonio Galvao, 2 July I663
(3) A.H.U.t Cabo Verde, caixa IV - Antonio Galvao, 15 April I665. (The nobles 
were each sold for 130 patacas)
(4) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa III - Antonio Galvao, June 1664.
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A few years later, captain Manuel Roiz de Mendonpa surpassed 
Dornelas in his disregard for the official policy of exclusivism. Mendonqa 
avowed frankly that he was in Cacheu to make money, that he could not care 
less about the royal restrictions, and that if the Turks came to Cacheu he wc 
do business with them. Seven foreign ships were admitted into port by 
Mendonqa in I67O and 1671. First there was an English ship with 10,000 
bars of iron and 30,000 bars' worth of other items. This should have paid 
4,000 cruzados duty, but ^endon<pa only entered 'JOO cruzados in the books.
The ship said with 600 quintals of wax and ivory, less than a quarter of 
which was recorded. Next came a large English launch which took about 40 
quintals of produce. A French launch obtained 50 to 60 quintals of wax and 
ivory late in I67O. In January 1671, a French ship tock 180 slaves. Anothei 
French ship carried 500 quintals of wax and ivory; while yet another broughl 
a cargo of specie, linen and utensils and took wax in return. Finally, a 
Dutch ship was allowed to enter, ^endonipa collaborated with two important 
private traders, Vicente Roiz and Ambrosio Gomes. When it was felt that th« 
regulations whould not be flouted too blatantly, these traders made 
arrangements with the English factory on the Gambia for business to be 
conducted in launches at a mid-way point off Cape Roxo. In these enter­
prises, they had Mendonpa's full support, and the profits were shared. The 
Conselho ordered that Mendonqa be arrested, (l)
Arresting defaulting captain-majors was hardly any use. A
(1) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa IV - Manuel -^acheco, 26 April I67I; and Minute 
of 1 Sept 1671. (For 'bars1, see below, Ch. VII)
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captain was given very little choice when faced with the demands of the 
lanc^ados and the threats of the Africans# The fundamental reality of the 
commaeial situation on the Upper Guinea Coast had remained the same since 
I64O ; namely, Portuguese inability to compete with other European powers#
As can be seen from the above references, theSpanish were no longer the 
problem# Trade with the Spanish Indies was by no means over, but the 
English?French and Dutch were now Portugal*s chief rivals for the trade of 
the Upper Guinea Coast, In the first instance, merchants on the Upper 
Guinea Coast saw the English ships in the role of carriers of slaves to the 
Spanish Indies# (l) but as early as 1645> an English ship called at Santiago 
to procure slaves for Barbados# (2) The English were also purchasing mules, 
donkeys and horses for work on their own plantations# The scope of this' 
line of trade must have been considerable, because in I67I, the Conselho 
repeated an earlier prohibition against the sale of young livestock from the 
Caj?e Verde islands to foreigners# (3) In 1657 > the residents of the Cape Vei 
islands made a plea for trade with English nationals to be freed from restri( 
tions. (4) The Conselho was willing to license the occasional English ship 1 
it did with respect to two ships in I658, but complete freedom of trade was 
never legally conceded# In 1663, the Conselho found it necessary to warn
(1) This was suggested by Jorge Castilho in July 1642# See Guin£, caixa I 
- No. 27#
(2) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa II - Minute of 2 Dec 1645
(3) C# da Silva Texeira: "Companhia de Cacheu" (Op.cit) p*103
(4) A.H.U.. Cabo Verde, caixa III - Petition of May 1657*
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the Cape Verde officials that no English ship which called at any of their 
ports was to receive anything but water, (l)
Apart from sending isolated ships, the English had for some time 
been a ttmmpting to conduct settled trade on the Upper Guinea Coast. The 
Commonwealth party formed a Guinea Company to trade with the Gambia in I65I, 
and the following year a trading factory was established on the Bintang. 
However, Prince Rupert entered the river shortly afterwards and destroyed the 
undertaking. After the Restoration, Prince Rupert encouraged the formation, 
of a company registered as the Royal Adventurers of England Trading in Africa 
This company and the Gambia Adventurers of England^ to whom they sublet their 
monopoly in 1668, were not very successful, but their presence first of all 
dispelled any pretence that the Portuguese had control of the Gambia, and, 
secondly, made it much easier for the pretended Portuguese monopoly of 
commerce south of the Gambia to be broken. Most of the Casamance trade was 
diverted through the Gambia outlet, Cacheu was in constant contact with the 
Gambia, (2) and Bissau, which waff the emporium for the trade soutfe of the 
Geba, was a favourite port of call for the ships of these new companies* (3) 
There was a succession of French companies from 1664 onwards,
all making claims to a monopoly of commerce over most of the West African
coast, but invariably concentrating their attention on the Senegal. Like the
(1) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa III - Minute of July I663
(2) A.H.U.. Cabo Verde, caixa IV - Reports on the activities of captain-$ajor
Mendon^a in 1671.
(3) For the importance of Bissau, see below, pp. 3o1 -ers
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English, the French first started trading on the Geba in 1644* (l) After the 
middle of the century, they became more interested in the slave trade as far a 
their own possessions were concerned. Thus in January 1665, the governor of 
Cayenne wrote the governor of Cape Verde attempting to establish regular trade 
in slaves, cattle and foodstuffs. (2) When the French took Goree from the Dut 
in 1677> their operations took a shift southwards, and they were to be reckoner 
with as competitors on the Gambia. Setting themselves up at Albreda, near the 
Gambia, the French also began exploratory moves on the Upper Guinea Coast. In
J
1682, a Portuguese ship was seized by a French vessel^ off the Gambia, and 
carried to Goree, where the cargo was unloaded and the captain detained. The 
rest of the crew were set free with the warning that "no one could trade on 
that part of the coast without permission, because it was part of the dominion 
of the king of France1.*. (^ ) A few years later, the officials of the French 
Company of the Senegal forwarded to tbe captain-major of Cacheu a copy of thei: 
charter which conceded a monopoly of the commerce between Cape Blanc and Sierr 
Leone. (4) The Portuguese monopoly of trade on the Upper Guinea Coast, long a 
thing of rags and tatters, was now being challenged in theory also.
The Dutch, too, were still trying to retain a foothold in the 
Gambia during the second half of the seventeenth century, and at their settle­
ment of Goree, the Dutch produced the necessary trade goods, especially iron.
(l)A.H.U.. Cabo Verde, caixa II - Joao Serrao da Cunha, 28 Jan 1645
(2) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa IV - La Febre de la Barre to Galvao, 12 Jan 1665 
and minute of 31 Aug I665
(3) Joao Barretos Hfstoria da Guine. p.Ill
(4) A.H.U.,Guine. caixa II - No.166, Antonio de Barros, 24 June 1686.
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The Portuguese at Cacheu were themselves forced to go to Sierra Leone and the 
Gambia to purchase iron from Portugal’s European rivals, (l) with Goree being 
the chief resort of the lan<pado coastal vessels. They were said to carry to 
this Dutch trdding fort some 1500 to 2000 quintals of ivory and wax every year,
(2) Those goods which Portugal did supply were more expensive (3) and even the 
Cape Verde cloths which were the single commodity which the Portuguese could s« 
advantageously, had dropped in value by the early 1670’s. The wax and ivory 
trade was almost completely captured by the French and the English, (4) and the 
scarcity of references to slaves being exported from Cacheu suggests that this 
mainstay of African commerce of that time had also passed out of the hands of 
the official Portuguese administration. In certain lines of exports, such as 
kola, from Sierra Leone and dyes from the Nunez, which had always been the 
preserve of the Portuguese, the problem was now one of shipping and capital. 
"Formerly, fifteen to sixteen ships went to Sierra Leone and to the Nunez 
every year now only three go to Sierra Leone and two to the Nunez", attested 
a report in 1674* (9)
Overlooking the ad nausea repetition of the need for a fort and 
for naval craft, there was one idea in the air which was proposed by Portuguese 
intsrests as a solution for all the difficulties' of conducting trade on the
(1) A.H.U., Guine, caixa I - No.l33» Antonio de Barros Bezerra, Aug 1673
(2) Lemos Coelhot Duas Describes, p.6
(3) A.H.U. t Guine'’, caixa I - No.131, Sebastiao Vidigal Roiz, 24 April 1673
(4) A.H.U., Guine'’, caixa I - No. 133? Antonio de Barros Bezerra, Aug 1673
(5)A.H.U., Guine, caixa I - No.131* Sebastiao Vidigal Roiz, 24 April 1673*
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Upper Guinea Coasts the creation of a joint-stock company. The idea of a 
Portuguese joint-stock company trading to West Africa was first mooted as early 
as 1654 ty Duarte Nunez, a Portuguese representative in Hamburg, (l) In 1664, 
an attempt was madd to create such a company to trade at Palmeirinho in the 
Senegambia backed by two brothers, Louren90 and Manuel Martins. (2) This
attempt was short lived, and it was until afterl670 that more serious attention 
was given to the scheme. The initiative came from certain individuals in 
Santiago and Cacheu offering to provide the capital for a company which would 
supply the necessary goods to compete on the Upper Guinea Coast, and which 
would build a fort within six years. (3) For two or three years this proposal 
was subjected to bureaucratic scrutiny. Antonio de Barros Bezerra, one of 
the principals behind the scheme, wrote the Conseho in August 1673> urging that 
a trading company was the panacea for the ills of Cacheu and the Portuguese 
trade on the Upper Guinea Coast as a whole. As a result, it appeared that the 
Conselho was ready to take definite action, but the matter was again deferred, 
and in January 1675> Manuel Preto Valdes, anothei? trader interested in the 
scheme, was still appealing for the urgent resolution of the question. (5)
The Conselho proceeded to work out the terms on which the company*s charter
(1) A.H.U., Guine, caixa I - No. 69, Minute of 10 Nov I654
(2) C. da Silva Texeira: Companhia de Cacheu (Op.cit.) p.110
(3) Ibid: p.109
(4) A.H.U., Guine, caixa I - No.l33> Antonio de Barros Bezerra, Aug 1673*
(5) C. da Silva Texeira: "Companhia de Cacheu" p.119*
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would be granted, and finally in May 1676, the first Company of Cacheu was 
launched, (l)
The sixteen-clause contract of the Company of Cacheu attended to 
four main subjects: defence, revenues, the Cape Verde islands and emergencie
TheCompany was required to reinforce the old stockade, build new walls of bri 
and lime, dig a trench around the circumference and a tunnel leading out of t 
fort, and provide artillery. Fifty soldiers were to be enlisted in Portugal 
and we: e to be equipped and maintahed at the Company’s expense during the six 
year duration of the contract. The fiscal provisions stated that all duties 
recoverable on the Nunez dye trade, on the Sierra Leone kola trade and from 
the trade of the river Casamance were to accrue to the Company of Cacheu, whi 
a new impost of three barafulas was to be collected on every slave exported.
(2)0ne of the primary considerations of the Conselho was that Portuguese 
goods and Portuguese shipping were to be utilised. The importation of Spani 
goods was prohibited, though the Company was free to ship slaves tp the Spani 
Indies. When it did so it was encouraged to use Portuguese shipping and if i 
employed Spanish transport half the dutes collected on the export of slaves 
were forfeited by the Company and went instead into the Portuguese treasury. 
An allowance was also made for the ships of friendly European powers provided 
they were freighted in Portugal. No duties were payable on goods imported
(X) A.H.U., Guine, caixa I - No. 134”137 discuss the contract of the 
Company of Cacheu
(2) A barafula was worth 200 reis. See below, Ch. VII, $.1 + 0 0
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^nto Africa by the Company, and on African produce sent to Portugal only 50^ 
of the normal import duties into Portugal were to be paid. But goods exporte 
to Cape Verde were to pay the full duties into the CaP© Verde treasury, and, 
as far as possible, the rights of the Cape Verde settlers were safeguarded, 
owing to their powerful lobbying. (l)^Cape Verdeans were free to trade in all 
ports of the Upper Guinea Coast, except that, like the 1anyados. they were 
not supposed to do business with Europeans other than Portuguese. The Compan 
of Cacheu was obliged to reserve one-third ibf its cargo space for goods which 
the Cape Verde residents wished to transport to and from the mainland. Finall 
two emergency provis63 were attached. In time of war and short shipping, the 
ships of friendly nations would be allowed to trade fieely, while heavy losses 
at sea would free the company from the obligation to continue paying its 
expenses for a reasonable period of time.
Within the Company’s charter, a captain-major of Cacheu was named 
on the recommendation of the Company. It was Antonio de Barros Bezerra, 
himself a principal shareholder^who was selected. He was a trader of 35 year 
experience on the coast and had already served once as interim captain of 
Cacheu. (2) It is difficult to trace in any detail how the Company of Cacheu 
fared during its first four years of operation under Bezerra, and for the two
(1) A.H.U., Guine, caixa I - No. 133» the governor of Cap® Verde forwarded a 
memorandum in May 1674> requesting that the rights of the Cape Verde 
settlers be protected. The Conselho constantly bore this consideration 
in mind.
(2) A.H.U., Guine'’, caixa I - No. 125, Minute of 16 Oct 1671.
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year.3 which remained of the contract after that. The Conselho had reserved 
the ultimate authority over Cacheu and all complaints against the Company 
were to be sent to Portugal, but the routine reports did not reach the 
Conselho. However, it is quite clear that the Company of Cacheu was not the 
panacea that it had been represented to be^  as far as rescuing the scraps of 
Portuguese monopoly were concerned* This can be ascertained in relation to 
the two principal pronlems of disciplining the Africans and excluding all but 
Portuguese shipping or shipping authorised by the Conselho.
Bezerra was convinced that nothing short of total conquest of tb 
Africans could provide a sound b asis for the conduct of trade on the Upper 
Guinea Coast, and he proposed to the Conselho since 1673 that such a conquest 
should be € feeted. (l) Salvador de Sa e Benavides, the hero fof the 
Portuguese reconquest of Angola and Brazil, (2) was then a member of the 
Conselho, and, not surprisingly, he advanced suggestions based on his 
imperial experience. He agreed that conquest of the Africans was necessary 
if Portuguese authority was to be respected, and to this end he advised that 
500 infantry and 200 cavalry should be despatched from the Cape Verde islands 
to Cacheu. In addition, the area was to be peopled by sending 100 married 
couples in the first instance, and augmenting this number later. The main 
function of these settlers was to penetrate inland, because "experience in
Guine, caixa I - No. 133 > Antonio de Barros Bezerra, Aug 1673
(2) See C.R. Boxer: Salvador de Sa. and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola 
(London 1952)
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Angola has taught me that only when we hold the interior can we preserve our 
position"• (l) But the same importance was not attached to the Upper Guinea 
Coast as to Angola, and no such bold steps were attempted.
In July 1679t the Conselho examined a request for help to Bezerri 
in Cacheu, because of hostilities with the neighbouring Papels. It was 
argued that the king of Bissau was very friendly with the Portuguese at that 
time, and that the rulers of Mata and Mompataz were the only ones who had to 
be dealt with. Indeed, some chiefs had offered to supply men to fight agains' 
the Papels of Mata and Mompataz. This was therefore presented as the ideal 
opportunity for the conquest of the area. (2) Santiago was asked to provide 
100 men, 15 horses, 30 carabines and 30 pistols, but the defence of Santiago 
had also gone to seed, and help on that scale was not forthcoming. The
governor of Cape Verde was willing to send 50 men and 4 horses, but before he
could intervene, hostilities came to an end, (3) and the conquest of the Pape] 
remained for the distant future.
With respect to commercial affairs, it was also clear that the 
Company was not powerful enough to cope with the increasing English and Frencl 
pressure. Like most of the captain-majors befofe him, Bezerra was accused of 
financial irregularities and the encouragement of rival European ships. The 
governor of Cape Verde sent a special magistrate to Cacheu in 1680 to conduct 
an enquiry into the captaincy of Bezerra and the activities of the Company of
(1) A.H.U., Guine, caixa I - No. 135» undated but around 18 June 1674*
(2) AJLJL., Cabo Verde, caixa IV - Minute of 12 July 1679
(5) A.H.U.j Cabo Verde, caixa V - Minute of the Conselho Sept 1682 and 31
Jan I685.
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Cacheu. As a result, both Bezerra and his son, Joao, were arrested. The son 
apparently remained in gaol in Santiago, (l) while the elder Bezerra was sent 
to Lisbon, where he was released on a bail of 12,000 cruzados. (2) Within a 
short time, Bezerra*s fortunes revived. After a petition from the residents 
of the Upper Guinea Coast, (3) he was once more nominated captain of Cacheu and 
returned there in 1685.(4) The Conselho must presumably have found that the 
charges laid against Bezerra by the governor of Cape Verde, Manuel da Costa 
Pessoa, could not be sustained.
It has been suggested that personal rivalry between Bezerra and 
Pessoa was at the bottom of the allegations, (5) Pessoa had originally been 
interested in trading on the Upper Guinea Coast, but he was not a party to the 
Company of Cacheu, and he continued trading to the mainland on his own account. 
As soon as Bezerra had been removed, Pessoa was said to have begun ruling 
Cacheu in his own interest, and was taking out twice as many slaves- as the 
Company. (6) Shortly afterwards, Pessoa tried to initiate a new company, so 
he obviously had a large personal stake in discrediting Bezerra, But there 
was more to the issue than simple personal rivalry. Pessoa was representing
(1) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa V - Minute of the Conselho, Sept 1682 and 31 Jan 
1685
(2) Joao Barreto: Historia da Guine. p,110
(3) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa V - Ignacio de Franca Barbosa, 20 July 1684.
(4) A*H,U., Cabo Verde, caixa V - Ignacio de Franca Barbosa, 12 Sept 1685
(5) Joao Barreto: Historia da Guine. p.110
(6) A,H.U,, Cabo Verde, caixa V - Manuel de Sousa Mendon^a, Dec 1680.
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the C^e Verde interests in opposition to Bezerra, (l) The Cape Verde intere 
were not reconciled to the Company of Cacheu, in spite of large concessions 
embodied in the charter of the Company, They objected most of all to the 
duty of three barafulas placed on all slaves exported from the Upper Guinea 
Coast, since this affected the Cape Verde import and re-export trade in 
slaves, (2) It is significant that when Bezerra was re-appointed captain of 
Cacheu he immediately pressed for the separation of the mainland from the 
jurisdiction of Santiago, and he was nearly successful, (3) In short, the 
conflict between the continental and insular interests was again very much to 
the fora during the era of Company rule.
Though Pessoa was not a disinterested person, and though Bezerra 
\as approved for a second term by the Conselho, it did not mean that Bezerra 
did not trade freely with the Europeans. There was scarcely any alternative 
for the Company of Cacheu than to trade with Portugal’s European rivals. As 
shareholder, Bezerra stood to benefit personally from promoting as much trade 
as possible. That he was so much beloved by the resident traders that they 
petitioned for his return further suggests that he was not exactly diligent 
in carrying out the Conselho1s policy of excluding foreign shipping. From an
(1) The residents of Santiago petitioned the Conselho for Pessoa to have a 
second term of office.
(2) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa V - Petition of July 1684
(3) A.H.U,, Cabo Verde, caixa V - Minutes of the Conselho, 19 Aug 1686 and
13 Oct 1686. (Bezerra in fact seemed to have won a great deal of
automomy.)
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entirely different source, one gets confirmation of this. In March 1678, 
agent Thurlow of the Gambia Adventurers wrote an account to his principals in 
London, stressing that the Cacheu trade was more important than that of the 
Gambia itself. Haphazard trade was then going on, and Bezerra had just offer* 
to make a contract with Thurlow to trade with the Gambia Adventurers and no 01 
else, if the English company was prepared to pay certain prices. Thurlow 
judged the prices to be extremely high, and he was not prepared to commit his 
own company because they were about to go into liquidation, (l)
At the end of 1682, when the Company of Cacheu came to an end, 
the Cacheu and Santiago merchants were more friendly than ever with the 
English in Gambia. (2) Again, this is substantiated by English records,
John Castle, Thurlow*s successor, and the first chief factor in the Gambia 
for the Royal African Company, carried through an agreement with the captain 
of Cacheu in 1681 and was trading regularly with the Portuguese. (3) When 
Castle wrote in October 1682, he was able to report that he just had 
concluded a bargain for 20 tons of wax and ivory, and he was sending a ship 
across to Cacheu. He complained that on the previous venture he made little 
profit because the Company of Cacheu took 10$ duty on all goods, but they had 
promised that the ship he was about to send would pay nothing. The daptain- 
major and all officials were resolved to trade with the English until they 
were recalled, which would be at any moment since the charter of the Company
(1) P.R.O., T70/10 - Thomas Thurlow, 15 March I678, Fl.l
(2) Joao Barretoj Historia da Guine, p.110
(3) P.R.O.. T70/10 - John Castle, 2 March 1681, fl.56.
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had come to an end. Besides, he said, the Africans were determined to have 
trade. (i)
When the idea of a Portuguese joint-stock company was first 
airedj it had been the fervent wish of the Conselho that such a company would 
be able to send at least six ships annually to the Upper Guinea Coast. (2) 
Instead the Company of Cacheu could only muster one. (3) As a result it was 
reduced almost completely to the role of a trading intermediary. Like the 
lingados, the Company of Cacheu worked on a system of credits, under which 
they received a certain amount of goods from a visiting European ship, and
hiked off into the sertao on the promise that an agreed number of slaves and
quantities of wax, ivory, etc. would be forthcoming. Bad debts could 
obviously be incurred by this form of credit trade. But John Castle in the 
Gambia was confident that he could trust the captain of Cacheu with large 
quantities of trade goods, because the captain1s position was precarious in 
relation to his own superiors. Ee could not afford to give offence to the 
English and risk the matter coming to light, because, as Castle put it, when 
the Portuguese traded with any other Europeans it was "Inquisition business" 
if they were found out. (4)
The Company of Cacheu concentrated on guarding its position as 
middleman. Shortly after the Company began operating)the English factor in
(1) P.R.O.f T70/16 - John Castle, 14 Oot 1682, fl.44
(2) C. da Silva Texeiras "Companhia de Cacheu", p.99
(3) P-R-Q- - T70/16 - John CsEtle, 20 Feb 1683, fl.46.
(4) P.R.O. T70/16 - John Castle, 20 Peb 1683, fl.46.
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Sierra Leone wrote that prices had gone up. (l) It appears that south of the 
Nunez the Company of Cacheu was organising the 1 any ados to demand more for 
their services, as was happening simultaneously in the Cacheu-Gambia area. 
Both in Sierra Leone and in the Gambia, the agents of the English c ompanies 
were eager to break the stranglehold which the Company of Cacheu was applying 
by virtue of its role as intermediary in all trade. From the Gambia came tb 
suggestion that a well-equipped launch could visit the rivers and trade 
directly with the Africans. (2) The shortage of river craft hampered the 
adoption of this policy. From Sierra Leone came the suggestion that the 
principal trading establishment should be transferred from the Sierra Leone 
estuary to a point near to present day Conakry, as this would put them in a 
better position to negate the effects of the Cacheu Company. (3) This was no 
judged feasible, and instead attempts were made to set up small factories or 
trading houses in areas such as the Pongo and Nunez, again with the intention 
of entering into direct contact with the Africans. The Company of Cacheu 
followed on aggressive policy of hindering the establishment of such factorie
(4) Their success must obviously have been based on the co-operation of the
(1) P.R.O.. T70/IO - Edmund Pierce, 29 Jan 1681, fl»57
(2) P.R.O.. T70/10 Thomas Thurlow, 15 March 1678, fl. 1
(3) P.R.O.? T70/l - Edmund Pierce, 4 Aug 1679> fl.33l and T/70 10 Edmund 
Pierce, 25 June 1678, fl. 3
(4) B.R.O.T T70/10 - Edmund Pierce, 14 June 1680, fl.55> and T70/10 - 
Thomas Thurlow, 10 June 1679> fl«53*
^ 0 2
FREH TRADE vs MONOPOLY
lanyados who were resident in the given areas# The Company of Cacheu 
therefore achieved a grip on local distribution, though this was far from the 
monopoly that the Conselho expected.
In the light of contemporary resort to the joint-stock company a 
a capital-raising venture, and especially because of its utilisation on the 
West African Coast by th© French, the Dutch and the English, it is not 
surprising that the Portuguese should have been attracted to the idea. But a 
company could have been more effective than direct national administration 
only if it had boasted considerable capital. This the first Company of 
Cacheu did not. It did not even have the support of financial interests in 
Portugal, but was the property of a few Guinea traders who were in no positio 
to compete with the companies and traders proceeding from European 
countries, where capital and trade goods were in greater circulation. Under 
these circumstances, it could hardly have acted in any other capacity than th 
of middleman, co-operating with one and all. Instead of monopoly, the 
Company of Cacheu encouraged free trade.
FREE TRADE vs MONOPOLY
PART III - "A QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY, BISSAU 1685-1701”
^02
It was only in August 1915 that the Portuguese finally ‘pacified* 
the Papels of Bissau, and took complete de facto control over their colony in 
Guinea, (l) That was the c'limax to more than two centuries of sporadic 
conflict between the Portuguese and the Papel inhabitants of the island of 
Bissau. Curiously enough, Bissau first appeared to the Portuguese in the 
nature of a haven. De Almada singled out the king of Bissau as the best frie 
that the Portuguese had on the coast in the late sixteenth century, and his 
ports w£re used as refuge when other Europeans attacked Portuguese ships on tb 
nearby seas. (2) Possibly, it was the same king whom Barreira found as an 
old man, when he visited the island in 1605* In any event, the ruler at that 
time was also a great friend of the Portuguese. (3) The king, 0 Equende', 
reigning in I663, was equally friendly, (4) and Coelho was so impressed with 
the treatment of 1anyados on Bidsau that he urged that the whole population 
of Cacheu should be transferred there. (5)
A high point in the relations between the Portuguese and the 
Panels of Bissau was reached in 1680, when the latter sent forces to help the
(1) Joao Barreto: Historia da Guine". p.318
(2) Alvaxes de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.308
(3) Femao Guerreiro: Relayao Anual. Vol. 1, pp.410,411
(4) Andre' de Faro: uRelayao do que obrarao os Religiozos Canuchos em a terra 
firme de Guine", p. 38 in Peregrinayao de Andre de Faro 'a Terra dos Gen tic
(5) Lemos Coelho: Duas Descricoes. p.41
FREE TRADE vs MONOPOLY
Portuguese merchants of Cacheu to free themselves from a threat posed by the 
Panels of frtfif'fHi' - Cacheu. (l) Quite probably, this was linked with the 
internal struggles for power within the Papel tribe, since the king of Bissau 
at that time was said to have held sway over the Papels of the adjacent 
islands and coast. (2)
Bissau was advantageously sited to serve as an entrepot for 
trade with the Bijagos, the rivers entering the Geba Channel, and the Ria 
Grande de Buba; and this was probably the factor which attracted settlers 
from the Cape Verde islands in the sixteenth century. (3) It was in Bissau 
that the lanpado-grumete community came into greatest prominence, prosecuting 
the slave trade to the point where they themselves undertook slaving 
expeditions against neighbouring peoples. (4) Bissau1s increasing 
importance during the seventeenth century can be seen from the serious 
consideration which the Conselho gave to a propos&l that the first Portuguese 
company on the Upper Guinea Coast should operate from Bissau rather than CacL
(1) A.H.U., Guine*, Caixa II, No. 229» Manuel Cordeira Santos, Oct. 1694*
(2) A.H.U.. Guine, caixa II - No. 229, Frei Francisco da Guarda, 8 Oct 1694
(3) That there was a sizeable number of Portuguese settlers on the island at 
the beginning of the seventeenth century can be inferred from Barreira’s 
distress concerning the number of souls who were in danger of perdition oi 
the island because they were without a priest. See Fernao Guerreiroi
Relayao Anual. Vol. 1, p.410
(4) Mateo de Anguianoj Misiones Capuchinas en Africa. Vol. 2, p.141
(5) A.H.U.g Guine, caixa II - No. 134, Consulta of the Conselho Ultramarino
17 Aug 1674.
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Though the second Portuguese trading company on the Upper Guinea Ciast, which 
was formed in 1690, was called the '’Company of Cacheu and Cabo Verde", the 
centre of interest had really shifted to Bissau some years previously, and 
the Portuguese crown was anxious to consolidate its position there*
The Portuguese Franciscan, Fr. Francisco de Pinhel, arrived in 
Bissau early in 1687 bearing gifts for the king, Bacompolco. (l) In return, 
the king of Portugal was offered a man, a woman and a child by the king of 
Bissau. (2) Over the next six or seven years, favourable reports reached the 
Conselho concerning Bacompolco’s friendship with the Portuguese traders and 
priests. (3) Yet, during that time, evidence was already forthcoming of the 
issues which were to cause Papel friendship to change to enmity. Several 
questions, such as the construction of a fort, the policy towards other 
European traders, the possibility of conversion to Christianity, and the legal 
status of the Afro-Portuguese in Bissau were involved. They can all be summed 
up as "a question of sovereignty".
It should be recalled that during the captaincy of Gamboa de 
Ayala the king of Bissau had ignored the Portuguese attitude and had welcomed 
all ships to trade in his ports. Nor was Bacompolco, friendly though he was 
to the Portuguese, unmindful of the benefits of free trade. The French were
(1) A.H.U. Guine', caixa II, No. 186 9 Fr. Francisco de Pinhel, 26 March 1687
(2) A.H.U. Guine, caixa II - No. 187, Verissimo Carvalho da Costa, special
commissioner in Cacheu, 2 April 1687.
(3) A.H.U.. Cabo V9rde, caixa V, Verissimo Carvalho da Costa, 17 June 1687
(3) A.H.U.. Cabo Verde, caixa V - Bishop of CV, 28 June 1690, and caixa VI -
Governor of Cape Verde, 26 April 1694
FRED TRADE vs MONOPOLY
particularly anxious to trade with his subjects. During the 1680*s, the 
French had stepped up their activities on the Upper Guinea Coast, especially 
after June 1685, when the French king renewed the concession of the French 
company of the Senegal, extending its area of privilege to Sierra Leone, (l) 
Later that year, the Company sent an official overland from the Gambia to the 
Cacheu, and then by ship among the offshore islands before returning to Goree 
The official, De la Courbe, negotiated with several rulers, including the kin 
of Bissau. (2) Bacompolco refused the French permission to build a fort, but 
trading factory was allowed, (3) and Bissau became the centre for French trad 
south of tte Gambia.
The French factor resident in Bissau in 1685-86 was Jean de la 
Fond, who shipped 1,800 slaves and nearly 400 quintals of wax during that 
period. &e returned in 1689, and acquired 300 slaves in three months; 
while in the interval (1687-88) another Trench agent, Bourguignon, despatched
(1) A.H.U. ■ Guine', caixa II - No. 166, Antonio de Barros Bezerra, 24 June I681 
He was given a copy of the French charter by the Company’s agents on the 
Upper Guinea Coast.
(2) P. Cultrus Premier Voyage de Sieur de la Courbe fait a la Coste dfAfrique 
en 1685. pp.211-214,220 for visit to Bissau.
(3) A.H.U., Guind', caixa II - No. 166, Antonio de Barros Bezerra, 24 June 168' 
(Refers to French factory), and No. 187, Verisdimo de Carvalho, 2 April 1 
(Refers to failure of French to gain permission for fort.)
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700 slaves in eighteen months, (l) The Conselho Ultramarino was kept 
informed of these developments not only hy its own officials but also by the 
clerical establishment on the Upper Guinea Coast.
Proselytising had always been a minor sub-theme as far as the 
Portuguese on the Upper Guinea Coast were concerned. (2) Such missionary 
activity as was carried on was usually associated with the conduct of trade, 
but never more blatantly than on the island of Bissau. From 1683 to 1686 
three Spanish Capuchins maintained a church in Bissau. They attempted to 
christianise the Papels, but not to influence their commercial policies in 
favour of the Portuguese monopoly. Indeed, they must have had good relation 
with Jean de la Fond of the French Company of the Senegal, because in June 
1686 when they wrote a letter to the king of Portugal on the state of Bissau
(1) J. Labat: Nouvelle .Relation, Vol. V, p.85
L. Abdoulaye: Un Navftire de Commerce sur la C6te Senegambienne en 1685 
(Dakar 1964)* This is based on the journal of the French ship, Amite7, 
and indicates clearly that while the French were based in the Senegambia 
they did a brisk trade with areas south of the Gambia. See pp. 17, 19 
for arrival at Goree of de la Font with slaves, and his despatch with 
iron and other trade goods
(2) For a review of the missionary endeavour on the Upper Guinea Coast, see
Lemos Coelho: Duas Descricoes. pp.75-84* For the Capuchins, see Mateo de
Anguiano: Misiones Capuchinas en Africa. Vol. II, and P. Rosco Corrado:
MLe Missioni dei Cappuccini sulle coste della Guinea Superior© nel Secolo
XVII" - Unpublished thesis in the library of the Propaganda Fide. Rome.
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Christianity, they forwarded a supporting testimonial from this French agent, 
(l) The parish priest of Cacheu complained to the Conselho that the Spanish 
missionaries in Bissau did no good to the Portuguese cause, because they did 
nothing to stop the English and French from trading. He cited, by way of 
contrast, the actions of the Portuguese priest, who in 1681 went to Bissau fl 
Cacheu, and succeeded in keeping out the English agent, John Booker, as well 
as preventing the French from obtaining the guides they needed to ta.de among 
the Bijago islands. It was imperative, he felt, that only Portuguese 
priests should be given permission to go to the Upper Guinea Coast, and with 
this judgment the Conselho was in full agreement. (2) The Spaniards were 
recalled in 1686, and, the following year, Portuguese Franciscans were sent 
out. (3)
In the above context, there was nothing incongruous in the title 
of a memorandum written by the notary of Cacheu in 1694 “ "Advice on the 
best method of introducing the Catholic faith into Bissau and expelling the 
foreigner". (4) The subject matter of the memorandum was mainly of 
commercial interest. It pointed out that a French vessel had arrived at 
Bissau seme months before, and in a short while was loaded with 200 quintals
(1) Mateo de Anguianos Misiones Ca.puchinas en Africa. Vol.2, p. 278, Note II, 
which refers to A.H.U.. Guiner, Caixa II, No. 165*
(2) A.H.U. t Guine caixa II - No. 174, Antonio Moreira, 22 July 1685 and No. 
178, Minute of 9 Bee 1686
(3) Mateo de Anguiahos Misiones Capuchinas. p.203 (Editor’s notes)
(4) A.H.U., Guine', caixa II - No. 229, Manuel Cordeira Santos, Oct 1694*
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of ivory. Another French ship took 300 slaves in less than two months, while 
at that very moment, An English ship was loading at Cacheu. Both the 
Portuguese residents and the Africans facilitated this ’illicit* trade, hut 
hasically the Africans were pro-Portuguese} callingthem brancos ('whites1) as 
opposed to estrangeiros ('foreigners' or * strangers') who were Europeans 
other than Portuguese. Indeed, the Papels of Bissau had a special grudge 
against the French, because a French frigate had attacked the island some tim 
previously. The rwo things which would be needed to win the complete favour 
of the Africans and the resident traders of Portuguese extfaction were goods 
in sufficient quantity and at competitive prices, and at least two more ships 
to take out exports from Bissau, because, as it was, the residents often had 
slaves, wax and ivory left on their hands.
On hearing of the activities of the French and the English, the 
Conselho Ultramarino had decided to temporise, laying their hopes for the 
future in the construction of a fort on the island of Bissau, (l) The 
Portuguese missionaries were soon able to report definite progress in this 
direction. Fr. Francisco da Guarda wrote that Bacompolco had been converted 
and that Bissau had a much better harbour than Cacheu and other mainland 
ports. Bacompolco was offering a site for a fort, and he was willing to 
keep out 'foreigners1. (2) The king of Bissau also wrote the king of 
Portugal in April 1694, telling of his conversion. He needed more churches, 
weapons, missionaries, some footstools, a bed, a sun hat and a gown (since
(1) A.H.U. T Guine^ caixa II - No. 171, Minute of 28 Sept. 1686
(2 ) A.H.U.f Guine, caixa II - No. 228, Minute of 27 Oct 1694*
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the one brought him by Fr. Francisco de Pinhel in 1687 was worn out); and he 
was giving eight of his 1 sons’ to the Bishop of Cape Verde as a guarantee of 
good faith, (l) Seven of them were to be given a Christian education in 
Santiago, while the eldest, Batonto, was sent to Lisbon, where he was made 
much of, being baptised by a high ecclesiastic, with the king of Portugal as 
his godfather, and ’Manuel* as his new name. The events reached as far as 
the Paris Gazette of October and November 1694* (2) Shortly afterwards 
Bacompolco became the first Christian king of Bissau, and the Conselho gave 
orders for the building of the fort of Our Lady of Conception on the island. 
(3)
Hitherto, Bissau had only been semi-officially connected to the 
Conselho through the intermediary of the missionaries and the bishop of Cape 
Verde. There was one official, known as a lieutenant-captain, who held a 
commission from the Portuguese crown, but the post seems to have been purely 
honorary, being conferred on Bamabe Lopez, an influential Afro-Portuguese, 
related to the ruling house of Bissau..(4) In 1696, after the decision to 
establish a nraya, Bissau was given the status of a captaincy, though 
subordinate to the captain-major of Cacheu, and Jose Pinheiro, former captain 
of Cacheu, was entrusted with the job of organising Portuguese authority on 
the island. (5)
(1) AjJLIL, Guine, caixa II - No. 229, Bacompolco, 26 April 1694
(2) Bertrand - Bocande. "Guinee Portugaise"
(3) A.H.U.. Guine, caixa II - No. 229, Minute of 21 Dec 1695
(4) A.H.U.. Guine', caixa II - No. 241, Jose Pinheiro, 16 June 1696
(5) A.H.U.. Guine', caixa II - No. 240, Minute of 21 Jan 1696.
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All seemed set for smooth relations between the Bissau Papels and 
the Portuguese, when fate intervened. Bacompolco died.
Pinheiro arrived in Bissau on May 5th, 1696, to find the island 
in two hostile camps, with the succession being disputed by two fidalgos. 
Incinhate and Toroco. Pinheiro wisely refrained from committing himself 
behind either conteatant,(]) though both he and the bishop of Cape Verde, Fr. 
Victoriano Portuense, favoured Toroco. Fears were entertained that life under 
Incinhate would not be very pleasant; while, on the othar hand, Toroco was 
already a Christian convert, and it was felt that he would preserve the 
religio-commercial ascendancy of the Portuguese in Bissau. Nine points of 
policy for the king of Bissau were detailed by the Bissau ecclesiastics and th 
bishop of Cape Verde: (i) the king should allow the fort to .be built on the 
chosen site, (ii) he should treat the Christians with love and courtesy, (iii) 
he should himself be a Christian, and publish a proclamation that whoever 
wanted to accept the new religion was free to do so, (iv) he must give 
permission for the removal of all Xinas (images of the traditional religion) 
from the area settled by Christians, (v) Christians were to be subjected not t 
local laws but to those of Portugal, (vi) Christians and non-Christians were 
not to live together, (vii) no non-Christians should inherit the goods of a 
Christian, (viii) the king should have no commerce with 'foreigners', but 
should defend the port against them, and (ix) he should favour no Christian 
who had committed a crime, but should return all fugitives to the captain-
(l) A.H.U., Guine', caixa II - No. 241, Jose Pinheiro, 16 June 1696
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major, who would punish them according to Portuguese law. (l)
Portuguese hopes for the implementation of these provisions lay 
in Toroco, so the Conselho was given a lengthy justification of Toroco*s 
claims to the throne, in the belief that they would intervene militarily.
In the process, the tenets upon which the Papel succession was based were 
incidentally exposed.
The kingdom of Bissau was inherited by the king's maternal 
sister's son, or by the nearest male relative descended through the king’s 
maternal grandparents. Torocofs claims were urged to be superior for three 
reasons. Firstly, he was the maternal brother of Bacompolco, the former 
king; while'Incinhate, though an older relative, was descended through 
another female line, and did not have a better claim than the mother of 
Bacompolco and Toroco. Toroco*s adherents advanced the following hypo­
thesis: if Toroco’s mother had been a man she would have been king, and as
it was her rights were transferred directly to her sons. Secondly, it was 
pointed out that when Bacompolco ascended the throne he did so without any 
opposition from Incinhate, who had already inherited the goods of his elder 
brothers, as was the custom. Incinhate's late assertion of a claim was, 
therefore, just an ambitious act without legal foundation. Thirdly,
Antoma, the noble to whom belonged the right of crowning the king, had crowne 
Toroco, placing in his hands the insignia of the kingdom and on his head the 
crown of his predecessors. He was thus duly consecrated and took possession
(l) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa VI - Jesus Maria Joseph, 24 May 1696 and the 
bishop of Cape V^rde, D. Frei Victoriano Portuense, 15 June 1696.
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of the house of his brother, the former king.
However, the matter did not end there. Apparently, the Beafada 
king of Guinala had some rights over the throne of Bissau, and it had 
previously been the custom for every Bissau king, after governing for two or 
three years, to request a crown from the king of Guinala. Bacompolco had 
ruled for more than ten years using the crown of his predecessor, but 
Incinhate decided to ask the king of Guinala for the crown, along with a few 
forces to see that it was securely placed on his head. The king of Guinala 
acceded, and Incinhate found himself another noble to perform the actual 
coronation. Incinhate took control of the main port of Bissau, and placed a
» n i n 3  t h e
boycott on trade with Toroco^ H a j W i ng iii» kA a* Bernagfbe Lopez and most 
of the Afro-Portuguese community.- Within a short while he was de facto king, 
and full constitutional sanction seems to have followed. "This only goes 
to show what little respect they have for law in that kingdom" wrote the 
Bishop of Cape Verdi'*'- in a spirit of righteousness which would have been 
better applied to European monarchical intrigues.
With Incinhate as king, the Portuguese nine-point policy did 
receive some slight support. Most important of all, the Conselho*s plan for 
a fort was put into operation, and there was a garrison of 30 degredados sent 
out since 1692. (2) Incinhate also nominally accepted Christianity, 
entitling him to refer to the Catholic monarch of Portugal as "my brother";
(1) AJLIJ., Cabo Verde, caixa VI - Bishop of Cape Verde, 15 June 1696
(2) A.H.U., Guine, caixa II - Ho. _218, Minute of 11 Feb 1692; and No. 221,
Jose Pinheiro 13 June 1693
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while at tha same time this Bissau king saw nothing' incongruous in protesting 
to the Catholic king of Portugal that Pinheiro was sacrilegious in his 
conduct towards the Papel Xinas. (l)
Differences of religious and commercial interests were serious 
enough, and'the chances of an amicable compromise were jeopardised from the 
inception by the poor personal relations between Incinhate and the bishop of 
Cape Verde, between Pinheiro and the bishop, and later between Incinhate and 
the bishop*
In the first pi ce, Incinhate was of the opinion that those of 
his relatives who had been entrusted to the bishop by Bacompolco were sent to 
Lisbon as slaves; (2) and in the second place, the bishop’s support of Toroco 
could not hive endeared him to Incinhate. For some reason, Pinheiro and the 
bishop were also at loggerheads. In November 1696, some slaves escaped from 
the pracpa of Bissau and fled to Balanta territory. They were pursued by an 
adjutant, four soldiers and several grumetes; but the party met diaaater.
Two soldiers were drowned, and the rest captured by the Balantas. The 
bishop tried to effect a ransom, but to get to Balanta territory he had to 
cross the island, and on returning there was an attempt on his life, reputedly 
inspired by both Pinheiro and Incinhate. Incensed at this, the bishop had 
five Papels seized and sent to Geba, including two relations of the king.
(1) Sena Barcelos: Subsidios para a Historia de C3bo Verde e Guine, Vol. X
Ch. Ill, pp.IIO-I36 for the whole of the Bissau episode.
(2) Ibid.
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In the early hours of the next morning, the church and living quarters of the 
priests were burned to the ground. The bishop retired to a house within the 
pra^a, and twenty days later this too was burnt, (l)
Several witnesses gave evidence that Pinheiro was deeply 
implicated in all this; though he attempted to saddle the Papel king with all 
the blame. This partly accounted for the rift which developed between him­
self and Incinhate, though the most violent clash was tocome over matters of 
trade. In December 1696, Pinheiro turned away two English ships which 
arrived at the main port of Bissau. Incinhate despatched his alcalde and 
three other fidalgos to ask Pinheiro "whether he thought he was the Senhor 
da Terra, that he had dared to turn away shipping". Pinheiro replied that 1 
was doing his duty as required by the king of Portugal, and that the Papels 
stood to benefit by the Portuguese presence. But the Papel delegation 
returned from Incinhate with the same query: "Are you the Senhor da Terra?",
This time Pinheiro shouted that they would trade with foreigners only over 
his dead body. The Papel king took him literally, and he was sentenced to 
death. The fort was not yet finished, but Pinheiro decided to withstand a 
siege. e and his small garrison were deprived of food and water, in much 
the same way as the Papels of Cacheu had held the settlement there ah their 
mercy. Fortunately for the Portuguese at Bissau, help was rapidly forth­
coming from Cacheu and Geba, organised by Santos de Vidigal Castanho, the the
(l) A.H.U.. Guine, caixa II, No. 244> Finheiro's version of events; and Cabo 
Varde, Caixa VI - Affidavits on this matter seen by the Conselho on
4 Feb I698.
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captain of Cacheu. Castanho brought 92 lanc^ados. 200 grumetes and other
Africans, who brought the total force to more than 400. (l) These forces did
not need to go into action, since Castanho and Incinhate1s nobles came to
peaceful terms, incorporating- the condition that Finheiro should be removed as 
soon
as possible. (2)
Only four days aft r Castanho left Bissau, Pinheiro found himself 
in lifficulties again. A Butch ship arrived, and Pinheiro fired upon it. The 
pra3a was surrounded by Incinhate and 400 Papels, who warned that if the 
captain-major should continue in his contumacy, they would pull down the walls 
of the fort and cut off the heads of all those inside. Pinheiro was determined 
to resist, but the priests prevailed upon him to at least v/ait until the 
fortifications were completed, if he was going to fight the Papels. (3)
Rodrigo de Fonseca, Pinheirofs successor, wrote the Conselho that 
linheiro had died in the service of his country on the 5th February 1698, after 
having been imprisoned and beaten up by the king of Bissau. (4) The Conselho 
was not particularly impressed by this martyrdom. They had specifically urged 
that the Bissau situation should be handled with caution and prudence, (5) and 
Pinneiro had displayed none of these qualities.
(1) A.H.U.. Guind', caixa II - No. 243, Jose Pinheiro, 7 March 1697; and No.
247) Vidigal Castanho, 24 March 1697
(2) Sena Barcelos: Subsidios, loc.cit.
(3) A.H.U.. Guine", caixa II - No. 245) Jose Pinheiro, March 1697
(4) A.H.U.. Cabo Verde, caixa VI - Minute of 3 Oct I698
(5) A.H.U.. Guine, caixa II - No. 229, Minute of 27 Oct 1694*
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Rodrigo de Fonseca was much more restrained than his predecessor. 
He was unable to put an end to free trade, because the Papels let him know that 
"the7 had to eat", and that "the land was theirs, and we (the Portuguese) could 
not call it ours". To offer resistance would have been suicidal, since the 
garrison had been reduced by mortality to twelve soldiers, the artillery 
carriages were destroyed by termites, and any altercation would lead to the 
stoppage of food and water. Fonseca*s advice was to allow the other 
Europeans to trade, collect duty from them, and temporise with the Africans 
until the Portuguese commanded enough force. To preserve Portuguese dignity 
in tne meanwhile, he had managed to persuade the Bissau king that all European 
ships should anchor outside the range of the fort!s guns, though even this 
smalL concession had been costly. Having made these compromises, Fonseca was 
able to report in March 1699 > after nearly one year on the island, that so far 
he hid managed to maintain peaceful relations with the Papels. (l) He was 
also fortunate in that the king of Guinala had been assassinated, and 
Incinhate, who had derived his authority from the king of Guinala, was said 
to hive been most chastened by this event. (2)
However, Incinhate had already made his position clear to the 
Conselho, as far as matters of trade were concerned. After thanking the 
Portuguese king, D. Pedro, for past favours, and after averring that he had 
no wish to incur the enmity of any king - least of all "his brother", the king 
of Portugal - Incinhate proceeded as follows: "On the subject of the
(1) A.H.U., Guine", caixa II - No. 266, Rodrigo de Fonseca, 16 March 1699
(2) Eena Barcelos: Subsidios, loc. cit.
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foreigners whom the captain-majors do not wash to allow to do business in 
this country, Your Majesty should know that I am a poor king, and that my 
country requires foreign goods, such as iron, alchohol and swords. Your 
Majesty’s Company which is here does not sell me alchohol or iron, nor does 
it have sufficient goods for my country.. .nor are the goods of the same 
quality as those brought by foreigners. Your Majesty should be well aware 
that the price paid by the foreigners for my slaves suits me better than that 
of the Company."(l)
It was perhaps with Incinhate1s letter in mind that a member of 
the Conselho noted a few years later that "the Negroes are not so barbarous 
that they do not know the advantage of having free trade with all nations".
(2) Were it not for the jaundiced attitude of which this remark is typical, 
the Portuguese might have been able t o appreciate fully that more than 
elementary mercantile considerations were at stake. When the Papels asked 
Pinheiro if he was setting himself up as the Lord of the Land, they reached 
to the heart of the matter, Pinheiro had rightly insisted that he was in the 
service of his king, What was at issue, therefore, was a clash of sovereignty.
In the welter of claims and counter-claims which the European 
nations made among themselves, they found it easy to overlook the basic fact
1I
that any claim to sovereignty over any part of Africa immediately introduced
V- i
the potential clash with the African rulers concerned. During the pre­
(1) A.H.U.. Cabo Verde, caixa VI - Incinhate to the governor of Cape Verde and 
to the king of Portugal, 2§ May I698.
(2) A.H.U., Guine, ma^o I - Minute of 28 Nov 1707-
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colonial era of trr.de, this question seldom came to a head, because the 
European powers did not embark on conquest or try to wrest political authority 
from the African rulers# But an area of overlapping authority did exist. 
Though Portugal and the other European powers trading to West Africa legis­
lated primarily for their own citizens and functionaries, the action of the 
law inevitably fell on the Africans also. Thus, when the chiefs and the 
kings of the Upper Guinea Coast espoused free trade, in opposition to 
the regulations of the king of Portugal, the question of whose authority and 
competence it was to determine such matters was never far from the surface. 
Bissau was no exception, though on that island several facets of the question 
were fully exposed.
Since Fonseca was much more tactful than Pinheiro, his 
difficulties with the Papel king were particularly meaningful in revealing 
the essential points of difference of policy rather than personalities. When 
Fonseca tried to collect taxes for his own sovereigh, he did not find it an 
easy matter. He reported in April 1699 that Maria Soares, an Afro-Portuguese 
trader, was en route from Sierra Leone to Bissau with a cargo of kola, and 
she stopped at Bissau. On being asked to pay duties to the Portuguese she 
immediately protested to Incinhate, who intervened in her favour, (l) An 
incident of this sort should have forewarned the Portuguese authorities that 
it was unlikely that, having granted free trade, they could collect revenues 
from foreign ships? but this was the plan adopted late in 1699* (2)
(1) A.H.U.. caixa II - No. 271 > Rodrigo de Fonseca, 23 April 1699
(2) A.H.U.T caixa II - No. 279> Minuteof Nov 1699«
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Predictably, Fonseca had a tale of woe to tell in his subsequent correspon­
dence. Two Dutch ships had not paid the IQffo duty required by the Portuguese, 
and when Fonseca tried to stop them they had recourse to the king of Bissau. 
Incinhate ordered that his bombalon be sounded, saying that whoever wanted to 
sell could do so without fear, because he was the Senhor da Terra who could 
order as he pleased, (l)
When the king of Portugal styled himself Senhor da Guine, what 
then did it mean? The Conselho had made specific reference to this issue in 
a memorandum on Cacheu in 1670 - "Your Majesty carries the title Senhor da 
Guin£, though having out of all that coast only a small parcel of land; and 
what is worse, Your Majesty conserves that at the cost of your reputation,... 
because you pay a tribute or feu-duty to the Negro king."(2) The Conselho 
was, therefore, regarding payments made to African rulers on the Upper Guinea 
Coast as an affront to and a derogation from Portuguese sovereignty. Their 
prescribed remedy for this situation was a fort.
As wiih the lane ados in the sixteenth century, so with the 
Portuguese crown in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries - the most 
crucial issue was always that of fort-building. The commercial regulations 
made by the Portuguese crown could normally be ignored by the African rulers, 
but the construction of a fort provided a physical sanction. The Papel rulers 
recognised this as a threat to their authority, but (apart from the instances
(1) A.H.U.. Guine", maco I - Rodrigo de Fonseca, letter seen by the Conselho 
on 26 March 1701
(2) A.H.U.. Guine", caixa I - No. 124> 26 Sept I67O.
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of building by subterfuge) the rulers were often prepared to grant permissioi 
as a calculated risk, and in the light of their own conception that land and 
the rights that went with it could not be permanently alienated, (l) 
Consequently, one finds in the fort-building episodes of Bissau and Cacheu a 
phase of seemingly contradictory behaviour on the part of the Papel leaders, 
first conceded the Portuguese the right to construct fortifications on a give 
site, and then did their best to make this concession invalid.
On® very practical problem in building a fort was the shortage c 
labour. The Papels of Bissau refused to provide labour and raw materials tc 
facilitate the Portuguese, and sometimes went so far as to withhold the watei 
which went into the building operations. (2) This was not the first experier 
of its kind which the Portuguese had had on the Upper Guinea Coast, for in 
Cacheu in the l650fs work on the much discussed fort had been held up becaus 
of the negative attitude of the Papels, who were not prepared to supply laboi 
even for wages. (3) Their motive could scarcely have been any different froc 
the one advanced for the behaviour of the Bissau Papels: namely, "because
they did not want to lose their freedom". (4) Barbot was well informed aboul 
this situation in Bissau, and gave an independent judgement which confirmed 
the official Portuguese reports, ^e noted that in 1686 the Portuguese had
(1) This question was much more important on the Gold Coast; where there was 
a network of European trading forts,
(2) A.H.U.. Guine, caixa II - No. 269, Rodrigo de Fonseca.
(3) A.H.U.. Guine, caixa I - No. JQ, Gaspar Yogado, 24 June 1656.
(4) A.H.U., Guine, caixa II - No. 269, Rodrigo de Fonseca, 28 Nov 1699*
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obtained permission to construct a fort by offering the Papel king a consider­
able present# However, after two pieces of cannon had been mounted, the re­
action set in, "for the Blacks in general are not pleased with this grant made 
to the Portuguese, which excludes all other Europeans from trading with their 
nation; and it is likely things will not continue so long, those Blacks being 
great sticklers for liberty"# (l)
As predicted, things did not continue so for very long. The 
Conselho itself came to realise that the fort of Bissau was not serving its 
purpose of protecting their monopoly, and thus represented unnecessary 
expense. The members of the Conselho were advised that even when functioning 
perfectly, the fort of Bissau could not stop ’contraband* trade from being 
carried on at other points which were relatively close. In fact, this argu­
ment would have applied to any other site on the Upper Guinea Coast, with its 
many-channelled estuaries, rias, bays and off-shore.islands. The Conselho 
did not draw the conclusion that all fortifications were likely to prove 
futile, but when they reviewed the position of the Portuguese crown on the 
Upper Guinea Coast at the end of the seventeenth century, they decided that it 
was better to concentrate what limited funds they had for such purposes on the 
fort of Cacheu. (2) The fortress of Our Lady of Conception on the island of 
Bissau was abandoned in 1701, so that when Incinhate died later that year, the 
sovereignty of the Bissau monarch was untrammelled by European cannon, and his 
ports were open to the trade of all nations.
(1) John Barbot: The Coasts of North and South Guinea, p.87
(2) A.H.U., Guine, caixa II - No. 271> Minute of Nov 1699*
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CHAPTER SIX
PRODUCTS CF THEFOHEST
Products of the Forest
Resident lane ados* European governments, joint-stock
companies and individual ships from Europe were all concerned 
primarily with the Atlantic slave trade; and it was in the interests 
of this trade that the Portuguese strove so desperately to maintain 
a monopoly of the commerce of the Upper Guinea Coast. But, although 
the Atlantic slave trade so obviously dominated Afro-European 
relations in the pre-colonial period, slaves were never the exclusive 
export of West Africa. The slave trader, Captain Canot, made a 
comment on this subject. He wrote: nAs it may be interesting to 
learn the nature of trade on this coast - which is commonly misunder­
stood as consisting in slaves alone - I thought it well to set down 
the inventory I made out of the daravan’s stock.
3,500 hides $ 1,750
19 large and prime teeth of ivory 1,560
gold
600 pounds small ivory 
15 tons rice 
40 slaves 
36 bullocks
2,500
320
600
1,600
360
sheep, goats, butter, vegetables 100
900 pounds beeswax 95
§ 8,885
Products of the Forest
The above list relates to a Fula trading caravan 
proceeding from the Futa Djalon in the early nineteenth century,(l) 
It by no moans includes all of the varied products of the forests 
of the Upper Guinea Coast, which, in greater or lesser quantities, 
were exported to Europe, A comprehensive list of those exports 
x/ould comprise gold, ivory, beeswax, camwood, malaguetta pepper, 
hides and pelts, civet, ambergris, indigo, orchilla (a violet dye), 
cotton, gums, resin, soap and raphia mats; apart from palm oil, 
rice, millet and citrus fruit, which served as provisions for slaves 
and sailors. Several of these forest products provided valuable 
supplements and even alternatives to the trade in slaves, and thus 
clearly warrant consideration in their own right.
It is convenient to begin this discussion by singling out 
gold, because this metal was “tbs principal factor motivating the 
navigational achievements of the Iberians in Africa, Though both 
the Senegambian shores and the Upper Guinea Coast proved disappoint­
ments as far as extensive gold supplies were concerned, the possi­
bility of find'ng gold was a great incentive, seldom absent from 
the minds of the Europeans on the Upper Guinea Coast, as elsewhere. 
Because of the xenophobia of the Balantas, and because of the fact 
that this tribe paid its tribute to the king of Casanga in gold,
(l) Captain Canot: Adventures of an African Slavey (London 1923) 
po, 39> 90.
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the Portuguese were misled into t h ’.nking that gold mines were 
located in Balanta territory. In 1695, the Portuguese of Bissau, 
along with three hundred Papels, invaded Balanta territory, partly 
motivated by the expectation of gold. This foray proved a costly 
failure.(l) Apart from this instance, the Portuguese realised that 
most of the gold in circulation on the Upper Ssid Coast had to be 
imported from the deep hinterland, though there were small deposits 
of alluvial gold on the coast. The English and French we^e not as 
well informed, and continued to believe for a long while that there 
was an El Dorado on the river Gambia. There was some substance for 
this belief, but the gold mines of Galam and Boundou were a long 
way from the coast, as the French were to discover.(n)
1/hen the Portuguese reached the Gambia in the middle of 
the fifteenth century, they were able to purchase a gfnall amount 
of gold at the estuary.(2) However, they had to proceed to the 
furthest navigable point on the river before they came into contact 
with the interior gold trade. (3) The terminus of this trade was 
in the district of Cantor. There the Mandinga merchants brought 
their gold to exchange for cloths, hats, beads and, above all,
(n) P. Labgrthe: Voyage au Senegal, pp. 56-60.
(1) J. Labat: Nouvelle Relation. Vo.IV, pp. 191-193*
(2) Valentim Fernandes: La C-ote Occidentale d*Afrioue. p. 34*
(3) Ibid: p.36.
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This was obviously the same expertise in measurement as displayed 
on the Gold Coast, and the comparison with this latter region is 
apt for another reason* From Pereira1s account, it would appear 
that the Mande merchants on the Gambia came from the hinterland of 
the Gold Coast, (l) It was a long and dangerous journey, requiring 
the protection of well-armed soldiers, (2) and such difficult conditions 
would explain why the Gambia never became an outlet comparable to the 
Gold Coast.
South of the Gambia, it was even more difficult to make
eCbntact with the IJestcrn Sudan, since the rivers did not penetrate
far enough. Supplies on the Gcba represented a trickle from the 
Gambia; while in Sierra Leone the gold arrived on the coast, in the 
sixteenth century, by way of the Susus and Fulas. (3) Although the 
traders on the coast believed that the mineral came from within Fula 
domains, later sources show that the Fulas too were a link in the 
chain of trade which started in the tfectern Sudan. The merchants of 
Sangara, east of the Niger, purchased £gold at Sego and sold it to the
a) Pacheco Pereira: Lsmrraldo de Situ Qrbis. p. 64*
(2) Albares De Almada: "Kios de Guine1’P p. 27C. (See also the discus­
sion of the Manes, Ch. II, p.fcg.)^
(3) Alvares De Almada ”Pdos de Guine%pp. 353y 355*
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copper bracelets. By the beginning of the sixteenth century, when 
war did not interrupt this trade, the Portuguese could count on 
carrying away some "5,000 to 6,000 doubloons of good gold" every 
year, according to Pacheco Pereira, (l) This commerce continued 
throughout the sixteenth century. In 1551* the captain of Santiago 
acknowledged receipt of fifty-seven marks, three and two-eighths 
ounces, and twenty-four grains of gold brought from Cantor; (2 ) while 
another report of 15S1 indicated that the Porguguese obtained on an 
average 10,000 to 12,000 cruzados of g old from the Gambia every year.
(3)
What the Porguguese encountered on the middle Gambia (and 
perhaps stimulated) was a branch of the well-developed Sudanese 
network. The Cantor markets were dominated by long-distance mefchants, 
who were professional gold dealers. De Almada was impressed that 
"these merchants are extremely skilful, in weighing and in every 
other respect; they carry very delicate scales inlaid with silver". (4 )
(1 ) Pacheco Pereira: Esmeraldo de Situ Orbis. pp. 62, 6 4 .
(2 ) A. Brasio: MonumeirtaJMissianaria, 4fccicana>2nd series, Vol. II - 
No. 12S, Letter of J0S0 Afonso Cedofeita to the king, 20 Nov.,
1551, p. 422.
(3) A. Brasio: Op.cit., Vol. Ill - No. 42, Relayao of Francisco de 
Andrade, 26 Jan.,15S2, p.104. (The most worthwhile comparison 
between these .three estimates of gold supplies from the Gambia 
would be on the basis of weight, but I have been unable to ascer­
tain the weight of the gold doubloon and cruzado f or the relevant
dates.) For a rough idea of the value and fluctuating gold content 
of the Portuguese cruzado,see Frederic Mauro: Lo Portugal et
1.1 At1 ant iq.ua, p p. 413,414 *
(4 ;') Alvares De Almada: "Rios de Guinn", p.276.
Kornnkos and Fulas in the hinterland of Sierre Leone,(l) Such tenuous 
connections with the source of supply did not encourage any substantial 
trade.
According to Pacheco Pereira, the Ternnes called gold tebon.qo.
(2) a word which actually means 1jewe Iry1. (3) Up to the beginning of 
the seventeenth century, most of the gold purchased by the Portuguese 
in Sierre Leone was in the form of rings and bracelets, U) and this 
could mean that this was theform in which gold reached the coast from 
the interior, after passing through thehands of Mande craftsmen.(5)
But, whether the jewelry was fashioned on the coast or in the interior, 
the fact that so high a percentage of gold on the coast was in the form 
of jewelry further reduced the prospects, as far as the Europeans were 
concerned, especially when certain social customs are taken into account. 
The Sapes hoarded gold ornaments to bury with the dead. This practice 
led the Mane invaders to disturb the Sape graves,(6) but in turn the
(1) A.G. Laings Travels in the Timmanee. Kooranko and Soolima Countries, 
pp. 356, 372.
(2 ) Pacheco Pereira: Esmeraldo de Situ Orbis, p. £2.
(3) Pet er Kup: A History of Sierra Leone, p. 6.
(4 ) Fernao Guerreiro: Rela^ao Anual. Vo. 2, p. 211.
(3) Peter ICup: A History of Sierra Leone, p. 7.
(6) Hakluyt Society, Ud. LVII, Thg Hawkins Voyagesr p. 1$; Alvarcc 
Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guinl", pp. 353> 3&2.
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Manes too adopted the same burial customs. In 1606, a Portuguese 
trader lamented that far more ^old would have been available for sale 
in Sierre Leone if the kings and nobles had not considered it such a 
high honour to be interred with this precious metal. The lan^ados 
were frustrated by not generally knowing the burial places, (1) and 
even when they did, fear of the consequences kept them from desecrating 
the graves. (2)
It is at first sight somewhat surprising that, in spite of 
their constant verbal preoccupation with &old, the Portuguese did 
not exploit the gold trade to its full potential on the Upper Guinea 
Coast. De Almada attested tha* he was himself present in 1573 at 
Cantor when, at the conclusion of the trade, an immense quantity of 
gold was not taken up by the Portuguese because they had brought 
insufficient merchandise.(3) 1 report from Santiago in 1531 also
claimed that the year!s return of gold from the Gambia was below the 
usual quantity, because the small Portuguese trading vessel failed to 
carry enough goods. U) De Almada went on to add that since 1536 no 
Portuguese ships at all had travelled up the Gambia to the annual gold
(1) Fernao Guerreiro: Helacao mual. VoL2, p. 211.
(2) A.R.S.I.. Lus.74 (Epistolae Lusitaniae 1599-1655) FIs. 63-73, 
Baltezar Barreira to the P. Provincial, 9 Sept.,.1607.
(3) Alvares De Almada: "Rios de Guine”, p. 279.
(4) A. Brasio: Monuments Missionarla A^ricana, Vol.Ill, p.104-.
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fair, and the trade had passed into the hands of the Moors, who 
offered items such as glazed pottery and red cloth. (i)
The explanation is that the Portuguese did not find the 
Gambia gold trade profitable. During the course of the seventeenth 
century, they continued to take some interest in it,(2) but Lemos 
Goelho, who personally participated in that activity for three years, 
did not give a favourable account. Only six to seven pounds of gold 
were purchased every year, because it was far more profitable to use 
one's trade goods to purchase slaves, ivory and cloth.(3) The French 
traders learnt the same lesson before the end of the seventeenth 
century, finding that gold in the Gambia was almost as dear as in
France.(4)
Similarly, at Cope Mount the Portuguese did not take a great 
interest in the gold trade. In the early sixteenth century, the 
Portuguese knew that the Bulloms were exchanging salt for gold from 
the Coyas in the near hinterland of Cape Mount.(5) let it was the 
Dutch who constructed the first fort at this point on the coast. One 
Portuguese lanyado was incredulous when told that the Dutch were netting
(1) Alvares De Almada: "Rios de Guine", p. 279.
(2) R. Jobson: The Golden Trade of the Moors, p. 33*
(3) Lemos Goelho: Duas Descrlcoes da Guine. pp.23,24.
(4)P. Cultru: Premier Voyage de Sieur de la C.mrbe fait a la Coste 
Occidentals d'Afrlqne en 1635. p.194*
(5) Pacheco Pereira: Bsmeraldo de Situ Qrbis. p. 32.
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huge quantiti’s of gold from the area between Mina and Cape Mount,
This langudo knew that gold was not available on the Malaguetta Coast 
in any appreciable amounts, but the explanation of his ,ftrustworthy 
Dutchman" was that the Africans knew that the Dutch wanted gold, and 
were thus encouraged to seek and guard it for sale.(l)
Since European goods constituted such an attraction to the 
peoples of the coast, it is obvious that they could have been prevailed 
upon to increase the amount of gold made available for sale, if the 
European merchants had seriously pressed the issue. But the latter 
were interested in discovering gold mines or in regular and substantial 
supplies of this commodity, and they did not consider the pickings of 
the Upper Guinea Coast as worth their while. As the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries wore on, one seldom heard of the acquisition of 
gold direct from the littoral peoples. As Barbot was aware, the gold 
purchased in Sierre Leone in the late seventeenth century was brought 
from "Mandinga and other remote countries, towards the Niger11. (2)
The trade thus became tied to the arrival of Mande and Fula merchants 
from the interior; and though, as in Canot's inventory, gold ranked 
high in Value, it should still be considered as incidental to the slave 
coffle, which was wending its way towards the coast.
Ivory, too, was a product which the Europeans were unlikely 
to overlook once it was readily available. The Upper Guinea Coast,
(1) Ferriao Guerreiro: Rnlapao Anual, Vol.2, p.211. After the state of 
Liberia had been established, some gold was known to be obtainable 
from the native Africans, both in the Interior and on the coast* See 
Ct.U. Brown, An Economic Hist try of Liberia.
(2) J.Barbot: Description of North and South Guinea, p.102
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though a comparatively poor African region was far as fauna is concerned, 
a ) was never lacking in elephants, even on the islands fringing the 
shore. Along the Gambia, it was a common sight to see herds of these 
animals on the banks•(2) The reputation of the Gambia was shared by 
the Nunez (3) - not surprisingly, since the belt of highland stretching 
inland from Gape Verga is a more suitable savannah habitat than the 
thick coastal forests. The Gocolis and the Landumas of the upper Nunez 
were particularly well known for their ivory, and coastal lore had it 
that these tribes used ivory tusks for delimiting the boundaries of 
their fields.(4)
English ships calling at Sierre Leone in the sixteenth and 
early seventeenth centuries usually availed themselves of the oppor­
tunity to pick up the occasional tusk. In 1532, Captain Fenton acquired 
a monkey and a large tusk for one and a half yards of broad red cloth, 
two ells of coarse narrow linen cloth and ten pounds of gunpowder.(5) 
Several years later, Captain Keeling called at Sierre Leone in the same
(1) J. Machat: Les Rivieres du Sud et le Fouta-Diallon. p. 202.
(2) Alvares De Almada: "Rios de Guine", p. 272.
(3) Ibid: p. 340. Pacheco Pereira: Esmeraldo de Situ Orbis. p. 74*
(4) Lemos Coelho: Duas Descricoes da Guine. p. 49.
(5) E.G.R. Taylor: The Troublesome Vovarre of Captain WilJiam Fenton. 
Hakluyt Society, No. CXIII, p. 103.
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way for wood and water, and bought a tusk of sixty-eight pounds for 
five yards of blue calico and a few bars of iron.(l)1
long before the above incidents, the Portuguese of Cape Verde 
and the mainland had put the ivory trade on a much more regular basis, 
and at the beginning of the sixteenth century, they were exporting 
considerable quantities of ivory from the Upper Guinea Coast.(2) In 
a brief statement on the finances of Santiago in November 1551, 
prominence was given to the revenues derived from handling ivory. At 
the time, eighty quintals were in stock on the island, and further 
supplies from Sierra Leone were anxiously being awaited. (3) Yet it 
was after the Dutch and English had established their factories in 
Sierra Leone that ivory was most intensively exploited.
The European factories on the Port Loko Creek and the Rokelle 
were concerned primarily with the expert of ivory. When the Dutch 
admiral, Dc Euiter, took Tar so Island from the English in I664, he found 
some four hundred to five frmdred 1 teeth', as the Europeans always 
called the tusks. U ) The previous year, Tarso had been visited by a 
Portuguese missionary, Andre de Faro, who was struck by the scale of 
operations. He wrote: "The thing which caused me greatest astonishment 
was to witness with my own eyes the arrival of an English ship to load
(1) Purchas his Pil?rimes. Vol.II, Ch VI, p. 506.
(2) Pacheco Pereira: EsneralLdo de Situ Qrbis. p. 90*
(3) A. Brasio: Monument a Mlwoicnaria africana, 2nd ser., Vol.II, !Io.l2C,
p .422.
(4) John Ogilby: xlfrtoa, p. 376.
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a cargo of ivory, at tho factory which they have in the Sierra.
Before my eyes, it loaded 23,000 teeth, many of which weighed four 
arrobas, some weighed six arrobas. and there were numerous smaller 
ones. Every year, a ship comes to lake a similar cargo. Judge from 
this how many elephants are killed here every year, because each one 
has only two teeth, and thus 14,000 elephants must be slain annually. 
This does not take account of the ivory that is purchased in the 
other rivers of Guinea, where there are similar factories, which 
despatch other ships; and the Dutch are also buyers in the ports of 
these rivers. There are, therefore, more elephants in Guinea than 
there are cattle in the whole of Europe. (1;
Andre de Faro must have allowed his imagination and his 
arithmetic to run wild; but the intensity of operations was undeniable, 
being reflected some years later in the depletion of the elephant 
population at Gape Mount. Barbot wrote that it was formerly a great 
centre for ivory, but that the trade had fallen off considerably due 
to exhaustion of supplies. (2) Perhaps the same may have been partially 
true of the rivers leading into the Sierra Leone channel, because the 
factor j . of the Poyal African Company on Bence Island informed London 
in June 1670 that no ivory came from upriver, and to the best of his
(1) Andre de Faro: Pererrina^ao. pp*35,36. 1 arroba = 3k pounds.
(2) J. Barbot: Description of the Coasts of Forth and South Guinea, 
p.109.
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knowledge that had been the state of affairs for several years 
previously.(l) However, since the Sierra Leone factories had 
previously received most of its ivory supplies from the Susus and 
Limbas of the interior, (2) the cessation could have been due to 
disturbed conditions in the Interior. (3) As far as the more northerly 
sections of the Upper Guinea Coast were concerned, Labat reported 
that the elephants on the island of Bulama were indiscriminately 
slaughtered. He thought, however, that around the Geba, whore five 
tons of ivory per year were extracted, there was no apparent impact 
on the elephant herds. (4)
In the 1660s the English began concentrating on the r ivers 
north of the Sierra Leone estuary, with the Nunez and Pongo being 
the most favoured. The Gambia factories were at first responsible 
for the Nunez trade. They set up a factory there in 1664* Prom which 
they took out 300 quintals of ivory every year.(5) After 1601, Bence 
Island and James Island (the Gambia headquarters) duplicated efforts 
in the Nunes, until a directive to the Gambia factory arrived from
(1) P.Ii.Q.. T70/10 - Edmund Pierce, 25 June, 1673* fl.3*
(2) Lemos Coelho: Duas Describes da Guine. p. 74*
(3) See below, Ch.IX, p.
(4) J. Labat: Nouvelle delation. Vol. V, pp.151,152,165.
(5) Lemos Coelho: Duas Descriyoes da Guine. p.59*
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London in 1636, stipulating that Bence Island should conduct the 
Nunez trade, (i)
There was also a Bence Island outpost at Tassily, obtaining 
its ivory from the Pongo. It will be recalled that the first Company 
of Cacheu proved a strong competitor to :he English on a local level, (2) 
and the collection of ivory was one of the major issues in dispute.
Unlike ivory, beeswax (to take another item on Canot’s list) 
is not a well-known supplementary to slaving in West Africa. Neither 
Pacheco Pereira nor Valentim Fernandes included wax as one of the 
exports of the Upper Guinea Coast at the beginning of the sixteenth 
century; but a century later, each of the three or more registered 
ships which left Cacheu every year carried over 400 quintals of wax.
With three quintals valued as the equivalent of one slave, this was 
obviously a lucrative sideline.(3)
Beeswax was obtainable at most points between the Gambia 
and Sierra Leone, apart from other sections of the West African coast. 
Most of the accounts of the commerce in the rivers of Sierra Leone in 
the seventeenth century show that some wax was exported; but it was 
procured in greatest quantities from the Geba and from the Casamance 
district, whose product was said to have been of the highest quality.
(1) P.11.0.. T70/5O - To Alexander Cleeve, 6 June, I606. fl.13.
(2) See above, Ch•#, p.3 o!
(3) Sena Barcelos: Subsidios nara a Historia de Cabo Verde e Guine'.
Part I, Ch.VII, p.221.
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During the era of the registered ships, the Gasamance alone accounted 
for 500 quintals of the total exports, (1)
Many of the issues generated by the Atlantic slave trade 
were played out in a lower key with respect to wax and ivory. The 
Portuguese were anxious that European rivals should not breach their 
monopoly, whether or not slaves were involved. Indeed, since the 
European interest in slaves from the Upper Guinea Coast was not fully 
aroused until the second half of the seventeenth century (and then only 
in the Gambia-Geba area), their penetration into the commerce of the 
area was initially on the basis of products such as ivory and wax* 
Furthermore, such products did not necessarily lose all of their 
appeal as the slave trade intensified. From the time of Captain- 
Major Gamboa de Ayala to the formation of the first Company of Cacheu, 
the English, French and Dutch appeared at Cacheu and la the other 
rivers of Guinea in search of whatever appeared to offer profit in 
addition to slaves.(2) Coelho noted in 1669 that when the Afro- 
Portuguese'travelled from Cacheu to Goree to do business with the 
Dutch, they carried ivory and wax amounting to between 1,500 and 2,000 
quintals.(3) A few years later, the Portuguese Conselho Ultramarino 
was informed that the ’foreigners1 were shipping 3,000 quintals of
(1) Alonso de Sandoval: Natureleza de Todos Etioues. p. 30.
(2) See above, Ch.V, part lL
(3) Lemos Coelho: Duas Descrlcoes da Guine. p.6.
Products of the Forest
wax and ivory every year from the whole region between the Gambia and 
Sierra Leone.(l)
In the last quarter of the seventeenth century, the English, 
as represented by the Royal African Company, were taking a definite 
interest in the beeswax trade. In 1673, the Bence Island factory 
recorded the purchase of 569 pounds.(2) This was a small purchase, as 
can be seen from a reprimand given to the chief factor in 1699* after 
the trade had begun to fall off. The directors stated that "It has 
been usual for our ships to receive quick dispatches with 20 or 30 tons 
of beeswax and 20 to 30 tons of elephants* teeth per each ship, but of 
late we have found the contrary practice, that for some humour of our 
Factory our ships have been detained without reason untill their bottoms 
are eaten with worms". (3) it was in the Gambia, hoever, that the English 
could best prosecute trade in commodities like ivory and wax, relying 
upon the Portuguese free-lance traders as well as upon the official 
establishment at Cacheu.
Reference has already been made to the way most captain- 
majors of Cacheu co-operated with the English and the French in Gambia, 
and it has also been stressed that this was to the benefit not of the 
Company or of the state but to that of the lan<^ ados and the officials
(1) A.H.U.. Guine, caixa I - Eo.l33> Antonio Bezerra, Aug.1673*
(2) P.R.O., T70/360 - Bence Island Accounts.
(3) P.R.O.. T70/51 - To Robert Loadman, 5 Sept.,l699*fl*4^,and to 
Thomas Corker, 3 0ct.,l699> fl.4-3.
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of Cacheu* a) One cargo sent by agemt Castle from the Gambia to 
Cacheu in 1632 did indeed pay the 10/£ duty on all goods demanded by 
the Company of Cacheu, but this appears to have been the only instance. 
Besides, Castle was aware that the v&vy inadequate servicing of Cacheu 
by the metropolitan Portuguese meant that the market was open to other 
competitors. Only one ship per year was being sent out by the Company 
of Cacheu and its cargo fell far short of the import requirements of 
the area. (2)
As was the case with slaves;, the Portuguese merchants on the 
coast protested to the authorities ini Lisbon that the prices paid by 
the Portuguese ships f or local produc-e were far too low, and that they 
had ever^ intention of selling to the French and English who paid more. 
The Cape Verde traders were worse off, having to buy goods from the 
lane ados* transport them to the islands and resell to European ships.
In 1639, the Cape Verde traders protested that one quintal of wax 
bought from the Guinea traders cost eight barafulas or sixteen cruzados: 
freight to Santiago added another cruzado: they were being asked to 
pay a duty of 2.375 cruzados; and yet the price which the Portuguese 
ships were offering was only fourteen cruzados. (3)
(1) See above, Ch.V, part II
(2) P.R.O.. T70/l6 - John Castle, H  Oct.,1632, tl.U-.
(3) A*H .U. * Cabo Verde, caixa V - Petition from the municipality of 
Santiago, 4kug.,l6S9.
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Because of these commercial considerations, both the French 
and the English gained a firm hold on the ivory and woo: trade north 
of the Geba. The French, for example, during the period of slaving 
which began in 1635 with-Bissau as the headquarters, also showed an 
interest in wax, and in that very year, De La Fond took four hundred 
quintals, a) most of which must have come from the Geba area, for which 
Bissau was the clearing house.
For the ruling class of the Casamance, beeswax was an 
important b basis for their partnership with the Europeans as were 
slaves. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, there was a 
serious rift between the Banhun king of Zeguichor and the Portuguese, 
which led to a lengthy interruption of the wax trade with Cachcu.
Friendly relations were re-established by Joao Baptista, a locally-born 
son of a former captain-major of Gacheu, who was sent to take command 
of Zeguichor in 1707.(2) At that tine, wax was of special importance 
to the Portuguese because French competition had for a while virtually 
driven the Portuguese out of the slave trade. In June 1707, the 
captain of Gacheu prognosticated pessimistically that soon the Portuguese 
ships would be reduced to taking cargoes comprised exclusively of 
beeswax, because, as it was, they could scarcely muster one shipload of 
slaves per year. (3)
(1) J. Labat: Nouvelle Relation. Vol.V, p.05.
(2) A.H.U.. Guine, ma<jo I - Testimonial of Paulo de Lima, June 1703; 
referred to by the Gonselho on 29 Jan.,1729.
(3) A.II.U.. Guine, ma^o I - Paulo de Lima, 30 June,1707.
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Even the wax trade, however, was slipping out of the hands
of the metropolitan Portuguese, The Africans (Banhuns, Gasangas and
Djolas) of the Gasamance found it more pro fitable to market their wax
in the Gambia, with the help of the Afro -Portuguese#Captain-major Jo£o
Carvalho (1734-36) was particularly concerned with this development.
He began writing/the Conselho in August 1734-* relating that Zeguichor
was trading with the Europeans on the Gambia, and stressing the importance
The Conselho replied
of wax as a principal item in this commerce, /sifter its traditional 
manner by having the captain-major promulgate an edict in the name of the 
crown, banning such activities. (1)
On a more practical note, the next captain-major posed the pro­
blem in terms of which rulers needed to be won over by the Portuguese
authorities if the Casamance trade was to flow through Cacheu. The Djola 
chief of the river Jame (a tributary of the Casamance)'wasthe foremost, 
because his domains produced the greatest quantity of wax; but there 
were others like the king of Sao Domingo and the fidalgo of Bagargole 
(Banhuns), who controlled the routes, and had to be given ’presents’ to 
permit free passage. (2) Similarly a Portuguese assessment of the 
commerce of the Upper Guinea Coast in 1778 suggested that friendship 
should be maintained with the Banhun, Djola and Casanga peoples of the 
area. (3)
1) A H.U.. Guine, ma^o VI - Joao Carvalho, 20 June 1736
2) A.H.U#, Guine, ma90 VI - Damiao de Bast os, 15 August 1734-
3) A.H.U.. Guine, mapo V - Bernardo de Azevedo Coutinho, 2 November 1778
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While slaves, ivory and beeswax were the principal commodi­
ties which Europeans sought and wrangled over in the region north of 
the Geba channel, to the south, camwood was given a much higher 
priority than wax, so that ivory and camwood were the two products 
which featured most often as the exports of sierra Leone in the 
seventeenth century. Camwood (Baphia nitida) is a species of dyeing 
wood, which was well-known in Brazil, and was consequently often 
termed ‘Brazil-wood1. it yields both yellow and red dye, but is 
generally associated with the latter colour, and hence its other 
popular name, that of ‘redwood1. The Sherbro variety had an excellent 
reputation, being capable of yielding colour up to the seventh time 
that it was put through the extractive process.(1)
The Portuguese knew of the existence of camwood in sierra 
Leone, and the Lisbon authorities were told of its quality;(2) but 
they never made use of the product. Only in the middle of the eight­
eenth century was it rediscovered by the Portuguese, when the captain- 
major of joissau despatched a specimen to iJisbon.(3<) In 1776, a Portu­
guese captain, sailing under the orders of the Company of Grao Para
{!) Alvares de almada: 'Rios de Guine", p.354 and John Ogilby: .Africa,
p.373. (Camwood was also used for manufacturing furniture, violin 
bows and a number of other items.)
(2) Fernao Guerreiro: Rela<pao Anual, Vol.2, p.211
(3) A.H.U., Guine, ma^o VIII - Francisco Sottomayor, 25 May 1753.
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and Maranhao, approached a ruler in Sierra Leone, who controlled the# 
river giving acess to certain camwood supplies, and paid him seventy- 
five cruzados for the right to use the waterway.(1) Very little seems 
to have stemmed from this - no doubt for the same reason that the 
Portuguese had never displayed serious interests namely, that they 
had a regular trade with brazil in this item,(2) even though the 
Sierra Leone dye was held to be of finer quality.
As mentioned earlier, the first English establishment in the 
Sherbro was that of Wood and Company, who began trading about the 
year 1623^3) They obtained permission from the king of Sherbro, and 
organised along lines designed to meet the requirements of extracting 
camwood* All the rivers leading into the Sherbro estuary were used 
as feeders into the coastal forest where the camwood grew in com­
mercial quantities; while an island in the Sherbro estuary was 
selected as a point of despatch for ocean-going ships. Wood and 
Company used Limberman on sherbro Island, while subsequently, the 
main clearing-house for camwood was shifted to another smaller island 
in the Sherbro estuary, which was given the name "York Island", when 
taken over by the Royal African Company in 1678.
(1) A.H.U., Guine, ma90 vIII - Germano de Matta, 17 Peb I767.
(2) For a description of the commerce in "Brazil-wood", see p. Mauros 
Le Portugal et 1 1Atlantique, pp.115-145.
(3) See above, Ch. V,
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Prom the days of Wood and Company until the termination of 
English company trade in Sierra Leone in 1723, commerce on this section 
of the coast was dominated by forest products, particularly camwood and 
ivory. The overriding importance of the forest products is mirrored 
in the struggles which took place over them.
When the rights which Wood and Company, derived both from the 
Eritish crown and the Bullom king of Sherbrcj were challenged, the com­
pany^ competitors were also interested in camwood. This competition 
was of a violent nature, and Wood’s chief factor, James Holder, was 
murdered; leading to proceedings in the High Court of Admiralty in 
164.3) In many rd spects, this affair is a prototype of the situation 
for the next eight decades. On the.one hand, there was the struggle in 
England to establish the legal position' of trading rights in Sierra Leone 
(and on other sections of the West African coast); while on the other 
hand, keen competition always took place on the coast itself, occasionally 
erupting into violence.
The charter of the Royal African Company,,granted on the 27th 
September 1672, gave it a monopoly of trade between Cape Blanco and the 
Cape of Good Hope for a thousand years. No Englishman was to visit this 
area without the Company’s permission, and certain goods might be carried 
to or from Africa only with the Company’s special licence. Those who 
broke these provisions were deemed ’interlopers’, and were actionable, 
at law. The charter sanctioned the erection of a court of judicature to 
sit on the African coast to hear and determine cases of seizure of inter— 
loppers and other mercantile suits. The court was to comprise two rnor-
v>
oi’ftti-lo-ettits;— The court was -to-eompr-ioe two merchants and a civil lawyer,
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all to be nominated, by the Royal African Company, (l) In 1673, the 
directors of the Royal African Company sought to have commisions drawn 
up, empowering the factors in Sierra Leone and the Gambia to seize in­
terlopers and send the vessels to Cape Coast Castle to be condemmed.
At the same time, they were agitating to set up an Admiralty Court at 
James Island in the Gambia (2)
bhips of the Royal Navy were occasionally placed at the service 
of the monopoly of the Royal African Company, but, like the Portuguese 
before them, the English had no success in avoiding serious infringe­
ments of their mercantile policies of exclusivism - infrigements which 
amounted to de facto free trade, at times, One such period of free 
trade was that between 1639 and 1693, at the end of which the situation 
was reviewed by an act of Parliament* (3) This act opened the African 
trade to all private trad ers, provided that a payment of ten per cent 
of the value <£ all goods exported from England to Africa was paid to 
the Company. Thus began the ara of the "ten per cent ships”.
The Royal African Company campaigned to have the Gambia and 
Sierra Leone specially treated under the Act of 1693,. Nhen trading in 
the area between Cape Blanco and the Sherbro, which the Company called 
"Our North Parts", English private raders had to pay a further ten per 
duty on the'goods imported from Africa, except camwood, which paid five 
per cent. In effect, the Company had lost the battle of the Lobbies,
(1) K. G. Daviess The Royal African Company , pp. 97-99
(2) T70/73 - Minutes of the Court of Assistants 
Cf) K.G.Daviess The Royal African Company, p.100
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which Had been waged over camwood, after the clothing industry had 
claimed that under conditions of monopoly the price of camwood was 
increased from £20 per ton to as much as £70 or £90.(1)
On the coast, the Royal African Company had to devise practical 
measures to meet the threat posed by the interlopers or trie ten per 
cent men, as tne case may have been, because the enactments of Parli­
ament never eliminated the competitors of the Royal African Company - 
they simply defined that competition to be legal or illegal, or 
placed greater or lesser revenue duties on competitors.
One of tne constant objectives of the Royal African Company 
was to outmanoeuvre their rivals where the purchasing of camwood in 
Sierra Leone was concerned. ijJor instance, in October 1694, there was 
a surfeit of camwood on the London market, and trie order went out to 
Sierra Leone to cut back on production, nevertheless, it was equally 
important that this should not have provided an opening fob the inter­
lopers, The instructions to their factors covered both these points, 
"Tne quantity of wood makes us not desirous of any further supply... 
¥et, our desires are that you exercise such foresight and diligence 
as to prevent interlopers procuring any, by buying up such quantities 
as may be necessary.,, We recommend to you a thing highly necessary 
for our interest, and meriting your greatest care, and to prevent 
interlopers breaking in upon your parts, wherein we perceive nothing 
will be a greater discourgigement than a disappointment in that 
commodity.M(2)
(1) J.M. Grays A History of the Gambia, p.121
(2J P.K.Q.» 'i'70/50 - To Corker, 16 Oct I694, f 1.156,
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ay August of the next year, camwood was once more in demand, 
and the market continued to improve steadily after that. The import­
ance of tne camwood operatic ns resulted in the growth of the Sherbro 
factory, ay 1698> there was on York island a storehouse and a dwelling 
house, surrounded by a fortified wall. There were four projections on 
this wall, enclosing three further storehouses and a kitchen. Two new 
‘forts* were said to have been built since the time of agent Gibson 
(1687-1692), along with a substantial granary. (1} jrrom barbot* s des­
cription, this refers to two large round flankers with five guns each. 
All the buildings were of stone and lime; and defended by about 
twenty-five whi.te men and between fifty and sixty grumetes.12) Apart 
from defence, the consideration which had always to be borne in mind 
in the construction of the forts was storage space. Storage was an 
essential part of the Companyfs plans to combat competition, in 1698, 
the bondon headquarters had repeated its earlier instructions urging 
their agent at sherbro to try and corner the camwood trade by buying 
up all supplies, Hit being out interest as well as our desire to have 
what camwood can be procured to prevent the interlopers from getting 
itM.(3) Presumably as a result of this directive, they authorised the
building of a shed on York island to store four or five hundred tons
of camwood.(4)
John i>arbot, writing in the early eighteenth century, gave the 
clearest account of the organisation of the camwood trade. Apart from
P.R.O.. T70/590 - bence island Accounts —
(2^ John joarbots Description of north and South Guinea, p.99 
f3) P.jU.O.» T70/51 - to Thomas Corker, 5 April 1698, fl, 1
(4) P.JUU.. T70/51 - to Kobert ho adman, 6 July 1699, fl.28
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the fact
/ th..t much of the information which he used was acquired at an earlier 
date, his description holds good because it reveals the conduct of the 
trade as being tied closely to the topography and the climactic con- 
c! it ions, The main waterway into camwood country was the river now 
known as the Bum or Sewa, which was then called the Sherbro. It was 
navigable for sixty miles upt to the town or Baja, as :kr as the aver­
age coastal vessels were concerned, while sloops of seven and half feet 
draught could proceed upstream for over two hundred miles. It was 
difficult to sail on the upper reaches of the river when journeying in­
land, because the trip had to be made between April and May, t the very 
end of the dry season. At that time,there was scarcely nine or ten feet 
of water in some places. However, for the return journey in September 
or later, after the rains had fallen,, the water level rose si: or seven 
feet, overflowing the bunks. X few small vessels also made their way up
- the other main Sherbro river, the Jung, though this was shallow and 
choked with small islands and shoals, (l)
Apart from the Sherbro, it was the rivers of the Sierra Leone 
estuary where most timber was foiled. In May 1721, when the Bence Is­
land agent wrote indicating that the camwood supplies on the river had bee 
exhausted, he was asked to go further upstream in search of more. (2)
A much later account, thvb of Major Laing in 1321, suggests that the 
heart of the camwood forests lay in the area where the Bum and the 
Rokelle (leading to the Sherbro and Sierra Leon^channels respectively) 
came quite close to each other, permitting a choice of which river
a) John Barbot* Description of North and South Guinea.p.107
(2) P.R.O. T70/60 - To Plunkett, 16 May 1721,fl.6
SCO
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would be used to transport this bulky and heavy product. Near the 
coast, the Bulloms and Temnes were the tribes involved in the cam­
wood trade, especially the Bulloms, but, further inland, the search 
for camwood led into Koranko territory. Indeed, by the end of the 
eighteenth century, the staple article of trade in Koranko country was 
camwood. Seeraera was the general place of barter; it was carried from 
there to Ma Bung, and floated down the Rokelle to Rokon, where it was 
exchanged for a variety of articles, among which salt featured prominently. 
The camwood which was cut further to the south was sent down the Bum (l), 
On all the rivers, the pattern of camwood operations must have 
been the same. It would have been impossible to sail upstream after the 
rains had fallen and there was a constant downstream current, so that the 
procedure was to travel up at the end of the dry season or at the very 
beginning of the rains, and to return several months later (2) When 
Edmund Pierce of Sherbro wrote his London officials in August 1678, he 
assured them that trade would improve at the end of that month (3)
Another agent in November 1681 reported that he had just shipped seven­
teen tons, two hundredweights of camwood. Besides, he had brought down 
a further eighty tons of camwood to York Island, and hoped to make it one 
hundred and thirty tons before the season ended in December (when the 
level of water would have begun to diminish rapidly) As it turned out, 
he was able to ship downstream one hundred and ninety five tons of camwood 
because of the particularly heavy rainfall that yeai?. (4)
(1) A.G.Laingx Travels. p.78
(2) William Smith: A New Voyage to Guinea, p.92
(3) P.R.O. T70/10 - Edmund Pierce,5 Aug 1678,fl.4*
(A)P.R.O.. T70/16 - Joshua Platt, 24 Nov l681.fl.2A5 and 8 Feb.l682,f1.47
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From the organisation of the camwood trade, it is obvious that ’inter­
lopers1 or Hen per cent men” had to find someone in a coastal harbour 
with stocks of wood, since they could not possibly seek it at its source 
in the bush. Barbot left the information that a ship could arrive at 
the Sherbro to load a cargo of 5^0 hundredweights, and he back in 
England within two months of setting out. (l) This quick turnaround 
was what the Company expected not only in the case of camwood, but with 
respect to all other cargoes; and that is precisely why they incurred the 
overheads of forts and factories. At the same time, the Company hoped that 
no one would provide similar services for its rivals, and above all, it 
did not expect that its own servants would despatch the ’interlopers1 
and Hen per cent men*1. let, this was common practice.
To defend their men and trade goods the chartered companies not 
only had to meet the expense of constructing and maintaining forts, but 
frequent attacks from several quarters multiplied their problems. In 
the first place, those chartered companies were identified with the nation­
al interest and image. Anglo-Dutch wars in the third quarter of the 
seventeenth century caused losses and disruptions stemming from attacks 
on sea and on sea and on the factories in Sierra Leone. After Anglo- 
Dutch amity was sealed on the accession of William of Orange to the 
English throne in 1688, France became England’s main rival on a global 
scale, and once more the Upper Guinea Coast was a minor theatre. (a)
(l) John Barbot: Description of North and South Guinea.p.107
(a) Bence Island was attacked by the French in 1695 and 1704, while 
York Island was pillaged in 1705.
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Attacks by Europeans (including pirates) constituted a menace 
the
to the factories from/seaward wide, and this was only one facet of the 
issue. When the Royal African Company gave their approval in 1686 for 
York Island to be considerably strengthened, the main intention was to 
secure it from "the insolence of the natives”. a) Apart from more modern 
evocations, this phrase recalls the posture of the Portuguese in Cacheu 
and Bissau. Like the Portuguese before them, the English, (both local 
factors and London officials) were quite clear that the primary purpose 
of their strongholds was to make themselves capable of resisting the 
Africans•
After the Dutch took Tarso island in 1664* the English shifted 
their headquarters to another island in the Sierra Leone channel, sub­
sequently called Bence Island because Squire Bence was the principal share­
holder in the Gambia Adventurers. Before th t date, attacks from the 
Africans had similarly caused the English to flee from one place to another.
According to Lemos Coelho, the English on T^rso Island, who were 
subject to the Bullom king of Carecole on the right hand of the river, 
had to leave the island after a dispute with that king. They moved to 
Tumba on the Sierra Leone peninsula, and it was several years before 
they returned to Tarso (2) It would seem from the account of Andre de 
Faro that the return of the English to Tarso Island was also precicitated j 
by violence. This odourred in-1659 when the factory at Tumba was attacked
(l) P.R-O.. T70/50 - To Joshua Platt, 24 Aug 1686, fl.22
(2) Lemos Coelho: Duas Descri^oes da Guinef p.74
^ r a >
Products of the Forest
by a force of four hundred Africans, who robbed them of their goods, 
and set fire to the buildings# In 1663, the same fate overtook the 
Dutch factory; and, with these experiences in mind, the English had 
res olved to rebuild in lime and stone and to mount sufficient artil- 
lery. (l)
A fairly substantial fort was built on Bence Island by the 
.Gambia Adventurers, and strengthened by the Koyal African Company# It 
was described by Barbot as being of lime and stone; the walls low; and
having a round flanker with five guns, a curtin with embrazures for large
<r
guns, and a platform before it with six guns - all of them well-mounted#
(2) Such a fort, well-manned and with its vails and cannon kept in good 
repair, could hold the Africans at bay in a crisis, but the optimum con­
ditions were seldom met, and the forts of Bence and Ibrk usually proved 
nearly as ineffective against the arms of the Africans as they were 
against the ordnance of attacking ships# Bence Island fell in 1705 with­
out a struggle when the French attacked, and it fell in the same way in
1729, when assaulted by the Africans led by certain Afro-Portuguese
elements#In the relations between the English and the African ruling 
class in the Sherbro, the first crisis of any magnitude during the era 
of the Royal African Company occurred around 1678-81# Disturbances, 
which called a halt to camwood felling, were reported by agent Zachary 
Rogers in September 1679. (3) Rogers1 own personal involvement in the lo­
cal structure compli cated matters (4) but most of the points of dis­
(1) Andre de Faro; Peregrinat^ao. p#86
(2) John Barbot: Description of North and South Guinea.p. 106
(3) P.R.O.# T70/10 - Zachary Rogers, 29 Sept l679>fl»53 
(A) B#R.O,# T70/1 - Joshua Platt, 3 March 1681,fl*91
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pute involved the commercial policy of the Company as opposed to 
that of the Shexbro-nullom ruling class* In 1.681, agent Platt left 
bence Island and went to niddam in the Sherbro to hold a Vpalaver • 
to allow a resumption of the camwood trade* The agenda foir discussion 
included the king's customs duties* the supply of brandy, and the 
price of goods- the last item being the most important* The king of 
Sherbro insisted that the price* of goods should be reduced to what 
they were in Mr* v/ood*stime, placing special emphasis on b»ass utensils* 
platt promised to consult his superiors on the matter, and trade was 
resumed* (1)
Continuing attempts were made to discuss problems peaceably, 
in august 1682, there was a debit entry of 14 I'bars ' 4 shillings i* 
the Sherbro accounts, representing the value of brandy, old hats, rice 
and a goat, which were made available to the king and a his. fidalgos 
when they v/ent to the factory to talk about trade* (2) but, sporadic 
clashes between the Sherbro ruling class and the servants of the 
Royal African Company continued to disrupt the camwood and ivory'trade* 
On August 24th* 1686, the London office wrote agent Platt acknowledging 
efforts which he had just made to secure peace at Ki.ddam and to re­
settle the factory tnere, (3J so that the discussions of 1681 and 1 
1682 did not yield any lasting result*
T70/16 - Joshua Platt, 24 'Nov. 1681
(2) P.R.O.* T70/587 - fork Island Accounts
(3) F.R.O*, T70/50 - To Joshua Platt, 24 Ajrg* 1686, fl*22
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One of the most persistent and explosive issues was that of the 
payment of the kingfs customs or cole, as it was called* The Sherbro 
account book for the years 1681-86 indicates that the king of Sherbro 
was given goods amounting to 49 ‘bars* and 2 shillings, as customs 
due to him at the time of Rogers1 death* The same source shows that 
rulers in the Sherbra, in the Gallinas and at Cape Mount were being 
paid cole, (1) That this was not always promptly paid is hinted at in 
a remark made by the fork Island factor in 1714: namely, that he gave 
the king of Sangra his cole to prevent him joining with the Bulloms 
of Shebar to stop commerce on the Sherbro riversu (2)
Non-payment of customs to the uulloms of the Sherbro, like non— 
payment of rent to the Papel rulers of Mata, Mompataz and Bissau, 
was almost certain to leau to violence if the situation persisted for 
any length of time. In July 172^* the London officials wrote their 
factors in sierra Leones "We are sorry to find there are misunderstand­
ings between you and the Africans. We find it arose frdm the not pay*— 
ing them the small rent due to them* We must recommend to you to take 
care not to give such occasions of quarrel"* (3) William Smith, a 
special envoy of the Royal African Company to West Africa in 1726, 
reported that there had been a recent clash between the king of Sher­
bro and the agent Rolditcn, over the refusal off the latter to pay 
cole* The king of Sherbro seized a. quantity of uompany goods, as a
P*R*0** T70/587 — York Island Accounts
(2) P.R.Q.% T70/591 — York Island Accounts
[3) P.R.Q*, T70/60 - To Archibald and Scott, 10 July 1723
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consequence, but in the ensuing skirmish the English gained the upper 
hand, inevitably, one feature df this episode was the reminder given 
by the king of Sherbro that the country was his* (1)
The king had threatened at one point during the dispute of 1679-81 
to drive out the English and allow the butch to take overjtand, in 
fact, though the fort of the Royal African Company remained, both be­
fore and after that period butch traders as well as English rivals to 
the Company were able to trade freely. The Royal African Company con—y 
stantly attempted to persuade the SKerbro rulers against this open-door 
policy,, and sometimes obtained verbal agreements, but, in practice, 
monopoly stood no chance* in 1699* the Company bestowed upon the king 
of Sherbro a present of a gown and a cap. in the covering letter to 
their agent, the London officials stated that the gifts were to induce 
the king to ‘palaver* with the Company tp put an end to the encourage- 
ment given the interlopers. (2) How successful the bribe proved can be
seen from another London letter three years later* The complaint then
was that the king of Sherbro had not kept the promises made in a letter 
he sent to the directors* The latter said to their York Island factor: 
"Pray put him in mind that it is below his kingly dignity to act contrary 
to the palavras he makes with us, and that it is also to his disadvant­
age $ that he cannot expect wee should continue to give him presents and 
do him all acts of friendship, when he has so little regard to perfnrnn 
his good offices to our factors and servants"* (3)
(l) William -omith: A Hew Voyage to (juinea* pp.59,60
P_*_R*U»* 170/51 - To Robert Loadman, 6 July 1699, fl.30
T 70/51 - To Uharles uaker, 21 1702, fl.239
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but
it may have been beneath M a  kingly dignity,/it was pointless 
for the Royal African Company to suggest to the king of Sherbro 
that it was not to his advantage to have free trade, when the company^ 
rivals were adding to the quantity of European goods made available 
to the peolpe of the area, as well as bringing those goods at cheaper 
prices.
±n so £ar as the question of monopoly was concerned, the pro*-, 
ducts of the forest quite clearly provided the same basis for the 
Afro-European relationship as did slaves, nowever, there was another 
dimension to the commerce in flora and fauna, which placed it in 
a different category altogether from the Atlantia slave trade. This 
difference is to be observed by measuring the effects of the trade 
in each commodity on the societies of the Upper Guinea Coast.
To greater or lesser extent, each forest product which was- 
sold to the Europeans, required a new scale of organisation on the 
part of the Africans, depending upon the role played by the given 
item within African society on the Upper Guinea Coast prior to the 
advent of the European. Several European observers had cause to 
comment that the elephant in Africa was not domesticated and put 
to labour, as in India*. (1) let, its value as game was enough to 
make the elephant important; and the overall significance of this 
animal is hinted at in the Susu tradition, which states that members 
of the tribe moved west in pursuit of the herds of elephants* (2)
^1) Valentim Romanies: La uote Occidentale d ‘Afri^aue* p*82
(2) M.baint-Pere: "retit nistorique des oossoe du Rio Rongas"
bulletin au Comity des Etudes nis tori cues et scientif ignew 
1930, Tome Alii
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‘l'he Africans of the Upper Guinea Coast hunted the elephants partly 
as a source of food, ^1) and partly because their tusks could be 
used as ornaments. The skill of the flppes in ivory work in the six­
teenth century attests to long familiarity with this material, while 
the use of ivory trumptts was also probably of considerable antiquity, 
up until recent times, there was a demand among the Africans for the 
best tucks, which were used for making carved trumpets, used by thw 
paramount chiefs, and regarded as valuable heirlooms, {2)
At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Sapes used, 
poisinad harpoons, which the hunter plunged into the elephant from 
above, after having secured a perch in a tree near a likely feeding 
place. The wounded animal usually fled several miles before it died,(3)
As far north as the uasangas, the method was the same, with the excep-
*
tion of the Nalus, who attached the elephant at close quarters, 
stabbing it from below. (4) I11 the Gambia, the ^andingas were said 
to use poisoned spears, which they threw either from a standing posit­
ion or occasionally from horseback. (5)
(1) Valentim i'eraandes: La Cote Occidentale d«Afrique, p.82
(2) W£B. Stanley:"Game Preservation in Sierra Leone", Sierra Leone
Studies. (Old Series) No. XI, March 1928
(3) Valentim Fernandes: La Cote Occidentale d fAfri^aue. p.96
(4) Alvares de Almada: ‘Rios de Guine'", p*340.
(5) Valentim Fernandes: La Cote Occidentale d*Afri^cue. p.50
Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.p. 305,300
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^t was only at the end of the eighteenth century that European guns 
were used in elephant hunting* The weapon preferred by the nijagos 
and the neafadas was the long bane gun, which was loaded not with 
shot but with a small iron rod. (It) In Sierra Leone too, the long 
bane gun came to be the staniard weapon of the elephant hunter in 
the nineteenth century; (2) but for most of the period of pre-colonial 
trade, though the demand for ivory within the indigenous context was 
obviousljt insignificant in comparison with the demand created by 
the European advent, the traditional methods of elephant hunting 
did not change. This is not surprising, because while it is true 
that the traditional methods do not appear to be particularly effect­
ive for large scale hunting, the firearms first exported by the 
Europeans to Africa were very flimsy, (3)
Lieutenant Beaver's explanation for the disparity between the 
amount of ivory produced for sale and the limitations of the methods 
of hunting was that many of the tusks were not procured by hunting 
at all, but were found on the ground,(4) Nearly two centuries earlier, 
Jobson had suggested the same thing; pointing out that those which 
were found lying around were often broken or cracked* (5)
(1) Philip beavers African Memorandum, p.p 318,319
(2) W.B.Stanleys ^Op.cit.)
(3) See below Ch.Vll., p.3{?£.
(4) Philip i3eavers African Memorandum, p.227 
{3) R.Jobson: The Golden Trade, p.193
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Another obvious ^but seldom noted) point is that ivory can 
be obtained from animals other than the elephant, notably the hippo­
potamus, 'i'ne nippopatamus was one of the most common sights in the 
rivers of the Upper Guinea. Coast, It was a source of food, (1) ana 
a pest to be killed because it came ashore and destroyed the rice 
fields, ^2) its teeth were nailed escravelhas by the Portuguese 
lancados, and were often marketed under the name scrivelios by 
European traders on the coast. These scrivelios weighed between 
four to fifteen pounds each, they averaged about sixteen inches in 
length, and they were very white and brittle. In 1721, the English 
trader, John Atkins, noted that the scrivelios were offered for sale 
in much greater numbers than the heavier elephant tusks.(3) This 
was probably the case from the very inception of the ivory trade.
There was a reference in 1666 to 100 tusks weighing 900 lbs.;(4) in 
1678, the x>ence island factory of the Royal African Company shipped 
80 tusks weighing 1,717 lbs., and thus averaging about 22 lbs, each,(5)
^1) Pacheco Pereira: Esmeraldo de situ Orbis. p.66 and Andre'
Domelas: "RelayAo sobre a Serra Leoa"
{2) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.283
(3) John Atkins: A Voyage to Guinea. p,181  ^ In commercial circles, 
every tusk or tooth below 7 lbs. came to be regarded as a
*scrivello*. See A. Maskell: "Ivory in Commerce and the Arts", 
Cantor Lecture, 1906, in Cantor Lectures. 1898-1930.
$4) .Nicholas de villault: Relation des Costes d*Afrique
(5) _P.R .0., T7O/36O - hence Island Accounts
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while the shipment of 1681 comprised 287 tusks weighing 32 hundred­
weights, which gives an average of about 12 lbs. per tusk.^l) It 
was only in 1722 that the scrivelios are mentioned by that name 
in the records of the sierra Leone factories of the Royal African 
Company, but the low average weight per tusk clearly indicates 
that the total included only a small number of the first-rate 
ivory tusks, which weighed between 80 to 100 lbs., and which were 
reputedly the best on the V/est African coast.^2)
In spite of the hippopotamus teeth and discarded 
elephant tusks, it is clear that there must have been a great 
intensification of elephant hunting, ue almada witnessed a 
iviandinga chief in the Gambia bag twelve elephants in one month; (3) 
while Andre de j?aro claimed that not a day passed without an 
elephant being slain on the imnez, (4) ho doubt, this required 
an increase in the number of professional hunters licensed by 
the king, whose most potent weapons ^in their own estimation)
^1) P.R.U., T'70/16 - Joshua platt, 2if isov 1681, fl.24
^2) John Barbot: description of North and South Guinea, p.102.
 ^ however, more knowledgeable authorities consider the ivory 
of the cameroons and the uongo to be superior to that from 
Sierra Leone and the Gambia, bee A. Maskell: "Ivory in Commerce 
and the Arts" (Op. cit.)
(3) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine; ", p.306.
(4) Andre de Faro: Peregrinacgfo. P.46
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were the amulets or 'greegrees' of their priests, rather than their 
spears or harpoons.(1) The organised nature of this activity can 
be seen from Mungo park’s evidence tnat there were groups of 
bambara hunters, who lived for several months in the bush in the 
pursuit of elephants;^) and from the fact that in the nineteenth 
century the Pula kings had villages of ivory hunters wno operated 
in the Geba area, (3)
Whenever and however the ivory was obtained by the 
Africans, it remains clear that they had organised to meet 
European demands, which were far greater than local requirements* 
Ivory was one of several products where this was the case. Some­
times, the effort involved was small, such as the collection of 
ambergris from the sea-shore, after the inhabitants of the 
islands and the coast came to realise that the Europeans placed 
some value on this commodity.(4) Pore often, however, the arrange­
ments were quite comprehensive. An example of this is provided 
by the trade in beeswax.
Valentim Fernandes reported that bees thrived in the 
Gambia, and that the Mandingas there practised a form of apiculture, 
constructing hives of wattle and clay, and hanging large numbers 
of them in the trees,^5) Considerable quantities of honey were
(1) Andre'" de paro: Peregrina^ao, p .46
(2) Mungo Parks Travels*, in the years 1795,1796 and 1797, pp.78-80
(3) J. Machat: Les Rivieres du bud et le Pouta-biallon, p.196
14) Alvares de Almadas ’’Rios de Guine*', p.318
(5) Valentim Fernandes: ha Gote Occidentale d tAfriquer p .54
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consumed by the Africans in the form of fermented drinks, which
were on sale at the market places, (l) "but there is no evidence
that the wax was locally utilised. The lanpados would have been
able to appreciate that there was great potential for the trade in 
wax, bearing in mind the European demand for candles. The legis­
lation directed against the Sierra Leone laneados in 1517 
specified that wax was one of the commodities which they handled.$2) 
During the course of the sixteenth ce ntury, wax came 
to assume a relatively prominent place in the exports of the Upper 
Guinea Coast, being invariably bracketed alongside slaves and 
ivory by the latter part of the century.(5) Certainly, beeswax 
was one of the items, apart from slaves, which the Africans of the 
Upper Guinea Coast for the first time made available for sale, 
in response to European demand, he Almada described seeing six 
hundred hives hung in a single tree in Casanga territory,(4 ) This 
was the sort of effort on the part of the Africans which lay behind
the export figures, resides, the hives of the wild bees were also
raided. This was so on the Gambia in the sixteenth century,(3) and 
among the Djolas of the Gasamance today, honey is still obtained 
partly through apiculture and partly from the wild bees.(6)
(1) See above, Gh.l, "pp.cS LI.
(,2) A. b ra s io :  jvionumenta M is s io n a r ia  A f r ic a n a . 2nd s e r ie s ,  v o l . I I  -
H 6 .43, in s tru c t io n s  to the Accountant o f  Santiago, 16 jjec 1517
{3) A. jorasioj V o l . I l l  -  H6 .42 , Francisco de Andrade, 26 Jan 1582
54) A lvares de Almadas *‘Kios de Guine'?, p. 297
[3J Valentim Fernandes: La u8te O ccidenta le  d ’A fr ia u e
{6) L . v . Thomas: Les b i o l a , v o l . I ,  p.82
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The activity involved in exporting the products of the 
forest had to be integrated into the pattern of existence of the 
peoples who were affected. The camwood operations, for example, 
fitted neatly into the agricultural cycle of African life. If 
the first sloop-loads of timber were ferried downstream late in 
August, this meant that the Africans of the area were relatively 
free to help, because their crops were planted some months 
previously and would not be reaped for at least another month.
It would appear that much of the actual felling of timber was per-- 
formed by the Africans during the dry season;, they broke off t# 
attend to their cultivation at the end of the dry season when the 
fields had to be burnt; and then they returned to the labour of 
cutting camwood. This, at any rate, is what occured in 1726, when 
the facts emerged. Early in May of that year, the king of Baga 
(on the hokelle) brought a limited quantity of camwood to the agent 
of the RAC, explaining that his people were busy in their lugars 
and that until all the rice had been planted it was not possible 
for them to do any other business. He intended to have his people 
go upriver and cut camwood as soon as the rice was sown.^1)
Probably more so than ivory and wax, camwood was the basis 
not only of trade but of industry. The directors of the Royal
C1) P»!»0 »»T70/1465 - Diary of Walter Charles, 1728
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African Company were not impressed by the way that the camwood was 
'barked* or cleaned, and suggested more than once that if the Bullom 
king of Sherbro could not get his people to do it any better, he 
should be prevailed upon to let the slaves and hired hands of the 
factory do the job*(l) But, the fact remained that spurred by the 
lure of European goods, the Africans had undertaken the regular and 
strenous task of cutting down certain trees, rough-hewing the logs and 
helping to transport them to the ships. Major Laing made a useful 
comment on the camwood trade as it was pursued on the Rokelle.
"It is well known,"...he wrote, "that during the time the timber trade 
was in activity, several native towns were formed on the banks of 
the river* and many natives came from a distance in the country to 
engage in itw*(2)
In terms of effects on the local societies, therefore, the 
commerce in the natural products of the forest stood in sharp contrast 
to the Atlantic slave trade. Absolute destruction in the latter in­
stance is to be set against the potential for constructive innova­
tion which the society showed as ‘it was brought within the folds of a 
global system of production. Of course, no matter how willing the
(1) P_.R.O. ♦ T70/51 - To Corker, 8 Nov 1698, fl.15; T70/52 - To
John Freeman, 7 Nov I704 fl.71 and T70/ 6O - to Plunkett, 19 feb 1721,'
fl.4
^2) A.G. Laing: Travels,p78 it
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Africans may have been to make available local forest produce, the 
extent to which trade was conducted in alternatives to slaves 
depended almost entirely on European choice. The period 1623 to 1728 
in Sierra Leone is rather exceptional, when one bears in mind that 
by the latter seventeenth century, the Atlantic slave trade was in ful 
cry; and that Companies like the Gambia Adventurers and the Royal 
African Company,,as well as the rival private traders were dedicated 
to tne slave trade elsewhere in West Africa, (l) Indeed, to draw a 
parallel from the West Indian alave plantations, this period was 
essentially a “Dead Season" - the time when slaves were least in 
demand. This was the context in which other alternatives were 
seriously considered and put into practice*
When the Royal African Company was lobbying to influence the 
Act which was to regulate the trade to Africa, (1698) they sought 
to have Sierra Leone and the Gambia placed in a special category on 
the grounds that those areas were not producing great quantities of 
slaves, and were thus of little concern to the American and West 
Indian planters who were among the chief opponents of the Company*s 
monopoly. Indeed, the Royal African Company argued that the Negroes 
from their "worth Parts" were not only few in number but "the worst 
in esteem".(2) This seems odd in the light of the reputation of the
(1) K.G. Davies: The Royal African Company. p41 points out that
when the Royal Adventurers received a new charter in 1663, the slave 
trade was mentioned for the first time as one of the principal objects 
of the Company.
(2) j*M. Gray: A history of the GambiaT p.120
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escravos de ley but, several years earlier the directors did advise 
their Sierra Leon*and Gambia agents not to send slaves to Barbados, 
because the planters there did not favour that brand.(l) To have been 
disliked by the narbadian planters could scarcely have been to the 
discredit of the inhabitants of Sierra Leonj.and since Sierra Leonpwas 
a popular area for slaves during the era of the Mane invasions, and 
since it entered another flourishing phase of slaving after the middle 
of the eighteenth century, neither its potential for producing 
captives nor the acceptibility of those captives should be doubted.
What happened in Sierra Leone was that, after the easy pickings 
of the period of active warfare and exploitation of the Sapes, the 
supply of slaves readily available dropped off; while simultaneously, 
the English and the Dutch established themselves in the area - and the 
English in particular were at that date relatively unconcerned with the 
slave trade, even as carriers for the Spanish. Thus, when these nations 
breached the Portuguese monopoly in Sierra Leont in the first half of the 
seventeenth century, they did so to conduct commerce in ivory, wax and 
camwood* There followed a sort of commercial inertia, with no effort 
being made to change the nature of the.exports, which had proven 
profitable. There was scarcely a break of any kind as one English 
Company followed another, handing over stock, employees and trading 
procedures*
(1) P.it.u.. T70/50 - To John Case, 24 aug 1686, fl,24
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Non-indulgence in the slave trade in turn caused a 'further 
falling away in the supply and a break in the chain of events by which 
the Africans would otherwise have reached the holds of the European 
ships. In June 1680, chief factor Edmund Pierce informed the 
directors that he had had to turn away slaves for lack of food.(l)
Shortly afterwards, he made them to understand that "your long dis­
continuance in sending for slaves is the reason that we cannot procure 
them"*(2)
The flow of slaves from Sierra Leone never dried up completely* 
but it was certainly reduced to a trickle. When Edmund Pierce considered 
the prospects in August 1679* he estimated that it would take him until 
the following July to round up 120 slaves between the rivers Sierra 
Leoiw and Nunez, and indeed, success would only be assured if could go the 
Geba or the Bijagos; that is to say, into the flourishing zone of the 
Cacneu-Bissau network.(3) John Case was able to send 118 captives 
across the Atlantic in 1682, but he stressed that they had been 
procured at great difficulty for want of trade goods*(4)
Since he had enough goods to by ivory and camwood, this again reflects 
the Company's lack of interest in slaves and their failure to provide 
the necessary goods for their purchase. This casual attitude to
(1) P»R»0.» T70/10 - Edmund Pierce, 14 June J.680, fl.55
(2) P_.R.0 .t T70/1 - Edmund Pierce, 29 Jan 1681. fl.97
(3J P.R.O.. T70/1 - Edmund Pierce, 4 Aug I679, fl*33
(4) P±R±0.» T70/10 - Jojm Case, 5 feb 1683, fl.6l
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the Atlantic slave trade is again in evidence in 1700 when a 
directive that 120 or 130 captives should he assembled in six months 
was qualified by the addition of two alternatives* If the slave 
cargo was not ready wnen the ship arrived, then no harm would be done € 
as rice and country cloth would be sent to Cape Coast Castle, or else 
the usual products could be returned directly to England*(l)
The almost complete divorce of Sierra Leone from the 
Atlantic slave trade can be seen at a glance when one is presented witl 
the charts of the Royal African Company illustrating how their 
chartered vessels were deployed* Under the heading "Where to Dis­
charge1'^  ships bound for Sierra Leone almost invariably had 'London* 
filled in; and it follows that under the heading "Number of Negroes" 
there was usually a blank space opposite the ships which went to 
Sierra Leone - in clear contrast to those which sere sent to other 
points on the West African coast, and which discharged in the West 
Indies* (2) These two patterns of trade were not compatible* When 
in 1694 'fche Royal African Company advised that a ship should load 
slaves, ivory and camwood at Sierra Leone; unload the slaves in the 
West Indies; and return with the ivory and camwood to England 
they themselves implied it was a most unusual procedure.(3) If they 
wanted products for the English market, thpy obviously had to dis­
regard slaves. Conversely, the slave ships were not normally
(1) P»R»0». T70/51 - To Robert Iioadman, 16 April 1700, f 1,116
(2) P.R.0*. T70/62 - Ships in the service of the Royal African 
Company in 1701
(3) £.«Rf.0jL» T70/50 - To Thomas Corker, 4 Dec I694, fl.160
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prepared to devote cargo space to other items. Thus, in 1692, the 
directors of the Royal African Company advised the Sierra Leone 
establishments to take over the trade on the malaguetta Coast in 
earnest, so as to send cargoes of Malaguetta pepper to England* because 
the slave ships which passed along that section of the coast could 
not be bothered with the pepper.(1)
There was a device by which the Royal African Company tried 
to capitalise on the small numbers of Sierra Leone slaves which were 
readily available without attempting to increase the volume of slave 
exports. When a ship was seeking a large cargo of slaves on the coast 
of West Africa, it was arranged that Sierra Leone should add its mite 
to the collection. At first Sierra Leone was asked to make up the 
complement of vessels which went to the Gambia, and perhaps failed to 
roach their target.(2) Later, it became customary for ships proceeding 
to Gape Coast Castle to make a landfall at Sierra Leone, where they 
obtained provisions for the projected cargo of slaves which were to 
be taken up on the Gold coast, and if Sierra Leone had any slaves to 
spare then they too were grist for the sugar-mill. Salt, palm-oil, 
country cloth and rice were supplied to the passing vessels, together 
with slaves in lots as small a® 24 or 65*(3) Even this process,
(1) F.R.Q..' T70/50 - To henry Gibson, 9 i*eb I692 fl.133
(2) P.R.U.. T70/50 - To Thomas Corker, 16 Oct 1694 f1.157
(3j P.K.O., 'i'70/14 - To Greenaway, 4 June 1704; T70/18 - John Clark,
Lov 1710; and T70/3 - John Clark, 10 July 1713
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however, was not profitable, and was to be avoided if possible, 
because calling at tiherbro or .oence island meant an increase m  the 
total length of the trading voyage, &nd the Hoyal African Company,, 
which chartered most of its ships, had to pay high charges for 
demurrage )
The Royal African Company eventually accepted the logic 
of the situation, and decided to discourage the slave trade in 
Sierra Leone, so as to be better able to conduct commerce in 
articles that had proven extremely profitable* Their instructions 
on this point in 1721 were explicit. They wrote: "Being sensible
that a very great profit will arise to the Company by returns to 
England of gold, elephants teeth, redwood and beeswax, we do give 
it to you as standing instruction that you promote the trade for thes« 
commodities or any other proper to send for England, and by every 
opportunity make us as large returns in such goods as possibly you 
can.**.If you should have one of the Company's own ships with you to 
slave, and at the same time have an opportunity of disposing of slaves 
for gold, teeth, etc at advanced prices, we direct you to do it"*(2) 
Their agent at the time, Plunkett, insisted that he could provide 
200 to 300 slaves, but the Company made it clear that this was not 
worth their wjrile, and indicated that what they required of the
(1) Peter Kup: A History of Sierra Leone. p85
(2) P_._R.0*. T70/60 - To Robert Plunkett, 6 May 1721, fl.6
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Sierra Leone factories was a regular cargo (every six weeks to two 
months) of camwood, pepper, ivory, gold, indigo and cotton.(1) Two 
years later, the London office dismissed the river Pongo as being an 
unimportant trading zone, because it yielded “only negroes and a few 
teeth, the former of which you will perceive we would have you deal
in as little as possible",(2)
Not only did the Royal African Company discourage slaves 
so as to concentrate on forest products, but they initiated as early 
as 1691 a substantial experiment in the cultivation and manufacture 
of indigo* The Company sought the permission of the king of Sherbro 
for the purpose, since the cultivation was to take place in the 
latter1s domains; and at the same time they made a plea that no other 
Europeans should share in the benefits of the Companyfs endeavour.(3)
A shipload of machinery for indigo manufacture was sent out to York 
Island in 1691* indicating the seriousness of the Company's committment; 
but, while expressing the hope that indigo from Sierra Leone would 
prove more profitable than that from the West Indies, the Company 
officials naively expected that the Jamaican planters would release 
specimens and skilled men to start the industry in Sierra Leone.(4)
When this expectation was not realised, they turned to the planters of
(1) P.R.O., T70/60 - To Robert Plunkett, 6 May 1721, fl.6
(2; P.R.O*, T76/60 - To Archebald and Scott, 10 July 1723, fl.3
(3) P.R.O.t T70/50 - To Henry Gibson, 22 Sept 1691, f1.127
(4) P.R.U., T.70/50 - To Henry Gibson, 28 Oct 1691, f 1.129 (In fact,
the Jamaican planters lobbied against the plans of the Company,)
SsTl ^
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Mountserrat, with a bribe of a few slaves, and were rewarded with four
slave-hands, whom the planters on that island had been unable to tame,
and who were later leaders of an escape plot of "factory slaves" at
Bence island.(1)
Meanwhile, the indigo cultivation was being superintended by
Richard Jbridgeman. This individual had spent some time in Jamaica, and
was a self-proclaimed indigo expert, about whom the Company harboured
some doubts, but who appeared to have been the only candidate for the
post of overseer, and he was sent to York Island in 1691.(2) As early 
*
as April 1692, having failed to produce results, he was consoling tne 
Company with the offer that if they sent him the necessary equipment 
he would manufacture rum and sugar.(3) Within a few years, Bridgeman 
had joined the ranks of the private traders, and it was left to the 
chief factor to see to the cultivation of indigo among his other duties. 
Some indigo continued to be grown at Tarso Island up until the last 
years of the Royal African Company's stay in Sierra. Leone,(4) but both 
the agricultural and manufacturing ventures proved failures.
In 1700, the suggestion of purchasing indigo from the 
Africans was put forward.(5) But it was only in 1723 that the Royal
(1) P.R.O., T70/1465 " Diary of Walter Charles, 1728 
^2) P.R.O** T70/50 - To Henry Gibson, 28 Oct 1691, f1*129 
(.3) P.R.o.. T.70/11
(4) William Smith: A New Voyage to Guinea, p.44
(5) P.R.O., T70/51 - To William Lewis, 2 Jan 1700, fl.76
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African Company hit upon tne idea of making the best of the local 
African processes for manufacturing dye - a rather tardy development, 
since the Portuguese had been stimulating the production of and commerce 
in local indigo since the sixteenth century.(1) besides, this idea was 
not followed up by the agents, who at no time displayed the same en­
thusiasm for the scheme as did the directors. let neither the short­
sightedness of the directors, nor the lethargy of tne agents, nor the 
eventual failure of the indigo experiment should detract from the 
significance of the attempts, here, in the midst of the slave trading 
era on the West African coast, one found a policy advocating settled 
industry and other commercial alternatives to the slave trade. That the 
indigo scheme was part of a conscious policy can be verified by citing 
the Company^ instructions in relation to a number of other possibili­
ties along the same lines as the indigo venture. This was what they 
wrote in 1723* "You are in the garden of the Island of Bence or at the 
Island of Torsus as a nursery to sett sow and plant all things that 
may be found out in those parts that they may be improvable for trade, 
as cotton, indigo, ginger, sugar canes, pepper, spice, gumm trees, 
druggs, etc. You are to put a stock of cattle on the Island of Torsus, 
clear the island of wood trees and make plantacions thereon... and to 
carry on the indigo and pottash works'*.^)
(1) See below, Gh.VIII,
(2) P.R.O*» T70/60 - To Archebald and Scott, 10 July 1723, fl.36 and 
to Archebald, 27 Nov 1723, fl.45
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For West Africa as a whole, the question of substitutes for 
slaves was seldom posed before the debate on the Atlantic slave trade 
and the nineteenth century attempts to refashion the Afro-European 
connection. In Sierra Leone, this issue had been taken, up in the 
seventeenth century - not for reasons of humanity, of course - but 
because the directors of the Royal African Company, for commercial 
reasons, saw the desirability of transforming Sierra Leone into a zone 
where the slave trade was not conducted* With the demise of the Royal 
African Company in Sierra. Leone, the situation did not change 
dramatically, but it did mean the end of an articulated policy in this 
direction* By the middle of the eighteenth century* the Atlantic slave 
trade had once more risen to dominance. "Dead Season” is, after all, 
followed by “Crop Time", the busiest period of the plantation routine*
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PART I - IMPORTS AND PRICES.
The list of imports from Europe into West Africa was an extremely
lengthy one, which tended to grow as the era of pre-colonial trade wore on.
Bosman, at the end of the seventeenth century, tabulated 150 items imported
into the Gold Coast; (l) And they were merchantable along most of the West
African littoral. In any complete list, many oddities would male their
appearance. Some of them are of interest only to the antiquarian, hut a few 
rather unusual imports were considered as valuable both by the Europeans and 
the Africans. Horses and cattle, for instance, would not normally feature in 
the literature of the early European trade in West Africa, but for a limited
period they were both important in the trade of the Upper Guinea Coast and the
Senegambia. The peoples of the Senegambia, who were already familiar with 
horses, showed a particularly great interest in acquiring them from the 
Portuguese; but horses were also saleable as far south as Cape Mount. Among 
the Sapes in the fifteenth century, one Portuguese horse initially fetched 14 
slaves, but the rate of exchangedropped to between 6 to 8 slaves per horse by 
the beginning of the sixteenth century. (2) In the Senegambia, there was a 
similar reduction in price, and perhaps it was this declining value which 
caused horses to disappear from the inventories of Portuguese imports into
(1) W. Bosnian: A New and Accuate Description of the Coast of Guinea.
p.79.
(2) Valentim Fernandes: La CSte Occidentale d’Afriaue. pp.36,74>76} and 
Pacheco Pereira: Esmeraldo de Situ Orbis. p.72
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the Upper Guinea Coast.
Cattle were of much less significance than horses. The 
Portuguese carried two-year old steers from the Cgpe Verde islands in the 
sixteenth century to the Bijagos islands. The reason given for the 
continuous demand for cattle in the Bijagos islands was the custom of sacri­
ficing large numbers of animals at funeral ’cries* and other ceremonies, (l) 
This custom was common to all the societies on the Upper Guinea Coast north 
of Sierra Leone, but most of them, like the Djolas and the Balantas, reared 
thair own herb specifically for ’cries* (2), so that th=s Bijagos seemed to 
have been the only customers whom the Portuguese found.
Something of a curiosity is presented by the demand for lead 
which existed among the Ralus in the sixteenth century^ (3) and a few lead 
bars were still being carried to the Upper Guinea Coast up until the end of 
the eighteenth century. (4) though the European traders did not reveal to 
what use this metal was put. Even more unusual was a significant import of 
Spanish and other silver coins by the peoples of the Gambia, Cacheu and Geba, 
especially the Mandingas. These coins were not regarded as currency, but 
simply as material for making ornaments such as bracelets. Lemos Coelho 
wrote that in one trading season 8,000 patacas were exchanged at Farim, 
mainly for cloth, which would increase its value when bartered elsewhere for
(1) Alvares de Almada: MRios de Guine", p.318
(2) A. Texeira da Mota: Guin^ Portuguese.. Vol. I, pp.247,286,288
(3) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.340
(4) B.M.. Add.Ms.12131 - Papers relating to £§erra Leone, 1792-96.
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slaves, ivory and camwood* (l) It was also the custom of the Rayal African 
Company to import coins into the Gambia, said to have been approximately equa 
in value to one Dutch rix-dollar, (2) while the French Senegal Company sent 
"pieces of eight" to Bissau. (3) How relevant these were to the local market 
it is difficult to say, but it is quite possible that they were mainly used b 
the Europeans when they conducted trade among themselves on the coast, as 
often happened.
The staple goods which were brought by the Portuguese and other
Europeans to the Upper Guinea Coast, and which were of lasting importance
during the centuries under discussion, can be conveniently divided into five 
categories, though the edges of the divisions are sometimes blurred. The 
first includes metal; the second cloth; the third alchoholic beverages; the 
fourth weapons; and the fifth comprises a miscellany of baubles, bangles 
and beads. These will be dealt with in reverse order.
For both the Europeans and the Africans, the numerous items of 
trumphery were placed at the bottom of the scale of values. William Finch, 
after trading in Sierra Leone in 1607, listed a number of articles of trade,
including beads, bells, garlick, French bottles and "other trifles"; but
(1) Lemos Coelho: Duas Describes da Guine. p.159
(2) These coins were known as 1 zealots1 or "Pieces of eight". See P.R.O* 
T70/5O - To Alexander Cleeve, 31 Aug 1686, fl.18, and T70/14 - Thomas 
feaver; 10 June 1704
See also J.M. Gray: A History of the Gambia* pp.140,141
(3) John Barbot: Description of North ah: South Guinea, p.87
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admitted that by themselves these 1 toyes* were capable of purchasing nothing 
but foodstuffs, (l) This continued to be the case for the next two centuries. 
A hen could be purchased on the Upper Guinea Coast for three strings of little 
beads, and the same applied to one gallon of palm wine, causing Ogilby to 
remark that "they do not set a high rate upon the best of their commodities".
(2) According to Beaver, the herds of the Mandingas were utilised for the 
making of "small trade" with the Europeans; through which the men procured 
tobacco, powder, knives, etc, and the women obtained articles such as beads 
and small looking glasses. (3) But it is also true tint trinkets formed a 
proportion of almost every payment made to the Africans, and they were useful 
as gifts. Besides, the low and restricted purchasing power of these items did 
not mean that they could be excluded from the cargoes or quantitatively 
reduced.
Of the several trinkets, beads featured most prominently. These 
were usually of glass, and the Portuguese in particular laid down specifica­
tions about the colour and size of the beads which were popular among the 
Africans on tin Upper Guinea Coast. Yellow and green glass beads were said 
to have been favoured by the Sapes in the early sixteenth century, and at that 
time red cornelian beads were also in demand on the whole of the Upper Guinea 
Coast. Indian beads, so well-known in the commerce of East Africa, also
(1) S. Purchas: Purchas his Pil^rimes. Vol.Ill, Ch.IIII, p. 9*
(2) John Ogilby: Africa, p.364 '
(3) Valentim Fernandes: La cSte Occidentale dtAfrique. pp.42,76 and Pacheco 
Pereira: Esmeraldo de Situ Orbis. pp.64,72,76,84.
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found their way to West Africa through the agency of the Portuguese, (l) 
Alongside of heads are to be enumerated goods such as glass 
buttons, crystal, amber, combs, small items of haberdashery, imitation pearls^ 
and medals, bracelets and armlets of copper, tin and pewter. Individually^ 
each one of these counted very little, ;?nd there were some goods of this sort 
which were carried to the Upper Guinea Coast and found to have no purchasing 
power whatever. This was partly attributable to the regional differences 
along the West African littoral, but occasionally blunders were obviously 
made because of the assumption that every bit of trumpery was veddible in 
Africa. For instance, in 1697» the second Company of Cacheu sent considerable 
stocks of threads, bells, combs, buttons, children’s socks and small shoes - 
much to the chagrin of the local representatives on the Upper Guinea Coast and 
in the Cape Verde Islands. (2) The Royal African Company found that even 
beads were a slow-selling line in Sierra Leone. Consequently, the string 
rotted, and it cost half their value to have the beads restrung. (3)
Weapons stood at the other extreme from the trinkets, being 
viewed by the Portuguese authorities as articles that should not pass into 
African hands or even be acquired by private Portuguese traders if this made 
them independent of the protection of the Portuguese crown. The greatest
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guini*, pp.276,277>347
(2) A.H.U. Cabo Verde, caixa VI - Antonio Salgado, 15 May I698
(3) P»R»0* T70/5O - To Thomas Corker, 24 Oct 1693» f1*475 and
T70/2 - John Clark, 24 Oct 1709, fl.12.
(4) A.H.U. Guine, caixa I - No. 27, Jorge Castilho, 1 July 1642
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fear arose over the ownership of cannon, but most private traders managed to 
acquire cannon, swivel guns and other ship’s ©rdnanoe. This was basically for 
defence against the Africans, and such armament was to be found in centres whei 
the lantpados were no longer amenable to the authority of the African rulers. (I 
and wherever white or mulatto traders had their towns and slave baracoons. (2) 
Yet, heavy weapons were occasionally obtained by the African rulers through the 
agency of the private traders, who to all appearances did $ot draw as strict a 
line between profit and security as did the established companies and adminis­
trations. (3)
Not surprisingly, the idea of banning the export of European fire­
arms to Africa was mooted in several quarters. Labat, in 1728, listed ordinary 
guns, buccaneers, gun-flints and powder among the imports sold by the Europeans 
on the Upper Guinea Coast; and he advocated that 'Hihis trade should be dis­
couraged by stiff penalties because of the terrible consequences of teaching 
these barbarous people the use of firearms". (4 ) Not only firearms, but swords 
and other similar weapons of iron were deemed "prohibited goods" by the 
Portuguese crown, along with iron, from which the Africans themselves
(1) See above, Ch. Ill, p. /78
(2) See below, Ch. VIII, p.
(3) P.R.O. T70/5I - To Corker or Bowman, 13 Sept 1698, fl.10. (Here the 
London officials wrote that "We believe interlopers care not what commo­
tions they make to carry on their own designs".) .
(4 ) J* Labat: Nouvelle Relation. Vol. V, p.181
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manufactured weapons, (l) In the sixteenth century, such manufactures did nc 
constitute any significant portion of the goods imported into the Upper Guine 
Coast by the Portuguese, but this was probably due more to Portugal’s 
inability to supply these goods than to the efficacy of legislative edict.
Among the major Portuguese commentators on the Upper Guinea Coas 
Lemos Coelho was the first to mention, swords, muskets? powders and shot as 
joods sold by the Portuguese and the Afro-Portuguese. (2 ) His remarks were 
meant for the eyes of the Portuguese authorities, and hisfrank inclusion of 
this category of goods could be interpreted as advice to the Portuguese 
administration to dismiss their fears and scruples on this subject. Never­
theless, the ban against weapons remained in force. In August 1679? "the 
bishop of Cape Verde wrote the Conselho warning' them that the residents of 
Jacheu sold swords, muskets and other weapons to the Africans. (3)
The loophole which permitted the Portuguese traders to import 
arms with equanimity was provided by the pretext that they w£re to be used fo 
the defence of the official prayas 6n the coast. Furthermore, because of 
this justification, such goods were duty-free. In 1752, the captain-major 
of Cacheu pointed out that this was a ridiculous situation from t&e point of 
view of the treasury, because when the Cape Verde cloths were taken into 
account, the greater part of the trade in the area was conducted in items
(1) A. Brasio: Monumenta Missionaria Africana. 2nd series, Vol. II - No. 26, 
Legislation on the commerce of Guinea, 24 March 1514, P*72.
(2) Lemos Coelho: Duas Descriyoes da Guine. p.12
(3) A.H.U.. Guine, ma<jo III - Francisco Roque Sottomayor, 12 March 1752.
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which paid, no duty. However, his only remedy was to reiterate for the 
benefit of the local traders and the soldiers of Cacheu that it was illegal 
to allow such articles as firearms and gunpowder to pass into the hands of tl 
Africans, and the penalty for so doing was confiscation of goods and three 
years exile to Sao Thome. The Conselho was at the same time urged to send 
alternative goods such as beads and iron, without which the soldiers of the 
pra^a of Cacheu could not even obtain food from the Papels. (l)
At no point did the Portuguese rescind their sanctions against 
weapons, but by the end of the eighteenth century, weapons were named by the 
servants of the Portuguese crown on the Upper Guinea Coast as imports which 
were being handled by them, and this situation obviously had the tacit 
approval of the authorities in Portugal. (2) Understandably, it was the trac 
in swords rather than firearms, which was first tolerated by the Conselho 
Ultramarino; and by the latter part of the seventeenth century, the import 
of this commodity was openly advocated by responsible individuals on the Uppe 
Guinea Coast. Advice in 1697 pertained to the despatch of broad well- 
riveted swords, each three feet in length. (3) The Eis^ lish companies found i1 
equally useful to introduce some of these weapons. When the stock of the 
Gambia Adventurers ih Sierra Leone was inventoried on the liquidation of the 
Company, it included a number of swords. These, along with cutlasses,
(1) A.H.U., Guine'', maco III - Erancisco Roque Sottomayor, 12 March 1752
(2) See, for example, A.H.U., Guine", maco XI - The table of the regular 
prices of goods submitted by the captain-major in 1801 included several 
types of European weapons.
(3) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa VI - Antonio Salgado, 15 May I698
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continued, to feature in the invoices of the Royal African Company in the 
Ga.nbia and Sierra Leone. An entry in the Sherbro Accounts of I698 indicated 
that 550 swords and large cutlasses were then in stock, (l) Much earlier, in 
1683, swords to the value of 1,113 ’bars* were received at the ^ence factory.
(2) (l sword being valued at 1 'bar1) and at that time, the Gambia agent was 
advising that trade southwards to the Cacheu was not possible without iron 
and "good swords". (3)
Perhaps the demand for swords on the Upper Guinea Coast was in 
part induced by the presence of the Portuguese lane ados and their descendants) 
because these traders attempted to live like Portuguese gentlemen, and a 
sword was thus an essential accoutrement. (4) However, the swords on the Uppe 
Guinea Coast did not originate in metropolitan Portugal. Prom the fourteentl 
century, the Portuguese had obtained their swords from Germany, and in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the commerce of Arguin had allowed a supply 
of blades to pass into the hands of the Taureg, who provided their own 
hafts. (5) At the end of the eighteenth century, Beaver noticed that the 
cutlasses and swords of the Bijagos warriors carried the mark of Solingen, th«
(1) P.R.O.. T70/590 - York Island Accounts
(2) P.R.O.. T70/648 - Bence Island Accounts
(3) P.R.O.. T70/16 - John Castle, 20 Peb 1683, fl. 46
(4) See below, Ch. VIII,
(5) L.C. Briggs: "European Blades in Taureg Swords and Daggers", in 
The Journal of the Arms and Armour Society. Vol.V, No. 2, June 1965 > 
pp.36-65
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famous German sword-manufacturing town, (l) The Portuguese authorities them­
selves confirmed that up to that time most of the weapons which they carried 
to Africa were re-exports from Germany - muskets, blunderbusses, pistols, 
cutlasses and flints being specifically listed. (2) The Portuguese could not 
afford to re-export these manufactures on any considerable scale, so that when 
firearms became important on the Upper Guinea Coast in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, they were introduced directly by the Dutch, English and 
French for the most part. English traders were at first dependent on Dutch 
industry for firearms, as for so many other goods for the African trade, but a 
process of substitution was carried to completion by the early eighteenth 
century, permitting the Royal African Company to depend exclusively on 
Eng-lish firearms during the later phases of their commerce with V/est Africa.
(3) The early records of the Royal African Company in Sierra Leone mention 
"Jpanish locks" as distinct from "English locks", the former being the 
more expensive. Pistols, muskets and fowling pieces were also named. (4) 
Between 1703 andl717> the Committee of Goods of the Royal African Company 
requisitioned a large variety of firearms for the African trade - buccaneers, 
carabines, brass blunderbusses, 'fusees1, fowling guns, muskets and round 
locks (5) All of course were muzzle loading^ and often the differences in
(l) Philip Beaver: African Memoranda, p.335
(?) Rooort of the Lords of the Committee of Council. 1789 - Part VI, 'Portugal
(3) K.G. Davies: The Royal African Company, p.177
(4) P.R.O*. T70/36O - Bence Island Accounts
(5) P.R.O.< T70/128 - Memoranda of the Committee of Goods.
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models was slight.
In sending out a ship from London in December 1721, the official 
of the Royal African Company at Africa House advised the Sierra Leone agents 
that "in this cargo you will find some trading' and some buccaneer gunns with 
beech stocks, hollowed in the butt, which are of a new pattern. We desire 
you will send us word how they take with the residents, and if they are liked 
better than those we used to send", (l) There is no record of a reply, but 
the implication that the Africans of the Upper Guinea Coast were calling for 
improved firearms was borne out by John Atkins who was on the coast of Sierra 
Leone at that time, and found that the marked required "a better sort of 
firearms". (2)
With guns ranging in prices from 20s to 10s.6d., it is not 
surprising1 that they were of shoddy manufacture, being likely to explode at . 
the first discharge. Various recommendations were made towards remedying 
the situation. In 1728, for instance, the chief factor of the Royal African 
Company in Sierra Leone urged that two armourers should be sent out to repair 
screws and locks on the guns since these were constantly defective. A-fc the 
end of the eighteenth century, traders oh the Windward Coast (as the Mala- 
guesta Coast was then called) were advised to supply "decent sham Dane guns", 
which had lohg barrels and ramrods of wood, and short French guns with iron 
ramrods. These two makes were to be the leaven of quality among the cheap 
"Bonny guns". It was piously hoped that the locks would strike well and the
(1) P.R.O., T70/60 - To Robert Plunkett, 21 Dec 1721, fl.20
(2) John Atkins, A Voyage to Guinea, p.162
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barrels be free from flaws, while it was remarked that strong or weak powder, 
good or bad guns, the Africans rammed the same charge down the barrels, so 
the European trader would do no harm to sell cheap cannon powder instead of 
gunpowder, (l) The Bijagos, being dedicated warriors, had their own solution. 
Well into the nineteenth century, they carefully tempered and tested each 
European firearm which they bought. The breach and muzzle were pegged with 
wood, the barrel filled with palm oil and then placed in fire. If no 
explosion occurred, the operation was considered successful. (2)
However, the advantages of these new weapons clearly outweighed 
their disadvantages, and the Africans of the Upper Guinea Coast became more 
and nore avid in pursuit of guns and powder during the latter part of the 
eighteenth century. In fact, some coastal communities were substantially re­
armed with these European weapons at an early date. For example, the Mandin- 
gas and Banhuns of Hereges (south of the Gambia), who had conducted 
flourishing trade with the Europeans from the fifteenth century, not only owned 
guns, but were adept at using them by the end of the seventeenth century. (3) 
The Papels acquired muskets, swords and cutlasses as a result of the 
Portuguese resident traders and tie commerce which was attracted to Cacheu and 
Bissau, while the Bijagos islanders obtained their arms via the Bissau
factories. The European arms reportedly in their possession at the end of
(1) B.M., Add%Ms.12131, Papers relating to Sierra Leone, 1792-96
(2) Edward Stallibrass: "The Bijouga or ^issagos Islands, West Africa",
Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society, 1889*
(3) P. Cultrus Premier Voyage de Sieur de 1a. Courbe.. p.207*
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the eighteenth century must have been in circulation among these tribes lor a 
long time. In Sierra Leone, too, firearms were by then widely distributed am 
expertly used; (i) and when there was any disputd among the Africans of Sierrj 
Leone, the European traders offered both parties ammunition, and prepared to 
welcome the captives. (2)
Firearms were slow in penetrating into the hinterland of the Upp; 
Guine 1 Coast. The great Jihad or Holy W r of the Futa Djalon was evidently 
begun in the early eighteenth century with weapons of local manufacture. (3) 
The first clear-cut instance of European arms being sought in a determined 
manner by the tribes of the interior occurred in 1757, when a Mandinga chief 
allied to the Fulas cut his way to the coast at the Searcies estuary, selling 
all who came into his hands for powder and guns. (4) From that point onwards 
the Mande and the Fulas of the interior evinced a constant interest in 
obtaining- arms from the coast. Reports of civil disturbances in the near 
hinterland of the Upper Guinea Coast in the 1780!s and 1790*s suggested that 
European firearms were utilised. (5) Yet the paucity of firearms in the 
interior is brought out by comparisons with the littoral. John Matthews
(1) Evidence at the end of the eighteenth century was provided by Philip Beav< 
and Joshua Montefiore, writing on the attempts at colonisation on Bulama 
and in Sierra Leone. See Philip Beaver: African Memoranda, pp.40,527,335*
(2) C.B. Wadstrom: An Essay on Colonisation. Part 2, p.77
(3) See below, Ch. IX* 9.
(4) Nicholas Owen: Journal of a Slave Dealer, p.96, and see below, Ch. IX. pf
(5) T. Winterbottom: An Account of the Native Africans of Sierra Leone, p. 154
3*?
AFRO-iflJROPEAlSr COMMERCE
related that ’the inhabitants of the sea coast have almost totally laid aside 
their national weapons for the sabre and the gun; but the natives of the inland 
countries still use the spear, dart and poisoned arrow", (l) Winterbottom also 
confirmed that on the coast and for some distance inland the blacks were very 
dextrous in the use of firearms, and it was rare to meet one at any distance 
from home without his musket, but that the Fulas often used poisoned arrows.
(2)
Careful consideration is required so as to place the import of 
firearms into its true perspective. It would be attractive to set this 
category of goods apart as the main stimulus to the slave trade) because guns 
were used to capture slaves to buy more guns to capture more slaves. If they 
added a new dimension to military techniques, then they would also have been 
decisive in relations among the Africans themselves. But in reality, their 
importance was narrowly circumscribed in the period under discussion, 
iur'opean firearms made their presence felt at a very late date. The first 
period of Hispano-Portuguese slave trading, for instance, had little or 
nothing to do with the import of firearms. Furthermore, while it is true that 
the coastal residents had by the end of the eighteenth century re-armed them­
selves with European weapons, the same did not apply to the inhabitants of the 
interior; and yet it was the Mande and Fulas from the hinterland who extended 
their dominion over the coastal tribes, (3) demonstrating clearly that
(1) j . Matthews: A Visit to the River Sierra Leone, p.88
(2) T. Winterbottom: Op.Cit., p.155
(3) See below, Ch. IX,
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European firearms did not automatically influence the tribal balance of power.
It is equally imperative to be circumspect in evaluating the inf­
luence of alchohol upon the Africans, and its role in the Atlantic slave trade 
This question has been posed in terms of the volume of alchohol imported into 
Africa, and the possibility of its exerting a degenerative effect on the 
Africans; and within such a context it has been pointed out that it was not 
until after the slave tiade had ended that alchohol was brought to Africa in 
great quantities, (l) Certainly, it was only in modern times that the import 
of alchohol into Africa assumed dangerous proportions, with thd purchase of 
31,000 hectolitres of pure alchohol by French West Africa in 1951, represent­
ing an increase of fifteen times the volume in 1938. (2) As with so many 
other commodities brought to Africa in the pre-colonial period, it is 
extremely difficult to estimate the quantities involved, but a number of 
factors suggest that the amount of alchohol was indeed small in relation to a 
later period, and probably had little effect on the Africans*, but for 
reasons quite unconnected with the total volume this import was nevertheless 
a decisive factor in Afro-European commercial relations.
Reviewing the centuries of slave trading, remarks on the 
indispensability of liquor as an import axe very common. De Almada asserted 
that the residents of the Gambia would die without the wine brought by the 
Portuguese and Spanish ships; (3) while the servants of the Royal African
(1) The Transatlantic Slave Trade from West Africa (Centre of African Studies, 
Edinburgh, 1965) pp.92,91
(2) Rene Dumont: Afrique Noire est Mai Partie (Paris 1962) p.34
(3) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guin£", p.276
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Company found that their own peace was endangered if the thirst of the Sherbro 
rulers was not assuaged, (l) In the latter part of the eighteenth century, sue 
comments became more frequent. John Newton, for example, reported in 1750 thal 
he lost the option to purchase ten slaves in the Sherbro for lack of "the 
commanding articles of beer and cider". Shortly afterwards, he bartered with i 
French ship on the coast to obtain four anchors of brandy,'. (2) Several years 
later, recalling his expe riences of slave trading in Sierra Leone, Newton 
stressed that "strong’ liquor" was so much in demand that without it scarcely a 
single slave could be purchased; (3) and this was a view shared by ether 
experienced Europeans at the end of the eighteenth century. (4)
The wine mentioned by De Almada, along with the beer and cider 
mentioned by ^ewton, should be considered separately from the "strong liquor" 
to which Newton also referred. Local fermented beverages of low alchoholic 
content, such as wine and beer, were extremely popular on the Upper Guinea 
Coast. (5) The Portuguese and the- Spanish catered to this taste by intro­
(1)P.R.O.. T70/1 - Joshua Platt, 7 Aug 1681, f1.120
(2) John Newton: Journal of a Slave Trader. p.l6
(3) Ibid: p.20 (l anchor = 10 old wine gallons or &J- imperial gallons)
(4) Joshua Montefiore: An Authentic Account of the late Expedition to Bulam
(5) See above, Ch. I, p. (&% (For the alchoholic content of African 
fermented drinks, see Rene Dumont: Afrique Noire est Mai Partie. p.34*
Palm wine has 4^ alchohol, beer from millet or maize contains 3«55& on an 
average, while most fermented fruit juices scarcely had more than 1fo)
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ducing grape wines. This was one of the principal constituents of the cargoei 
of the Spanish registered ships; and it was brought not only f rom Spain but 
also ffom the Canary Islands. There was in fact an enduring connection betwei 
the Upper Guinea Coast and the Canary islands which began in the years when 
Spanish ships were considered as 'interlopers1 on the West African coast, (l) 
matured during the era of joint monarchy, when Teneriffe was an office for 
issuing registros. (2 ) and persisted during the later seventeenth century and 
the eighteenth century. (3 ) With the Canary islands, one can also bracket 
Madeira. They both sought slaves ffom the Upper Guinea Coast, (4 ) and in 
return they offered alchoholic beverages, - primarily wine, but also brandy ai 
rum.
(1) 1. Brasios Monumenta Missionaria Africana, 2nd series, Vol. II - No. I4 6 , 
Letter from the ambassador of Spain to the Regent of Portugal, 22 Jan 1555 
P.473
(2 ) For references to wines from the Canaries during this epoch, see A.H.U., 
Cabo Verde, caixa I - Treslado of 11 July 1619 that ships from Seville anc 
the Canaries should trade with the Upper Guinea Coast only via Santiago. 
See also Guine, caixa I - No. 27, Joao Pereira Corte-Real, 23 Dec I64I
(3) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa III - Governor of Cabo Verde, 8 June 1657; and- 
caixa IV - Antonio Galvao, 15 April I6 6 5.
(4 ) For slaves to Madeira in the sixteenth century, see A. Brasio: Monumenta 
Missionaria Africans. 2nd series, Vol. II - No. 149,150* Declarations to 
the sugar planters of Madeira, 16 Oct and 30 Oct 1562; and for the 
eighteenth century, see Ch. Xj f- € ^  ^
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Aguardente, a word referring to both brandy and rum, only began 
to oust wine from the Portuguese inventories of sale goods in the late seven- 1 
teenth century, (l) so that irrespective of volume, the spirits imported up to 
that point could not have constituted a great departure from the indigenous 
pattern. Indeed, for several decades of the eighteenth century, beer and 
cider were the fermented beverages brought by the English traders, especially 
ships from Bristol. (2) However, supplies of cheap West Indian rum had become 
popular by the end of the seventeenth century, and couldbe ferried directly 
from the West Indies to Africa. In 1700, the London officials of the Royal 
African Company wrote to their agents in the Gambia and Sierra Leone advising 
them that a small ship was bringing rum from Barbados, and if the venture was 
successful that would be the standard practice in the future. (3) Between 1703 
and 1709, thirty-one ships were despatched from the West Indies to West Africa 
by tbe Company. (4) Private traders apparently continued to import rum in this 
manner after the demise of the Royal African Company in Sierra Leone, for 
Newton made passing reference to "rum sloops" on that section of th coast.(5)
(1) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa V - Inventory of the goods of the first Company 
of Cacheu, on 6 April 1686; and advice to the second Company of Cacheu by 
Antonio Salgado, 15 May 1698.
(2) Charles Johnston: A General History of the Pirates {Ed. Arthur Hayward, 
London 1926) p.198
(3) P.R.O.. T70/51 - To George Coates, 9 July 1700, f1.127; to Robert Lewis,
9 July 1700, f1.131} and to Thomas Corker, 3 Oct 1699, fl*50.
(4) Peter Kup: A History of Sierra Leone, p.70
(5) John Newton: Journal of a Slave Trader.
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A second and even morevital distinction can be drawn between the 
alchohol brought to the Upper Guinea Coast as a vendible product and those 
supplies which were considered as revenue payments to the local rulers or were 
re ;arded as "entertainment allowances". The annual rent paid by the 
Portuguese of Cacheu to the Papel king of Mata and the chief of Mompataz was 
dominated by wine, (l) Throughout the era of the Atlantic slave trade, 
alchohol of one sort of another played a principal role as a constituent of 
the fixed revenues of the African rulers* As one captain-major of Cacheu put 
it, the rents were paid to the African rulers in "goods most appropriate to 
their appetities". (2) The Royal African Company in Sierra Leone reckoned the 
most appropriate goods to be brandy, old clothes and swords; (3) and the 
English private traders continued to offer alchohol in this context* When the 
anti-slavery party launched the Sierra Leone Company in 1787, they found that 
six or seven chiefs in the vicinity applied to them for quantities of alchohol 
which they had until then received from the slave traders, apparently on a 
regular and agreed basis. (4) There is in fact one surviving example of a 
signed treatyy between the Europeans and an African ruler in which liquor was 
specifically mentioned* This was a contract between the Portuguese and a 
Beafada fidako on the Geba, in which it was stated that whenever the fidalgo
(1) See above, Ch. V, p.2L£ff
(2) A.H.U.. Guin/,ma<po IV - Antonio Bezerra (Jnr), 10 June 1721
(3) P.R.O., T70/36O - Bence Island Accounts, and T70/587 - Sherbro Accounts, 
1681-86
(4) C.B. Wadstrom: An Essay on Colonisation. Part 2, p.81
sqr
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returned, a slave who escaped, from the Portuguese he would he paid one bar of 
iron and one bottle of aguardente; while he and his successors were to be 
treated with 'gifts1 ofliquor from time to time, (l)
Apart from the fixed payments, there were a large number of 
occasions on which the Europeans had to give 'presents1 or remuneration to the 
African rulers with whom they dealt. Writing to the holder of the Cape Verde- 
Cuinea contract in 1617, the local Portuguese trade factor in Cacheu argued 
against attempting to use force in dealing with the Africans, because he felt 
that wine effectively smoothed the way. ^e had just despatched a ship to the 
Canaries for supplies, for it was his policy to keep 7 pipes of wine in the 
factory solely for treating African guests, and this was quite distinct from 
the amounts expended when there were disputes. (2 ) It is no accident that alo 
the whole of the West African coast, the word 'dash* though used initially to 
refer to a gift of any kind, came to mean a small quantity of liquor offered a 
a preliminary to trade, for, as John Atkins realised, the African trader 'hever 
cares to treat with dry lips". (3) This was the substance which the traders 
found best fitted to lubricate the wheels of Afro-European commerce.
It is not difficult to imagine how the imports of alchohol were 
consumed. The social life of the peoples of the Upper Guinea Coast was 
studded with events such as funeral 'cries1, initiation ceremonies, harvest
(1 ) A.H.U., Guine, ma<jo V - Copy of agreement JO June 1751
(2) A.H.U. Cabo Verde, caixa I - No. 99, Baltezar Castel ^ranco to the contra 
holder, 15 April 1617*
(3) John Adkins: A Voyage to Guinea, p.171
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celebrations, etc., where the emphasis was on the maximum consumption of food 
an I drink, (l) In the midst of the hostilities with the Portuguese in 1753, the
king of Bissau called a truce to obtain supplies of liquor, because a relative
of his had been killed, and they had to begin the 'cry1. (2) The mulatto chiefs 
of the late Eighteenth century also observed this "country practice", and where 
the 'cry* of chief James Cleveland was solemnised in 1793, 20 puncheons of 
alchohol were consumed. (3) For that matter, the resident European officials 
and traders were themselves obliged to hold similar wakes when one of their
number died, and this meant that intoxicants should flow freely. When De la
Courbe visited the Portuguese trading centre of Geba in 1686, a 'cry* was in 
process for the recently deceased Afro-Portuguese sergeant, who represented the 
authority of the Portuguese crown in this remote area. (4) Several years later 
when the chief factor of the Royal African Company in Sierra Leone died at this 
job, his colleagues failed to invite the king of Sherbro to the 'cry1, which 
was a serious breach of protocol, endangering the relations between the Company 
and the ruler in question. (5)
When alchohol was made out to be the most important item of trade
(1) See above, Ch. IJ p*tiq.
(2) Antonio da Costa Araujos Rela^ao da Viagem da Fragata "Nossa Senhora da
Estrella a Bissau em 1753 (Ed. Damiao Peres, Lisboa 1942^ p.22.
(3) T. Winterbottom: An Account of the Native Africans of Sierra Leone, p.250
(4) P. Cultru: Premier Voyage de Sieur de la Courbe. p.246
(5) P.RO., T70/3 - Richard Smith, 29 June 1715
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by contemporary observers, it is almost certain that they had in mind its 
strategic value. Placed in this narrow and specific context, the alchohol 
transported to the Upper Guinea Coast was of undeniableimportance not because 
of absolute volume nor any inducement to alchoholism on the part of substantial 
numbers of people, but because it .was one of the most decisive factors affect­
ing’ the Afro-European partnership.
Cloth, the next category of imports, was not as dashing as 
alchohol, but was probably of greater general appeal. The story must begin 
with the crafts of spinning, weaving and dyeing which were practised on the 
Upper Guinea Coast. Cotton manufacturing in the Senegambia and on parts of the 
Upper Guinea Coast drew the attention of most visitors to the area from the 
time of Valentim Fernandes to that of Mungo Park. The cotton was woven on a 
very narrow frame, requiring at least six strips to be sewn together to produce 
one "country cloth" or pano; but the neat craftsmanship made the stitching 
virtually indiscernible, (l) The quality of the blue dyes (indigofera and 
Lonchocarpus cyanescens) also drew European admiration. (2) According to 
Ogilby, the best cloths on the Gambia were panos sakes. which were two and a 
half ells long and one and a half broad, bleached white and having eight 
strips sewn together; barafulas, which were great blue cloths; and, bontans, 
which were two ells long and one and a half broad, comprising six strips of
(1) T. Winterbottom: An Account of the Native Africans of Sierra Leone, p.96
(2) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.248; and Mungo Park: Travels ...in 
the Years 1795. 1796 and 1797. p.181, and The Journal of a Mission ... in
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blue and white, (l) The Portuguese performed three distinct services in 
relation to the "country cloth" of the Senegambia and the Upper Guinea Coast,
I
they distributed it locally, they exported it, and they manufactured it on the 
Upper Guinea Coast and in the Cape Verde islands.
Being extremely knowledgeable about the local requirements, the
I
laacados and the Afro-Portuguese were aware of precisely what areas needed cloth
and what kind of cloth sold best in the given districts. Generally speaking
the movement was from north to south, because the Wolofs, Mandingas, Fulas,
Banhuns, Casangas and Beafadas were the manufacturing tribes. Thus, of the
Nunez, Coelho remarked that to trade there one needed cloth and more cloth, most
of which was “country cloth11, while on the Searcies, cloth from Farim was
particularly fancied. (2) On the other hand, the manufacturing peoples needed
further supplies of dye, and indigo could be obtained from the Nunez in large
quantities. Consequently, there was established a regular coastal trade
between the Nunez and the Cacheu, transporting processed indigo in the form of
dried sticks called tintas by the Portuguese. (3) I
To a limi ed extent, the Afro-Portuguese on the mainland also I
<
tried to enter into the production of "country cloth". At Hereges, Be la Gourde’
•
found a mulatto mistress who superintended the production of cloth, (4) while »
the Afro-Portuguese at Farim and Bissau were also manufacturing their own cloth ;
- 11 ■ ■■■■■■■■■■■■■— 1^ _________________________________________________       _ *4.
(1) John Ogilbyi Africa. P.356
(2) Lemos Coelhoi Duas Deacriyoes da Guine". pp.60,227
(3) Alvares de Almada* f,Rios de Guine", p.342 I
(4) P. Ouitrui Premier Voyage de Sieur de la Courbe. p.292 J
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in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries* (l) However, it w as in the Cape 
Verde islands that the Portuguese settlers, African slaves and their common 
descendants came to specialise in the manufacture of "country cloth"* From 
the fifteenth century, cotton was the commodity which bound the Cape Verde 
islands most closely to the mainland* The dry conditions on the island made 
them suitable for cotton cultivation; and some of the raw cotton found a marl 
on the Gambia, Geba, Cacheu and Casamance among the Banhuns, Casangas, Beafadf 
and Mandingas, in exchange for cloths which were already woven and dyed* (2) 
By the end of the sixteenth century, however, the islands had ceased to e:<por1 
raw cotton, and had become instead manufacturers, using basically the same 
African techniques* Apart from cotton, the Cape Verde islanders utilised 
blends of European fabrics such as silk, worsted and wool, and they were 
capable of producing attractive quilts and counterpanes, the best of which 
were exported to Brazil* (3) The Cape Verde cloths held a commanding positic 
on the mainland, especially among the Papels, Bjolas and Bulloms, while seme 
went as far south as the Gold Coast*
"Country cloths" not only held their ovjn against European 
manufactures in this era, but the English, Butch and French were forced to 
purchase these cloths from the Cape Verde islands or from those sections of 
the coast where they were available (those being the Senegambia, the Upper
(1) A*H*U,. Guine, MafO 1 - Paulo de Lima, 30 ^une 1707
(2) See p. 4.37
(3) A.W. Lawrence (ed.)j A Series of Uncommon Events which befell Cantain 
George Roberts (London 1930) pp*2183220
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Guinea Coast as far south as the Nunez, and the Malaguetta Coast around Cape
Me3urado) in order to conduct their trade in areas where the cloth was in
demand. This was the article which allowed the Cape Verdeans continue to
play a role in the slave trade on the Upper Guinea Coast until the end of the
eighteenth century, because they could either purchase slaves directly on the
mainland with theiz; cloths, or obtain them from other Europeans by paying in
"country cloth". Prom the viewpoint of the Portuguese crown, this selling oj
<
cloth to the ships of other European nations was prejudicial to the national 
interest, because it facilitated the commerce of Portugal*s rivals. But when 
the Conselho Ultramarino tried to clamp down on the practice, the Cape Verde 
settlers raised strong protests, and in fact disregarded the prohibitive 
legislation, (l)
In reality, cloth was not only one of their most valuable exchan? 
commodities, but was the basis of their currency. The effort to maintain a 
truly monetary economy in the Cape Verde islands based largely on Spanish 
coin was beyond the Cape Verdeans, and instead they utilised the strips of 
cloth as a conventional medium, following the practice in vogue on the 
African mainland. It was, to be precise, the barafula which was used as the 
basis for most Cape Verde accounts, as well as those of the lan^ados on the
(l) For the banning1 of the sale of Cape Verde cloths by the Lisbon
administration in 1688, see Sena Barcelos: Subsidios para a Historia
de Cabo Verde e Guine. Vol. I, Ch. VII, pp.86,87.
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mainland, (l)
Meanwhile, traders of other nationalities were exploiting the 
local trade in "country cloths". In September 1679> the London office of the 
Royal African Company was informed that £100 worth of Santiago (Cape Verde) 
cloths would be of the greatest value in Sierra Leone, especially the barafula 
and another type known as golozans. (2) Two years later, the chief factor at 
Sherbro gratefully acknowledged receipt of 1,413 cloths from the Gambia. (3)
Of course, the interlopers too were aware ofthe profitable interchange of 
"country cloths" for commodities which they wished to carry to Europe or the 
Americas* Because the Sierra Leone factories of the Royal African Company 
were ill-equipped with boats in 1682, the interlopers had the market at Cape 
Mesurado to themselves, buying cloth and shirts, which they transferred to the 
Sherbro to barter for ivory. (4) To meet competition of this sort, the Royal 
African Company ceased to rely exclusively on their factories in the Gambia 
and Bence island for supplies of "country cloth" for the Sherbro and the Gold
(1) Sena Barcelos and Jo&o Barreto take 200 reis to be the value of the bar -fu 
but this value fluctuated. For instance, in 1673» it was said that becais 
of the competition from other Europeans and the decline of Portuguese trad 
even Cape Verde cloths had fallen off in price, and the barafula was then 
worth 200 reis instead of a previous figure of 300 reis. See A.H.U., 
Guine, caixa I - No. 133> Antonio Bezerra, Aug 1673*
(2) P.R.O., T70/l - Edmund Pierce, 4 Aug 1679 > fl#34
(3) B«R.Q.t T70/16 - Joshua Platt, 7 Aug 1681, fl.10
(4) P.R.O.t T70/16 - Joshua Platt, 6 Feb 1682, fl.27.
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Coast. Instead, they sought to have imitations manufactured in England. The 
Committee of Goods had two specimens made up in 1702, and they chose the more 
convincing copy to be produced in greater quantities, (l)
Imitation and substitution was a process which the English 
manufacturers followed with great skill and success, and this was nowhere 
more marked than in the case of textiles. In the sixteenth and early seven­
teenth century, Indian and Dutch cloths were frequently mentioned as being the 
most useful of the imported types, and the Portuguese were in the fortunate 
position in the sixteenth century of being able to supply Indian cottons. (2) 
Indeed, the Conselho Ultramarino remained conscious of the possibility of the 
profitable interchange of goods from one sector of the Portuguese empire to 
another, and with the Spanish Indies. The global strategy for re-opening the 
slave trade from the Upper Guinea Coast to the Spanish Indies in 1647 involved 
the sale of slaves to the New World for gold and silver, and the use of the 
latterin India to procure floths, especially black cloths which were in 
demand in Angola and the Upper Guinea Coast. (3) The English went a step 
further, and produced the Indian cottons and Dutch linens. (4) Two of the 
most frequently encountered cloths on the Upper Guinea Coast and on the West
(1) P.R.O., T70/5I - to Charles Barker, 21 July 1702, f1.242; 
and T70/130 - Memoranda of the Committee of Goods.
(2) Alvares de. Almada: "Rios de Guine", pp.276,374 (Mentioned both black and 
white cloth from India.)
(3) See above, Ch. V, p.
(4) E.G. Daviess The Royal African Company, p.175
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African coast were nicoanees and annabasses. The former was originally 
Indian and the latter Du\;ch, but they were produced more cheaply in England.
There was obviously a constantly expanding market for cloth on 
the Upper Guinea Coast during the era of pre-colonial trade. Nothing’ else 
could account for the absorbtion not only of local supplies and of the Cape 
Verde manufactures, but also the amountsof cloth imported from outside. 
Recalling that at the moment when the Portuguese made their appearance on the 
Upper Guinea Coast, the littoral peoples were adopting cotton clothing under t 
influence of the Senegambia and the Vies tern Sudan, (l) one realises that there 
was ample scope for such expansion. (2) In addition to cotton, the Europeans 
supplied silks, linens, woollens, baizes and serges, the last two being 
particularly popular because they were both cheap and durable. By mid­
eighteenth century, when Nicholas Owen reflected on what changes had occurred 
among the Africans on the coast of Sierra Leone owing to contact with the
Europeans, he thought the most significant was the alteration in their
appearance brought about by European clothes and swords. (3)
Cloth, metals and metal utensils accounted for most of the trade 
aarried on by the Portuguese in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. One of 
the earliest reports on Portuguese commerce in Sierra Leone, that of the Frenc' 
Interloper1, Eustache de la Fosse in 1479> mentioned tin basins as one of the
(1) See above, Ch. IJ p./x/ and Ch. II, p.
(2) Cloths were not only used for clothing but were also stored up as burial 
wealth.
(3) Nicholas Owen: Journal of a Slave Dealer, p.70.
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main articles of the commerce, (l) A large wide basin known as a barber's bas: 
was invariably enumerated among the imports of the Upper Guinea Coast in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; (2) and to these must be added a wide 
collection of pots, plates, pans, kettles and cauldrons, made of brass, copper, 
tin and pewter. The agents of the Royal African Company in Sierra Leone found 
it necessary to remind the officials in London that such utensils were 
indispensable for the trade of their factories. (3) In 1703» "the Committee of 
Goods in London ordered 380 pewter basins of assorted sizes for the Sherbro 
factory, while 440 were requisitioned for Bence island. (4) "Dutch knives" 
were also in great demand in Sierra Leone, and the large wooden-hafted 
Birmingham knives which were despatched instead did not seem to satisfy the 
residents of the area* When pressed to supply "Dutch knives" to Sierra Leone 
in 1721, the Committee of Goods at first declared that it was inconvenient to 
place a small order in Holland to supply Sierra Leone but they later conceded, 
and obtained the knives required. (5)
Most of the above articles were for use in the household, but 
the salt-making industry on the Upper Guinea Coast occasioned the import of a
(a) "Voyage a la Cote Occidentale d'Afrique", Revue Hjgpanique II, pp.175-201
(2) Pacheco Pereira: Eameraldo de Situ Orbis. pp.76,845 
Alvares de Almadas "Rios de Guine", p.318
(3) See, e.g., P.330., T70/10 - Zachary Rogers, 5 Aug 1678, fl*4
(4) P.R.O., T70/130 - Memoranda of tine Committee of Goods
(5) P.R.O.♦ T70/60 - To Plunkett,.31 Oct 1721, fl.18; and
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wide brass pan called a *neptune*j in which the salt was evaporated to dryness 
(l) This wa3 a rare instance of a European import that could he put to 
productive use by the Africans, and indirectly the import of iron also fell 
into this category, since it was utilised by the Africans not only for the 
forging of weapons, but also for agricultural implements. (2)
Before the arrival of the Portuguese caravels and for some time 
after, the littoral peoples of the Senegambia and the Upper Guinea Coast 
obtained their supplies of iron from the Puta Djalon and the hinterland of the 
Senegambia. (3) Probably the first step taken by the Portuguese with regard 
to this important mineral was to enter the local trade. The 1 anyados 
purchased iron in the Senegambia and resold it in the coastal regions to the 
south. This conformed to a standard pattern by which the 1 any ados and later 
their Afro-Portuguese descendants transferred African goods from one locality 
to another, enhancing their profit at each stage, and ultimately securing 
slaves and other forest products for export to Europe and the Americas. (4)
In this instance, the Portuguese 1 any ados took slaves from the Upper Guinea 
Coast and exchanged them for iron among the Wolofs. The latter handed on 
most of their slaves to the Moors, while the Portuguese took the iron and
(1) See above, Ch. I, p. 44.
(2) Andre de Fa^o: Peregrinacao. p*86, and P.R.O.. T70/1465 - Diary of 
Walter Charles.
(3) Valentim Fernandes: La C6te iSccidentale d'Afrique. pp.4®>76> Pacheco 
Pereira: Esmeraldo de Situ Orbis. p.84; and Alvares de Almada: "Rios 
de Guine", p.354•
(4) See below, Ch. VIII.
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disposed of it for further captives on the Upper Guinea Coast, making a surplus 
which was designed far the Spanish Americas, (l)
However, some imports of iron must have reached the Upper Guinea 
Coast from Europe at an early date, evq&igg a prohibitive edict from the 
Portuguese crown. (2) Yet, when associated with the Spanish, who had supplies 
of iron ore, the Portuguese administration partially negatived this law by 
conceding,to the lessee of the Cape Verde-Guinea contract the right to ship 
iron to the Upper Guinea Coast, provided he paid an additional sum equivalent 
to 1/4 of the contract. (3) Bids entered for the Cape Verde-Guinea 'trades1 
up to I64O all showed that the privilege of transporting iron to the Upper 
Guinea Coast was sold separately from the overall lease, though to the same 
merchant. (4)
Portugal's inability to supply iron to the Upper Guinea Coast was 
demonstrated by the sharp change which came about after the 'Restoration' of 
I64O. By August 1642, the Conselho Ultramarino was advising the new 
Portuguese monarch to place a complete ban on the exports of iron to Guinea
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.301
(2) A. Brasio: Monument a Missionaria Africana. 2nd series, Vol. II - No. 26,
Manueline legislation on trade, 24 March 1514> PP>72,73
(3) A. Brasio: Monumenta Missionaria Africana, 2nd series, Vol. Ill - No. 42
Relayao of Francisco de Andrade. 26 Jan 1582, p.105
(4) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa I - No. 57> bids for the contract considered by 
the Conselho, 23 Jan 1616, and copy of contract awarded to Gaspar da Costa, 
Jan I638.
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because Portugal lts&lf was badly in need of this metal for its own defence. 
(1) Of course, the trade of the Upper Guinea Coast was never the complete 
monopoly of the Portuguese and the Spanish, and during the latter portion of 
the sixteenth century, the English and Dutch had been welcomed by the 
resident traders when they arrived with cargoes of iron. This was pointed
out by an English ship’s captain callingat the Gambia in 1591) and two or
three decades later, the amount of iron brought by these 'strangers1 had 
increased a great deal - so much so that the governor of Cape Verde expressed 
fear that the market would be saturated to the detriment of slave exports.
His reasoning was that iron was the article which the Africans of the Upper 
Guinea Coast most desired, and that if this demand was satisfied by the 
Spaniards and the Portuguese lanyados, the numbers of slaves supplied would 
then fall. (2) Subsequent events showed that the demand for iron on the Upper 
Guinea Coast and in the Cacheu-Gambia area in particular, never slackened and 
may well have increased as the seventeenth century progressed.
Time and time again, the Conselho was informed of the fact that
the English, Dutch and French were bringing iron as one of the key goods for 
successful trade on the Upper Guinea Coast, and this information was usually 
complemented by pleas for more iron to be brought by the Portuguese merchai^.
(1) A.H.U., Cohsultas of the Conselho, Cod.30 - Minute of 14 Aug l642,fls.219~ 
223.
(2) A.H.U. Cabo Verde, caixa I - No.54) Memorandum on the trade of CaP© Verde, 
Dec 1615.
(5) See, e.g., A.H.U.. Guine, caixa I - No. 51) Joao D 1Almeida, 5 EeB 1647) 
p.229) and Manuel Cordeira S^tos, 1694-
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Similarly, the agents of the Royal African Company in the Gambia found it 
necessary to remind the officials in London that to trade in the Cacheu area, 
they had to pay half the purchase price in iron, (l)
Of the thirty-five ships despatched by the Royal African Company 
to West Africa during the year 1685, all but six carried cargoes of iron, 
much of which was destined for the "North Parts". (2) 90 tons of iron were 
sent to the Gambia factory the following year, (3) a quantity which still 
fell short of the 122 tons (10,000 bars) which agent Castle had estimated in 
1683 as the annual capacity of the Cacheu market. (4) In December 1687) the 
London officials seemed to have made a special effort to increase the tonnage 
of iron sent to the Gambia, for they decided that the ships which usually 
carried supplies to this factory were too small, and that iron should be 
discharged at the Gambia by a ship bound for the Gold Coast. (5) A few years 
later, they also sent an extra tdn tons to the Sherbro factory to enable it to 
handle the trade in malaguetta pepper on the adjacent coasts beyond Cape 
Mount. (6)
The quantity of iron brought by the Europeans to the Upper Guinea 
Coast must have levelled off by the early eighteenth century. As the activity
(1
(2
(3
(4
(5
(6
P.R.O.. T70/16 - James Castle, 20 Feb 1683, fl.46 
K.G. Davies, The Roval African Company, p.171 
P.R.O.. T70/5O - To Alexander Cleeve, 4 June 1686, fl.10 
P.R.O.. T70/16 - James Castle, 20 Feb 1683, fl.46 
P.R.O.. - To Alexander Cleeve, 20 Dec 1687, fl*54 
P.R.O., T70/50 - To Henry Gibson, 9 Feb 1691, fl.133
AFRO-EUROPEAN COMMERCE
required to supply the European ships was pushed further and further inland, ■ 
(l) the demand for iron lessened. On the middle Gamhia, there had never been 
any overwhelming1 desire for European iron, because the residents there could 
obtain the mineral in the vicinity. (2 ) When Mungo Park proceeded up this 
river, he found that at a certain point the movement of iron was still towards 
the estuary, indicating quite clearly that European imports of this metal had 
captured only the coastal market. (3) On the upper reaches of the river, the 
inhabitants were so interested in the European article only in so far as it ws 
brought in the form of useful items, for in the Futa Djalon, the mining, 
smelting and forging of iron continued to the end of the eighteenth century;
(4) and this local iron was said to have been preferred by the people of Sieri 
Leone for its malleability, and considered second to the European product 
(which was usually Swedish) only for the making of edge tools. (5)
Engugh iron was brought from Europe to this region during the 
centuries under discussion to warrant this mineral along with other metallic 
products being placed first in order of value among th imports of the Upper 
Guinea Coast; followed by cloth, and then by alchohol and weapons. In the 
final analysis, however, what mattered was not one article as opposed to 
another, but the combination in which the several categories were presented tc 
the African merchants.
(1) See below, Ch. IX fO-Z'Co
(2) Richard Jobsons The Golden Trade, p.l65
(3) Mungo Park: Travels...in the Years 1795.1796 and 1797. p.26
(4) C.B. Wadstrom: An Essay on Colonisation, Part I, p.41
(5) John Matthews: A Voyage to the River Sierra Leone, p.52
PURCHASE OF A SLAVE IN THE GEBA SERTAO
Trade Goods
Prices in Portuguese reis
In Lisbon In Bissau In Geba
1 . Ordinary gun 1 :200 4:000 8:000
2 Ordinary swords 1 :000 3:000 8:000
2 Iron bare 2:400 4:000 S : 00Q-,
1 Case of aguardente con­
taining 12 fiveinint flasks 3:600 12:000 24:000
1 Barrel of gunpowder with 
2 arrobas or 64 lbs. 5:760 15:000
s
30:000
2 Boxes of beads 400 2:000 4:000
100 Flints 300 1 :000 1 :500
100 Balls (lead shot) 300 1:000 • 1:500
2 Agulha Caoe Verde cloths 3:000 4:000 8:000
. 1 Ordinary hat 200 2:000 4:000
1 1 Carafe of aguardente 220 500 • 1:000
1
To tal 18:380 ' 48:500 96:000 (sic)
PURCHASE OF A QUINTAL OF WAX IN GEBA
Trade Goods Prices in Portuguese reis
In Lisbon In Bissau In Geba
3 Five-pint flasks of 
aguardente 1 :500 3:000 6:000
14 Ordinary Dutch knives 560 1:400 • 2:800
1 Exercise book 20 500 1:000
5 Flints 25 500 1 :000
1 Box of beads 200 • 2:000 4:000
6 Soans of bar iron (4.5 ') 360 1 : 200 2: 400
2000 Large beads 20 200 400 ‘
'■ Small bells (1/2 box) 150 1 :000 2:000
1 Box of imitation coral 200 1 :000 • 4:000
1 Glass (1 oint) 100 1:000 2:000
1 Ordinary hat 300 1:000 2:000
1 Linen handkerchief 150 1:000 2:000
Total 3 : 535(slc) 1 4:800 29!600
i I,
PURCHASE IN GEBA OF AN IVORY TUSK WEIGHING MORE THAN A QUINTAL
Trade Goods Prices in Portuguese reis
In Lisbon In Bissau In Geba
* 1 Ordinary gun 1 :200 4:000 8:000
? Flasks of aguardente 1:200 . 3:000 6:000
1 Agulha Cape Verde cloth 1:500 3:000 4:000
1 Flask of gunpowder 500 2:000 4:000
6 Knives 240 600 1 :200
Total 4:640 12:600 23:200
The above tables are taken from Bernardino de Andrade: Planta da 
Praga de Bissau (Ed. Damiao Peres) pp.65-67* Towards the end of the 
18th century, when they were drawn up, 48;Q00 reis were equivalent 
to 27 shillings. ./ ,
PURCHASE OP A SLAVE IN THE GEBA SERTAO
Trade Goods
Prices in Portuguese reis
In Lisbon In Bissau In Geba
1 . Ordinary gun 1 :200 4:000 8:000
2 Ordinary swords 1 :000 3:000 8:000
2 Iron bars 2:400 4:000 8:000-,
1 Case of aguardente con­
taining 12 five-pint flasks 12:000 24:000
1 Barrel of gunpowder with 
2 arrobas or 64 lbs. 5:760 15:000
% ,
30:000
2 Boxes of beads 400 2:000 4:000
100 Flints 300 1:000
00LT\
100 Balls (lead shot) 300 1 :000 1: 500
2 Agulha Cape Verde cloths 3:000 4:000 8:000
!\ 1 Ordinary hat 200 2:000 4:000
\ 1 Carafe of aguardente 220 500 1 :000
I
Total 18:380 48:500 96:000 (sic)
PURCHASE OF A QUINTAL OF WAX IN GEBA
Trade Goods Brices in Portuguese Peis
In Lisbon In Bissau In Geba
3 Five-pint flasks of 
aguardente 1:500 3:000 6:000
14 Ordinary Dutch knives 560 1 :400 2:800
1 Exercise book 20 500 1:000
5 Flints 25 500 1:000
1 Box of beads 200 • 2:000 4:000
6 Spans of bar iron (4.3') 3 60 1 :200 2:400
2000 Large beads 20 200 400
Small bells (1/2 box) 150 1:000 2:000
1 Box of imitation coral 200 1:000 4:000
1 Glass (1 pint) 100 1:000 2:000
1 Ordinary hat 300 1:000 2:000
1 Linen handkerchief 1 50 1:000 2:000
Total 3;535(sic) 1 .4 :8 p 0 (sie) 29 i600
PURCHASE IN GEBA OF AN IVORY TUSK WEIGHING MORE THAN A QUINTAL
Trade Goods Prices in Portuguese reis
In Lisbon In Bissau In Geba
* 1 Ordinary gun 1 :200 4:000 8:000
3 Flasks of aguardente 1:200 . 3:000 6:000
1 Agulha Cape Verde cloth 1:500 3:000 4:000
1 Flask of gunpowder 500 2:000 4:000
6 Knives 240 600 1 :200
Total 4:640 12:600 23:200
J ♦
The above tables are taken from Bernardino de Andrade: Planta da 
Praca de Bissau (Ed. Damiao Peres) pp.65-67* Towards the end of the 
18th century, when they were drawn up, 48;Q00 reis were equivalent 
to 27 shillings. J
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For every slave, every quintal of wax, every ton of camwood, the 
Africans expected a variety of goods which could range from pins to firearms, 
and which were often demanded in a fixed combination. The accompanying 
tablesrepresent the assortments which ould be tendered to Africans in the Geba- 
Corubal area in the latter part of the eighteenth century. They were drawn 
up by Bernardino de Andrade, who had many years of experience in the region, 
Considering for the moment the left hand columns only, it is clear that all 
five categories of goods were involved? namely, trinkets, weapons, alchohol, 
cloth and metal. In a sense, each category counted equally, because its 
absence from the stock of the trader wishing to make the purchase would make 
him 1 ill-assorted*, and incapable of concluding a deal, if there were 
competitors who had all of th goods demanded. This explains why no concept 
so pre-occupied the European traders on the coast as that of the ,lproper:. 
as3ortmentH of trade goods.
The price of each European article in the assortment was 
calculated in a straightforward manner. The basic factor was its cost in 
Europe, and the Committee of Goods of the Royal African Company, for instance, 
which had buyers in England and several European countries, purchased its 
goods for the West African trade at the lowest possible prices, (l) It is 
to be notiod that Be Andrade cited each product as having one price in Lisbon, 
a second and higher price in Bissau where the goods were unloaded, and in the 
Geba hinterland a third price which was higher still. With an average 100^ 
mark-up at each stage, this obviously represented not only the costs of
(l) P.R.O.« T70/128 - Memoranda of the Committee of Goods, and T70/130, 
1703-1719.
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distribution and services, but included a built-in profit margin. Equally 
obviously the price of African goods to tbs European buyer was wrapped up in 
each bundle of trade goods, though the computation of the cost of slaves and 
other African produce was more devious than it appears at first glance.
ResidentEuropean traders approached the business of buying and
selling on the Upper Guinea Coast by ascertaining the model assortments. Each
item in those assortments was given a valuation in European currency, and one
arrived at the price of the African article. At Geba in the latter eighteenth
century, according to De Andrade*s arithmetic, one slave cost 18?380 reis, or
48:500 reis or 96?000 reis, depending on whether one used the price list of
Lisbon, Bissau or the sertao respectively. 4s800 reis was then equivalent to
27 shillings, (l) so that the slave was supposedly obtained for an assortment
of trade goods bought in Portugal for £5.6s. or thereabouts. That assortment
was valusd at £13.10s on the island of Bissau, and it doubled in value when
carried into the bush. The prices of the assortments advanced for the
purchase of 1 quintal of wax and one quintal of prime ivory also underwent
similar mutations. However, the results obtained from these culculations were 
sometimes
^meant to be taken as the ceiling prices, but they were certainly not averages. 
Such an understanding would considerably deflate the price of slaves and other 
products on the African coast.
There was a certain elasticity in every prescribed assortment, 
allowing both the African seller and the European buyer to suggest that one or 
the other of the items on the list should be replaced by another - a process
(1) C.B. Wadstrom: An Essay on Colonisation. Part I, p.141
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known as •rooming'1 • It was the job of the European trader as he saw it to 
practice such •rooming1 as would reduce his payments; that is to say, by 
replacing' the more expensive items by the cheaper. Often this was not difficu.' 
because the .Africans themselves were neither knowledgeable about the price of 
each European product nor concerned about that factor. At any given time, the
African seller may simply have preferred two more carafes of aguardente
\
instead of two swords, as indicated in De Andradefs table of the cost of a 
slave. Our informant makes this explicits "very often a slave turns out to 
be much cheaper, because those who sell them ask for certain goods, which are 
less expensive, and the purchasd is made at virtually half of the exemplar 
cited", (l)
to
Of course, the European trader was also alive/the possibility 
of prevailing upon the African to accept a substitution, even if this was not 
the original intention of the African seller. Around Cape Mount at the end of 
the eighteenth century, the European traders were always anxious to replace 
guns and fneptunes* with cheaper articles. If ivory was bought in quantities 
requiring the payment of ten guns among the assorted goods, then the European 
buyer might persuade the African seller to accept six guns, and •room* the 
other four. Gunpowder, however, was one item that could not be •roomed1. 
Understandably enough, there was no substitute far gunpowder, and the trade 
in this product grew so great that keg-making became a subsidiary industry 
in Sierra Leone, supervised apparently by the white and mulatto residents.
(i) Bernardino de Andrade: Planta da Praca de Bissau. P*65
4>r
AFRO-SDBOP.KAH COMM?rh?C!'Fi
The kegs they produced were considered as good as those from England, and they 
were cheaper. (i)
Newton's Journal gave a typical picture of the intricacies of the 
trade system based on the assortment. In 1750, he was assembling his slave 
cargo by making' several purchases at various points on the coast of Sierra 
Leone; and among his competitors following the same procedurewas one Captain 
Ellis, who had come down from the Gold Coast with an excellent assortment. 
Newton wrote on the 29th October, "But believe shall be forced to go from 
Captain Ellis wherever we meet, his large gold-coast cargoe enabling him to 
bear away all the trade here from a vessel that has only a common assortment". 
An entry for the 14th December showed that Newtonvas bargaining astutely, 
forcing the local traders to take "a more equal assortment than they have 
hitherto done". Ngwton was still on the coast the following May; by which 
time his trade goods were depleted and ill-balanced. The net price at which 
he procured his slaves increased, "because I have many things on board 
which will not sell any where and in generall poorly assorted". In particular 
he was short of both beads and kettles so that when he obtained six slaves 
on the 4th May, he gave only seven kettles and 21 lb of beads, which were not 
only below the usual amount offered, but such a low proportion was dis­
advantageous to Newton himself, since these were relatively cheaper items.(2) 
Because of the process of adjusting the assortment, the price 
of any African good was a variable which could fluctuate between wide limits.
(1) B.M., Add.Ms.12131, Papers relating to Sierra Leone, 1794-96
(2) John Newtons Journal of a Slave Trader, pp.13,24,50*
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Canot evaluated a group of forty slaves purchased from the Fulas in the 
"Rivers of the South" in the early nineteenth century at 1,600 dollars, 
that is at 40 dollars each. let when large amounts of tobacco (an important 
nineteenth century import) were put into the assortment, the price was as 
low as 18 dollars, while the cost of a slave calculated in gunpowder was 
only 20 dollars (l) - half of the original quotation, as De Andrade had 
suggested. Furthermore, the prices cited by the Europeans were invariably 
related to prime products, and in the case of slaves this made a very great 
difference indeed.
Slaves were appraised after the manner of livestock. Age and 
height were the elementary considerations, the two being in any case physio­
logically related. The dividing line between a man and a boy was round 
about 4*« When Newton arrived in Sierra Leone on his second slaving voyage 
in 1752, his instructionswere to secure a cargo of slaves who were all above 
the height of 4f2u. (2) In giying evidence later to the Lords* Committee on 
the Slave Trade, the vital statistics of Sierra Leone slaves, with which he 
supplied them, were height 4*6" and age 16-30 years. (3) let Newton himself 
had several entries in his diary where both age and height were considerably 
les3 than this norm.
Both the records of the Royal African Company and the Report of 
the Lores* Committee yield further evidence on this point. The Englisji
(1) Captain Canot: Adventures of an African Slaver, p.90
(2) John Newton: Journal of a Slave Trader, p.72
(3) Report of he Lords of the Committee. 1789 - Part I, ’Slaves1
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trading Company usually suggested a range of about 25 to 35 or 40 years, (l) 
Similarly, John Matthews indicated that no old people or children below the 
height of 3*9" were purchased if it could be avoided, and that the bulk of the 
cargo ranged between 15-40 years of age. But James Penny, who served in a 
Sierra Leone slave factory in 1768 gave a lower estimate of 9-50 years; (2) and 
it is clear that while the slavers would have preferred older youths and young 
adults, they veiy often fell back upon children, especially since old people 
were definitely taboo. Besides, there are occasional references to traders 
who arrived specifically to obtain a very young- cargo. (3) As far as the 
intrinsic importance of age selection is concerned, it appears that a much 
larger number of children and very young persons were taken into the holds of 
the slave ships, and this had a definite bearing on prices.
The Royal African Company was prepared to pay £6 for its adult 
slaves m d  £4 for children between 8 and 16 years, according to a memorandum 
of 1700. (4) Matthews informed the Lords* Committee that the price paid for
children of 3*9” was about half that for the adults. (5) Then sex was added 
as a rider to age and height. Canot explained that "if the woman offered in
(1) P»R.Q*« T70/5I - To Thomas Corker, 3'Oct 1699, fl.50, and to Pinder, 7 
March 1700, f1.110.
(2) Report of the Lords of the Committee. 1789. - Part I, ’Slaves*
(3) P.R.O.. T70/1465 - Diary of Walter Charles, 1728, and Captain Canot: 
Adventures of an African Slaver, p.
(4) P»R»0»« T70/51 - To Pinder, 7 March 1700
(5) Report of the Lords of the Committee. 1789 - Part I, ’Slaves*.
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the market exceeded 25 years of age, we made a deduction of 20fo, b^jft if 
they were stanchly built, and gave promising tokens for the future, we took 
them up at the price of an able-bodied man", (l) Much earlier, reports from 
Barbados suggested that women from 13 to 22'fetched £8 or £10 more per head 
than those in the age group 26-32, so that obviously the slave traders made 
an attempt to procure only girls and young women." (2) The proportion of 
females taken by slavers visiting Sierra Leone seemed to have been fairly 
constant at l/3rd of the cargoes. (3)
Having made allowances for the main physical characteristics 
of the slaves, deductions to the price were forthcoming if any blemishes 
were discovered. Some were obvious - like 'fallen-breasted* women, from 
whom the traders shied away if possible. But for smaller defects, the 
detailed examination of skin and orifices Was necessary. As one slave 
trader put its "they are sold in open market on shore, and examined by us 
in like manner as our Brother Trade do beasts in Smithfield". (4) And then 
they set their final price. "If the slave does not measure 3f> or if it has 
any defect, however slight it may be, (and whether hereditary or acquired)
(1) Captain Canot: Adventures of an African Slaver, p.91
(2) P.R.O., T70/5I - To John Brown (Gold Coast) 29, July 1703, f1*360.
(3) This was the proportion the Royal African Company expected. See P.R.O., 
T70/51 - To Thomas Corker, 3 Oct 1699, fl*50. According to Matthews 
and Norris, this was the proportion realised in the ei^teenth century.
See Report of the Lords of the Committee. 1789 - Part I, 'Slaves*
(4) John Atkins: A Voyage to Guinea, p. 178
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we do not pay more than 20:000 reis as the price in the sertao." (l) This 
20:000 reis represented the down-scaling of the original 96:000 reis; that 
is to say, from about £27 for a prime adult male slave in the bush when 
the most expensive goods were placed in the notional assortment to less 
than £5 for the actual purchase of a child or slave with defects. It
also represented the down-scaling of humanity - white and black.
(l) Bernardino de Andrade: Planta da Prapa de Bissau, p.66.
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PART II - "THE CLASH OF CULTURES"
Uh bargaining over each individual purchase, the Africans and the 
Europeans were seeking some common ground between their two contrasting 
conceptions of the economic process. It has been recognised that the two 
economies did differ fundamentally, and that over the centuries of trade 
there was some approximation of the one to the other, K.G. Davies, for 
example, made the general observation that ,!when one civilisation trades 
with another, their values become roughly assimilated"j and he added that 
as far as the West African trade was concerned, the impression left by the 
records of the Royal African Company was that the pattern of trade was 
dominated by the needs and methods of the Africans, (l) This theme was 
subsequently taken up by Karl Polanyi, using the Gold Coast as his model.
He refers to the African trading system as one of "gainless barter", where 
the principle of the exchange of equivalents was fundamentaL; while the 
Europeans wished to conduct "market trading", aimed at making a monetary 
profit on price differentials. In Polanyi*s opinion also, it was the 
European syst&n which adjusted to the African. (2) Evidence taken from the 
Upper Guinea Coast helps to substantiate as well as to modify this inter­
pretation.
(1) K.G. Daviess The Royal African Company, p.255*
(2) K* Polanyi: "Sortings and * ounce trade* in the West African Slave Trade"
in The Journal of African History. Yol. Y, No. 3, 19^4> pp.381-393*
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When the Eulas exchanged their salt for rice from the people of Port Loko,
the operation went very smoothly, because they bartered equal amounts of the
one for the other, (l) 1 It has been discerned that the Djolas not only refrain
from the exploitation of exchanges for profit, but they regard this as ignoble.
contenlng that an honest man ought to live on the proceeds of his labour. What
the Djolas regard as just is the exchange of measure for measure - a basket of
if,  .
rice for a basket of groundnuts, a pot of wine for a pot of oil. (2) This was,
of course, typical pre-capitalist ethics, and it was the fundamental principle
of the barter economy, though one in exchange for one could become two in 
exchange for one, or any other simple fixed equivalent. L.Y. Thomas, who 
made the above observations on Djola economic behaviour, also noted that among 
the Dftolas of Eogny, a cloth was measured against a number of hens, and a 
number of cloths against a cow; and he suspected that this was a relatively 
recent innovation. (3) The use of cloth as a fixed measure represents the 
"incipient monetisation" that is usually found in a barter economy, allowing 
one convenient item to ^ serve as a common denominator in exchanges. Its 
introduction among the Djolas of Eogny is probably to be attributed to the 
great influence of the Mandingas in the region, for even when the Djolas of the
Casamance became involved in the trade generated by the Europeans by the end of
the eighteenth century, the Mandingas acted as intermediaries. (4)
(1) T. Winterbottom: An Account of the Native A-pricans of Sierra Leone.
(2) L.V. Thomas: Les Diola. Yol. 1, p.283
(3) Ibid: loc.cit.,
(4) Mungo Park: Travels ..in the Years 1795.1796 and 1797.
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The grasp of the commercial process which the Mandingas displayed on the 
Gambia, and which they utilised to make a profit from the Djolas was no doubt 
partly acquired in their centuries of trade with the Europeans, but to some 
extent it must have preceded the European advent. Certainly, the economic 
activity in the Western Sudan was not "gainless barter", and the Mande on the 
Upper Guinea Coast brought with them the commecial spirit of their homeland. 
The differences among tribes even on this relatively small section of the 
coast go towards indicating that one should tread extremely delicately when 
generalising about 1 African1 economic behaviour. Nevertheless, it is tolerab] 
accurate to circumscribe the littoral non-Mande peoples of this region within 
Polanyi's terminology, bearing in mind that the features displayed by the 
Djolas until modern times provide a useful indication of the nature of the 
economies of the other tribes of the Upper Guinea Coast in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries, since the Djolas retain much of what is 'traditional* and 
* indigenous *•
The extent that the commercial world of the Africans of the Upper 
Guinea Coast differed from that of the Europeans was mirrored primarily in the 
lack of sophisticated measurement among the former, since all that mattered was 
a simple unit which could serve as the standard of barter; and it is by no 
means surprising that the Africans should have utilised their own measures on 
first meeting the Europeans, and those measures carried with them a conception 
of the process of exchange. A striking example is provided by the trade in 
malaguetta peppers along the coast of what is now Liberia. The toponym 
•Cess', which makes its appearance in more than one place on that coast, is a
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distortion of the Portuguese word cesto, meaning a * pannier* or "large 
basket"; for that was the manner in which the malaguetta peppers were brought 
for sale, (l) They were not only c ontainers but also units valued equally 
irrespective of contents. As L.V. Thomas realised in the case of the Djolas* 
the insistence on the exchange of a basket of rice for a basket of groundnuts 
was really lop-sided if judged by the European understanding of price, (2) and 
this serves to emphasise the wide gulf between the two systems.
On the Upper Guinea Coast, the employment of the basket in the 
kola tr .de provided a counterpart to the malaguetta of Liberia. It was De 
Almada who first referred to the long baskets in which the Africans measured 
and sold the kola nuts as cokquas. (3 ) As described by Lemos Coelho, they 
were long narrow wicker containers, holding several thousand nuts, while 
there was a smaller basket called a molla. which was also in use and which 
had a capacity of about 500 kola nuts. (4 )
Both ivory and camwood were heavy products, which were usually 
mentioned only in quintals or hundredweights. In reality, they were not 
purchased by weight. Ivory was measured by placing a stick in the hollow of 
the tusk. The distance between the tip of the tusk and the furthermost point 
of the hollow was then spanned. In effect, therefore, each tusk was assessed 
on the lenth of solid ivory. Whether this was a prior African practice, or 
whether the lanpados made this arrangement with the Africans is not clear, but
(1) A. Texeira da Motas Toponimos de Origem Portuguesa na Costa Ocidental de 
Africa (Bissau 1950) PP*233-238
(2) L.V. Thomas: Les Diola. Vol. 1, p.283
(3) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.284
(4) Lemos Coelho: Duas Describes da Guine, p.62
the length of tusk so estimated appeared to have had a fairly constant relatioi 
ship to the weight, facilitating the eventual transfer to European measures. 
According to tiemos Coelho, the tusks selected varied in weight between 52 lb. 
and 192 lb* with the maximum weight corresponding to a length of 5 spans or 
45".
The measurement of camwood was even more rough and ready* A 
small rectangular stockade was erected and camwood logs deposited within it 
until it was filled* It was thenemptied, the wood handed over to the 
European buyer, and the stockade refilled. In this instance, the specifica­
tions were European, the space being intended to hold one quintal of camwood, 
(l) The camwood was cut into sections of four to five feet in length, (2) so 
that the number of logs would also have provided a rough guide to weight. 
Having measured the camwood and ivory, it was customary for the resident 
Portuguese traders to quote its price in ’’country cloths” or sometimes in salt 
since the Portuguese themselves carried salt inland from the coast. (5) For 
every 9" of solid tusk, for instance, the residents on the middle Gambia would 
accept two cloths or the equivalent in salt, which was about two bushels. (4) 
Undoubtedly, however, the most outstanding measure used on the 
Upper Guinea Coast was the iron bar* That this resulted from the African 
cultural bias towards the use of this metal has been recognised, but the iron
(1) Ibid: For ivory, see p.24 and camwood p.65.
(2) J. Labat: Voyages du Chevalier des Marchais en Guinee, p.106
(3) See above, Ch. I, p,^ (Jt tU  l^JL ^
(4) Lemos Coelho: Duas Descricoes da Guine, p.24
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bar itself has been wrongly considered as a European introduction, (l) When 
the Portuguese 1anyados entered the local trade in iron in tie Senegambia and 
the Upper Guinea Coast, they found that the Africans forged the metal in a very 
distinctive shape. It was a narrow bar about 9” long, two fingers thick at 
one end and three fingers at the other. (2) This was the original "country bar 
which must have been not simply raw material for weapons and implements, but a 
very convenient circulating- standard in exchanges^not only among the Mandingas 
and the Susus who manufactured it, but also among the Wolofs and those tribes o: 
the Upper Guinea Coast who were in closest contact with the Mande. It is
significant that even cloths were ultimately evaluated on the basis of the iron
\
bar. Panos sakes sold at one iron bar each, three bontans were exchanged for 
two bars, and barafulas for three bars. (5) It must have been the local 
practice which provided the Europeans with the idea of using the iron bar as a 
unit of currency in coastal profit-and-loss accounts.
Iron was shipped to the Upper Guinea Coast in narrow flattened 
bars, each ton comprising between 80 to 84 such pieces, so that each weighed 
between 26 and 28 lb. This at any rate was the practice of the Royal African 
Company, (4) and it appears to have been followed by all other traders on the 
coast. Thus, the Portuguese reckoned 58 bars to ten quintals or 1,000 lb.,
(1) K. Polanyi: Op.cit.,
(2) Alvares de Almadas "Rios de Guine", p.281
(5) John Ogilbys Africa, p.556
(4) F.R.O., T70/78 - Minutes of the Court of Assistants, 1678-81 and 
T70/150 - Memoranda of the Committee of Goods, 1705**1719*
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giving 26.5 lb. per "ship’s bar", (l) According to a Portuguese source, the 
length was 18 palmos or 13.5*> (2) though sarbot estimated it at 16 to 18*, (3) 
This was then cut up into several sections on the coast by African blacksmiths. 
Jobson specified that the length of each was 12" at the Gambia estuary, but 
that further upriver the African traders accepted 8". (4) At the end of the 
eighteenth century, Labarthe also gave two estimates of the length of the small 
bar - one of 8-9" and the other of 12". He claimed that it weighed 27-28 lb.
(5) but here he was obviously referring to the longer "ship’s bar". These 
discrepancies can be ironed out to yield a single figure for the weight of the 
small bar. In the case of the Portuguese, the "ship’s bar" would have produced 
18 sections, each 9" long; while the English and French would have had 18 sec­
tions, each 12" long; but the sections would in both cases weigh approximately 
1.5 lb. This was the nearest approximation to the article already familiar to 
the Africans of the Senegambia and the Upper Guinea Coast, the only difference 
being that the European product was mass-produced, and so had to be symmetrical 
as distinct from the iron rods forged individually by African blacksmiths.
Thus, when the small iron bar was described as a "country bar", this is to be 
taken in the same sense as "country cloth" or "country lavft namely, as some­
thing which originated in Africa.
(1) A.H.TJ. , Guine, mayo X - Table of the regular prices of goods in Bissau 1799
(2) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa VI - Antonio Salgado, 15 May 1698.
(3) John Barbot: Description of Uorth and South Guinea. 15 May 1698.
(4) Richard Jobson: The Golden Trade, p.l65
(5) P* Labarthe: Voyage au Senegal, p.236
4^~
AFRO-BUP.OPijAJT COi-jlWCE
All the points raised so far authenticate tie claim that Afro- 
European commerce in West Africa involved a considerable adaptation on the 
part of the Europeans; but there was more to it than that. In the first 
place, one must examine the tensions which preceded assimilation, and which 
in many instances remained unr. solved. In the second place, to assert that 
the process of adjustment was entirely one-sided is to overstate the case and 
distort the true situation.
Since the Afro-European connection represented a meeting of two 
societies at two completely different stages of production, this incorporated 
certain fundamental tensions into the partnership which was formed between 
the Europeans and the African rulers. The attitudes and expectations of the 
one were alien to those of the other. As contended earlier, the initial 
response of the African ’hosts* was in terms of hospitality; (l) but the
European trader in search of profit could not reciprocate in the same spirit.
At the end of the eighteenth century, Smeathman, an official of the Sierra 
Leone Company, wrote a stringent criticism of customary hospitality as he 
found it in that area. "The law of hospitality is obstructive of industry.
If there is provision in the country, a man who wants it has only to find out
who has got any, and he must have his share. If he enters any man’s house 
during his repast, and gives him the usual salutation, the man must invite 
him to partake. Thus, whatever abundance a man may feet by assiduity, will be 
shared by the lazy; and thus they seldom calculate for more than necessaries. 
But the laws of hospitality are not restrained to diet. A common man cannot
(i) See above, Ch. Ill, p«/£if-
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quietly enjoy a spare shirt or a pair of trousers. Those who are too lazy to 
plant or hunt are also too lazy to trade, and begging is not disgraceful, so ti 
if an industrious man gets a spare shirt or utensils he will be teased to deatl 
for it, and he must not refuse or he must talk the palaver."(l)
The above is a beautiful set-piece of the moral terminology of 
capitalist accumulation - the fassiduous* and the ’industrious* will inherit 
the earth, while those who do not share grace are the ones who were too lazy tc 
plant or tr.-:de. t^s value here is that it supports the hypothesis that from 
the outset certain tensions would have been inherent in the 1anyado-chief 
relationship. For one thing, the European traders took great exception to 
the constant demands for trifling items. Taken as a whole, they could 
represent a frittering away of profits; but even where they had minimal 
financial significance, the very haphazard nature of the requests frustrated 
the Europeans who had to make profit-and-loss accounts* and foresee their 
commitments. (2) Like Smeathman, most Europeans who visited or were familiar 
with the Upper Guinea Coast invariably felt constrained to mention that the 
Africans "seldom calculate for more than necessaries": namely, the material 
needs of the present and tbs immediate future. (3) This was clearly one of
(1) C.B. Wadstrom: An Essay on Colonisation, p.202 (Letters from Dr. Smeathman
to Dr. Knowles 1785)
(2) This is what frustrated Nicholas Ownn, especially since he had other
expenses. Lee, The Journal of a Slave Dealer. p.4&.
(3) See, E.g., John Atkins: A Voyage to Guinea, p.50; Nicholas Owen: Journal
of a Slave Dealer, pp.31,32 and T. Winterbottom: An Account of the Native 
Africans of Sierra Leone, p.45*
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the issues on which the two cultures were at odds* Linked with this was the 
fact that they had two differing conceptions of time. The European traders 
were most impatient of the palavers1 which could arise for an infinite variety 
of reasons, apart from the one given hy Smeathman. It must have been difficult 
indeed to reconcile the leisurely and exhaustive •palavers1 with the frenzied 
regard for the clock, which is the hall-mark of capitalist discipline, (l)
To say that the fundamental contradictions b etween the two 
cultures resolved themselves into European compliance with African ways and 
needs is to select only certain mechanical features of the trade. The African 
subsistence and barter economy was different from theEuropean capitalist 
economy not simply in its mechanics, but in ethos and concept. Calculated 
activity oriented towards the accumulation of profits on price differentials 
- this the Europeans on the West African coast quite obviously never relin- 
quished for "gainless barter" a la Africana. If at times they appeared to 
bend before the opposed African value system it was only so as to pick up 
their profits.
The very example of the iron bar can be pursued further to demon­
strate that, having selected this article because of its use value, and its 
conventional utility among the Africans of the Upper Guinea Coast, the 
European traders transformed it into a tool of their own commercial system.
As far as the records of the Royal African Company indicate, one ton of iron.
(l) Evidence of irritation with the leisurely pace at which the Africans
conducted commerce comes from John Newtons Journal of a Slave Trader, p.37 
and T. Wintcrbottom: An Account of the Native Africans' of Sierra Leone.
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fluctuated in price around £13 to £15. (l) When divided into 80 or more 
"ship's bars" each section thus cost between 3s and 3s 9d. This was then cu$ 
up into 18-20 "country bars", but at no time was the latter the basis for 
European profit-and-loss accounts, being too small in value. It was the 
"ship's bar" which was marked-up automatically on the coast*
Polanyi cited the example of Captain Thomas Phillips, who bought
his iron bars in London at 3s. 6d., and sold them on the Gold Coast at 7s.6d*
(2) According to De Andrade, the 27* bar of iron was worth 6s.3d. in Lisbon, 
and it was quoted at 11s.3d. in Bissau, and 22s.6d. in the bush. (3) Though 
the Royal African Company imported its iron from Sweden, its prices were rathei 
more conservative. Davies pointed to an example in the Gambia ledger of a 
consignment of 2,000 bars of iron rated in the invoices as £398*4s«, and 
rendered as 1,327 bars of account. (4) Each bar of iron was thus marked-up 
to about 6s., and considered a "bar of account". This was in effect the 
transition from iron bar as object to 'bar1 as an accounting unit. Because 
iron predominated in the ships' cargoes in the seventeenth century, itwas 
feasible to give the whole value of the cargo in nominal 'bars', derived from
the marked-up price of the iron bars. Consequently, the accounts of the
factories of the Royal African Company in Sierra Leone and the Gambia were
(1) P.R.O.. T70/78 - Minut s of the Court of Assistants, 1678-81, and T70/128, 
T70/l30 - Memoranda of the Committee of Goods.
(2) K. Polanyi: Op.cit.
(3) See Accompanying tables.
(4) K.G. Davies: The Ro.yal African Company, p.238
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kept in‘bars’, shillings and pence, (l)
The 'bar1 as a unit in profit-and-loss accounts was vaiable. It
was inherited by the Royal African Company from the Gambia Adventurers at
5s.6d., (2) but rose to 6s. shortly afterwards. (3) In 1714, an entry of ”22 
bars 5s.4d.” disclosed that the 'bar1 was greater than 5s.4&. (4) Eight years 
later, however, the 'bar1 was down to 5s. (5) Ihese fluctuations were partly
induced from the European side by the rise and fall of prices in Europe,
especially the price of iron; but another factor leading to inconstancy was the 
African evaluation of European products. One string1 of white beads may have 
been accepted by the Bijagos as the equivalent of a "country bar" of iron; (6)
but in reality those beads cost the Europeans less than the iron, and the same
kind of comparison could be made for all the objects of the assortment. In 
drawing up his accounts, Nicholas Owen stuck to the system of entering the 
value of the 'bar* for each separate manufacture. This baffled the editor of 
his Journal, who thought it inconsistent that the 'bar* counted in beads should 
be 3s.4d., while in relation to knives it was 4s.6d. (7) For Owen and other
(1) There was some discrepancy caused by the accounts being kept in both 
Sterling and 'bars'. The accountants in London had to insist on the uni­
form practice of using 'bars' only. See, e.g., P.R.0.1 T70/5O - To Joshua
Platt, 3 Oct 1688, fl.85
(2) P.R.O.. T70/36O - Bence Island Accounts
(3) P»R.O.. T70/108 - Inside front cover, dated around 1683.
(4) P.R.O.. T70/590 - York Island Accounts.
(5) P.R.O., T70/60 - To Archebald and Scott, 25 July 1722, fl.30
(6) P. Labarthej Voyage au Senegal, p.236
(7) Nicholas 0wnn: Journal of a Slave Dealer, p.4& and editor's note.
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European traders, what mattered was not the intelligibility of accounts to an 
outside party, but the knowledge that it was cheaper to pay 'bars1 of beads 
rather than 'bars1 of knives. This what lay behind a statement such as "the 
bars came excessive dear", which was Newton's comment when he was asked to 
make up his assortment with trade goods which were realtively highly priced*
(i)
For the sake of accuracy, it seems to have been necessary that ths 
bar of account, which was initially quoted in European currency on the basis oJ 
the cost of iron, should be modified to constitute a more realistic represen­
tation of the African market situation on the Upper Guinea Coast. The 
directors of the Royal African Company required of their resident agents in 
Sierra Leone that "they must put a value (the current price of the country) on 
every thing they either buy or sell". (2) At the same time, the London 
accountants of the Royal African Company and the agents on the Upper Guinea 
Coast engaged in debate over the fixing of the "bar rate". The former wrote h  
July 1722 that "as to the rate of bars, we desire they may be continued at 5s.. 
and for the Accounts being sent home regularly we must insist upon it, since 
otherwise we shall never be able to know in what posture our affairs are".(3) 
That they should never be able to know the posture of their affairs was the 
fervent hope of most of the employees in Africa, who tried their best to 
confuse the London accountants. In 1724? there was a directive to reduce the
(1) John Newton: Journal of a Slave Trader, p.13
(2) P.R.O.. T70/51 - Accountants memorandum, Aug 1702, fl.251
(3) P.R.O.« T70/60 - To Archebald and Scott, 25 July 1722, fl,30.
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value of the nominal bars from 5s* to 5s., but the Sierra Leone agents countart 
by arguing that this feat of conversion would require trained accountants* (l) 
The implication was that the higher the rate at which the ’bar* was fixed, the 
greater was the margin of profits which remained in the pockets of enterprising 
employees* Ultimately, the ’bar* was devalued, probably because of trade goods 
being manufactured much more cheaply in Europe. Vadstrom, who recognised the 
shifting nature of this fictitious currency, attributed to it a notional value 
of about 5s. in 1795> (2) while on the Gambia it was then currently valued at 
only 2s. (5)
As it finally emerged out of the invoices anl profit-and-loss
accounts of traders and trading companies on the Upper Guinea Coast, the ’bar1
was an accounting tool, devised to overcome the limitations of the barter
to
process. The need for such a device was a testimony both/the clash of 
cultures, as well as to the fact that European adjustment did not signify an 
acceptance of economic standards on tb Upper Guinea Coast.
Rather surprisingly, Polanyi seems tohave inferred that profits 
from the Afro-European trade awaited the coming of more sophisticated account­
ing devices. (4) In a complex industrial and commercial context, ’slick1 
accounting techniques can obscure taxable earnings, but they never create
(1) P.R.O,r T70/4 - Archebald, 20 April 1724
(2 ) C.B. Wadstromi An Essay on Colonisation* Part 2, p.56
(5) Mungo Parks Travels...in the Years 1795* 1796 and 1797* p.28
/ \ "(4) K. Polanyi: Sortings and ’ounce trade* in the West African Slave Trade",
in Journal of African History. Vol. V, Wo. 5
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profits, and on the West African coast the most primitive of accounting tech­
niques must not detract from the fact that profits were "being realised on a 
scale which those who were engaged in the trade found highly satisfactory, 
from Valentim Fernandes and Pacheco Pereira, through De Almada, Villault and 
Coelho to Nicholas Owen, there were frank avowals of the profitability of the 
trade on tte Upper Guinea Coast, with profits running at levels of 200^ and 
more. Nicholas Owen made the boldest statement in this respects "I have 
found no place in all these several countries of England, Ireland, America, 
Portugal, the Caribes, the Cape de Verd, the Azores and all the places I have 
been in, I say I have found no place where I can enlarge my fortune so soon as 
where I now live". (i)
As indicated in discussing the affairs of the Royal African 
Company in Sierra Leone in the seventeenth century, the commerce in products 
such as camwood and ivory was considered more remunerative than the slave 
trade under certain circumstances. (2) However, for the most part West Africa 
trade in this epoch was synonymous with the Atlantic slave trade; and by their 
choice of slaves above all other commodities, the European traders indicated 
quite clearly where the greatest profits lay. Newton, when questioned by the 
Parliament-ry Committee on the Atlantic slave trade, replied that "it was 
generally considered as a sort of lottery in which every adventurer hoped to 
gain a prize". (5) To this one must add that there were a remarkable number
(1) Nicholas Owen: Journal of a Slave Dealer, pp.9719®
(2) See above, Ch. VI^
(3) John Newton: Journal of a Slave Trader, p.81 (Note)
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of winning tickets. Besides, in estimating the profits made by the Europeans
from theslave trade on the Upper Guinea Coast it is essential to bear in mind
always that this area and the West African coast as a whole was not the sector
in which the most profits were accumulated. As K.G. Davies remarked, "even at
its height in the eighteenth century, the African trade derived its importance
not from its absolute volume but from its connection with the commerce of the
West Indies and America", (l)
In pursuit of the desired level of profits, the Europeans did not
regard themselves as bound by such humdrum considerations as honesty and fair
play, and the Africans reacted adversely to this attitude. De Almada admitted
that familiarity with the Portuguese bred contempt on the part of the Africans
(2) and subsequently other European observers confirmed this, with John Newton
examining the process at some length. The Africans, he explained, were viewed
as persons to be robbed with impunity. Eveiy art was employed to deceive them
achieved most
and the European trader who hxdxmsdx^ xxiiEasdsrxxf in this respect had most to 
boast of. No article was delivered without t ampering - the alchohol was 
adulterated with water, false heads were placed in the kegs that contained the 
gunpowder, and lengths were cut from the middle of the cloths where the 
missing portions were not readily noticed. "The natives are cheated, in the 
number, weight, measure, or quality of what they purchase, in every possible 
wayj and by habit and emulation, a marvellous dexterity i^ acquired in these
(1) K.G. Davies: The Royal African Company, p.38
(2) See above, Ch. Ill, p.n £
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practices. And thus the natives in their turn, in proportion to their commerce 
with the Europeans,... become jealous, insidious, and revengeful." To complete 
the vicious circle, the unpleasantness and dishonesty of the African rulers the 
goaded the European traders to commit further acts of chicanery, (l)
In no sphere, therefore, was the Afro-European commercial connec­
tion static, and the process of mutual adjustment on the Upper Guinea Coast cai 
be illustrated in numerous instances. Yet a knowledge of the minutiae of 
trade on the Upper Guinea Coast and in West Africa as a whole is not enough to 
lay bare the essence of the Afro-European relationship. Historically, the 
initiative and the momentum came from Europe. It was the European commercial 
system which had been expanded to embrace the African barter economy, and to 
assign to it certain specific roles in global production. This meant the 
accumulation of capital from trading in Africa, and above all from the 
purchase of slaves and their employment in the New World. It is essential to 
stress that all changes on the coast occurred without prejudice to this overal] 
conception. Indeed, as the following chapters will reveal, the most signifi­
cant social changes on the Upper Guinea Coast demonstrated how African society 
became geared to sertfe the capitalist system.
(l) John Newtons Journal of a Slave Trader. "Thoughts upon the African Slave 
Trade", pp.106,107.
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Page 399. note 2.
Valentim Fernandes: La Cote Occidentale d’Afriaue. pp.42,58*68. (The editors1 
translation into French in inconsistent. Femandes gave one list of exports 
from the Gambia in which he included finished cloth and another list of imports 
into the Gambia in which he included raw cotton. He described the commerce of 
tne Casamance in similar terms: "Os morad#res deste regno comumente todos som
ta^elaes e faze panos de muytas maneyras e de coores. E aqui vem os christaos e 
rasgatar seu algodom por panos." This is translated "Les habitants de ce pays 
sont communement tous tissevands et font des pagnes de tres nombreuses fa^ons 
et couleurs. Et la les Chretiens viennent echanger leur coton pour des tissus". 
That is to say, it was barter of cotton on the Portuguese side for finished 
cloths from the Africans. Later, Fernandes wrote of the Geba area, "Per aqui 
vem os navios das ilhas do Cabo Verde pera fazer ho regate do seu algodom pera 
panos assi como em Casa Mansa". This is rendered "Les bateaux des lies du Cap 
Vert viennent echanger ici du coton pour fail* des pagnes", which means that the 
Portuguese were buying cotton to make cloth.
The first rather than the second interpretation finds support from other 
sources, which indicate that cotton was exported from the Cape Verde islands tc 
Cacheu and Geba in the first half of the sixteenth century. The Cape Verde 
islands were probably manufacturing cloths of their own, but the object seemed 
to be to obtain as many as possible to send to Mina, where they were extremely 
valuable. See A. Brasio: Monument a Missionaria Africana. 2nd series, Vol. II - 
No. 89, Certificate from the Casa da Mina to Jorge Correia, the Comptroller of 
cottons of Fogo, 10 Sept 1535* p•275 5 and No. 143 > Voyage from Santiago to 
Guinea, 19 May 1558, p.446.)
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4CHAPTER VIII 
THE RISE OF THE MULATTO TRADERS
For a period of eighteen months over the years 1684 ^nd 1685, 
the Portuguese captain-major was held captive by a private trader, Senhora 
Bibiana Vaz - An Afro-Portuguese; in 1728, the aoyal African Company was sent 
packing by Senhor Lopez - another Afro-Portuguese; while by the end of the 
eighteenth century, the most powerful ruling families in Sierra Leone were the 
Caulkers, Clevelands and Rogers - all of mixed English and African blood.
These were not isolated individuals. They were the most salient representa­
tives of a powerful social formation, which was the product of the physical 
and commercial contact between Europe and the Upper Guinea Coast and which 
served the interests of European mercantilism. %
The extent, composition, attitudes and functions of the Afro- 
Portuguese community at the end of the eighteenth century are all succinctly 
summed up in an observation by a French captain, Lajaille, who visited the 
Upper Guinea Coast in 1784* "fifteen thousand Portuguese half .-castes, 
mulattoes, and blacks are spread throughout this immense country, preserving 
amidst poverty their national pride. They have made no attempt to seek the 
benefits of agriculture; their greatest occupation is to serve as the middle­
men of the commerce which the other European nations come to conduct in these 
countries where the Portuguese formerly held dominion", a) Attention had 
been drawn to these individuals more than one hundred and sixty years 
previously, when Jobson wrote about the Gambiai "They call themselves 
Portingales, and some few of them seeme the same; others of them are
(l) P, Labarthe: Voyage au Senegal, p.143
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Molatoes, between blacke and white, but the most part as blacke as the 
natural inhabitants: they are scattered some two or three dwellers in a place,
and are all married, or rather keepe with them the countrey blackewomen, of 
whom they beget children". Those children "become in a manner naturalised, 
and as they grow up, apply themselves to buy and sell one thing for another 
as the whole country doth, still reserving carefully the use of the Portingall 
tongue, and with a kind of affectionate zeal, the name of Christians", (l)
Recalling the hospitality extended to the lanpado on his arrival, 
and the arrangements which were made for him to co-habit with African women,
(2) it is to be expected that children of mixed blood would have been born in 
considerable numbers in the areas where the lancados were 'guests*. Those 
children were commonly known as filhos da terra or brancos da terra ("children 
of the soil" or "local Portuguese") as distinct from brancos da Portugal. (3)
By a slow process, these filhos da terra came to replace the metropolitan 
1anyados as the dominant element in the coastal community, which comprised 
them both, along with the African grumetes and helpers.
Here, incidentally, a point of contemporary controversy is 
involved. It is made out in certain quarters that the relationships between
(1) R. Jobsons The Golden Trade, p.39
(2) See above, Ch. Ill
(3) Fr. Francisco de Santiago: "Cronica da Provincia Franciscana de Nossa
Senhora da Solddade" (Ms.) Extracts in A.J. Dias "Crenyas e Costumes dos 
Indigenas da Ilha de Bissau no Seculo XVIII, Portugal em Africa, vol. 2,
Ho. 9, 1945, pp.159-169.
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Portuguese males and African females have always been exceptionally good - par- 
of a peculiar Iberian approach to tropical people. Gilberto Freyre, for 
instance, speaks in the highest terms of the Portuguese and Spanish, "who 
began to take tropical women as companions and even as wives: companions of
their adventures of settlement and procreation in those same areas", (l) This 
passes from innocuous self-indulgence to dangerous cant when it is used to 
justify colonial oppression, by suggesting that; this has always been one of 
the positive aspects of the Portuguese civilising mission* James Duffy briefl; 
and effectively dismisses this line of argument. "It is true that the African 
women, in the absence of Portuguese ones, offered an outlet for sexual impulse, 
Miscegenation in Portuguese Africa, however, though often admirably free 
from the sense of shame which sometimes accompanied it elsewhere in Africa, 
must still be considered as erotic expediency; it has become colonial policy 
only in retrospect." (2)
It is indeed apposite to remark that in so far as any policy 
operated in these matters it was policy laid down by the Africans# On the 
Gold Coast, for example, the attitude of the society to Europeans cohabiting 
with their women was hostile. The Portuguese reported that women around 
their fortress of Mina who became pregnant by white men often resorted to
(1) Gilberto Freyre: Portuguese Integration in the Tropics (Lisboa 1961)
p.22
(2) J. Duffy: Portugal in Africa, p.71
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abortion or infanticide# (l) On the Upper Guinea. Coast the welcome was 
complete, though relations between African women and the Portuguese 1 anyados 
were surrounded by stringent rules# Lemos Coelho stressed that the 
Portuguese could not flirt with the women, that being the worst crime that a 
white could commit and would always cost loss of goods and often loss of life. 
He further singled out the Corubal as an area where it was advisable to keep ai 
a very respectable distance from married women. (2) In effect, the Portuguese 
lanyados had to marry African women, as illustrated earlier, and the Afro- 
Portuguese certainly considered themselves as married after they had gone 
through African rites, a fact which threw the Catholic missionaries into 
consternation. The Spanish Capuchins wrote in a letter to the king of Portugs 
in 1686 that "they (the Afro-Portuguese) celebrate their concubinage as though 
it were true marriage", while in their opinion it was "illicit commerce 
between Christians and heathen women". (3) So much for the peculiar 
enlightenment of the Iberians.
Numerically, the mulattoes came to outstrip their white fathers 
not only by natu. al increase, but because during- the seventeenth century the 
flow of Portuguese to the mainland was not heavy. Voluntary immigrants seemed
(1) A. Brasio: Monumenta Missionaria Africana - Africa Occidental, vol. Ill, 
1570-99 - "Informayao da Mina"; quoted in C*R. Boxer: Rpce R0lations in the 
Portuguese Colonial Empire. 14-15-1825 (Oxford 1963)
(2) Lemos Coelho: Duas Descricoes da Guine. pp.92,201
(3) Mateo de Anguiano: Missiones Capuchinas en Africa, vol.II, pp. 277>278
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to have been few, and the whitd population could only be augmented by the 
sending out of degredados, convicted in the Portuguese courts. Barbot suggesti 
that by this process forty or fifty Portuguese were exiled every year to 
Cacheu, (l) but a his is not borne out by the Cahheu records, which indicate 
that the deportation was irregular, giving rise to complaints from several 
captains about the paucity of Portuguese-bom citizens in Cacheu and other 
official centres on the Upper Guinea Coast. (2) Thus, the districts which 
were well-known lanyado resorts in the sixteenth century were almost entirely 
taken over by their descendants by the middle of the following century, 
beafada women had a reputation for being the most beautiful on the Upper Guinea 
Coast; there were many whites resident there in Dornelas* time, (3) and even 
more filhos da terra living there in Coelho*s time, On the rivers leading 
into the Sierra Leone estuary, there were two very important lanyado towns, 
Port Loko and Tumba (Rotumba), which came under the dominance of the children 
of the Portuguese by midOseventeenth century, if not before. (4)
Prom a purely genetic viewpoint, it is obvious that, even if
there was a high degree of in-breeding among the mulatto population, they woul<
eventually have been swallowed up by the preponderant Africans, given the small
(1) J. Barbot: Description of North and South Guinea, p.83
(2) See e.g., A.H.U., Guine, mayo I - Antonio Bezerra (Jnr) 30 Jan 1719; 
mayo III - Francisco Sottomayor, 12 March 1732; and mayo I - Manuel Pinto 
de Gouveia, 15 April 1800
(3) Andrd" Domelas: "Relayao sobre a Serra Leoa"
(4) Lemos Coelho: Duas Descripoes da Guine, p.74
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numbers of Portuguese who continued to arrive. In 1685j for instance, Sieur 
de la Courbe found that at Cacheu there were fewwhites, while most of the 
mulattoes were very dark, (l) A little later, another French commentator wrote 
that "nearly all the Portuguese in Africa are of mixed blood, that is, imlattoes; 
but they are b o  black that it requires a good knowledge of colours to 
distinguish them from negroes. (2) A knowledge of the facts would also make it 
clear that many of the blacks who were considered ’Portuguese' had no 
Portuguese blood whatsoever, so that as Jobson and Lajaille indicated, colour 
was by no means the onlycriterion which helped to set the successors to the 
Portuguese 1anyados apart from the mass of Africans.
It is very significant that the Africans extended the category 
brancos da terra to include all Africans who were closely as., ociated with the 
Portuguese. (3) Thus, the grumetes were regarded as 'Portuguese' and ’white1, 
and rhis applied to other Africans who became 'Portuguese’ by adoption. When 
a Portuguese trader wished to take an African child with him on his travels 
around the coast and to the Cape Verde islands, he had to seek the permission 
of the father or paternal uncle. (4) By the mid-eighteenth century, if not 
before, it had become customary among the white and mulatto merchants to foster
(1) P. Cultru: Premier Voyage du Sieur de la Courfbe, p.230
(2) J. Labat: Nouvelle Relation, Vol. V., pp.66,67
(3) A.H* Bias: "Crenyas e Costumes dos Indigenas da Ilha de Bissau no Seculo
XVIII"
A.H.U., Guine, mapo III - Jose da Costa Ribeira, May 1731
(4) 11v ares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.326
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African babies. In such cases, after permission had been obtained^ the child 
was baptised or at least given a Saint's name, though it could only be taken 
avray from its mother after two to three years, this being the lengthy period 
during which it was suckled. (i) On passing into the home of its adopted 
parents, the child automatically became part of a 'Christian1, 'white', 
'Portuguese' trading- community.
While the .^fTo-'PoTt'agv.ese community right until the end of the 
eighteenth century comprised a few whites and many blacks, the mulattoes gave 
leadership and character to the social grouping. Some lanyados and their 
descendants completely adopted the customs of the Africans, down to the details 
of tribal tatoos; (2) but generally the racial admixture of the mulattoes 
was matched by cultural hybridisation and ambivalence. Language, dress and 
religion were the features to which the Afro-Portuguese clung^ so as to out­
wardly identify themselves as a community with a different heritage and a 
different social purpose from the mass of the Africans; and, in every instance 
the basis for the distinction was that the Afro-Portuguese represented an extei 
sion of the European commercial system on African soil, serving to facilitate 
the exploitation of the Upper Guinea Coast along colonial lines.
The language was "Creole Portuguese", which was vital, not simply
(1) A.J. Dias: (Op.cit.)
For the lengthy period before weaning, see M.McCulloch: Peoples of 
Sierra Leone, p.44
(2) See above, Ch.Illj f I *+0
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as a link with the Portuguese patrimony, but because of its functional value 
in matters of trade* The Afro-Portuguese could thus act as interpreters, and 
carry out all the issks required of middlemen in the coastal trade, from acting 
as pilots on the rivers to serving as commercial advisers to the local ruling 
class.
The Afro-Portuguese tried as far as possible to maintain themselve 
in European clothes, including shoes, hats, swords and muskets. The wealthiesl 
merchants lived in large rectangular houses with white-washed walls and 
verandahs, where they relaxed, (l) However, few could affort to maintain theii 
pretensions, and even the richer ones, in attempting to live up to the ideal of 
the Portuguese cavaleiro, merely achieved a sort of shabby gentility. As 
Lajaille's pen-picture suggested, the Afro-Portuguese were "preserving amidst 
poverty their national pride".
Metropolitan Portuguese and other Europeans did not consider 
the brancos da terra as true representatives of Portugal, and were in fact 
often disdainful in their attitude to the "so-called Portuguese". An official 
of the Company of Grao Para and Maranhao contemptuously referred to the Afro- 
Portuguese as 'monkeys'. (2) On the other hand, the Portuguese were quite 
willing to grant the mulattoes titles and to appoint them to lesser posts in 
the administration; placing them in charge of places like Zeguichor and Geba, 
or making them sergeants at Bissau and Cacheu. Labat was not quite sure of the
(1) P. Cultru: (Op.cit.) pp.192,193*196
(2) A.H.U., Guin^, mayo VIII - Antonio Francisco Martinez, 27 July 1777*
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motivation of this brotherly treatment, Was it genuine or just politicue?
(l) In part it must have been genuine brotherly appreciation between white and 
mulatto, because they were blood relations; but their employment in the adminis 
tration was also motivated by the fact that the important filhos da terra were 
often related to the local ruling class, and thus their appointment had 
political value. (2)
For a deeper understanding of tie mulattoes, one must turn to the 
accounts of Lemos =Coelho, himself born at Balola on the Ria Grande de Buba. As 
De Almada illumined the activities of the Afro-Portuguese. Coelho himself had 
adopted two Bijago boys, who remained with him for many years, serving as inter­
preters on the occasions when he returned to those islands. (3) The same writer 
gives information about the mulattoes of Recife in the Senegambia, who for some 
time followed the religion of their Jewish fathers, (4) but generally 
Christianity was part of the definition of the Afro-Portuguese community, the 
members of which Coelho very often calls filhos da terra christaos. The other 
attributes of this social formation are seen in simple asides, such as the 
mention of "a negro on the island of Ponta who spoke Portuguese, was brought up 
with the whites, and was called Christovao"; (5) and the reference to a very
(1) J. Labat: Voyage du Chevalier de Marchais en Guinee fait en 1725, 1726 and 
1727. (Amsterdam 1731)
(2) A.H.U., Guine', mayo I - Santos de Vidigal Castanho, 27 Oct 1704
(3) Lemos Coelho: Duas Descriyoes da Guine. p.43-
(4) Ibid, p.7
(5) Ibid, p.181
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large house at Port Loko, which was owned by "a filho da terra of the Bullom 
nation, but a Christian, who was treated as a white"; (l) and yet again to 
another Negro senhor, who had a Christian son, master of a very small boat.
(2) An outstanding example of this type is provided by Captain Francisco 
Correia, whom Beaver met in 1792. was a Mandinga of Geba, who had been to 
Lisbon, visisted Santiago several times, and for many years commanded a tradi: 
vessel on the coast. Correia spoke Portuguese very well, dressed as a 
F£iropean, had considerable property, was literate, and could ascertain 
latitude by the sun's altitude. (3) It is not surprising that the Africans 
should have called a black man like Correia a "white man" and a 'Portuguese'.
With few exceptions, the Afro-Portuguese made commerce a full­
time occupation. All of the main centres whore they conglomerated, such 
as Bissau, Cacheu and Farim, were dependent upon the Africans for their dood 
supplies, a factor of considerable importance whenever any conflict broke out 
They were castigated by de la Courbe for "having neither foresight nor couragi 
to procure themselves vegetables in such a fertile country, industry to breed 
domestic animals, nor strength to hunt game". Some profered the excuse that 
they had their sights set on returning to Portugal, (4) but this applied only 
to the few metropolitan Portuguese. On the whole, it would seem that their 
removal from the land was not a matter of choice but of African policy. The
(1) Lemos Coelho: Duas Descriyoes da Guine, pp. 75*234
(2) Ibid: p.182
(3) Philip Beaver: African Memoranda, p.275
(4) P. Cultru: Premier Voyage de Sieur de la Courbe, p.250
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African ruling- class never granted the Portuguese more land than was absolutely 
necessary for houses and trading centres and occasionally a fort, (l) The 
fact that the Afro-Portuguese were divorced from the land set them apart from 
the traditional economic order of subsistence agriculture.
As a rule, trade on the Upper Guinea, Coast was a seasonal and 
secondary endeavour. Even the relatively highly developed market system of 
some of the tribes of the area was not an economic institution which was 
generally associated with the professional t rader, and the most important trade 
fairs were annual rather than weekly events. Trade achieved peak points when 
agricultural activities permitted; namely, during the dry season. For instanc 
it was after the harvest in November that the Djolas of the Casamance made the 
relatively short trip to the Gambia to exchange their rice for fiattle. (2) 
Conversely, the beginning of the rains meant a return to the farms. The 
Beafadas clearly establish the priority of agriculture in their maxim that at 
crop time those who are on journeys must return home. (3) This procedure by 
which trade was sandwiched between agricultural operations was extended to 
commsrce with the Europeans.
Coincidentally, the best season of the year for sailing ships to
voyage to the Upper Guinea Coast was between September and May. (4) 3n Sierra
(1) A.H.U., Guine, ma^o I Jose das Neves Leao, 25 May 1800 (The Africans would 
not concede land even to grow fodder for cattle)
(2) L.V. Thomas: Les Diola, p.284
(3) Landerset Simoes: Babel Negra
(4) A.H.U., Guine, caixa II - No. 267, Andre de Fonseca, captain of Bissau,
27 March 1699*
4 STD
MULATTO TRADBRS
Leone the rains began in May and lasted for three or four months. Wadstrom 
observed at the end of the eighteenth century that "in the beginning of the 
season, the earth being softened with rain, the Negroes till and plant their 
grounds; and after the return of dry weatlsr, they gather in their cuops; 
occupations which they seldom abandon, even though allured-by the most advan­
tageous commerce.’*, (l) North of Sierra Leone, the rainy season set in 
progressively later, which accounts for Labat’s assertion with respect to the 
Geba-Gambia area that ’’all commerce ceases with the Negroes during the months 
of August, September, October and November; they withdraw then to their 
villages and work in their fields”. (2) Precisely because of the later rainy 
season and the accompanying wind conditions it was advisable for ships to 
avoid the latitudes around Cape Verde in September and October, (3) so that 
both parties were ready to trade in December. By a further coincidence, the 
dry season was also the best trading season for pastoral people like the Fulas 
who brought their cattld down to the Gambia river in December; (4) while the 
long-distance inland trade was also facilitated at this time of year by 
favourable travelling conditions. fed
(1) C.B. Wadstrom: An Essay oh Colonisation, p.25
(2) J. Labat: Nouvelle Relation. Vol. V. p.323
(3) C.B. Wadstrom: (Op.cit) p.325> citing Tillemanfs Description of Guinea,I69
(4) R. Jobson: The Golden Trade, p.46
(■5) Ssg-Above, -Qh. I,
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As the lineal descendants of thslantpados. the Afro-Portuguese had as their 
principal function that of purveyors of goods to European ships. But the 
laneados had been quick to provide their services for the transfer from river 
to river of commodities which were of interest mainly to the Africans, and her* 
too the Afro-Portuguese followed and probably went further than their 
predecessors. They handled salt, cloth, dyes, kola, palm oil and rice, with 
great profit to themselves and to the appreciation of the Africans. The Afro* 
Portuguese purchased their commodities by the system of barter, but they infus< 
a new spirit into the operations, which was essentially European, For one 
thing, they traded on a scale which was clearly unprecedented in this area, 
and for another thing, they oriented all their activity ultimately towards the 
Atlantic. This is well-illustrated by taking the example of the kola trade*
The value of kola in West Africa can scarcely be overstressed. The kola 
nut is associated with religious rites, initiation ceremonies and property 
rights; it is used as a stimulant, as a yellow dye, fof medicinal purposes, 
as a symbol of hospitality, and in diplomatic relations between tribes; and it 
was particularly highly regarded among Islamicised peoples. The best known 
kola trade routes ran north and north-west from the forests of the Gulf of 
Guinea, where the kola trees grew in great numberq to markets in the Western 
Sudan. Sierra Leone was on the periphery of the important kola route which 
stretched from the upper valley of the St. Paul river through Beyla to Kankan 
and Kissidougou. (l) It is almost certain that from early times some kola
(l) M. Le Long: ,rLa, Route du Kola”, R0vue de Geographie Humaine et dfEthnologic 
No. 4, pp.35-40
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would have been sent across the Niger from the area now held by the Koranko 
and Kono in the hinterland of Sierra Leone, since they both adjoin Kissidougou. 
Possibly, too, kola from the Sierra Leone littoral made its way inland, as was 
known to be the case at the end of the eighteenth century; (l) but the coastal 
kola was only fully exploited after the arrival of the Portuguese, who initiate 
a shipping link between Sierra Leone and the rivers north of the Geba.
The kola trees were found in greatest concentration between the Rokelle 
and the Searcies; as far north as the Nunez they grew rather less profusely; 
while further north they became rare, (2) Attempts by the Portuguese in the 
sixteenth century to cultivate this species in the Geba-Gambia area were
unsuccessful. (3) Consequently, the coastal trade in kola was based on the
transport of that commodity from the coast south of the Pongo to the rivers 
Geba, Cacheu, Casamance and Gambia.
Like most other trading projects on the Upper Guinea Coast, the kola trade
was organised on an annual basis, involving ships which traded exclusively in
that product and embarked in a fleet. In the mid-seventeenth century, from 
Farim alone at least twelve ships went annually on the kola run, and Coelho 
attests that up to eighteen were despatched in some years. (4 ) Besides, G@ba 
and Bissau traded on their own account. At the producing end, the Bagas, 
Temnes and Bulloms were the tribes who sold kola, especially the le^es and
(1) John Matthews: Voyage to the River Sierra Leone, p.59
(2 ) J. Machat: Les Rivieres du Sud et le Fouta-Diallon, pp.181,182 
(p) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", p.284
(4 ) Lemos Coelho: Luas Descricoes da Guine, p.38
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the Bulloms between the Rokelle and the Great Searcies. On one occasion in 
the late seventeenth century, the Portuguese complained of reduced yields 
because of lack of attention to the trees, (l) Whether this was the exception 
or the rule was not stated, but the likelihood is that the Bulloms and Tgmnes 
simply interested themselves in the gathering of the fruit from the trees whic] 
grew in profusion without being planted or cared. They separated the nuts roi 
the husks, and sold the former in a measure made of wicker which held 500 to 6( 
nuts which were deposited into a much larger hamper. These wes?e checked for 
insects before being sealed with the broad leaves of the cabopa. On the 
voyage northwards, the hampers were opened on three occasions to check for 
the development of larvae, the infected nuts being thrown overboard, and it 
was a good year when more than one-third of the cargo did not have to be 
discarded. Net the amount of vendible kola was great. Among themselves, the 
Portuguese and Afro-Portuguese measured the kola in barrels holding 5,000 
nuts, and on an average over 100,000 barrels made up the annual haul. (2)
All exchanges in which the Afro-Portuguese had a hand ultima.tely 
facilitated trade with the Europeans, which too often meant the trade in 
slaves. Cloth, dyes and kola were part of & process of permutation designed 
to get cargoes for export to Europe. De Almada had put forward that without 
the laneados. the products of the Upper Guinea Coast would never have reached 
the holds of European ships in the quantities and in the manner desired, (3)
(1) A.H.U., Guine, caixa I - No. 131 - Sebastiao Roiz, 24 April 1674
(2) Demos Coelho: Unas Describees da. Guine^ p.38,62
(3) See above, Ch. Ill, p• i^o
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and the Afro-Portuguese were playing the same role as the lanpados. Inevitabl 
however, someEuropean buyers on the coast came to believe that the profits of 
the middlemen should and could be cut out by alternative arrangements. This 
attitude was particularly evident on the part of the established companies, 
whether Portuguese, English or French.
The Gambia Adventurers traded on the river Gambia largely through 
the Apro-Portuguese intermediaries, (l) When the Royal African Company 
inherited this situation, their first chief factor at James Island, who had 
already been serving the Gambia Adventurers, reported unfavourably concerning 
the profits lost by employing the Afro-Portuguese. On the river Gambia itself 
the prices current in 1678, as paid to the Afro-Portuguese, were 30 ’bars’ per 
slave, 18 per hundredweight of ivory and 16 per hundredweight of wax. These 
were far higher than the prices paid if the goods were purchased directly from 
the Africans, and yet the bulk of the trade lay in the hands cf the Afro- 
Portuguese. Thurlow considered that the trading zone south of the Gambia 
was more important than the Gambia itself, and the prices of goods originating 
there were steeper still. On wax and ivory, four to five ’bars’ more per 
hundredweight were often demanded, while it was impossible to compete with the 
Spanish for slaves, since they were offering 'JO to 80 ’bars* in comparison 
with the 30 'bars’ per captive which the Royal African Company expended in the 
Gambia. (2)
(1) P.R.O.. T70/544 - Ledger of the Gambia Adventurers. (Portuguese names 
dominate. Small bills are paid out to them.)
(2) P>R.Q., T70/10 - Thomas Thurlow, 15 March 1678, fl.l.
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Thurlow suggested that the Company should send a small vessel of 60 tons 
on trading voyages direct to the Nunez, Grande and Casamance, which would prove 
half as expensive as purchasing through the Afro-Portuguese, especially since 
at that time the first Company of Cacheu was also collecting a 10^ duty on 
trade, advocated that for the Gambia the policy should he to deal judicious 
with the Agro-Portuguese, commissioning them with small quantities of Company 
goods in such a way that they would not accumulate capital of their own. Those 
who grew rich were too independent and encouraged trade with the interlopers.
a)
In practice, there weretwo types of Afro-Portuguese - those with 
sufficient capital to trade with the Africans on their own account, and then 
sell to whatever European ship arrived; and those who had to he Mgrub-stakedM 
hy the visiting European ships or hy officials of one European company or 
another. The latter type were in the vast majority, (2) though the rich
traders naturally exercised far greater influence. "When the English went to
Cacheu, for example, they dealt with Mthe great tracers" as Thurlow(s successor 
John Castle, wrote in February 1683. Castle made a deal with these principal 
merchants at Cacheu to purchase a combined total of 20 tons of ivory and wax 
(apparently, ten tons of each). At that moment, the merchants were short of 
stock, which they did not expect to arrive before July of that year, so Castle 
loaned them trade goods to the value of ten tons of wax. (3) The fact that such
(1) P.R.O.« T70/10 - Thomas Thurlow, 15 March I6 7 8, fl.l.
(2 ) g. Cultru: Premier Voyage de Sieur de la Courbe, p.193
(3) b.R.Q., T70/16 - John Castle, 20 Eeb 1683, fl.46.
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arrangements were still necessary after Thurlow1s advice is ample evidence 
that it was not at all easy to cut out the Afro-Portuguese middlemen.
In 1678, Thurlow had reported on an offer made him by the governo 
of Cacheu to conclude a long-term agreement, by which the English would be kep 
supplied with ivory and camwood at 24 'bars1 and 20 'bars* respectively, (l) 
Thurlow baulked at the high prices, especially since the Gambia Adventurers 
were about to go into liquidation, and he could not be sure of the policy of 
his new employers, the Royal African Company. However, John Castle did give 
his approval to a similar proposal, and he was apparently able to hold the 
prices down to 22 'bars* and 16 'bars1 per hundredweight of ivory and wax 
respectively. (2) The value of this treaty was that it meant stability and 
regularity in every respect. There was constancy of price and supply and 
there was no need to haggle over individual purchases. Hence, the accounting 
would become less complicated, and the estimate of future commitments would be 
more reliable. Besides, the quantities were also important. Instead of ten 
tons of ivory and ten tons of wax being accumulated piece-meal, they would be 
supplied in bulk.
In Sierra Leone, a situation existed parallel to that in the Gamb 
and the chief factor in I678, Edmund Pierce, was chafing at the Afro- 
Portuguese control over trade. His proposed solution was that forty to fifty 
blacks should be brought from the West Indies, where they had learnt to speak 
English, and they would be used to replace the Afro Portuguese. (3) Ho actio:
(1) P.K.O., T70/10 - Thomas Thurlow, 15 March 1678, fl.l
(2) P.R.O.t T70/16 - Castle, 20 Feb 1683, fl.46
(3) P.R.O., T70/52 - To Freeman, Jan 1705, fl.79
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followed this request, and it took a much longer time before attempts were mac 
to regularise the situation in the same fashion as in the Gambia. The 
directors themselves specifically drew attention to the experience in the
Gambia, when in 1705 they urged their factors in Sierra Leone to come to an
arrangement with the middlemen of trade, for the Gambia pattern, in the
opinion of the directors, had proven beneficial, (l)
If it was not possible for the European companies or administra­
tions to come to a compromise with the Apro-Europeans, then the latter were 
likely to react violently. They had been called into existence by the 
European trade, and had no function in the society if deprived of their 
position as intermediaries. It was in Cacheu that the Afro-Portuguese 
launched their first major counter-attack on those who challenged their 
position.
The months immediately after the first Company of Cacheu had 
ceased operations witnessed one of those temporary aberrations caused by the 
efforts of a captain-major to stick to the letter of the law. He was 
captain-major Jose Gonsalves Doliveira. Loliveira arrived in Cacheu some 
time around June 1682, succeeding Manuel Quaresma. (2) For several months 
after his arrival Doliveira had been party to the customary encouragement 
given to the English and French; (3 ) and at least up to May 1683 John Castle 
was trading extensively with Cacheu. (4 ) But for some reason, Doliveira
(1) T70/52 - To Freeman, Jan 1705, fl*79
(2) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa V - Minute cf the Conselho, 2 Sept. 1682
(3 ) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa V - Lopes de Barros, 18 Aug I69I
(4) P.R.O.1 T70/16 - Castle, 20 Feb 1683, fl.46.
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decided to take a firm line, and absolutely refused permission for foreign 
ships to trade, even if they were prepared to pay duties. The merchants tried 
petitions, such as the one to the governor of Cape Verde in January 1684, (l) 
and when those brought no results, they sided with the Papels when the latter 
massed forces against the praya. and thus induced Doliveira to allow the 
English agent, John Booker, to do business. (2)
Apart from upholding the policy of monopoly, Doliveira had also 
been guilty of trying to curtail the freedom of movement of the principal' 
traders of Cacheu, thus limiting their role as the middlemen of all the 
commerce on the Upper Guinea Coast. (3) Leading the opposition to Doliveira 
was a female mulatto trader, Bibiana Vaz. She had a number of relations on 
the coast who were all well-off. Her brother Ambrosio lived at Cacheu, and 
helped to run her business; her nephew, Francisco, was the most outstanding 
trader on the river Nunez; while the most powerful Afro-Portuguese on the 
Gambia in the 1730!s was one Antonio Vaz, who must have been a relation, since 
they all bore thefamily name "Vaz de Franca". (4) When Moore was on the
(1) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa V - Barbosa, ^a*^* 1^84
(2 ) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa V - Lopes de Barros, 18 Aug I69I
(3) A.H.U., Guine, b'aixa II - No. 212, Copy of a document signed by the
traders on 20 March 1684
(4 ) A.H.U., C-uine", caixa II - No. 230, for reference to Francisco’ Vaz de
F Franca; and Cabo Verde, mayo III - Governor of Cape Verde, 7 Nov 1732
for mention of Antonio Vaz de Franca.
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Gambia in 1731 be reported that Antonio Vaz was worth £10,000. (l) But it was 
Bibiana herself who was the most outstanding member of the family. She had 
augmented her capital by marrying a former captain-major of Cacheu, Ambrosio 
Gomez, who was one of the richest men on the coast in his time - at the 
expense1 of the revenues of the Portuguese crown. (2) Bibiana herself was not 
over-scrupulous, since she took possession of all her husband's goods on his 
death in 1679, to the exclusion of a son of his, Lourenyo. (3) Senhora 
Bibiana Vaz traded on every part of the Upper Guinea Coast. She was estab­
lished at Cacheu among the Papels, she had a trading house at Quimquim among 
the Banhuns, another at Farim among the Mandingas; and the English at Bench 
Island were donducting business with her. (4) With her own two-masted vessel 
and her own rivercraft, she was able to exploit the coastal and riverain
(1) Francis Moore: "Travels into the Inland Parts of Africa" in Thomas Astley: 
A New and General Collection of Voyages. Vol. 2, p.212. Antonio Vaz had i 
son in Cacheu and traded there regularly. See P.R.O.t T70/1451* It is 
most probable that the whole family were the direct descendants of Manoel 
Vaz de Franca, who lived at Bintang and in 1662 claimed to hold a 
commission from the king as commander of the river. See J.M. Gray:
A History of the Gambia, pp.26,78.
(2) Ambrosio Gomez was named as an accomplice of Captain-major Mendonya (See 
above Ch. V, p.xtfland A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa IV - Manuel Pacheco,
26 May I67I)
(3) A.H.U., caixa II - No. 157, Minute of 2 Sept 1682
(4) P.R.O., T70/36I - Bence Island Accounts, 1678.
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trade to the full*
It was around Bibiana Vaz that the opposition to Doliveira centred. 
A-fc a meeting at her house in Cacheu, several Afro-Portuguese traders as well as
they should engineer Doliveira*s death. The attempt was made in February 1684, 
but Doliveira was forewarned against the plot and managed to evcde it. Early 
in March, the Spanish Capuchin, Fr, Antonio de Trozido, who was said to have 
borne personal animosity against Doliveira, advised that the captain should be 
imprisoned. It was this Capuchin who produced the written denunciation of 
Doliveira, (l) accusing him of fraud and malversation. These charges were 
recorded in the official books of the praya by the factor, Manuel de Sousa 
Mendjdonija, after having’ been signed by all the traders in the vicinity*
Doliveira was seized and sent off the house of Bibiana Vaz in Farim, where he 
was kept for fourteen months before he managed to escape.
of Cacheu, but the "Republic of Cacheu", set up by the Apro-Portuguese, was 
hostile to any external controls, and when two attorneys of the Company 
arrived, they were refused permission to land. The three fundamental decrees 
of the 'Republic1 emphasised the Afro-Portuguese conception of independence. 
Firstly, they stated, they would not accept any captain-major from Cape Verde 
or Portugal until such time as they had communicated with the king of Portugal 
and had had his resolution on the matter; secondly, they would have nothing to 
do with the new company; and thirdly, it was stated that no Portuguese was to
the factor of Cacheu (who was the second in command of the pra^a) decided that
The revolt coinc: with the attempted formation of a new Company
(i) A.H.U.t Cabo Verde, Caixa V - Lopes de Barros, 18 Aug 1691
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trade with the Africans except through the agency of the resident traders of 
Cacheu, on penalty of confiscation of goods. (i) Only the person of Antonio 
de Barros Bezerra was acceptable both as a captain-major and as the head of tfc 
new company, (2) Meanwhile, Cacheu was governed by a triumvirate elected by t 
traders, the three being Ambrosio Vaz, Santos de Vidigal Castanho and Manuel 
de Andrade.
A few months after Doliveira*s deposition, the governor of Cape 
Verde sent a magistrate to Cacheu to conduct an enquiry, (3) On the basis of 
this, the Conselho urged that action be taken against the leaders, and Bezerra 
was entrusted with this task, ^e returned to Cacheu in May 1685 with two ship 
from Portugal and a smack and one hundred men from Cape Verde. He waa not 
opposed on his arrival, and came to an understanding with the traders that 
their co-operation would make punishment lighter. (4) Bezerra sent Ambrosio 
Vaz and Manuel de Andrade to Santiago, along with the factor, Manuel de Sousa 
iVlendonca. Left to Bezerra, Bibiana Vaz would have come off lightly, but the 
Conselho sent a commissioner to che ck on the measures taken by Bezerra, and it 
was specified that Bibiana Vaz should be arrested because her presence in the 
rivers of Guinea was most undesirable. Bibiana Vaz was therefore secured and 
sent to Santiago in 1687 to join her brother. (5)
(1) A.H.U.t Cabo Verde, caixa V - Lopes de Barros, 18 Aug, I69I
(2) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa V - Governor Barbosa, 20 July 1684
(3) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa V - Magistrate Luiz Bello, 22 July 1684
(4) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa V - Barbosa, 12 Sept 1685
(5) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa V - Governor Verissimo de Carvalho, 17 July 1687
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During the next few years, the matter dra ;ged on, with the 
Portuguese administration showing no clear purpose. By June 1688, Bibiana Yaz 
had been returned to the mainland, and was living at Quimquim in Banhun 
territory, having promised that she would build a fortress on the nearby 
Macanha river, as well as one at Bolor among the Djolas. (l) But Doliveira wa 
clamouring for justice, and the Conselho thought it necessary to appoint two 
further commissioners. (2) The second of these two remained on the Upper 
Guinea Coast for nearly three years between I69I and 1693* advised that 
those traders who had played a minor role should be excused, but that stringen 
measures should be taken to ensure that the prominent personalities earned the: 
pardons. Bibiana Vaz was supposed to look after the stockade of Bolor and tha' 
of Cacheu, while her nephew, Antonio, was fined 1,300 barafulas. Bibiana 
petitioned for her brotherfs release from prison in Cape Verde, on the : promise 
that she would pay 9*500 barafulas, but the commissioners felt that Ambrosio’s 
imprisonment would hasten Bibiana1s payments. Santos de Vidigal Castanho, the 
only principal who does not appear to have been apprehended, was offered a 
pardon on the payment of 4>00r barafulas and the continued maintenance of two 
of the bastions of Cacheu. (3) Very shortly afterwards, Castanho was actually
(l) A.H.U., Guine, caixa II - Ho. 201, Antonio Bezerra, 7 June 1608
_(_2) A.H.U. t Cabo Verde, caixa V - Minutes of Jan and Feb 1688
(3) The second commissioner was Manuel Lopes de Barros, who prepared a compre­
hensive report forwarded to the Conselho in Aug I69I (Cabo Verde, caixa V) 
In a second report of Dec 1693? He repeated much the same material. (Cabo 
Verde, caixa Vi).
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appointed captain-major of Cacheu.
The only historian to have taken note of the above episode, Joao 
Barreto, dismisses it within a few lines. "The Revolt of Bibiana Vaz", as he 
terms it, was simply the work of a few seditious individuals, (l) From time to 
time a number of petty local feuds broke out in Cacheu, but tie banishment of 
captain-major Doliveira was not one of those. It was an event which had 
implications for the whole of the Upper Guinea Coast, and which serves to 
emphasise the unity of that region. When the triumvirate passed their decrees 
"in the name of the people", and when they created the post of "the people1s 
purveyor", they were speaking’ on behalf of the vast majority of the Afro- 
Portuguese. The denunciation of Doliveira was widely circulated, and it was 
signed by all into whose hands it passed.. It was suggested that some people 
signed under duress, but at the same time, it was conceded that so many 
traders had been behind the move that it was only feasible to punish about a 
dozen of the organisers. (2) Antonio Duarte, a delegate of the Afro- 
Portuguese on the Jame (a tributary of the Casamance) and Manuel de Andrade 
a representative of Farim, had both arrived in Cacheu to settle certain 
financial matters, and joined in the revolt. That De Andrade should have 
been elected to become one of the ruling junta points to the broad-based 
nature of the participation. In effect, therefore, the Portuguese adminis­
tration had to deal with a whole new class* articulating a well-defined set 
of commercial interests. Some forty years later, when the chief factor of
(1) Joao Barreto: Historia da Guine. p.Ill
(2) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa V - Lopes de Barros, 18 Aug 1691*
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the Royal African Company was to he summarily ejected, from Sierra Leone hy the 
Afro-Portuguese, the same class solidarity was demonstrated hy the arrival of 
Afro-Portuguese support from Cacheu.
In keeping with the mixed heritage of the mulattoes, Bibiana Vaz 
also had powerful connections on the African side. Antonio Vaz was related 
to the Mandinga king of Fogny, so it was from this tribe that the Vazes must 
have derived much of their strength. In addition, Bibiana could count on the 
support of the Papel and Banhun rulers, and probably others among whom she 
dwelt and traded, because of the identity of interest on the question of free 
trade. This applied to the whole Afro-Portuguese group. For instance, the 
governor of Cape Verde was not prepared to shoulder the responsibility of 
arresting the leaders of the revolt because those individuals had the friend­
ship and protection of the neighbouring Africans, (l) The special commissioners 
also found that large numers of persons who were implicated could not be 
apprehended because they were under the protection of the African rulers.
They explained that it was impossible to levy on the property of Senhora Vaz, 
because it was in the sertao within African dominions. Apparently, Bibiana Va: 
was only arrested after she had been lured to Cacheu, (2) and it is significant 
that after she had been returned to her home from Cape Vprde, Bezerra wrote 
that "the kings are now satisfied". (3)
(1) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa V - Verissimo Carvalho, 17 July 1687, and 
Lopes de Barros, 18 Aug I69I
(2) A.H.U., caixa V - Verissimo Carvalho, 17 July 1687.
(3) A.H.U., Guine, caixa II - Ho. 201, Bezerra, 7 June 1688.
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Bibiana1s counterpart in Sierra Leone was one Senhor Lopez, who 
played a dominant role throughout the first half of the eighteenth century* 
Lopez (Jose Lopez de Koura being his full name) was the grandson of a Mane 
emperor. As late as 1752, as an extremely old man, he considered it within hi 
power to give Sierra Leone as a doaeao to the Portuguese crown (l) - and he 
was not presuming overmuch. The following item from Newton's Journal on 
Thursday 13th August 1752 speaks for itself: "In the morning King Peter of
Whiteman’s bay sent for his duty, but having heard yesterday that he had been 
very lately deposed, I put then off -till the morrow, and at noon an embassy 
arrived from his new majesty Seignor Don Pedro de Case upon the same errand, 
with a written testimonial from Seignor Don de Lopez, the undoubted king-maker 
of Sierra Leon. Upon consideration I found reason to recognise his title 
preferably to the former, ard paid his demand of 16 bars, which by the bye, is 
4 more than was required by any of his predecessors." (2)
Literate, firmly given to counting the beads of his rosary, and 
equally devoted to his 'greegrees1, Senhor Lopez wasan outstanding example of 
the cultural phenomenon under discussion. In 1727? he was already an old man 
a shadow of his fofmer energetic self; and even with the help of liatenants, hi 
was afraid to embark on projects, which he himself would have managed single- 
handedly before. As it was, he had plenty of support, both from members of 
families established in Sierra Leone, such as Jerome, Tomaa and Matheus, as
(1),iDocumentos acerca de Sierra Leone" in Arauivo das Colonies. Vol. I. pp.
97-114-
(2) John Newton: Journal of a Slave Trader, p.66
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well as from Afro-Portuguese drawn from the Searcies, Pongo, Nunez, Geba and 
Cacheu. The clans had found it necessary to gather at that date because of 
a serious propaganda offensive launched against them by a Sassenach, Walter , 
Charles, chief factor of the Royal African Company, (l)
Charles made his position very clear: MI will take effectual
care while I stay in the country that no white black man shall make any 
figure here, above what the meanest natives do". To achieve his aim, Charles 
tried to impress upon the African ruling class that it was in their interest 
to dismiss the Afro-Portuguese. By the time that he had arrived in Sierra 
Leone, the latter had come to wield a great preponderance of power, treating 
the African masses 1tyranically*, and even insulting the persons of their 
kings. The Afro-Portuguese achieved this position "by having it in their 
power, either to supply or not supply the black natives with such necessaries 
as they chiefly stood in need of, but at their own terms". Charles felt that 
if the Africans themselves monopolised the camwood trade and applied themselve 
to the cultivation of grain, Sierra Leone would become a 'rendezvous1 for 
commerce, without there being any necessity for the "black white Portuguese", 
who would have to return to Cacheu and Gebaj while the African leaders would 
secure "the blessing of liberty".
About twanty-five years before Charles wrote, an incident had 
occurred which showed that the Afro-Portuguese could possibly be by-passed
(l) P«R«0«* T70/1465 “ hiary of Walter Charles, 1728-29* (Except where noted! 
to the contrary, all information on the events of these years are taken 
from this source.)
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if the Africans took the initiative. That was in 1703, when an important Susi 
king made a journey of some 300 miles to the coast to discuss trade with the 
chief factor of the Royal African Company. He brought with him a huge train 
of attendants, and offered 100 men to agent Freeman to conduct him to Susu 
territory on a return trip whenever the latter was able. Apparently, the 
king’s main suggestion was that his own people, as apt as the Mandingas in 
matters of trade, should do business directly with the Company. This set the 
Afro-Portuguese community in a stir, and they approached the chief factor wit! 
a counter offer to stabilise the prices of slaves, ivory and wax, while 
guaranteeing certain quantities per year. The prices of those articles were 
then variable, though the Afro-Portuguese struggled to maintain a price of at 
least 24 ’bars' per hundredweight of ivory and 24 'bars' per slave. The 
agents of the Royal African Company at the time were preoccupied with a 
proposal of their own, namely, that the directors should set a standard price 
and then allow the agents to retain the difference whenever they succeeded 
in making apurchase below the standard rate, (l) All these proposals seem 
to have come to nought; but Charles was in effect advocating the same policy 
as the Susu king, and on an even larger scale, so that the Afro-Portuguese 
could not help but take anxious notice. Lopez was singled out for attack, or 
the grounds that his services were indispensable to previous agents of the 
Royal African Company only because most of them were dishonest, and wanted the 
help of Lopez and his men to conduct private trade. In fact, the Company 
servants who had turned private traders were either lieutenants or allies of
Lopea.______________________________________________________________________
(l) P.R. 0., T70/14 - Greenaway, 18 March’
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The year 1727-28 was one of great confusion in Jierra Leone.,: with the
Royal African Company in the centre of a maelstrom of combined forces. The
most serious dispute was between the Company and the majority of the Bulloms of 
bherbro, caused by the actions of previous agents. All Company employees had 
to be withdrawn from the Sherbro area, with the exception of one Simon Wild, who
was stationed on the Jong. To maintain contact with him from -^ ence Island, it
was necessary to take an inconvenient circuitious route to avoid entering the 
Sherbro estuary, and Simon Wild actually fell into the hands of hostile 
Africans at one stage. Other employees of the Royal African Company were being 
held by the private traders of the Banana Islands, and Charles had also laid 
hold of some of their men, so that armed conflict between these two forces 
was looming. But it was the Afro-Portuguese who took the lead against the 
Royal African Company, driven (on their own admission) by the need to preserve 
themselves since Charles was going to great lengths to drive a wedge between 
them and the Africans.
Without the assistance of the trading community, and in the face of 
hostility from a large section of the Africans, Charles was reduced to what 
he called "trade for the belly"- scrounging around for rice to maintain himself 
and other loyal Company servants, though he had trade goods retting in his stores 
At the same time, since the Royal African Company handled a high proportion of 
the volume of goods in the area under normal circumstances, trade was generally 
slow, especially on the Rokelle and Port Loko Creek, so that the Africans 
themselves were worried; and they were by no means all in agreement with Lopez 
and other white and mulatto traders that the Royal African Company should be
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made to leave, Lopez1 own sister, Maria, was a staunch ally of the Company, 
holding the view that Company trade was far more dependable than that of the 
interlopers, Another important personage on Charles* side was Suphulo, the 
Bullom king of Ba ;a on the Rokelle, For some years, his personal relations 
with Lopez had been poor, and in the general malaise that had overcome commerc 
in Sierra Leone, he and his people saw Lopez as the prime mover, Theyclaimed 
that Charles had placed a ’fetish* on the river because of Lopez, and thus no 
goods were re ching them. They grumbled, and they were contemplating making 
common cause with the Bulloms below Tagrin Point to engage in a struggle again 
Lopez and the Bulloms further south, the latter camp being reinforced by the 
private traders of the Banana Islands, (l)
Charles’ tactical decisions were not of the same standard as his incisive 
analysis of the situation in Sierra Leone and his strategy of dividing the 
Afro-Portuguese from the Africans, A 'palaver* was held in the Sherbro 
around April 1727 > where the Yongree (Yoni) Bulloms were opposed to those of 
the Sherbro estuary on questions concerning the Royal African Company, The 
king of the Sherbro estuary, Sangrafare, was hostile to the Company at the 
outset, but later even he was ready to seek conciliation. Charles, though 
repeatedly invited, did not attend any of these vital discussions among the 
Bullom ruling class, giving the lame excuse that he had no boat to carry him 
from Bence to Sherbro, In spite of his brave words, Charles appeared to have
(l) King Lewis, ruler of the Bulloms below Tagrin Point, was said to have 
been poisoned at the instigation of King Sangrafare of the Sherbro,
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been personally timid; (l) concentrating on strengthening the defences of 
Bence fort, and introducing a half-hourly watch. These were of no avail when 
Lopez struck in November 1728.
An obituary notice appeared on a tree at th: watering place of the Sierra 
Leone estuary. Written by Lopez on a large sheet of paper, it was addressed 
to all captains and commanders, indicating "that the ships of all nations, 
English, French, Dutch, etc. shall have free liberty of trade in the river and 
the utmost safety, except those belonging to the Royal African Company of 
England"•
Having’ dealt with the Royal African Company, Lopez turned his 
attention on the Company*s principal ally, the king of Baga, forcing the 
latter, with savage contempt, to eat food placed at the feet of D. Jose Lopez 
de Moura. This symbolic act highlighted the fact that the Afro-Portuguese 
social formation was not simply a "middle class", but that some of its members 
had achieved clear dominance over the African ruling class. This must have 
been a development in Lopez* time, because as late as 1654? the Afro-Portuguese 
in their principal township of Port Loko were suppliants before the Mane 
emperor, who was given to making arbitrary levies on their goods. Fortunately, 
visiting Capuchins converted the emperor, Bolofare, who became D. Felipe, 
the second king in Sierra Leone to bear that name. He was persuaded to 
respect the rights of the Afro-Portuguese of Port Loko who seemed to have had
(l) Peter Kup: A History of Sierra Leone, p.107 (The author expresses the
same view.)
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a settlement of their own. (l) As late as 1821, one of the villages on Port 
Loko was ruled over hy Pa Antonio, described as "having a brazen crucifix 
suspended from his neck", and claiming descent from the Portuguese. (2) 
Geographically, Pa Antonio’s power was narrowly circumscribed, but he was a 
chief in his own right. It was Lopez, "the king-maker", who foreshadowed 
the oevelopment by which a number of Afro-Portuguese took over the reins of 
power in various places on the Upper Guinea Coast#
The developments over the Upper Guinea Coast were not even. In the Gambia 
during the earlier part of the eighteenth century, there were prominent 
mulattoes like Antonio Vaz and Tomba Mendez, a son of the king1 of Barra by a 
'Portuguese' woman; (3) but later generations lost wealth and prestige. Theii 
children either emigrated to the banks of the Geba or !.hrew in their lot with 
the neighbouring tribes, ceasing to make any pretensions to European 
nationality. (4) Indeed, in the whole Geba-Gambia area, the Afro-Portuguese 
in spite of their numbers did not achieve social prominence and political 
power, they have survived to the present day as elements owing loyalty to 
no particular tribe. Invariably, French commentators like Lajaille, who 
were taking stock of the area south of the Gambia in the late eighteenth
(1) A.B.F., Letters Antichi, Vol. 248, Declaration of king Farma, Emperor of 
the Gapes, 15 Sept 1654
(2) Christopher Fyfe: Sierra Leone Inheritance, p|l69
(3) Francis Moore: "Travels into the inland parts of Africa" in T. Astley,
Vol. 2, p.217
(4) J.xi. Gray: A History of the Gambia, p. 15
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century referred to the impoverished state of the Afro-Portuguese. (l)
However, in the vicinity of the Pongo there was a noticeable 
rise to power of mestizo elements. Lieutenant Matthews found that "the 
principal people call themselves Portuguese, claiming’ their descent from the 
colonists of that nation who were formerly settled here, though they do not 
retain the slightest trace of European extraction. (2) It is interesting to 
note that the tribe within which these Afro-Portuguese held power was not the 
Bagas, who had been on the Pongo when the Portuguese arrived, but the Susus, 
who had displaced them during the course of the eighteenth century. (3) Susu 
tradition not only records incidents relating to the white' and black 
’Portuguese*, but they recall the name of Sittel Fernando as the first 
Portuguese to settle among’ them; (4) an event which is probably dateable to 
the middle of the eighteenth century when the Portuguese were taking- a renewed 
interest in this area on account of the extension of the slave trade. This 
Fernando was married to the daughter of the king of Bramayah or Konkoure, and 
his son became ruler of the country. The name of the first king of Koba,
(1) J. Machat: Documents sur les Establissements Franpais de l*Afrique 
Occidentale au XYIIIe Siecle (Paris 1906) p.106 - Description of the Casa- 
mance by Le Brasseur in 177©* (Governor of Goree)
(2) J. Matthews: Voyage to the River Sierra Leone, p.13
(3) See below, Ch. IX, p.
(4) M. Saint Pere:"Petit Historique des Sosoe du Rio Pongas", Bulletin du 
Comite des Etudes Historiques et Scientifiques, tome XIII, pp.26-47> 1930
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Manque Sousra (Suares) also suggests a mixture of Portuguese and Susu blood. 
(1)
The Afro-Portuguese were not present on the Sherbro at all (2) - 
for the simple reason that the lan^ados did not settle in that area, although 
they traded there. Thus, when a number of mulatto children of English fathers 
were born in that area during the seventeenth century, they quickly came to 
play exactly the same role there as the Afro-Portuguese played elsewhere.
With a growing white community of English traders and pirates, all subject to 
"erotic expediency", the Afro-English half-castes increased rapidly, and they 
too were augmented by black grumetes sharing their values. There is no need 
to elaborate on the activities of the mass of these mulattoes, since they so 
closely followed the pattern set by the Afro-Portuguese and in fact merged
with the latter. Of the 12,000 of them said to have been in Sierra Leone at
the end of the eighteenth century, (P) it is useful to follow the careers of 
only a few outstanding individuals who rose to power within the African 
polities.
It was of course the Bulloms, lying along the coast between the 
Gallinas and the Ribbi, who were the most involved with the English traders -
or, more precisely, it was their integrated Mane ruling class*, while Vai
(1) Andre* Arcin: Histoire de la Guinee Fran^aise, pp.141,207
(2) J. Labat: Voyages du;; Chevalier des Marchais. p.80 (He claims that there 
were Portuguese mulattoes on the Sherbro, but he must have been mistaken.)
(3) J. Machat: Documents sur les E&ablissements Franpais, p.129.
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elements were also to t>e considered at Cape Mount and in the Gallinas. Local 
traditions in those areas take special notice of three mulatto families, those 
of the Tuckers, Rogers and Caulkers. According to one version, recorded in 
1929> there.arrived, ahout 150 to 200 years before, three cousins Hho came 
from England: namely, Cleveland Caulker, who stopped at Shaingay (shenge),
Abraham Tucker, who stopped at Bar Hall (Shebar), and Charles Rogers, who went 
to Sulima (Gallinas). (l) As Peter Kup points out, these three were not the 
real founders of their respective families, the confusion in the traditions 
being due to the fact that several of these individuals went to Europe for 
education and travel before returning to Africa. (2) Nor were the three 
related. This was the liberal interpretation of their common English 
ancestry.
Two of the above mulatto families were cradled by the Gambia 
Adventurers and the third by the Royal African Company. Both Zachary Rogers 
and John Tucker were in the service of the former company in 1665, (5) while 
Thomas Corker (from whom the name Caulker was derived) was sent out to Sierra 
Leone by the Royal African Company in 1684* Like the Portuguese lan^ados 
and all other resident traders, the employees of the Royal African Company on 
the Upper Guinea Coast took African wives. Very often, these wives seemed to 
have been carried within the factory, and their maintenance placed on the
(1) J. Roques and M. Luseni: "The Origins of the Kpakas or Rogers", Sierra 
Leone Studies. No. XV, Dec 1929
(2) Peter Kup: A History of Sierra Leone, p.149
(3) P.R.O., T70/544 - Gambia Ledger,
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Company1s expense account - a feature about which the directors were not very 
happy. The accountants in London were even more perturbed by the fact that 
the local agents overloaded the payroll by employing all their children. An 
order was sent out in 1692 that "the children of Mr. Rogers and all others 1 
that doe the Company noe service be discharged", (l) However, the local agents 
were prepared to stand up for their kith and kin. Agent Corker, who in 1697 
had two sons in the Company*s employ, stressed the need for mulatto labour, 
and the London officials temporarily deferred to his judgement; (2) though 
within another three years they returned to the subject, submitting a list of 
*molattoes’, who were receiving wages while performing no specific function. 
Peter and Joseph Tucker and Zachary and Lame Rogers featured on this black­
list. (3)
In reality, there was a genuine need for personnel in the forts 
and factories of the Royal African Company on the Upper Guinea Coast, which 
were chronically understaffed as far as attracting white men from Europe was 
concerned. (4) The mulattoes joined the free Africans and "factory slaves" 
who worked for the Company, filling' -jobs like that of storekeepers, carpenters, 
blacksmiths and hunters. Peter Tucker, for example, was employed as an inter­
preter at Kiddam in 1684, while Simon Rogers was named as a sailor in 1688. (3)
(1) P.R.O.. T70/163 - The Book of Advices, 1685-94
(2) P.R.O.. T70/50 - To Corker, 28 Jan 1697, fl.172
(3) P.R.O., T70/51 - To William Lewis,31 OgJi 1700, f1.142.
(4) Peter Kup: A History of Sierra Leone, pp.71-73
(5) P.R.O.. T70/144I - Lists of the Living and the Dead.
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As far as the more important positions were concerned, the view put forward by 
agent Greenaway in 1703 was that even the factories in outlying districts shoul 
be superintended by white men, irrespective of qualifications other than colour
(1) This contrasted with the Portuguese belief that a mulatto related to the 
African rulers of the area would be their best representative. Once more, 
however, expediency provided a common denominator; and, for instance, the 
Royal African Company consigned goods directly to Samuel and Zachary Rogers at 
Cape Mount, indicating that these mulattoes were in charge of that area. (2)
Around Sierra Leone, the mulattoes ultimately distinguished them­
selves not as hired servants of the Royal African Company but as free agents, 
sometimes for but more often against the Company. This was true of all three 
of the principal families under consideration, though Corker*s children had 
least to do with the Royal African Company. By the middle of the l690fs the 
Tuckers were a power in the Sherbro area. They were commended in 1697 for the 
help which they gave the Company; (3) though not long afterwards, the directors 
noted with annoyance that the "mollotoe Tucker to whom we pay a salary" was 
among those who sided with the interlopers not only in matters of trade but 
also in helping them to bring the Company1 s name i^to disrepute. 1'his prompted 
the London officials to suggest that all their mulatto workers should also sign 
bonds, just as those whites who were recruited in England. (4)
(2) P.R.O.. T70/52 - To John Clarke, 11 Nov 1714, fl.427
(2) P.R.O., T70/14 - Greenaway, 18 March 1703
(3) P.R.O.. T70/5O - To Corker, 21 Dec.1697, fl.17^
(4) p»R«0»« T70/51 - To William Lewis, 2 Jan 1700, fl.80
MULATTO TRADERS
There were several Tucker brothers who achieved no distinction, 
but in the middle of the eighteenth century, the name of Henry Tucker was a 
password in Sierra Leone. John Newton mentions Henry Tucker regularly in 
his well-known Journal and in the Letters to his wife; and commends him as 
"the man with whom I had the largest connection in business and by whom I was 
never deceived", (l) Nicholas Owen was also impressed by Henry Tucker, and 
provides a vivid pensketch of this individual. "He has been in England, Spain 
and Portugall and is master of the English tongue; he has 6 or 7 wives and 
a numerous off-spring of suns and daughters; his strength consists ofhis 
own slaves and their children, who has built a town about him and serves as 
his gremetos upon all occasions. This man bears the charectar of a fair 
trader among the Europeans, but to the contrary among the blacks. His riches 
set him above the king's and his numerous people above being surprised by war; 
almost all the blacks owes him money, which bring a dread of being stopt upon 
that account, so that he is esteemed and feared by all who has the misfortune 
to be in his power. He's a fat man and fair spoken, and lives after the 
manner of the English, haveing his house well furnish'd with English goods and 
his table tolarably well furnish'd with the country produce. He dresses gayle
and commonly makes use of silver at his table, haveing a good side board of
plate." (2) This genial king Hal presided over the expatriation and sale into 
slavery of thousands of his younger half-brothers, the blacks.
(1) John Newton: Letters to a Wife (Cited in Journal of a Slave Trader, p.15)
(2) Nicholas Owen: Journal of a Slave Dealer, p.76
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In essentials, the above description fitted all the mulatto slave 
trading chiefs in Sierra Leone in the second half of the eighteenth century. 
They are, for instance, wholly applicable to James Cleveland, who reigned 
supreme for nearly thirty years until his death in 1791* Many people walked i 
dread of "being stopt" by this mulatto - that is to say, in fear of being 
seized and sold to the slave ships because of debts they owed him. Debts were 
by then among the most commonly used pretexts for ensnaring victims for the 
Atlantic slave trade. It was the manner of the trade that most of the petty 
chiefs who were involved sought advances of European goods from the slave 
traders. Cleveland lent goods to every chief who requested them, and if any 
chief was slow in repaying, Cleveland would arm 200 or 300 of his grumetes, 
sending them under white officers to tattack the debtor's town. In this way 
he depopulated all the country between Cape Sierra Leone and the Sherbro. (l)
Cleveland's depredations inevitably intensified violence, chaos 
and fear in Sierra Leone. One chief gave evidence that his town was attacked 
by Cleveland, some other chiefs and an American vessel then waiting for slaves 
His town was taken and destroyed, but he escaped with most of his people, and 
later carried out reprisals against Cleveland. (2) This sort of incident was 
typical, with a long train of hostilities springing from every act of violence 
Besides, a vendetta had broken out between the Caulkers and Clevelands, after 
James Cleveland organised an attack on the Plantain Islands in 1785, killing 
chief Caulker, and usurping the position of that branch of the family. This
(1) C.B. Wadstrom: An Essay on Colonisation. Part I, p.75
(2) Ibid: p.76.
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family feud was pursued for several decades, (l)
Chronic fear was reflected in the arrangements by which whole 
villagers were shifted from exposed positions to ward off slaving attacks. 
Servants of the Sierra Leone Company reported as follows: "Wa saw a number of 
creeks along the river, too narrow to admit above a canoe at once. At the head 
of most of these creeks are towns which were placed there in the time of this 
mulatto chief, because such situations favoured an escape before an attack 
could be made. A subordinate chief, at whose town we landed, confessed that
such had been his motive for choosing so difficult a spot." (2)
From time to time, there were attempts at a more active form of 
resistance to the mulatto traders. One of the most powerful and feared slave 
traders on the coast in the latter part of the eighteenth century was John 
Ormond, an Englishman, who owned barracoons on the Konkoure. About the year 
1780, he went to the Idolos for the sake of his health, leaving his mulatto sor 
in charge of his factory. The Bagas descended upon his settlement, and with 
the help of Ormond's slaves they destroyed or carried away everything, after 
killing young Ormond and his adherents. (3) But to the south, where the 
Caulkers, Tuckers and Rogers operated, the balance of forces was on the side of
the slave trading chiefs, who vsrent so far as to take control of the Poro, the
citadel of power within the local society. James Cleveland was in a position 
to call out the Poro, (4) while a member of the Tucker family as late as 1826
(1) Christopher Fyfe: A History of Sierra Leone, (See Index, "Caulker")
(2) C.B. Wadstrom: An Essay on Colonisation, Part I, p.76
(3) Ibid: p.87
(4) Ibid: p.76.
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invoked the Poro to ensure the continuation of the slave trade, (l)
How did individuals like Henry Tucker and James Cleveland come to 
wield such power within African society so as ultimately to have been in a 
position to make the Poro (the. 'Law God' society, as it has been termed) into 
an instrument of their own policies? That they had some kinship relationship 
with the hereditary ruling class is well-known, and this could in some cases 
lead to the inheritance of land, prestige and authority.
The origins of the Rogers one is the best documented in this 
respect. Agent Zachary Rogers married a relation of the king of Sherbro 
(possibly his sister), who obviously had some authority in her own right, being 
referred to as "the great woman" by agent Platt. On Rogers' death in February 
1681, she demanded the salary due to him, this being one of the complications 
of the dispute of 1679-81? and the camwood trade gas renewed only after her 
demands were met. The Sherbro ruler was conceivably a Quoja, ruling over 
Bulloms; (3) and in any case descendants of Zachary Rogers strengthened their 
position by marrying into the local ruling family of the Massaquoia at Cape 
Mount.
By 1723, the Rogers must have been well entrenched, because when 
the directors had a dispute with Zachary Rogers (Jnr), they were forced to 
handle him with great caution. (4) Some years later, Walter Charles, in his
(1) Christopher Fyfe: A History of Sierra Leone, p.157
(2) F. W. Butt-Thompson: West African secret societies, p.17
(3) See above, Ch.
(4) P*R*0». T70/60 - To Archibald and David Scott, 10 July 1723, fl.35*
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usual disparaging manner, mentioned Zachary Rogers as "a mulatto sprout from 
a former Company chief", hut he conceded that Zachary monopolised the camwood 
trade at Cape Mount, (l) Charles Rogers, mentioned in tradition as coming 
from England, must have been a grandson of the first Zachary Rogers. He 
married the daughter of the king, Kajou, and the son of this marriage, James 
Rogers, was one of the factors causing the division of the Massaquoia ruling 
family of the Vais into Kpakas (Rogers) and Gallinas. (2) By this time, camwoo' 
had ,iven place to slaves; and in the nineteenth century, the Rogers family, 
by then completely Africanised, played a major role in the slave trade in an 
area made notorious by the barracoons of the Spanish trader, Pedro Blanco. (3) 
The development of the Caulker family was parallel to that of the 
Rogers. Thomas Corker, the Englishman, had several sons, one of whom bore his 
father's name, and was in the employ of the Royal African Company in 1713* (4) 
Robin and Stephen were two other sons. The mother of some, if not all of 
Corker's children was known to the English as Senhora Doll, Duchess of Sherbro. 
Whe was a Bullom; and their tradition places her as a member of the Ya Kumba 
family who ruled on the shores of Yawry Bay between the Sierra Leone peninuula 
and the Sherbro estuary. When she died in 1722, her children kept their
(1) P.R.O., T70/1465 - Diary of Walter Charles.
(2) S.M. Despicht: "A Short History of the Gallinas Chiefdoms", Sierra'Leone 
Studies, No.XXI, Jan 1939
(3) See, e.g., Captain Canoti Adventures of an African Slaver, p.300 et seq.
(4) P.R.0., T70/591 - York Island Accounts 1710-1720
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father's name, while supposedly inheriting her claims to authority, (l) Newton 
recorded in his journal that when he crossed the bar of the river Bum on the 
14th November 1750, a message was sent to James Corker, implying1 that Corker 
was the senhor of that area. (2) This coincides with the seat of power of the 
Ya Kumba family.
However, careful scrutiny suggests that the blood ties on the 
female side were the least of the qualifications of the mulattoes. After all, 
they were operating within a patri-lineal framework among the Mane descendants 
in the Sherbro and the Sierra Leone peninsula, as well as mong the patri­
lineal Susus of the Pongo and Nunez. Furthermore, it appears that James 
Cleveland, the most successful of the mulatto chiefs, was not descended from an 
African ruling family, Cle&veland the slave trader, said to have been a member 
of a respectable Devonshire family and the brother of a Secretary to the 
Admiralty, arrived at the Banana Islands towards the middle of the eighteenth 
century, and married the daughter of chief Caulker, who was already established 
there. But their son, John, did not long survive the father who died in 1758; 
and the James Cleveland who became notorious was reputedly the son 
of a Kissi woman named N'Damba. (3)
As far as the situation on the Nunes, Konkoure and Pongo was 
concerned, a very pertinent parallel is suggested by the careers of mulatto
(1) Christopher Fyfe: A History of Sierra Leone, p.10
(2) John Newton; Journal of a Slave Trader, p.17 (Newton sometimes calls him 
^Corker' and sometimes 'Calker'.)
(3) Claude George; The Rise of British West Africa (London 1903) PP*65”67*
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slave trading1 chiefs in the nineteenth century. Most of them were offspring 
of Americans, and boasted names like Curtis, Lightbourne and Wilkinson. 
According to tradition, when these mulattoes first made their bid for power 
they were scoffed at and told that their fathers had been duped into thinking 
they had married the daughters of kings, but that they had only been provided 
with slave women, (l) Ultimately, they did achieve the status of rulers, but 
their political power, far from resting on a traditional kinship base, could 
only have been achieved in spite of previous social prescriptions. The same 
appeared to have been true of the eighteenth century mulatto chiefs.
At every juncture in their rise to social and political prominence 
the progress of the mulattoes must be seen in relation to the trade with the 
Europeans. In the first instance, they inherited wealth from their white 
fathers, which tie latter had acquired from trading and from fobbing their 
employers. Little is known of the original John Tucker, who was in the employ 
of the Gambia Adventurers, but both Zachary Rogers and Thomas Corker had grown 
rich by defrauding the Royal African Company, (2) their primary capital 
accumulation following the general rule of being based on outright robbery. 
Judging from a report of 1705, the "biggest villains", such as Rogers and 
Corker undoubtedly were, had started plantations and used the Company's slaves 
to work them. (3) Such plantations were the nucleus of the chiefly estate.
(1) Andre Arcins Histoire de 3La Guinee Eranpaise, p.142 **
(2) Rogers died in the Sherbro in 1681. Corker died shortly after he had been 
carried back to England in 1700 to answer charges of peculation.
(3) P.R«0«, T70/14 - Greenaway, 18 March 1703.
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At the end of the eighteenth century, the largest plantations on the coast of 
Sierra Leone belonged to the Caulkers and their cousins, the Clevelands, (l) 
With the goods, slaves and boats transferred from the Royal 
African Company and made to yield increase by trade, the white resident traders 
and their mulatto progeny were- able to-build-their -own -towns -in- many instances. - 
Henry Tucker had his town, and so did Lopez and other individuals in this 
category. Since the Manes indulged in the breaking up of the patrimony, and 
the setting up of several village chiefdoms of approximately equal power, (2) 
when the mulattoes built their towns they automatically had as much power as 
the average chief in the area. Indeed, the mulatto towns were usually 
stronger,v being protected by European cannon in some instances, as was "Jamaica 
Town", the home of Zachary Cumberbatch. (3) Owen mentioned that Henry Tucker's 
strength consisted in the slaves, grumetes and relations who comprised his 
town. Their functions we., e not only the relatively peaceful ones of trade, 
but, as with the Caulkers and Clevelands, they would have been used as the 
bailiffs who collected debtors bodily for the slave ships.
Perhaps what was even more decisive than the inherited wealth of 
the mulattoes was their commercial expertise. Walter Charles had realised 
that for some reason the mulattoes were performing services for the European 
buyers which the Africans did not. He considered that this was an easily
(1) B . M ., Add. Ms. 12131 - Mr. James Strand Journal of Occurrences, 1792, 
and Mr. Gray's Journal 1795*
(2) Fernao Guerreiro: Relapao Anual, Vol.3, p-267
(3) P«R«<C«« i'70/1465 - Diary of 'Walter Charles, 1728
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reversible process, which only needed African initiative to oust the 'black- 
whites1. How.ver, the understanding of European trade possessed by the 
mulattoes was the product of their training in this sphere and their constant 
pre-occupation with trade as a profession, and not simply as an additive to 
agricultural endeavouis; and this understanding placed the African rulers 
perpetually in the debt of the mulattoes.
Apart from the knowledge of European techniques which the 
mulattoes obtained informally on the coast, quite a sprinkling of them went 
to Europe from Sierra Leone in the eighteenth century, along with the sons of 
African chiefs. John Matthews informed the Lords1 Committee on the /-Atlantic 
slave trade that in 1788 there were fifty African children in Liverpool, and 
that in some years the figure had been as high as seventy, apart from those in 
London and Bristol. The purpose, according to Matthews, was that they should 
"receive such an education such as will fit them for trading with greater 
advantage", (l) Anna Maria Falconbridge purported to be quoting the African 
explanation that it was to "read book to learn and be rogue sa well as white 
man". (2) From all reports, the mulattoes succeeded only too well.
There were two other ingredients which went into the success of 
the mulattoes, apart from their knowledge of the European system of commercE.
(1) Renorts of the Lords of the Committee. 1789 - Part I "Detached Pieces of 
Evidence relating to the Trade to Africa generally" No. 4, Delegates of 
Liverpool 1788, and No. 5, John Matthews.
(2) A.M. Falconbridge: Narrative of Two Voyages to the River Sierra Leone, p.'
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The first was the consciousness of the fact that they straddled two worlds, 
and that there was advantage to be gained by identifying themselves to greater 
or lesser degree with one or the other, as circumstances dictated. Of James 
Cleveland, Matthews had this to say, "To sum up his character in a few words: 
with a White Man he is a White Man, with a Black Man a Black Man". Similarly, 
it was said of Prince George, an educated son of a Sierra Leone chief, that 
his European education had no other effect than to enable him to impose upon 
both his own countrymen and whites with greater facility, (l) In the second 
place, the mulatto chiefs displayed a ruthlessness which must have stemmed from 
the fact that for the first generation or two at any rate they were not 
restrained by any rules or loyalties. Nicholas Ownn perceived this. His 
assessment of the mulattoes was that "they are in a general way worse than the 
blacks and as they are given to trade, which leads them into the fashons of the 
English and shews them insight in the manner we trade with the black people, our 
proffit is not sufficient to satisfy them, but they make new extortions of their 
own, which renders the poor blacks miserable a both sides". (2) This then was 
the efficient comprador class of the Upper Guinea Coast in the proto-colonial 
situation. They squeezed the Africans to make as much personal profit as 
possible, but essentially they served the wider interests of European 
commercial capitalism.
(1) Report oP Lords of the Committee, 1789, Loc.cit.,
(2) Nicholas Owen: Journal of the Slave Dealer, p.102.
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CHAPTER IX
THE INFLUENCE OF THE INTERIOR ON THE COAST
Throughout the period under discussion, the littoral strip of 
Upper Guinea remained in close contact with its hinterland, so that the 
Europeans did not represent the only external influence which acted upon 
that society. The impact of the interior can he seen in part as a 
continuation of the process which had heen going on for centuries, and 
which was responsible for the peopling of the coast; hut it is discernible 
that by the eighteenth century, the hinterland, too, had immensely 
strengthened the ties which had earlier been established with the Atlantic 
slave trade, so that the paradox arose that even the influences of the 
interior in the eighteenth century were reflections of contacts with the 
Europeans. Both the old and the new themes in this coast - hinterland 
relationship must be considered.
In certain respects, the Sudanic presence on the Upper Guinea Coast, 
so powerful in the sixteenth century, was on the wane in the seventeenth 
century, and virtually non-existent in the eighteenth. For instance, over 
this period, references to the Farim Cabo and Farim Bra^o are rare. These 
kingdoms were no longer part of a centralised empire ruled over by the 
Mandimansa. Ogilby was well aware of the process of disintegratioh. He 
wrote (in 1670) that "the king of Mandinga some years since was so puissant 
that almost all the kings and people of Upper Guinea abeyed and paid him
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tribute; especially the Cassangas, and other kingdoms lying at the river 
Gambia. Heretofore he held the seat of his empire in the inland, and gave the 
lower countreys lying on the west sea, to one Chabos and Faim Brasop placing 
moreover many other viceroys under £im; ... but now these have taken the 
title of kings, and regard this Mandimansa little or nothing; every one 
governing his countrey with full power, without acknowledging him or any other 
for their superior", (l) Besides, some of the subjected littoral peoples 
were no longer prepared to tolerate Mandinga dominance. The Djolas in 
particular dealt some serious blows at the Mandinga king of Fogny in the 
early eighteenth century, when he attempted to assert his authority over them. 
(2)
The Mane system of viceroys or dondaghs had broken down even more 
completely than its Mandinga equivalent, leaving Sierra Leone isolated from 
the former centre of the empire at Cape Mount, as well as leading to the 
divisionism within Sierra Leone itself. F.A. Utting, in The Story of Sierra 
Leone, provides a chronology based on what was in effect a number of Mane 
dynasties. He mentions Bai Farima (died 1606); Farama Borea (I6O6-I63O); 
Borea the Great (1630-64); Philip II (1665- ) etc. (3) But, no viable
centralised Sierra Leone kingdom persisted over this long interval. The 
area ruled by "Farama Borea", who is the same Farma Boure christened Philip
(1) John Ogilbys Africa, pp.367*368 (Also p«353)
(2) J.M. Gray: A History of the Gambia, p*179
(3) F.A. Utting: The S+ory of Sierra Leone (London 1931)
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"by the Portuguese, was divided up between four brothers; (l) while the
second king in Sierra, Leone to be baptised 'Philip*, like the first Parma or
Parima, ruled over the Port Loko area rather than the peninsula. (2) It is 
obvious that with time each of the original four kingdoms reported at the 
beginning of the seventeenth century wan disintegrating into several smaller 
units.■
Yet, to concentrate on the decline of the formal political structures
of the Mande is misleading. In numerous other spheres, ranging from house­
building to language, the peoples of the Upper Guinea Coast have been 
profoundly influenced by the Mande, sometimes to the point of adopting the 
identity of the latter. (3) One of the most important sub-divisions of the
(1) See above, Ch. II, p. fol. At lease one of these brothers, Dorn Thomas, was 
alive in the l660*s. He was seen by the Portuguese missionary, Andre' 
de Faro in 1663, and by the French trader, Nicholas de Villault in I667.
Andre' de Paroj Peregrina^ao, p.52; and Nicholas de Villault: Relation de; 
Costes d'Afrique, p.62. See also C. Pyfe: Sierra Leone Inheritance, p.5!
(2) Andre' de Faro: Peregina^ao, p.60. (However, the king whom Utting’ calls 
Borea the Great (I63O-I66O) was apparently regarded as 'Philip II* by 
European traders who knew that his predecessor was baptised and given 
the name Philip. See Alonso de Sanderval: Natureleza de Todos Etiopes 
(Second edition under the title De Instaurandum Aethiopum SadLute,
Seville, 1641).
(3) A. Carreira: 0 Fundamento dos Etnonimos na Guine Portuguesa; and
A. Texeira da Mota and M.G. Ventim Neves: A Habitapao Indigena na Guine 
Portuguese,, p.46. Naturally enough, the process was not one sided. 
Mandinga construction, e.g., was influenced by the littoral people - 
P.458.
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Balanta tribe, for example, is called the ^alanta-Mane1. They modelled 
themselves after the Mandingas of the Casamance and assumed the Mande family 
name 'Mane*. It was in the late nineteenth century that a European first
drew attention to the 1Balanta-Mane*, (l) hut such acculturation must have
heen proceeding slowly over centuries, ever since the first contacts were 
made between the Balantas and the Mandingas.
Bo doubt, political conquest stimulated cultural change, but the 
Miandinguisation* (2) of the West Atlantic peoples continued during the 
eighteenth century when the Mande political empires were crumbling. Besides, 
even politically there was an up-trend, discernible in the weight of Mande 
opinion within the councils of the coastal chiefdoms.
Alongside of the Mande, one must take into account the second ethnic
group of the Upper Niger Circle: namely, the Fulas. They did not always
act in concert with the Mande by any means, but it is a tolerable approxima­
tion to consider the Upper Niger Circle as a single entity in so far as it 
acted upon the West Atlantic Circle. The Islamic state of the Futa Djalon 
which was created by the Mande and Pulas in the eighteenth century was of 
the greatest significance in the lives of the people of the littoral.
(1) Bertrand-Bocande: "Notes sur la Guinee Portugaise ou Senegambie 
Meridionale", Bull. Soc. Geog. Paris, Vol. XI, pp.265-550> &nd Vol. XII, 
PP.57-9%
(2) This somewhat heavy-handed term is already in use in the literature 
on the subject.
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On regarding the several spheres in which the influence of the interior 
was manifest, trade emerges as an outstanding aspect; and it is one that 
underwent appreciable changes during the centuries of pre-colonial Afro- 
European contacts. All these changes ultimately tended to reinforce the 
connection between the coast and the interior, though this development was 
not inevitable.
The arrival of the Portuguese caravels automatically meant that the 
coastal peoples no longer had to maintain exclusive commercial relations with 
the interior. Under certain circumstances, the interior could conceivably 
have been relegated into an unimportant position as far as the coastal 
peoples were concerned. When commodities such as cloth and ironware 
obtainable from both directions, Europe had the advantages to supplant the 
interior, as indeed ultimately happened with these two manufactures. (i) 
Alternatively, European imports could have replaced African products at the 
coastal end. In Sierra Leone there was a real threat of this occurring if 
the Europeans imported salt; and it was observed at the end of the eighteenth 
century that the peoples of the swamps had a ban on European imports of salt,
since that was the only coastal African commodity which rated high with the
interior peoples at that time. (2) But the element of competition was not 
pronounced, because European goods were usually novel, and because the 
Europeans were requesting goods which the Africans had not been exchanging 
among themselves.
(1) See above, Ch. VII# ^
(2) John Matthews: A Voyage to the River Sierra Leone, p. 144*
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Given that the inhabitants of the interior were as desirous of 
European goods as were the coastal residents, and given that they were both 
capable of supplying the same African products, and given further that the 
European demand (especially for slaves) could easily absorb the supplies from 
both coast and hinterland, the overall impart of the European advent was to 
induce a greater movement of goods between the littoral and the hinterland.
A nucleus of the old trade remained; cloth, cattle and shea-butter (l) from 
the interior being exchanged for salt, kola and rice from the coast; but 
proportionately what mattered was that black men were purchased with weapons, 
alchohol, utensils, glass beads and the like.
In the sixteenth century, the Susus and the Djalonk^s travelled in large 
annual caravans from the Futa Djalon to the Pongo, Nunez and Konkoure; (2) 
while in the seventeenth century, the position seems to have been the same. 
Coelho calls the traders who arrived atithe Nunez the 1Jagancazes*, but in 
all probability they came from the Futa Djalon or Njalonkadoo, as it would 
then have been called. Anxious to secure supplies of salt both for themselves 
and their cattle, they despatched every year three large caravans to the 
coast - one to the Senegal, one to the Gambia and one to the Nunes. (3)
(1) Shea-butter is a vegetable product. Its importance among' the peoples of 
the Gambia was discerned by Mungo Park, and hence the tree from which it 
is obtained is called Bassia Parkii (Sap.). See Mungo Park: Travels ... 
1795-97. pp.26,35 and J. Machat: Les Rivieres du Sud, p.180.
(2) See above, Ch. II, p./f7
(3) Lemos Coelho: Duas Describes da Guine". pp. 7>8>6l
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It is significant that the caravans travelled to the coast rather than 
the littoral residents taking the initiative to proceed inland; and it was 
ecrually significant that the Portuguese lan^ados undertook the responsibility 
of tapping the resources of the sertao, with the Afro-Portuguese following in 
their footsteps. The Mande and Fulaidisplayed a flair for commerce which was 
absent from the coastal tribes. Coelho pinpointed a Mandinga town on the 
Corubal as the only place where markets were held every day of the week, 
organised by professional Mandinga traders, (l) Ubiquitious in West Africa in 
this capacity (usually under the name Dioula), it was the Mandinga merchants 
who kept the Upper Guinea Coast in contact with the deep hinterland. At 
Cantor, Geba and Farim, the boats of the Afro-Portuguese handed over their 
produce to the Mandingas, who s^ t off inland.
Long-distance tra.de always had its intervening hindrances and hazards. 
Almost without exception, peoples on or near the coast in Africa were 
reluctant to allow direct contact to be made between the Europeans on the coast 
and the sources of trade in the interior. First-hand information on the 
trading policies of the coastal residents of Sierra Leone comes through an 
unusual set of circumstances. One Charles Franklin was fleeing from the 
pirate, Charles Roberts in 1718> and was given sanctuary by king Thom at the 
Sierra Leone estuary. During his residence, he found that the inhabitants on 
the sea front used every means of propaganda to keep the inland people away 
from the Europeans. On the one hand, they discouraged the whites from 
venturing into the bush by painting a picture of a barren and hostile
(l) Lemos Coelho: Duas Describes da Guine. p.54
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interior, while they had the visitors from the hinterland believe that there 
was always the danger of being carried off in the slave ships if they turned 
up to sell their commodities. When Franklin had to be sent to another king 
ninety miles inland, his journey was conducted in such a way as to prevent 
him making any useful observations, and particular care was taken to see 
that he made no written notes, (l)
Caravans and coffles were open to attack along the route. Naturally 
enough, the travellers made arrangements for their own defence, and the 
larger the party the better. The Fulas in the late seventeenth century 
were said to have been foremost among the caravan parties, and travelled with 
adequate protection and hunters to procure food; though at the same time 
bands of Fulas were notorious highway robbers. The Fulas were also strong 
enough to brush aside imperiously the demands for tolls, paying only a trifle 
which they themselves determined upon. (2)
The administration of such a Fula caravan was an affair of state - an 
"administered trade", as Karl Polanyi categorises this pre-capitalist form 
of commerce. (3) The king*s permission was necessary and he was to receive 
naif the profit. The privilege of leading1 the caravan was usually given to a
(1) A *W, Lawrence:(Ed.): A Series of Uncommon Events which Befell Captain 
George Roberts (London 1930) pp.l60-l67» 176-178.
(2) Mateo de Anguiano: Misiones Capuchinas en Africa. Vol. II, p.132
(3) K. Polanyi: "The Economy as an Instituted Process", in K. Polanyi,
C.M. Arensberg and H.W. Pearson (eds.): Trade and Markets in the Early 
Empires (Glencoe 1957) p*263.
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son or an important personage who had the power of life and death over his 
followers. set out for the coast at the beginning of the dry seasoh, 
taking up a position on a well-frequented path, while despatching small bands 
of retainers to other trails throughout t he neighbourhood so as to blockade 
access to the sea. This would be kept up for a month or more until sufficient 
traders were trapped to constitute a valuable caravan. For this unsolicited 
protection, each trader had to hand over a small percentage of his profits to 
the caravan leader, (l)
When the caravan reached the end of its journey at some place where the 
Europeans had a factory, such as Port Loko or Kambia on the Gt. Searcies, 
they applied to the African inhabitants of the given settlement to serve as 
brokers and interpreters, the latter being a ceremonial rather than a 
functional role. Small huts or boughs were built to shelter them from the 
heat of the sun, though the leader of the caravan was usually accommodated 
by the European factor. Before the two sides embarked on business the factor 
had to give the leader his present or boonyar, comprising usually kola, 
malaguetta pepper, tobacco, rice and palm oil. The first two articles were 
of the greatest consequence, and once the kola was chewed a bargain could be 
completed. The trade for rice was soon settled as an equal measure of salt 
was offered to the Fulas. Other goods were bartered for individually, each 
requiring a fresh palaver* and all its attendant formality. Not surprisingly, 
the Europeans complained that the Fulas had no idea of time, since they would 
spend all day to gain an extra shilling or two in value. Eventually, the deal
(i) Captain Canot: Adventures of an African Slaver, p.92
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wa3 completed, and the caravan leader requested his second boonvar, propor­
tionate to the amount of business transacted. The articles involved in this 
barter were slaves, ivory, rice, soap and cattle on the one hand, and salt, 
kola, guns, gunpowder, cloth, tobacco, beads, etc. on the other, (l)
A marked increase in the number of caravans was noticeable by the latter 
part of the eighteenth century, with all the rivers between the Sierra Leone 
estuary and the Nunez discharging slaves into the hulls of the European ships. 
But this was not all. Long before this, the Mande and Fulas had been drawn 
closer to the coast by the European presence. The movement across the plains 
and down to the littoral plains was two-pronged, consisting of peaceful 
penetration and aggressive domination.
Invasions such as those of the Fulas in the fifteenth century and those 
of the Manes in the sixteenth century obviously affected the ethnographic 
picture on the Upper Guinea Coast in a dramatic manner, but, on balance, they 
were not the most important means by which population changes came about.
The Mande and the Fula appeared among’ the coastal tribes in small groups, 
perhaps at times even individually. They were allowed to have their own 
quarter in a village or a village to themselves, and the result was a cunda 
or home. (2) The Fulas had their Fulacundas. the Soninke their Tienecundas, 
and the Islamicised Mandingas their Morocundas. (3) As these cundas grew 
large and more numerous, the contradictions between themselves and the host
(1) T. Winterbottom: An Account of the Native A-rricans of Sierra Leone.
(2) Cunda is really a suffix, though it is used here as a substantive.
(3) A, Texeira da Mota: Guine Portuguese. Vol. I, p.158.
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community intensified, and eventually the Mande or Fula aliens took control 
of the region, with the main body of the tribe usually supporting their 
irridentist members.
As would be expected, the above process was a long drawn out one.
Though the Fulas had been in the Senegambia centuries before Jobson wrote in 
1621, they were at that time still slowly building up their position on the 
river Gambia, transforming themselves from a nomadic to a sendentary existence 
"Their profession is keeping of cattle, some goats they have, but the herds 
they tend are beefes, whereof they are abundantly stored: In some places the
have settled towns, but for the most part they are still wand:.ring, uniting 
themselves in kindred and families, and so drive their heards together; where 
they find the ground and soil most fit for their cattle, there with the 
king’s allowance of the country, they sit downe building themsehres houses, as 
the season of the yeare serves." (l) Later in the century, they were mostly 
resident in their own towns, still subject to the Mandingas. (2)
Eventually, the Fulas rose from the position of vassalage in which they 
were held by the Mandingas on the Gambia to one of equality rather than hege­
mony . In other places, the complete inversion of power did occur, though no 
always within the period under discussion. In Cabo and the Badjar, for 
example, it was not until the nineteenth century that the Fulacundas among 
the Mandingas and Beafadas proved Trojan horses for Fula imperialism. (3)
(1) R. Jobson: The Golden Trade, p.46
(2) Lemos Coelho: Duas Descripoes da Guine, p.8.
(3) Velez Caroco: Monjur o Gabu, e a Sua Historia, p.106; and 
J. Mendes Moreira: Fulas do Gabu (Bissau 194®) pp.80,82.
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But the eighteenth century witnessed the establishment of Fulacundas not 
only in Cabo and on the Bad jar, but also much closer t'o the coast among the 
Djolas and the Banhuns, and among the Beafadas and Malus in the Geba-Nunez 
area. This latter district also harboured several Morocundas and Tienecundag 
as did the whole of Sierra Leone as far soufch as the rivers leading into the
Sherbro estuary. In two instances, the process had been carried to
completion, resulting in Susu domination of the coast between the Pongo and 
the Ilelakoure, and in Pula rule in the Futa Djalon.
The map produced by Mungo Park after his first journey inland shows the 
left bank of the Gambia studded with Fulacundas. He himself commented that 
"the Fulas are pastoral people who have introduced themselves into all the
kingdoms of the Windward Coast, as herdsmen and husbandmen, paying a tribute
to the sovereign of the country for the lands which they hold". (i)
Fortunately, a brief account of the Fulacundas in the Geba-Corubal region in
the late eighteenth century is available, demonstrating what they were like 
in this embryonic stage. The isolated Fula communities were tightly organised 
mutual interdependence and economy were stressed; and the harvest was never 
sold until the following one was reaped. Hot that many of the Fulas worked 
the land. Their main concern was their large herds of cattle, whose milk the;y 
exchanged for grain, as well as manufacturing butter and cheese. They were 
monogamous, in contrast to all their neighbours, and the men married strictly 
within the ethnic group. (2)
(1) Mungo Park: Travels...1795-97. P-17
(2) Damaio Peres (ed.): Planta da Praya de Bissau e Suas Ad.iacentes nor
Bernardino Antonio Alvares de Andrade (Lisboa 1952) pp.56-58.
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Pula traditions speak of a dispersal from the Futa Boundou, tracing the 
route of travel and pinpointing the positions in the Geba-Corubal area where 
the immigrants set up their Fulacundas and Fulas os (another word meaning Fula 
family hamlets). Led by one Kunta Meta, they brought their cattle across the 
Badjar to Cabo (Gabu), founding the settlement of Cuntanto in what is now 
Tumana de Cima in Portuguese Guinea. Later they tried to form another colony 
in Chanha to thesouth, but were discouraged, end returned to Tumana to build 
a stronghold at Gabu-Sara. From there a number of other settlements were 
formed, mainly in the chao or territory of the Mandingas, but also among the 
Beafadas; tribute being paid to the respective sovereign tribe. (i)
Meanwhile, south of the Geba, the Mande had long been advancing towards 
the coast. Both the Susus end the Mandingas were involved, though because 
of the reputations of the Mandingas, Susus were often called Mandingas by 
the European traders. (2) Up to the mid-seventeenth century, the Susus were 
still a land-bound ttrib$-.r but they were approaching much closer to the sea. 
Goelho remarked that the Susus had no kings: only villages like the Bijagos,
each under the command of a headman. (3) This is clearly erroneous if applied 
to the Susus of the interior, who lived under a more developed state system 
than the inhabitants of the littoral. The isolated villages were the out­
posts of the Susus, the cundas in the territory of the Nalus and Bagas.
(1) Velez Carofo: Mon.jur o Gabu. e a Sua Historia, pp«133»134 
J. Mendss Moreira: Fulas do Gabu, pp.76-79
(2) A.G. Laing: Travels, p.69
(p) Lemos Goelho: Duas Descricoes da Guine\ pp.59,210
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Almost a century later, Nicholas ©wen echoed the comment about the Susus 
living only under headmen. He was referring to the co-jst, so that some of 
the Susus had made their way to the waterside by that date, (l) Several late 
eighteenth century accounts show that between the Pongo and the Searcies the 
coastwards thrust of the Susus had reduced the Bagas to a few straggling 
villages along the coast, and had forced some to take refuge in the Isles de 
Los. (2)
The process of Mande penetration was well exemplified by the development; 
at Port Loko Creek. A Temne town called Old Port Loko was the earliest 
settlement in that area; while at a later date the Temnes built another 
called Romarung. Susu incursion was represented by two towns, Sandegu and 
Robatt. After a period as guests, the Susus seized power in Port Loko, 
apparently at the end of the eighteenth century. Tradition names the Susu 
leader as a member of the Sankong family which held sway in the Scarcies- 
Melakourd district, (3) Divisions' within the Temne ranks aided the achievemei 
of hegemony by the Susus; (4) though there was to be a reversal of policy and 
fortunes in 1816 when the Susu king of Port Loko was expelled by a Temne
(1) Nicholas Owen: Journal of a Slave Dealer, p.69
(2) J. Matthews: Voyage to the River Sierra Leone. p.l6; and T. Winterbottom
An Account of the Native Africans of Sierra Leone, p.5*
(3) Christopher Fyfe: Sierra Leone Inheritance, Section 9> extracts 1 and 2,
pp.166-170
(4) A.G., Laing: Travels, p.73
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alliance. (i)
Unlike the Mane invasions, the eighteenth century Mande offensive was 
stimulated and accompanied by Islam. Towns like *Mori Kunda1 and fMori Funde* 
sited in Koranko territory in the early nineteenth century could mean only one 
thing - the presence of Muslims. (2) They were built up by Mande traders 
professing Islam, who had complete freedom of movement over the whole of the 
Upper Guinea Coast and were the most vzealthy individuals in the region, 
Families such as the Sankong were Muslims, and their rise to power was 
followed by the establishment of mosques and inducements to the Temne chiefs 
to send their sons for an Islamic education.
Islam made its appearance on the Upper Guinea Coast at an early date, 
tahen in the context of ¥est Africa. This fact has received little considera­
tion, largely because the coast seemed to fall outside the radius of light 
cast by the Sudanic empires. (3) In the sixteenth century, if not earlier, 
Islam had reached a stage of development in the Mande dominated sections of 
the Upper Guinea Coast comparable to that in the Western and Central Sudan in 
essentials; that is to say, a body of Muslim clerics was in existence, a 
programme of instruction in Arabic was available, and the ruling class was
(1) Christopher Fyfe: Sierra Leone Inheritance, loc.cit., (Peter Kup places 
’ these traditions in a late sixteenth and early seventeenth century
context - A History of Sierra Leone, p.142.)
(2) A.G. Laings Travels, pp.188,189
(3) A standard work such as J*S. Trimingham; A History of Islam in West Afric 
makes scarcely any reference to the Upper Guinea Coast.
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heavily influenced by Muslim advice. There were three important Islamic 
centres on the Gambia - one at the estuary; a second at Malor, 200 miles 
inland; and a third at Sutuco a further 150 miles distant in the territory 
of the Farim Cabo. In these the imams (called !bisserins! and lmaraboutsl 
by the Europeans) were trained, and the important mosques were to be found,
(l) The authority of the Almami at Sutuco extended to the south over the 
Susus as well as the Mandingas, and the region was divided into units which 
the Portuguese equated with bishoprics. (2)
The imams lived separately from the mass of the people, and their way 
of life was distinctive. The practices of their religion were adhered to. 
They were described by De Almada as being thin and debilitated, because of 
abstinence and fasting; they did not eat pork, nor drink wine, nor eat 
flesh killed by any handsbther than theirs; and they performed their 
ablutions and their prayers. (3) What their religion was like in a 
qualitative sense it is difficult to say* Lemos Coelho noted that certain 
Moorish devotees who visited the Senegambia commented that the religion 
practised there was filled with a thousand deviations from the law of 
Mohammed. (4) Conceivably, however, the Moors might have been speaking from 
a sectarian position. The great emphasis on education along with the 
possibility of regenerative influence from outside must have helped to keep
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios da Guine", p.275*
(2) Fernao Guerreiro: Relayao Anual. Vol. Ill, p.242
(3) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", pp.275»276
(4) Lemos Coelho: Duas Descricoes da Guine, p.107
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the religion of the Upper Guinea Coast relatively orthodox, at least by 
Sudanic standards; though at the same time, somewhat paradoxically, it was the 
flexibility of religious practice which helped to maintain the Muslims high in 
the favour of the mass of Africans.
It is obvious that the Muslims were extremely tolerant of the African 
religion and way of life, and as such they were not regarded as aliens. This 
was in a sense a survival technique of a tiny minority, but their forebearance 
is in distinct contrast to the attitude of the Portuguese priests who went 
about breaking ancestral images and demanding the limitation of the number of 
wives of the polygamous peoples they were trying to convert. a) On a 
fundamental issue such as initiation and circumcision^ the imam quickly became 
the individual in charge of the ceremony, as Valentim Fernandes observed. (2) 
Very probably this involvement was possible because the African Muslims still 
shared most of the fundamental conceptions of their society, especially with 
regard to metaphysical force. Neither party found it incongrous that the 
Muslims inexorably usurped the power and authority of the "medicine man" or 
priest.
All over the Upper Guinea Coast even when there was no suggestion that 
the people in a given area embraced Islam, both the imams and the Muslim
(1) Andre de Faro: Peregrinacao. (This missionary nearly lost his life 
as a result of his conviction that it was necessary to destroy all 
African 1 idols1•)
(2) Valentim Fernandes: La Cote Occidentale d*Afrique, p.44 (referring 
to thd Mandingas and the Wolofs.)
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traders wore welcomed and revered as the dispensers of fgreegrees* or amulets. 
Any object or collection of objects could constitute a'greegree1, provided it 
we.s recognised as having1 power; but the Muslims standardised their prescrip­
tions by writing on a piece of paper end sewing it up within a decorated 
leather bag, the work of Mande craftsmen. There was more than a hint of the 
!greegrees* being perverted into a pardoners1 trade. When Barreira tried to 
effect the conversion of the Susu king of Bena, he was opposed by a Muslim 
whose principal fear seemed to Barreira to have been the loss of ^reegree* 
revenues, (l) Writing ;at the end of the eighteenth century, Beaver voiced his 
suspicion that a number of illiterate frauds had entered the profession, but 
whoever could win the reputation for producing "strong greegrees" had his 
fortune made. Even the Bijagos welcomed the Muslims and purchased their 
dispensations. (2)
The above phenomenon stimulated the demand for paper on the Upper Guinea 
Coast. Paper was one of the items prohibited by Manueline legislation from 
being sold to the Africans; (3) but the Portuguese and other Europeans did 
ask, carry small supplies to the Upper Guinea Coast, and particularly to the 
Gambia, where, in Coelho*s time, four quires of paper had the same purchasing 
power as an eighth of an ounce of gold. (4) Paper was also needed for the 
books and manuscripts upon which the Muslims placed the greatest value, as
(2) P. Beaver: African Memoranda, pp.201, 323
(3) See above, Ch. VII } f ^ 1-
(4) Lemos Coelho: Duas Descripoes da Guine'', p.24
(l) Fernao Guerreiro: Relayao anual, Vol. 3> p.245
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the basis of their programme of education, A-fc the beginning of the
seventeenth century, there was a large Islamic school to be found at Bena
among the Susus. Every day, the young men would write on their parchments
and read aloud, no doubt memorising the Ojur’an. (l) Richard Jobson describes
a similar schoolf the Gambia in 1621; (2) and indeed, up to the end of the 
i—
eighteenth century, this was the kind of tuition which was to be found on the 
Upper Guinea Coast, ($) increasing in extent slowly as Islsm spread.
With their monopoly of literacy and their ability to prescribe powerful 
spiritual 'medecine’ added to their role as traders, the Muslims formed a 
close alliance with the coastal ruling class, though the latter invariably 
remained committed to the beliefs of their ancestors, (4) Even among the 
Mande and Fulas of the Upper Guinea Coast and its hinterland, the Islamic 
community remained a very small minority until the eighteenth century, but 
members o f these tribes were nevertheless the ones who were extending the 
faith. Consequently, the direction in which Islam spread on tbe Upper 
Guinea Coast was southwards from the Gambia and westwards from the Futa 
Djalon. In the sixteenth century, the Beafadas and the Casangas were the
(1) Fernao Guerreiros Relacao Anual. Vol. 3> P*245
(2) R. Jobson: The Golden Trade, p.92
(3) T. Winterbibttom: An Account of the Native Africans of Sierra Leone.
(4 ) it is quite possible that one section of the ruling class, namely,
the priests, opposed the Muslims, but there is no evidence forthcoming 
on this point.
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most exposed to the influence of Muslim traders and priests, (l) no doubt 
partly because they were the littoral peoples over whom the Mandingas 
exercised some degree of direct political control. Further south the Sapes 
were as yet relatively freeof Muslim peregrinations; but Islam was widely 
enough propagated for the Jesuits to view the question of proselytisation on 
the Upper Guinea Coast not simply as Christianity vs Paganism, but also as 
Christianity vs Islam. (2)
There were no Muslims among the Manes, and all Islaric influences appeare 
to have reached the southern section of Sierra Leone from the north and north­
east. By the mid-eighteenth century, the Muslim "greegree" men were privi­
leged individuals among the Bulloms of the Sherbro-Cape Mount area; (3) and 
by 1785 John Matthews could write of Sierra Leone: "I have never visited a
town in this part of Africa where I did not find a Mandinga man as prime 
minister, by the name of bookman, without whose advice nothing was transacted",
(4) This was the end-product of a lengthy process, which had been speeded up 
in its later stages by the Jihad of the Futa Djalon.
There is a concensus of opinion on the general outlines of the develop­
ments leading to the proclamation of the eighteenth century Jihad of the Futa 
Djalon and the rise of the Fulas to power in that region. The earliest Fulas 
went to be mountain massif before Coli Tenguela's time, and were re-inforced
(1) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guin£", pp.291-93> 327
(2) Fernao Guerreiro: Relacao Anual, Vol. 3> p.284
(3) Nicholas Owen: Journal of a Slave Dealer. pp.58,$l
(4) John Matthews: Voyage to the River Sierra Leone, p.69.
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by hiS arrival. Much later, there was an influx of new Fula immigrants from 
beyond the Gambia and the Niger - from the Futa Toro, Futa Boundou, Macina 
and even the Sahel and Tichit. At first they were welcomed by the Djalonkes 
and their own kinsmen, but, as outlined earlier, peaceful penetration by 
Mande and Fula aliens invariably gave way at some stage to violent struggles. 
Squabbles arose primarily over the division of land between the pastoralist 
newcomers and the indigenous agriculturalists, and a further line of 
distinction was drawn because the later Fula.settlers were Muslims in contras 
to their forerunners and the Djalonkes. After the contradictions between the 
Muslims and the non-Muslims had matured, a Jihad was proclaimed, ultimately 
producing a state that wos both Islamic and dominated by the Fulas.
The history of the Jihad of the Futa Djalon as such, which h^ .s been 
discussed at length by Louis Tauxier, is outside the scope of this study, 
but a few cardinal points are of interest in relation to the coast. The 
first is that the Fula presence in the Futa Djalon did not become significant 
only after 1694? when, according to Tauxier, the first Muslims arrived, (l)
A. Texeira da Mota has drawn attention to the contemporary Portuguese 
evidence in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries showing that the Fulas 
were very well entrenched in the Futa Djalon ever since the sixteenth century
(2) From that time, the Fulas were the principal trading partners of the
littoral peoples, and it is significant that the Susus and Limbas sought
(1) L, Tauxier: Moeurs et Histoire des Peuhls (Paris 1937) P*219
(2) A. Texeira da Mota: Note, sobre a Historia dos Fulas: Coli Tongue la e a
Chegada dos Primeiros Filas ao Futa-Jalon.
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their support against the Manes, even though the Fula forces in the encounter 
were a handful, (l) Descriptions such as those of Andre' Dornelas, Alvares 
de Almada, Baltezar Barreira, Lemos Goelho and the Spanish Capuchins all 
refer to the Fulas as constituting a centre of power behind the Susus. Indeed 
b y  Coelho*s time, the Fula-Susu alliance was broken, and these two groups 
were engaged in conflict. (2)
Furthermore, the Muslim Fulas must have arrived in the Futa Djalon much 
earlier than 1694? as Tauxier suggests, (3) and had been indulging; in peaceful 
proselytisation, especially among their animist Fula brethren. Thus, by 
1726, when the "Holy War" was proclaimed, peaceful penetration had proceeded 
long' find successfully enough to allow the struggle to proceed on to a new 
level - that of military combat, while the size and aggressiveness of the 
Muslim forces was sufficient to bring about a considerable displacement of 
Djalonkes towards the coast. Some of the Djalonkes took refuge among their 
cousins, the Susus. The Susus of the Pongo recall that "there arrived from 
the Futa Jallon district people whom the Peuhls call Yalunkas ... They told 
them that the yellow Peuhls of Futa Jallon had made war on them and that they 
had wanted to convert them to their fetish called Allah". (4) Other Djalonkes
(1) See above, Ch. II, p.
(2) Lemos Coelho: Duas Describes da, Guineg, p.59
(3) Tauxier places four generations of the founding family of Muslim Fulas 
between the years- 1694 and 1726. This is clearly untenable, and the error 
does not lie with the latter date (1726) nor with the number of 
generations.J r
(4 ) M. Saint-Pere: 'Petit Histori ues des Sossoe du Rio Pongas", in Bulletin 
Au Comite'' des Etudes Historiques et Scientifioues, 1930, tome XIII,
pp.26-47.
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settled among the Bagas, Nalus, Landumas, Temnes and Limbas, stimulating the 
process of Mande interpenetration which was observed by the Europeans on the 
coast, and which, as already mentioned, reached a very advanced stage by the 
end of the eighteenth century.
Each river and each locality offered its own variation on the same theme, 
For instance, Pula successes in the Futa Djalon caused a Mande family, the 
Mikhifore, to move on to the left bank of the Nunez, with the permission of 
the Bagas and Landumas: a welcome that soon gave vray to disagreements end
wars. The Bagas between the Konkoure and the Searcies (known as the Baga- 
Mandenyi) had previously been exposed to the Mande, having been in contact 
with the Susus and the Manes, and they were ethnically mixed. Consequently, tt 
their attitude to the new Mande immigrants of the eighteenth century was more 
favourable. Then in the second half of the eighteenth century, a Mande chief 
named Soumba Toumane descended to the coast, he found two Baga-Mandenyi 
states, led by Manga Gnienie and Manga Tomboli. He had the help of the first 
and conciliated the second by marrying his daughter. This allowed the 
children of Toumane to take power in the country, founding a number of 
settlements, the most important of which was Dubreka, not fan from modern 
Conakry. (i)
Although the Mande pressure on the coastlands' in the second half of the 
eighteenth century was partly due to refugees from the Jihad, Islam- made 
great inroads within the coastal ruling class at this period. By the early 
nineteenth century, even when the Temnes turned against the Muslim family of
(i) Andre''’ Arcin: Histoire de la Guinee Francaise, p. 134
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Sankong at Fort Loko, the Temne leaders were already adherents to Islam, (l) 
The main contribution was made by the educational opportunities in the Puta 
Djalon, which were offered not only t o Muslims but also to the children of 
animist chiefs. Eere again, one must turn to the course of events within the 
Puta Djalon itself.
Under the first leader of the Muslim state of Puta Djalon, Karamoko Alfa 
(1726-51), emphasis was placed on conversion of the animists and on education. 
The converted Djalonkes were authorised according to the importance of their 
villages to establish missikoun (little mosques) or tipourou (substitute 
places of worship); while the large mosques cr missidi were preserved for the 
Fulas, with one in each of the nine diwals or provinces of the state. (2 )
Labe, the largest of the diwals, gained a reputation for learning. Hamadu 
Sellou, its prince^ at the outbreak of the Jihad was sand to have studied in 
the Puta Boundou, and to have founded on his return a school which attracted 
students from great distances. (3) Major Laing made mention of one Salem 
Gherladoo, a teacher of Labe, who was reputed to h.-vetrained some of the best 
’bookmen* in the eighteenth century. (4)
On the rare occasions when the Jihad of the sword was carried directly 
on to the coast in the eighteenth century, it was led by individuals who came 
from an educational and religious environment such as was provided, by the
(1) Christopher Fyfe: Sierra Leone Inheritance, pp.166-170
(2) Andre Arcin: Histoire de la Quinse Prangaise, pp.94,95
(5) J. Mendes Moreira; Fulas do Gabu, p.266
(4) A.G-. Laing j Travels, p. 375
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schools and mosques of Labe and Fugumba (the religious capital). The first
such occasion seems to have been in the 1750*s, after one Mara, supposedly
a Mandinga, secured the chieftainship among the Susus in the Melakoure-Sc-rciee
district* Mara had received his education in the Puta Djalon, where he was
considered one of the best Koranic scholars in the country. Presuming on his
reputation and his good understanding with the Pulas, which he assiduously
cultivated, he commenced his reign with a system of oppression, (l) Nicholas
Owen knew of a Muslim king in the Searcies at this time, who was attempting
to bring the country under subjection; and had in fact conquered two petty
kingdoms near the coast by 1757* (2) The coincidence of time, place and
activity suggests that he was referring to Mara.
Amara*s attempts to serve his Fyla mentors eventually alienated all but
one of the Susu chiefs. Political hegemony bred its own reaction and the
Susus formed an alliance against Amarafs brand of the Jihad imported from the
Puta Djalon. The same sequen.e of events was repeated with the appearance
in 1790 in the Melakoure-Scarcies district of a self-styled Mahdi, an
emissary of the Prophet. From traditional sources, this individual appears
to have been one Laye-Salou, who came from. as far afield, as the Bambouk in the 
Senegal. ($) For a while, he was very successful, until a coalition of Susu
(1) A.G-. Laing: Travels. pp.126,127
(2) Nicholas Owen: Journal of a Slave Dealer, pp.96,100,101. (Owen calls him 
Musolum or Furry Do (’’bastard son”). Peter Kup mistakenly attributes these 
events to the Sherbro area. See A History of Sierra Leone, p.l55»)
(3) Andre Arcin: Histoire de la Guin£e Francaise, pp.135>136.
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effected his death in 1793* (l)
However, Islam and tie influence of the Fulas continued to make headway 
on the coast along non-military channels. In this eighteenth century 
situition, Islam was beamed only at the ruling class on the Upper Guinea Coast, 
The latter either imbibed the new ideology or were in danger of being replaced 
by those who were its advocates. Thomas Wirterbottom, whose brother travelled 
to Timbo, the capital of the Futa Djalon, in 1794> gave some useful insights
t
into the role of the Futa Djalon in this respect. "Not more than seventy 
years ago,” he wrote in 1800, "a small number of Mahomedans established them­
selves in a country about forty miles to the northward of Sierra Leone. (2)
As is the practice of the professors of that religion, they formed schools in
the laws of
which the Arabic language and/Mahomed were taught... The whole power <£>£ that 
part of the country in which they have settled has gradually fallen into their 
hand3. Those who have been taught in their schools are succeeding to wealth ar 
power in the neighbouring countries, and carry with them a considerable propor­
tion of their religion and laws.” (3)
(1) C.B. Wadstrom: An Sssay on Colonisation p.85; and
Christopher Fyfe: Sierra Leone Inheritance, pp.87,88
(2) "About forty miles to the northward” is a serious under-estimation. It is 
about 60 miles from Freetown to Port Loko, a convenient pai#t of 
departure for the Futa Djalon, and from Port Loko to Timbo is about
150 miles.
(3) T. Winterbottoms An Account of the Native Africans of Sierra Leone.
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Linked to the question of education was the political and military 
power of the Futa Djalon. This could generate jealousy and fear in the minds 
of neighbours, as happened both in the interior and on the coast. Sulima 
traditions relating to their wars with the Fulas in the second half of the 
eighteenth century show that fear of the power of the Futa Djalon was the 
principal factor which caused them to turn against the Fulas who were formerly 
allies; and the same attitude was adopted by the Korankos. (l) On the other 
hand, some Sulima chiefs sought to associate themselves with the Fulas* 
ascendancy. For instance, the large town of Berria, which stood at the source 
of the Rokelle, was deliberately destroyed by its Sulima sovereign, because 
certain prominent elements there wished to switch their allegiance to the 
Fulas. (2)
On the coast, there was similar ambivalence. When Watt and Winterbottom 
were making their journey to Timbo, they found that the Landuma chief of 
Kakundi on the Nunez was extremely reluctant to allow passage through to the 
Almami, because he felt that Watt*s party $ight bring* down the Fulas to drive 
him out of the country. (3) On the other hand, most of the chiefs on the 
Upper Guinea Coast appeared to have been mindful of the prestigeand advan­
tages of trade which would accrue from an alliance with the Fulas, even 
though this meant the payment of tribute. The extent to which the Futa Djalon
(l) A.G. Laing: Travels. pp.405-408 
(2 Ibid, pp.318,412
(3) "Journal of James Watt in an expedition to and from Timbo in 1794**?
Rhodes House Library. Ms. Africa, S.7» fl.6
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had become an external point of reference for the Upper Guinea Coast was 
dramatised by the de :ision of a Bullom chief in 17&9 to send one of his sons 
to be educated in England and the other to be trained in the Puta Djalon. (l)
In their traditions, nearly all the important limba ruling families trace 
their origins to the country north of them. Some of them claim to have come 
from the Puta Djalon and others from Sankaran (further east^; and they after­
wards kept their connection with the north, sending their sons to be educated 
there. Several of the chiefs were Muslims or were much influenced by Islam; 
and there were also many Pula and Mandinga Muslims settled or travelling 
throughout Limba country, who kept up their communications with the north. (2 ) 
Laing was an eye-witness to this movement of Mande and Pula traders maintain­
ing the influence of the Muslims in the early nineteenth century in Temne, Loko 
and Limba territory; (3) and before him Golberry had observed that the Fula and 
Susu colonies on the coast maintained close contact with their Metropolis* at 
Timbo. (4 ) It is a curious coincidence that he should have used the same word
'metropolis* which nearly two centuries before Manuel Alvares had applied to
Cape Mount, where the Poro 'University* was sited. (5) The Jihad of the
(1) Report of the Lords of the Committee, 1789 - Part I, "Government, 
religion, manners and customs", evidence of James Penny.
(2 ) Ruth Finnegan: Survey of the Limba People of Northern Leone (London 196 5) 
pp.14,15
(3) A.G. Lainj: Travels, pp.6 9 ,76,129
(4) S.M. Golberry: Voyage en Afrique, Vol. 2, p.241
(5) See above, Ch. il, p./T-8
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Puta Djalon went even further than the invasions of the Manes towards creaking 
throughout Sierra Leone and other sections of the Upper Guinea Coast a ruling 
class which was unified in interests and ideology.
It was the Atlantic slave trade which provided tie most attractive 
material prospects linking the members of the ruling class on the Upper Guinea 
Coast, whether they were parvenus like Cleveland or direct descendants of the 
lianes, whether they came from the cosst or from the hinterland; and the 
relationship between the Jihad and the Atlantic slave trade was of the greatest 
Importance.
No one challenged the fact that the Jihad was the greatest recruiter of 
slaves for the European ships on the Upper Guinea Coast in the latter part of 
the eighteenth century. The only point at issue was the light in which the 
connection was projected. John Matthews, a slave trader in Bierra Leone and 
a spokesman for Liverpool k.lave trading interests, stressed that the captives 
which were purchased by the European ships were mainly the result of Muslim 
wars of religion, (l) Beyond this superficial observation he was not prepared 
to go, because it was the orthodox pro-slavery propaganda that the crptives 
who reached the coast were victims of African wars whose origin and develop­
ment were quite unconnected with the slave trade. However, not long after 
Matthews wrote, Thomas Watt penetrated to Timbo in the Futa Djalon, and 
reported that he was told by the Almami's deputy "with a shocking degree of 
openess, til >t the sole object of their wars was to procure slaves, as they 
could not obtain European goods without slaves, and they could not get slaves 
il) John Hat thews: Voyage to the .River Sierra Leone, p. 94
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without fighting for them". Watt added that '’their religion affords them an 
apology for this horrible injustice, hy permitting them to destroy all 
infidels, a term which seems to include all their neighbours", (l) A close 
analysis of the activities of theFulas and their cohorts leaves no doubt that 
Watt was correct both in reporting his informant and in his conclusions.
It is we11 to recall that the Mande and Fulas were the vectors of the 
Atlantic slave trade before they spearheaded the advance of Islam, and Muslim 
traders were in the forefrontcf slave trading long before the Jihad began. (2) 
Sulima traditions, as collected by Laing in 1822, take their starting’ point
about he year 1690 when their king, Geema Fonda came to the throne, and they
admit that his principal occupation was raiding the Limbas and Kissis for 
captives, all of whom were sold to the Mandingas and Susus who came up from 
the coast with European goods. (3) When the Sulimas joined forces with the 
Fulas, fighting for Islam against the same Limbas, Kissis and other non- 
Islamicised peoples, their activities did not change appreciably in 
character. The real change was one of intensity.
In the case of the Fulas themselves, it is possible to discert. many 
forms of activity in the eighteenth century which were qualitatively different 
from the slave hunts of their animist predecessors of the seventeenth century,
(1) GkB. Wadstrom: An Sssay on Colonisation, Part 2, p.Ill
(2) See above, Ch. IV, (For the leading role of the Muslims in the
Mandinga slave trade, see R. Jobson: The Golden Trade, pp.108,109; and 
Lemos Coelhoj IXias Describes da Guine, p. 15
(3) A.ii. Laingj Travels, p.400
1
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In tha process of subjugating the Futa Djalon during the regime of Karainoko
Alfa, Djalonkes and animist Fulas must have been despatched to the coast, but
at least a theocracy was brought into being, schools and mosques built and the
faith spread as far as it was possible to spread an ideology by force.
Subsequently, however, the annual campaigns did not seek to widen the
boundaries of the Futa state, nor to extend the faith outside the mountain
massif, except among ruling elites.
In 1751» a commission appointed to investigate the forts and factories of
the Royal African Company reported that in Sierra Leone there was a
'prodigious1 trade in slaves, (l) This was a startling- change from the "dead
season", and coincides suspiciously with the extension of the Jihad outside of 
and
th6 Futa Djalon,/with the rise to power of Ibrahim Sori, who took charge of 
the Fula armies in 1750, became supreme ruler of the state in the following 
year, end pursued a militarist policy until his death in 1784* At one stage 
during the 1760*s, Sori rebuilt his army by enlisting the support of the Fula 
chiefs of the bowal to the west. (2) This was an ominous link-up because the 
bowal chiefs were singled out j*ince the l680*s a,s the principal agents of the 
Atlantic slave tr de on the Upper Guinea Coast. (3) The fact is that the Fula 
campaigns in the second half of the eighteenth century showed a pre-occupation
(1) P.R.O., T70/176 - Inspection of George Island, Sierra Leone by Captain ■ 
dye, 1751
(2) L. Tauxier: Moeurs et Hidoire des Peuhls. p.232
(3) Ilateo de Anguiano: Misiones Capuchinas en Africa. Vol. 2, pp.132,133;
.and see above, Ch. IV, p. 1*1.1•
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with the acquisition of captives and other booty, and the wars between the
Fulas and the Sulimas-Oussoulunkes, which were essentially motivated by
considerations of state pow r, boosted slave production considerably. On
one occasion, the Sulimas were beal/ back by the Fulas (1767) but as a fringe
V'
benefit they collected 3>500 captives from the weaker Limbas and sold them on 
the Pongo. (1) Thus, though these wars failed to increase the numbers of 
believers they certainly reduced the numbers of unbelievers.
The genuine religious convictions of the imams and other Muslims of the 
Futa Djalon would be sufficient to allow their wars to be categorised as 
’religious1, just as many European wars have been so described, sometimes with 
less justification. But the Jihad in Muslim theology is rather more rssecise 
and exacting. It is an obligation imposed by Islamic writ as an integral part 
of the faith, and whether it is peacefully conducted or fought with the sword 
its objective is to spread the Islamic doctrine. In this strict sense, the 
Jihad had virtually to be abandoned in the context of the Atlantic slave trade,
Without a substitute which could earn them European goods, the Fulas were 
not prepared to cease export of slaves. This priority accorded to slaving was 
asserted not only at the end of the eighteenth century, when Watt and Winter- 
bottom visited the Futa Djalon, but several times in the nineteenth century.
The slave trader, Theodore Canot, had an interchange with the son of the 
Almami on the subject of the Jihad and the Atlantic slave trade. He wrote as 
follows: "My inquisiti eness prompted me to demand whether these holy wars 
spoken of in the Koran were not somewhat stimulated, in our time at least, by
(l) A.G. Laing: Travels, p«409
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the profits that ensued; and I even ventured to hiht that it was questionable 
whether the mighty chief of the Futa Jallon would willingly storm a Kaffir 
fortification, were he not prompted by the booty of slaves. He replied that 
in truth Mahometans were no worse than Christians, so that it was quite 
likely - if the white elect of heaven, who knew how to make powder and guns, 
did not tempt the black man with their weapons - the commands of Allah would 
be followed with le<:s zeal and with implements not quite so dangerous", (l) 
This subtle reply is an rdmission of the role of the Atlantic slave trade 
in stimulating the Jihad, but at a more fundamental level it can be shown 
that the latter was conducted with less and not greater zeal because of the 
former; the crux of the matter being that believers were protected from 
sale into the hands of the Europeans, (2) so that the definition ’Kaffir* 
had to be made as wide as possible and had. to remain as wide as possible.
As Watt observed, virtually all the neighbours of the Fulas were 
conveniently categorised as enemies of the faith - only in this way could the 
obligations of the faith and the demands of the Europeans be reconciled. For 
those coastal chiefs who attached themselves to Islam and the Fulas, religion 
was both a cloak and a shield. It was the practice of the Pula caravan 
leaders to utilise the annual trip to the coast an an opportunity for 
collecting tributefrom the littoral kings and debts from traders. Those 
who could not pay were liable to be sold as slaves - unless they were
(1) Captain Canoti Adventures of an African Slaver, p.96
(2) C.B. Wadstroms An Essay on Colonisation, Part I, p.Ill
IN'iTJRIOR
Muslims. (l) lhus, as was the case with the littoral ruling class in the 
era of Hispano-Portuguese slaving before I64O, the Muslim elite of the 
eighteenth century was protecting its own persons and interests: this time
under the cover of Islam, while the mass of the people could be enslaved 
for want of well-pronouncing 'Shibboleth1.
(l) Captain Canot: Adventures of an African Slaver, p.92
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Part 1 - H3?ne Zenith of the Atlantic slave trade on the
Upper guinea CoastM*
Tne activities of the mulatto, and the Muslim chiefs, 
in the second half of the eighteenth century serve to indicate 
that the Atlantic slave trade had reached, during that period, 
a level which surpassed anything that had gone before in 
its own annals, *et, it would of course be completely 
fallacious to portray the mulatto chiefs and the Muslim Jihad
as the primary causes in that increase in slaving. Like theifc
I
i
successors, the colonial elites, the African agents of the 
Atlantic slave trade must be seen in a global perspective, 
Specifically, in this instance, the increased slaving was prompted, 
by the expanding markets created by Europe in the Americas, 
since the first phase of nispano-Portuguese slaving 
partnership had ended in 1640, the plantation system had 
become firmly established in America and the Caribbean, occasioning 
English, Prench, oAitch, Lanish and iNorth American interest in 
the Atlantic slave trade, resides, old acquaintances were not 
forgotten. The Spanish ±ndies and Portuguese .orazil continued 
to make use of the labour power of Africans brought by force - 
exploiting them so absolutely, as was characteristic 'of planta­
tion slavery, that the labour force had constantly to be renewed 
by the thousands,
by I69O, it seemed as though the former flourishing slave 
trade between the Upper Euinea Coast and the Spanish Indies was
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about to be renewed. It was in that year, on the 1st January, 
that the second Company of Cacheu and Cape Verde was incorporated, 
in the hope of reviving the commerce of the commerce of the 
ares.^1) It was in that year, too, that the Spanish consul in 
Lisbon pursued the negotiation of an agreement by wnicn Gape Verde- 
Guinea was once more to be the fount of Slaves for the Spanish 
Indies* A Spanish agent was to be appointed to serve in Santiago, 
and a blueprint was drawn up for the employment of captains, crews, 
pilots, etc* The Conselho signified its agreement.^2) After 
some delay, the second company of Cacheu did receive a contract 
in 1694 to supply 4,000 slaves per annum to the Spanish Indies*(3)
At this juncture, nrazil was also crying out for more slaves, 
at the rate of 10,000 per year; and as James Duffy points out,
Angola could not meet th is  quota, e s p e c ia lly  since i t  was supplying  
slaves to o th er p a rts  o f the flew W orld, so th a t  the Upper Guinea 
Coast nad the op tio n  to make good the d e f ic i t  fo r  the Portuguese.(4 ) 
However, demand in  the Americas was c le a r ly  not the on ly  e x te rn a l 
fa c to r  which in flu en ced  the A t la n t ic  slave tra d e , as f a r  as A fr ic a  
was concerned. Of equal, i f  not g re a te r  im portance wasthe
(1 ) The second Company o f Cacheu and Cape Verde rece ived  a 
s ix -y e a r  co n trac t in  1690, but th is  was renewed, and i t
la s te d  u n t i l  1703. See Joao B a rre to : H is to r ia  da Guine, p.141
(2 ) A .h .I)*, Cabo verde, caixa V -  Minute of 10 flov*l690*
(3) .U . * Guine, Caixa II -  flo. 225, m inutesoof the Conselho,
Fee, and May 1694 
^4) James D u ffy : P o rtug a l in  A f r ic a * p . 36 and Portuguese A f r ic a ,
P . 137.
STJlf*
S la v e  T r a d in g  1 6 9 0 -1 8 0 0
capital resources of the various European powers, and tneir 
capacity to deploy such capital into tne African trade in tne 
form of consumer goods. It nas been pointed out that the most 
successful phases of tne history of the Royal African Company 
coincided with those when the Company was equipped to despatch 
considerable amounts of trade goods to Africa; (1) and the same 
applied to other European companies, because of its own 
socio-economic backwardness in the late seventeenth century and 
in the early eighteenth century, Portugal was not in a position 
to respond fully to the increased demand for slaves in brazil 
and other parts of the ivew World; and the Upper Guinea Coast 
was certainly not one of the areas to which the Portuguese 
allocated their meagre resources.
The second Company of Cacheu was incapable of reviving 
Portuguese fortunes in that part of the world. Instead of the 
four ships annually that were promised in the contract, one small 
vessel was all that was foihcoming, with grossly inadequate 
supplies at high prices, as several complaints attested,^2)
Bissau had been hailed as the slave entrepot which would be 
associated with more prosperous times for the Portuguese,^3) 
andit was from there that the Portuguese directed their 
operations on the Upper Guinea Coast in the 1690‘s; but the
^1) K.G. Davies: The Royal African company
(2) A.M.U,, Guin^, caixa II - ho, 219, Jose Pinheiro, 1 July 1692;
and minute of the Conselho, 28 jan 1694.
{3) Salvador Correia da ba had shared this view, bee above,
Ch. V, p.303.
Slave T r a d in g ,  1 6 9 0 *1 8 0 0
Conselho Ultra-marino, after consulting the governor of 
Cape verde and the captain-major of Cacheu, came to the 
conclusion in 1700 that with Portugal's limited finances uissau 
had to go. (1)
jj'or a very brief while after the decision to retrench at 
Bissau, there were signs of business activity/centred round 
Cacheu. The captain-major of Cacheu went so far as to purchase 
slaves from the Royal African Company in the Gambia, ^2) 
reversing the customary roles. This was facilitated by the 
coincidence of the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the 
Royal African company for the slave trade in the Gambia at that 
point,^3) Nevertheless, the Portuguese effort was not sustained 
for long, uy 1707* the captain-major of Cacheu was lamenting 
that the Portuguese could scarcely muster one shipload of slaves 
annually,
When the occasional ship arrived from Portugal, i t  carried 
very few Poiuguese goods. Indeed, ever since the sixteenth 
century this was the case. At that time, it was the Spanish 
who supplied most of the more attractive trade goods which the 
Portuguese used for securing slaves for the Spanish indies*
A.n.U,. Guin£, caixa ll - no. 271,2 72, Castanho, 12 March 1699 
^in favour of the demolition of the fort of Bissau) and 
Salgado, governor of GV, 18 June I699 ^against the demolition),
^2) A.n.U., Gabo verde, caixa v'l - Minute of the Conselho, 10 
nov 1700
(3) K.G. bavies: Op. c i t . ,  p. 236
(4) A .n.U., uuine, mapo 1 -  rau lo  de Abreu e Lima, 30 June I707
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M e tro p o lita n  Spain fu rn ish ed  a v a r ie ty  o f c lo th s , la c e s , threads  
and c lo th in g , ap art from iro n  -  the ind ispensab le  im port on the 
Upper Guinea uoast, re s id e s , wine was brought from the  
^Spanish) Canary is la n d s , and s i lv e r  coin from Mexico and 
C artagena.^ 1 ) ,  subsequent to the breakdown in  the close  
nispano-Portuguese re la t io n s h ip , the goods req u ire d  fo r  the  
A fr ic a n  trade came from the very  “Nations o f the north*' whom the  
conselho u ltran & rin o  u s u a lly  po rtrayed  as P o rtu g a l's  r iv a ls  and 
enemies. The l i s t  o f  e s s e n tia l commodities recommended by lo c a l 
merchants on the Upper Guinea Coast to the second Company o f  
Cacheu comprised t in  and c lo th  from England, iro n  from Germany 
and Sweden, and brandy from P rance*^2) Dutch knives and lin e n s  
were also mentioned re g u la r ly . ^3) Apart from these European 
im ports , the most successful lin e s  were c lo th s  from ceba and 
from the Cape verde is la n d s , so th a t  P o rtu g a l's  c o n tr ib u tio n  
was r e a l ly  m in im al.
Most o f the slaves were c a rr ie d  from the upper Guinea coast 
in  the s ix tee n th  century in  Spanish fbottom sf as a tte s te d  to 
by R ichard Rainolds in  1 5 9 1 ; and once more the shipping powers 
o f ‘.Western Europe succeeded the Spanish in  th is  serv ice  to the 
Portuguese, The re la t io n s h ip  between the Portuguese and the i/utch
^1) See above, Ch, VII}
( 2) A H .U , Guine, ca ixa  I I  -  No. 229, Manuel C ordeira  Santos,
O ct. 1694
^3) See above, Ch, Vllj ff- ^ 03,4-0 6
^4) Richard nakluyt: Voyages, Vol. 3, p*188
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is particularly revealing, The l/utch placed a high priority on 
Portuguese salt, while the Portuguese were dependent upon initch 
ships, ships’ stores and munitions, apart from other manufacturer, 
as U.K. J30xer points out, these commercial ties in Europe were in 
curious contrast to the hostility in colonial affairsi\l) but even 
overseas there was a measure of cooperation, un the upper Guinea 
uoast, the Portuguese authorities were never as anti-Dutch as they 
were anti-Spanish after the ’Restoration1 in I64O, and a few Dutch 
vessels were given permission to carry slaves from the Upper Guinea, 
Coast to prazil in an effort to replace the Spanish.(2)
The E n g lish  had t h e ir  tu rn  as c a r r ie rs  in  the e ig h teen th  
cen tu ry , N icholas Owen mentioned th a t in  1751 the cap ta in -m a jo r o f  
Cacheu had sent fo r ty  slaves and a few tons o f wax to Lisbon on an 
E n g lish  v e s s e l, and on i t s  re tu rn  i t  brought out f o r ty  degredados 
to serve as s o ld ie r s , (3 ) Two years l a t e r ,  evidence was forthcom ing  
from the Portuguese them selves, as the Conselho ch arte red  an Eng lish  
ship to take out b u ild in g  supplies to n issau . The agreement was 
drawn up on a p r in te d  form w ith  the re le v a n t d e ta i ls ,  such as the  
name o f cap ta in  and sh ip , natu re  o f cargo, and d e s tin a t io n , f i l l e d  
i n ; (4) so th a t  the procedure appeared to have been a common one.
(1) C •R. Boxers Portuguese and Dutch Colonial Rivalry,1641-1661
(Lisboa 1958) p.l
(2) See a b o v e , C h . 7
(3) Nicholas Owens Journal of a Slave healer, pp. 33> 34
(4) Guine, ma^o III - April 1753i copy of contract with
captain Samuel Kittridge,
S 3 0
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In 1755, tne captain-major of cacheu reported aggrievedly 
that an English ship from Barbados nad gone straight up to 
Zeguichor on the river Casamance without a pilot, something which 
no Portuguses ship had ever done.(l) This was truly symbolic^ 
because it was in the sphere of navigation that Portugal had led 
the world in the fifteenth century. The truth is that the 
financial and commercial infra-structure of European mercantilism 
and nascent industrial capitalism was never developed within the 
Iberian peninsula, so that the profits of Iberian expansion 
ultimately flowed to banking, commercial and manufacturing centres 
outside of Portugal and Spain. With the pretensions to a monopoly 
of world trade completely shattered by the seventeenth century, 
Portugal became a depressed area of the Western European economy.
Of course, capitalism, even in the days of chauvinist 
mercantilism, was already an international phenomenon; and all the 
advanced Western European powers displayed a great degree of 
interpendence in the buying,selling and transporting of goods 
intended for the African trade. however,* Portugal1s relationship
was one of dependency rather than equality. Joao x>arreto, in 
his history of the Portuguese colony on the Upper Guinea Coast, 
stresses Portugal’s weakness by way of an apologia for that 
country’s responsibility in the Atlantic slave trade, his argument 
in effect is that Portugal's moral blameworthiness should be
U) A . n . U Guine, ma^o ill - Prancisco Roque Sottomayor, 28 
April 1755.
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directly proportionate to the profits they reaped - and these 
v/ere small. "It is curious to note", he writes, ’’that the 
economy of Portugal was the one which profited least from the 
slave trade. In the first place, the national mercantile 
fleet was very limited; the majority of the ships, which, since 
the sixteenth century were used to carry slaves from the African
coast being foreign, and no gain accrued to Portugal ..... In the
second place, Portugal did not produce the articles which the 
slavers made use of in their transactions with the peoples of 
Africa; cotton cloths, trumpery, beads, mirrors, iron etc.” (l)
Moral sophistry aside, he is substantially correct.(2)
The above considerations explain why the suggestion that it was
(1) Joao Barreto: Historia da Guine, p. 285
(2) This view that Portugal declined after the period of 
expansion overseas is widely held, but has not gone 
unchallenged. Frederic Llauro finds the picture of
a decadent Portugal inconsistent with the creation of 
an empire in Brazil, and demonstrates that profits from 
the Atlantic trade flowed into Portugal. V/hat is 
surprising, however, is that in a study avowedly devoted to 
’’commercial capitalism”, a supra-national phenomenon, the 
author does not establish Portugal's role as a sector of 
European commercial capitalism. The Iberian peninsula was 
often the direct point of entry for much of Europe's gains from 
mining, trade and plantations overseas, but how much remained 
within Spain and Portugal is an issue which cannot be 
overlooked. See Frederic LUaurosLe Portugal et L'Atlantique 
au XVIIe Sieole, 1570-1670
(He formulates the problem in his introduction)
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from the latter part of the seventeenth century that 
■Portuguese uuinea entered a new period of prosperity".is somewhat 
premature,^1) The heavy demand for slaves in the Americas 
was not automatically reflected in increased exports from the 
upper Guinea uoast through Portuguese agency, in spite of the 
fact that Angola alone could not fulfill the Brazilian 
requiremats , The period of prosperity for Cape Verde-uuinea was 
to come in the second half of the eighteenth century, when the 
Portuguese demonstrated both the ability and the willingness to 
inject capital into the commerce of the area. In the meanwhile, 
other European powers were more favourably placed; and the French 
in particular kept the slave trade in the ueba-uambia region from 
ever falling to as low an ebb in the seventeenth century and the 
early eighteenth century a3 it did in sierra Leone.
although no rrench company was ever formed to operate w ith  
i t s  headquarters in  the "R iver> o f the south% most o f the companies 
in  the Senegal took a sporadic in te r e s t  in  th a t  d i s t r i c t .  In  f a c t ,  
the coafct between Cape Blanco and the B ijagos is lan d s  was the  
most p r o f i ta b le  p a rt o f the tra d in g  zone o f the French Senegal 
Company in  the l a t t e r  seventeenth c e n tu ry ,(2 )  Between 1685 and 
1689, the agents o f the Benegal Company managed to secure 
2,800 slaves through t h e ir  fa c to ry  a t  B is s a u .(3 ) Subsequently, 
the French continued to pay a t te n t io n  to B issau, and s e rio u s ly  
contem plated e re c tin g  a f o r t  e ith e r  on Bissau o r the neighbouring  
is la n d  o f Bulama a t the tu rn  o f the seventeenth cen tu ry , during  
the regime o f an en erg e tic  d ir e c to r ,  Andre Brue, who fo llo w ed  the 
precedent set by 3)e la  Courbe in  v is i t in g  the d is t r i c t  south 
o f the Gambia.(4 ) A p paren tly , an attem pt a t the co n s tru c tio n
U )  James D u ffy : P o rtug a l in Africa, p .36
(2 ) J . iviachatj Documents, p .78
(3 ) See above Ch. V j^ -3 oC.
(4 ) J .  Labat: Nouvelle  R e la tio n ,Y o l . v ,p p .87-114 (D e a lin g  w ith  
tne v i s i t  to nissaii and the attem pts to b u ild  a f o r t )
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of a fort at or near Bissau in 1723 was abandoned only-
after the shipwreck of supplies. (1)
In spite of the lack of a fort, which was probably no
great disadvantage, the French dominated the scene at Bissau
for most of the first half of the eighteenth century, causing
the prices of slaves to rise, and making it virtually impossible
for the Portuguese to compete.(2) The most intensive French
slaving on the Upper Guinea Coast took place between 1736 and
1744* Every year during that period, a ship was despatched
from Gor6e along v/ith a sloop, which plied the rivers between
November and Hay. Between 1744 and 1752 > the coast was relatively
free of the French because of their involvement in v/ars in Europe.(3)
These observations, which were made by the Portuguese on the
Upper Guinea Coast, are in accordance with the evidence generated in
Europe. The period 1714 to 1744 was a flourishing one for the
premier French slave trading city of Nantes, and the Upper Guinea
Coast did have some share in this,indirectly through the Senegal,
as well as directly in the form of ships to the Banana Islands
and Cape Mount. Of the 126 ships which left Nantes with their African 
destinations named, 24 went to Senegal and 12 to Cape Mount. (4)
(1) J, Barreto: Hist or ia da Guine, p.1445 and A.H.U., Guine' 
ma^o I - Antonio de Barros Bezerra, 30 July 1724*
(2) A.H.U, Guine, ma^o I - Antonio de Barros Bezerra, 10 May 1727
(3) A.H.U.,Guine', raa^ o III - Francisco Roque Sottomayor, 12 March 1752
(4) Gaston-Martin: L ’Ere des ITegriers (1714 - 1744) (Paris 1931)
p.188
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In spite of general prosperity, the trade of the port was 
virtually stagnant during some years, such as 1725 ” 1726 and 
1747 - 1748# Above all, the Seven Years War proved a disaster 
as far as the French merchants trading to Africa and the West Indies 
were concerned#(l)
Intervals provided by French and English confrontation in Europe 
gave Portugal much needed breathing space on the Upper Guinea Coast 
and allowed for a recuperation in the latter half of the eighteenth 
century. Once more, it was envisaged that Bissau would be the focal 
point for the revival, and this set in motion a series of events with 
a very familiar ring. The campaign was opened on the religious front 
on the basis of the news in 174& that the king of Bissau wished to 
be converted,that he needed new clothes, and that he would allow a 
fort to be built. Indeed, it v/as emphasised that the Portuguese were 
the only nation to v/hom permission to build a fort had ever been 
conceded, and that agreement was still valid.(2) However, the 
parallel with the previous fort-building episode at Bissau v/as 
stretched further by the fact that Papel cooperation was not readily 
forthcoming, in spite of the permission to start building.(3)
In fact, on this occasion, force had to be used to gain the 
Portuguese objectives.
(1) Ibid:pp.l73, 201, 266
(2) A.H.U, Guine,ma^o II - Minute of the Conselho, 25 Sept 1748 
(7) Roo p.bove, Ch.V^ ^3 1 /
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Apparently, same preliminary construction got underway 
on the island of Bissau in 1732 under the guidance of the 
Afro-Portuguese official who represented the Portuguese crown 
on the island during the many years since 1702 when the captain- 
major was witndrawn. nut, when the frigate, xiossa Sennora 
da Estrella, anchored off the island in peoruary 1753 with heavy 
equipment and men for the fort, it was not welcomed. The Papels, 
under General Palanca, decided to oppose landing and disembarkation 
in the teeth of the ship’s guns. unfortunately, it was with 
good reason the mandinga muslirns never sold 1greegrees1 against 
“great guns' .(1) The papels simply provided fodder for the 
Portuguese cannon.; and within two days of the commencement of 
hostilities on the 17th February 1753 > the papels were suing 
for peace. Several merchant ships in the Bissau harbour at the 
time had sided with the Portuguese frigate, and their casualties 
totalled a mere nine men dead and a few wounded.(2)
Tne whole op eration  was handled by the captarn-major o f  
Uacheu, Francisco Roque Sottomayor, who had accompanied the f r ig a te  
from Uacneu in  a y a c h t. ne had fo rm e rly  been in  Angola, and 
boasted th a t h is  f irm  hand there  had e x c e lle n t r e s u lts ,  since he 
had taken a lead in g  ro le  in  the m i l i t a r y  suppression o f the Gingas and 
the peoples o f j&atamba. ^3) ne was in  Angola between 1734 and 1742,
( l j  P . Beavers A fric a n  memoranda, p .210; and see above Uh.lX  
\2) JJ. peress hossa senhora da E s t r e l la ,  p p .16-25
OJ A.n.U., uuine, ma^o ill - prancisco Bottoraayor,2 9 April 1755
£ 3 < o
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and thus served under the Angolan governor, Joacquim Jacques de 
*,agalhaes (1 7 3 8 -1 7 4 8 ).(1 )  From Sottom ayor’ s rep o rts  in  1755, i t  
emerged th a t  he b e liev ed  in  a "tough l in e " ,  and was appalldd  a t the 
way th a t the ru le rs  on the upper Guinea Coast were pampered w ith  
g i f t s . (2) I t  is  not s u rp ris in g , th e re fo re , th a t  the new era  o f the 
Portuguese in  Bissau should have begun w ith  v io le n c e . Furtherm ore, 
d u rin g  a l u l l  in  the f ig h t in g  o f February 1753, an im portant Bissau 
f id a lg o  was shot dead by a Portuguese s o ld ie r ,  w h ile  engaged in  an 
a lte r c a t io n  w ith  aottom ayor. The k ing  o f B issau, Anhanheta Co, though 
fo rced  to accept the f o r t ,  was not prepared to acknowledge ssotto- 
m ayor's a u th o r ity , and wrote the king  o f P o rtug a l in  A p r i l  1753, 
req u estin g  th a t  th is  o f f i c i a l  be r e c a l le d . (3 ) Sottomayor, as governor 
o f Cacheu, v/as in  any case on ly  on a temporary m ission to B issau, 
and the Guinea tra d e r , JMicolhao de Pina A ra ja u , was given an 
honorary appointment to adm in is ter the is la n d .
Personal antipathy was the least of the complicating factors 
in this new Portuguese attempt to restrict the freedom of the papel 
rulers by building a fort. In spite of being regularly supplied with 
Portuguese ships for the next year or two, the fort of Bissau 
literally never got off the ground.
(1) J, Ribeiro da Cruz: Resumo da historia de Angola (lisboa 1940)
P.133
(2) A.H.U., Guine, ma^o III - Francisco Sottomayor, 28 April 1755
(3) A.H.U., Guine, ma^o Y - Anhanheta Co, 13 April 1753* (Another 
version of this incident, more favourable to Bottomayor, is to be 
found in I). Peres: flossa Senhora da Estrella, p.18
5^7
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One o f the main problems w aslabour. The prisons o f  P o rtug a l 
were scraped to provide degredados to send to Bissau and uacheu 
as lab o u rers  and s o ld ie rs .^1 ) The m o r ta lity  ra te  was extrem ely  
h ig h , and a f te r  a few years the Conselho had to r e ly  p r im a r ily  
on lab o u r brought from the Cape verde is la n d s , since the Cape 
Verdeans found i t  r e la t iv e ly  easy to a c c lim a tis e  themselves in  
uissau;v2J and y e t the death t o l l  continued. The second major 
d i f f i c u l t y  was the la c k  o f te c h n ic a l s k i l l .  The engineer brought 
out by the f r ig a t e ,  flossa Senhora da E s t r e l la ,  in  1753 d ied  
w ith in  two weeks o f la n d in g ,^ )  an<i  there  was no one to take h is  
p la c e . Thus in  1755» the cap ta in -m a jo r o f B issau, iNicolhao 
de P ina  A ra ja u , stressed th a t the work could not proceed w ith o u t  
an eng ineer to draw up plans fo r  the f o r t . ( 4 ) .  as i t  turned o u t, 
i t  was not u n t i l  1765 th a t an engineer was despatched from the  
uape Verde is la n d  o f uogo to x>issau, and on ly  a f t e r  th a t was such 
a fundam ental m atte r as a rc h ite c tu ra l drawings attended to .
^1) 1). reress "hnotapoes nistoricas11, in planta da rraga de jissau
PP.84 ,85  *
^2) A.H.U., Cuine, ma^o lV - minute of uonselho, 20 Oct 1758
{3) u. jreress hossa aenhora da Estrella, p. 25
(4; -U. Jreress "jmota^oes ^istorioas", in plant a. da i-rana. da
-ois.qau, pp.80,81
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In the meanwhile, there had occurred one of the mo3t 
decisive events in the history of Portuguese slaving on the 
Upper Guinea Coast - the formation of the Company of Grao Para 
and llaranhao in 1755. It took over responsibility for the 
construction of the fort of nissau, and for maintaining Cacheu 
and other points on the mainland; and for two decades it conducted 
the Portuguese slave trade on the Upper Guinea Coast. As the name 
implies, the Company was designed to serve the interests of the 
Portuguese in the Brazilian states of Para and ITaranhao. At that 
time, those states were the most underdeveloped on the Atlantic 
coast of notthern hrazil with a small European settler population.(1) 
Portuguese were still attempting up to the mid- eighteenth century 
to harness the labour of the indigenous Indian population; but 
this system was not functioning well, as far as agricultural 
productivity was concerned, and there were famines in 1754 an<i 
1755.(2) It was against this background that the Company of 
Grao Para and Ivlarannao was conceived to solve the problem of 
mao de obra.
While the first company of Cacheu was proposed and backed by
Francisco Varnhagens nistoria Geral do Brasil (3rd edition,
Bio de Janeiro, 1926) Vol.4*Section XLI, p.108
(2) Report of tne Lords of the Committee, 1789 - Part VI,'Portugal*
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traders from the Upper Guinea Coast, who were relatively 
undistinguished private citizens and who had to petition for 
several years before they gained recognition in Lisbon,(1) the 
idea of the creation of the slave trading Company of Grao Para 
and Maranhao was first mooted by Francisco Xavier Mendon<ja 
Purtado, governor of Para and brother of the Marquis of Pombal, 
the first secretary and de facto ruler of Portugal.(2) Pombal*s 
sponsorship of tne suggestion made by his brother ensured that 
the Company had wide privileges and that its charter was readily 
granted; while, in contrast to the previous Portuguese companies 
operating on tne Upper Guinea Coast, the company of Grao Para 
was well endowed, being floated at a time wnen Pombal was 
streamlining tne administration and finances of the Portuguese 
state. It boasted a share capital of 1,200,000 cruzados, was 
grai.ted land in urazil and was equipped with two frigates by 
the Portuguese crown. it was registered on the 7th July 1755 
with a twenty-year concession - to begin when the first company
ship left Lisbon, which was on the 26th April 1756.(3)
(1) See above, Ch.Vj f-"LfX.
(2) Furtado became a minister and Secretary of State sometime
during the 1760*8,
(3) J. Lucio d'Azevedo: 0 Marquez de Pombal e a bua Epoca 
Lisboa 1909) pp. I63-I65
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Apparently, the statistics of slave exports from the 
Upper Guinea Coast in the twenty years spanned by the Company 
of Grao Para are not available, but the volume of the trade is 
indicated by three factors: firstly, the strenuous efforts 
which the Company made to protect their interests on the Upper 
Guinea Coast; secondly, the extreme profitability to the shareholders, 
which was a most unusual feature for these joint-stock endeavours 
trading to Africa;(l) and thirdly, the influx of slaves into Para 
and Maranhao, most of them being acknowledged as originating from 
Bissau and Cacheu#(2)
Bissau's most prolific period of slave trading during which it 
sometimes surpassed Luanda,(3) was presaged a year or two before 
the Company of Grao Para and Maranhao went into operation# The 
Conselho was reliably informed in April 1755 that since the previous 
year Bissau had handled more slaves then ever before# Several 
Portuguese ships had left loaded with captives; one French ship 
took more than 25O, while another was in the process of loading and 
had accumulated 240; and there was yet another Portuguese vessel 
which had close to 200#(4)
(1) See above,Ch.VII
(2) Grande Enciclopedia Portuguesa e Brasileira# Entry under 
"Companhia Geral do Grao Para e Maranhao"#
(3) J. Duffy: Portugal in Africa, p. 36
(4) A.H.U.. Guine", majo III - Francisco Sottomayor, 29 April 1755
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T.7ith this report added, firstly, to the information in 1751 that 
the English slave traders in Sierra Leone were despatching large 
quantities of slaves, and secondly to the evidence of increased 
fighting and raiding in the hinterland at that point, it can he cleaily 
established that the aenith of the Atlantic slave trade on the Upper 
Guinea Coast dated from the mid-eighteenth centur#. Supply, demand 
and capital investment were all complementary.
In dealing with the Africans, the Company!s approach v/as 
quite similar to that of the Portuguese crown, in that they utilised 
the services of priests and missionaries to intercede on their behalf 
with the Bissau king and nobility. After getting renewed permission 
in 1765 to carry on with the fort, the Company promised that they would 
not hinder the trade of other Europeans, though the Papels by no means 
fully accepted this blatant piece of dissimulation. Even though the 
Bissau king v/as bought over by bribes, his council remained divided, 
and the majority of his fidalgos were sceptical of the Portuguese 
entrenching themselves in such a manner as to be able to pursue 
their policy of monopoly. Later, it v/as affirmed that the king of 
Bissau had met his death by Witchcraft1, because of this unpopular 
decision, (l) In the meanwhile, the Company of Grao Para and iilaranhao 
had unloaded men, munitions and materials; and began construction 
in a tense atmosphere.
By 1785* the efforts put into the second fort of Bissau 
had resulted in nothing more than a badly laid foundation, which was 
abandoned and a third venture initiated. The sum total of human
(l) A.H.U., Guine, maco V - Sebastiao da Cunha Sottomayor,5 Aug 1766
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Endeavour that went into this fort - called the Sao Jose" de Bissau - 
would have been heroic in most contexts other than that of the 
Atlantic slave trade. It was not completed until the 20th August 1775 
and the last decade alone of its erection cost 2,602 lives*(l)
The soldiers mutinied because of inadequate rations; the rate of 
work at best was very slow; the rain undid what had been done in 
the dry season; and the Papels resisted passively by witholding 
foodstuffs* But the determination of the Conselho and the Company 
of Gr&o Para and Maranhao was demonstrated by the Conselho*s 
willingness to provide a well armed frigate to support Portuguese 
forces on the mainland, and by the fact that the Company expended 
the enormous amount of 147*690,763 reis* (2)
The outlay in Bissau and to a lesser extent in Cacheu and 
Cabo Verde did not stop the Company of Grao Para and Maranhao from 
realising great profits for its stock-holders, including Pombal himself, 
to whom considerable sums were disbursed in the name of his wife* (3)
(1) Bernardino de. Andrade: Planta da Prapa de Bissau* p. 51
(2) J. Mendes da Cunha Saraiva:HA Porteleza de Bissau e a Companhia 
do Grao Para e Maranhao", in Congresso Comemorativo do Quinto 
Centenario do Descobrimento da Guine (Lisboa 1946) Vol. 1
p 190 (He is of the opinion that the fort was completed
by the end of 1773; but this was an inference as opposed 
to the direct evidence of De Andrade who was in Bissau*
See p. 188)
(3) J. Lucio d'Azevedo: 0 Marquez de Pombal* p. I65
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Above all, the Company justified its existence in terms of importing 
a labour force for the provinces of Para and Maranhao* At least, 
while there is some doubt as to its efficacy in Para, all historians 
of Maranhao are in agreement that the agricultural prosperity of that 
area dated from the era cof the Company* Prom a position where it was 
on the verge of ruin, Maranhao began to produce rice and cotton, on a 
scale which brought it into line with the richer provinces.(l) Thus 
it was that the Company of Grao Para and Maranhao epitomised the 
tri-continental implications of the Atlantic slave trade.(2)
V/hen the contract of the Company of Grao Para and Maranhao v/as 
about to expire, great efforts were made to have this profitable 
monopoly renewed, but to no avail, and it went into liquidation in 
February 1778*(3) This meant that the basic tasks of revenue 
collection and the maintenance of officials, forts and factories 
devolved’ once more upon the Conselho Ultramarino* In 1780, the 
Conselho decided to reorganise the fiscal system for Cape Verde and 
the Upper Guinea Coast establishing Santiago, Bissau and Cacheu as their 
revenue posts. This plan yielded little results, and the revenues
(1) Francisco Varnhagen: Historia Geral do Brasil, Vol.4,pp*307,308
(2) The Company was also a crucial issue in the conflict between 
Pombal and the Jesuits, both in Portugal and in Brazil. One 
Jesuit priest declared that those who joined the Company of 
Grao Para would not enter into the Company of Heaven. See 
J. Lucio dfAzevedo: Op* cit.
(3) Francisco Varnhagen: Op. cit., Vol. 4, P* 307
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were farmed three years later to a private company, the Commercial 
Society of the Islands of Cape Verde.(l) However, it is again to 
he stressed that the inability of the Portuguese administration to 
develop techniques to secure revenues was no indication of the volume 
of trade.
After the demise of the Company of Grao Para and Maranhao, the
Portuguese on the Upper Guinea Coast maintained their connection with
Brazil, and continued to send a regular flow of slaves to that country.
Very occasionally, this emerges from their own records. For instance,
Company
an administrator of the Caixay of Grao Para and Maranhao who was 
stationed at Bissau, wrote in 1778 that Cacheu exports had registered an 
immediate decline after the Company came to an end, but it nevertheless 
exported 800 slaves, while Bissau despatched 1,200.(2) In May 1793 
the captain-major of Bissau reported that during the season just 
concluded he had despatched more than 1,000 slaves to Brazil, (3)
Then, in the second decade of the nineteenth century, the attempts to 
put an end to the Atlantic slave trade by legislation and treaty 
provoked responses from Brazil and the Upper Guinea Coast, v/hich 
showed that a substantial trade persisted between two regions. On the 
5th October l8l8, the governor of Rio de Janeiro wrote the governor of 
Cape Verde, expressing his concern over the suppression of the slave trade
(1) J. Barreto; Historia da Guine, p. 154
(2) A.H.U.,Guin^, mayo III - Jaao da Costa, 1778
(3). A.H.U., Guine, mayo X - Jose Antonio Pinto, 10 May 1793*
o* 4 * '
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"which the factories of Guinea have conducted, until now* with such 
well-known profits, hoth with those very islands (the Cape Verde Islands) 
and with some Brazilian ports*’• (l)
Other observers commented in the late eighteenth century on the 
pattern of trade mentioned above, whereby some captives from the Upper 
Guinea Coast went to the Cape Verde Islands (and to the Madeiras), while 
the majority were despatched to Brazil. Indeed, Para was still the 
destination of 2,000 of these Africans every year, according to Golberry, 
while 1,000 went to Cape Verde and the Madeiras. Goldberry and another 
French informant, Labarthe, also provided the useful information that 
in 1786 the ’Portuguese1 trade on the Upper Guinea Coast was controlled 
by Englishmen resident in Lisbon; (2) indicating that Pombal*s reforms 
had not succeeded in ousting English capital. (3) The British 
Parliamentary enquiry into the Atlantic slave trade in 1789 revealed 
the same dependence of the Portuguese on foreign imports, which then 
had to be re-ezported to Africa. Figures of the Portuguese slave 
trade were also provided. They transferred a total of 20,000 slaves 
annually from West Africa, three-quarters of whom were from Angola.
(1) Joao Barreto; Historia da Guine, p. 180
(2) S.M. Golberry: Voyage en Afrique. Vol. 2, pp 231>232; and 
P. Labarthe; Voyages au Senegal, p. 144
(3) Pombal*s attempts were aimed primarily at English holdings 
in the wine industry of northern Portugal.
S la v e  T ra d in g ,  I 69O -  1800
Roughly one-seventh of the remaining 5>000 came from Juda on the
Slave Coast> with the Upper Guinea Coast accounting for over
4>000. (l) Not only was this figure quite distinct from the
export of slaves by other Europeans ard by the North Americans,
but in fact the main impetus behind the Atlantic slave trade on
this section of the V/est African littoral was not Portuguese but English.
After the Royal African Company had been driven from Sierra 
Leone in 1728, the English private traders were the only ones with 
whom Lopez could trade, and they came to dominate completely the 
commerce of the region. (2) Pence Island was occupied by three 
London merchants - Alexander Grant, John Sargeant, and Richard Oswald - 
and in 1744 their title to this island was upheld by the British Crown, 
so that in 175^ > Bence Island, unlike the other possessions of the 
Royal African Company did not pass into the hands of the Company 
of Merchants trading to Africa. Of equal importance with the 
act of George III which gave these London traders title to Bence Island,
was the agreement with the local sovereign, who considered the land
as being rented to Grant, Sargent and Oswald. In fact, a number of 
separate contracts with the neighbouring African rulers allowed most
(1) Report of the Lords of the Committee, 1789, Part VI, 'Portugal*
(2) Arquivo Colonial, Vol. 1, "Locumentos acerca a Serra Leoa"
sr^ 7
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and they were, renewed when the assets of these three merchants were
acquired by John and Alexander Anderson.in 17&5 (l)«
Meanwhile, the Banana and Plantain islands, which had long
been the haunt of private traders, had risen to great prominence, along
with the islands off modern day Conakry, the Idolos. The Bananas and
Plantains became the home of the mulattoes, while the Idolos were
taken over by a Liverpool firm, headed by one Barber, and known on the
coast as the Liverpool Company. In 1755 materials were brought out to
construct a solid factory on one of these tiny islands where the Bulloms
had strewn their Xinas, (2) and the land-based structures were
supplemented by an 800-ton ship, permanently moored in the port. It
carried 24 guns for defence, and on it was stored the most valuable
merchandise (3). The factory at Bence Island was even more impressive.
Well furnished quarters of residence and ample storerooms were protected 
by a strong fort; while the island also boasted a golf course of two holes*
(1) Claude George: The Rise of British West Africa (London 1903 
pp.285, 286.
(2) Arquivo Colonial, Vol. 1, "Informapoes da Guine em 177711 •
(3) S.M.Golberry: Voyage en Afrique, Vol. 2, p. 237> and J. Montefiore: 
An Authentic Account of the late expedition to Bulama (London 1794)
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Bence, the Idolos, the Bananas and the Plantains were all strongly 
manned by whites, mulattoes and blacks; and adequately supplied with 
boats which they built and conditioned themselves. a)
The impressive infra-structure of the English slaving industry in 
Sierra Leone during the second half of the eighteenth century was not 
wasted. It showed results in increased productivity. The scope of the 
Atlantic slave trade as conducted on the Upper Guinea Coast at this 
period and more specifically in Sierra Leone, has not been fully 
appreciated. It is held that the exports of slaves only reached 
significant proportions during and immediately after the American war of 
Independence (1776 -85)j (2) but while this short period v/as undoubtedly 
a peak, the general level throughout the second half of the eighteenth 
century was high.
As cited earlier, one apparently reliable opinion of slave trading 
in Sierra Leone in 1751 was that it v/as ’prodigious1. (3) Translated 
into statistical terms, this would have meant at least a few thousands 
per year. Judging from the accounts of Nicholas Owen, who was familiar 
with the coast betv/een 1750 an<t 1757, a*id that of John Newton, who made
(1) S.II. Golberry; Voyage en Afrique, Vol. 2, pp. 239, 240; and
J. Llachat: Documents, pp. 116, 124
(2) Peter Kup: A History of Sierra Leone, pp. 60, 61; and Christopher
Fyfe: A History of Sierra Leone; p. 7
(3) See above, Ch. IX ^
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three voyages to Sierra Leone between 1750 an^ 1754? it would appear
that Sierra Leone was capable of filling the holds of several small
vessels over a trading season through a process of accumulating a few
at a time at every port and cove, with the resident whites and mulattoes
acting as agents. Besides, the extension of the Sierra Leone trade-net
to the north was responsible for a great many more slaves. It was
said that the English from Sierra Leone took 1,000 slaves from Bissau
during the first five months of 1748; (l) and when it came into being
faced with the fact 
in 1755? the Company of Grao Para and Llaranh^ fo was inSxrousad that English
competition 7/as the greatest threat in the area. (2)
Important European wars did have disruptive effects, as discussed
earlier in the case of the French, and the evidence of Nicholas Owen
clearly pointed to the difficulty of obtaining European goods and hence
slaves after the outbreak of the Seven Years War. (3) However, peace
in Europe allowed the exploitation of Africa to be fully resumed.
The French closely watching their rival*s progress noted that, as far
as the slave trade was concerned, English commerce flourished after
1763; and this v/as maintained until after the outbreak of the American
Y/ar of Independence. In 1778? information reaching the French Minister
(1) A.H.U., Guine, ma^o V - Report c. 1749 advocating a new 
Company to Brazil.
i
p(2) N* Owen: Journal of a Slave Dealer, pp. 75?80
(2) J .1.1. da Cunha aaraiva: "A Forteleza de .Bissau e a Compannia do 
Grao Para e Marannao*' (Op. cit.)
Tra.fllnfl»T 1630-1800
of Marine gave English exports as 3*000 from the 0amM a.
2.000 from the ('asamance, Cacheu and. the Dijagos, and
4.000 from Sierra Leone. 1^) Wherever these figures can be 
checked against alternative sources of evidence, they are more 
or less corroborated. Witnesses before the Lord's Committee on 
the Slave Trade in 1789 indicated that the Gambia trade then 
stood at between 1,200 and 1,4Q0 slaves per annum, but that it 
had been declining steadily for nearly two decades, and nad in 
fact been 2,500 some 17 years previously, that is, in 177?* {2 )  
Another English slave trader who had served at the Liverpool 
Company's factory in Idolos between 1768 and 1770 stated that 
they handled 2,500 slaves per year in Sierra Leone.^3) Possibly 
he was excluding the hence Island figures and certainly the 
Sherbro-Cape Mount trade. The governor of Goree gave the total 
figure for Sierra Leone as 4*500 in June 1778 (^ 4) wnile the 
previous year a Portuguese official of the .Bissau Port wrote 
that the English factories in Sierra Leone collected more
u ; J. Macnat: Documents, p. 116
V ) Report of the Lords of the Committee, 1789 - Part 1,
• Slaves *, evidence of Mr. heatley.
(3 ) Report of the Lords of theCommittee , 1789 - Part 1,
1 Slaves1 Evidence of Mr, James Penny
w J . Machat: Documents, p. 116
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than 5,000 slaves every year. ^1) When these minor 
discrepancies are ironed out, they substantiate the view 
that the slave trade on the Upper Guinea Coast as conducted 
by the English had got into full stride after the interruption 
of the Seven tears V/ar, and had not been immediately affected 
by the outbreak of the American War of lndpendence in 1776,
It was not u n t i l  1779 th a t the E ng lish  fa c to r ie s  on the  
Upper Guinea Coast s u ffe red  a ttacks  as a d ire c t  consequence 
o f e x te rn a l wars, as had occurred during  e a r l ie r  phases o f  
Anglo-uutch and Anglo-prench m i l i t a r y  c o n fro n ta t io n ,(2 ) The 
jrrench welcomed the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f being able to deal a few 
blows a t the E nglish  in  the Senegambia andon the Upper Guinea 
Coast, They were co n fid en t th a t w ith  complete c o n tro l o f  the  
coast they would secure ann ua lly  3*000 slaves from the Gambia;
300 from the Casamance and the uijagos and 6,000 from Sierra Leone
O )
1,1) Arquivo Colonial, vol. 1, **mforma<joes da Guine em 1777”
This was supplied by x»ernardino de Andrade. When he 
published his description of the upper Guinea Coast 
in 1796, he revised this to "between 8,000 and 
10,000”. bee planta da Prapa de nissau, p, 53
(2) See above, Ch. vI ^ p .  i f  I
(3) J. Machats Documents. p. 135 {■)
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The Lostonians struck first at the Liverpool Company 
factory at the Idolos and deprived the .french of this plum; 
but the French commander Ponteves, made a thorough job of 
demolishing the ^ence settlement in march of 1779* The spoils 
taken from the slave barracoons and storerooms allowed two 
ships to be sent to Saint uomingue with slaves, while ivory 
and camwood were fowarded to jrrance. (1) let, even these 
were temporary setbacks from which the English slave traders 
recovered within five years.
A most ironical situation arose in 178 5 when the French 
resprted to the came factories which they and the Americans 
had bombarded, and the English, without bothering to rebuild 
to the previous standards of luxury or solidity, were only too 
happy to supply the .french Y»est Indian market. In January 
1785» "the Liverpool society concluded an agreement with a 
company of ne .^avre bachelor, rorbison and carmichel), under 
which the English were to deliver in the course of a year
3,000 slaves to one captain Rousseau, an accredited agent of 
the trench company. The slaves were to be of both sexes and 
of all ages and were to be chosen by the captain and paid for 
at a rate of 600 francs per head. Captain Rousseau arrived 
in the river Sierra Leone on the 25th September 1785 and by
l^j J. Machatj Documents, p. 124
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the 1st May he had packed and despatched 2*000 slaves
to the French sugar colonies in shps commissioned by
his company. he then awaited the arrival of more vessels
to take the remaining 1,000 who were already assembled.
Similar orders were captured by the Liverpool Company in
1787 and 1788 on behalf of commercial houses in ivantes. (1) 
Certain influential Frenchmen who were cognisant of
this state of affairs, felt that it was intolerable that the
French colonies should be dependent upon an English source
of supply, and that the English should reap profits in the
process. naving failed to secure any of the uritish
possessions in the Gambia or bierra Leone by war or by
P
treaty, the French hoped to gain an entree into the bierra 
Leone trade by occupying the small island of Gambia in 
the bierra Leone estuary. Their choice of this site was 
based on the fact that a Frenchman named uannibal had been 
residing there since 1772, earning his livelihood by 
handling some 30 to 40 slaves per year. Another French 
citizen, Ancel, joined him in 1780 and took over the 
following year when Hannibal died, in the 1785-86 trading 
season, he handled 140 slaves. The French administration 
therefore hoped to displace these petty adventurers with a 
capitalised enterprise.
^1) b.1,1. Golberry: Voyage en Africue. vol. 2, pp.274-281
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Having obtained permisLion in 1786 from king Haimbana 
to settle on Gambia island, the French for a brief wnile 
demonstrated a serious purpose in the Sierra Leone area. They
introduced a garrison, as well as experienced Alrican traders 
from the Senegal; ^1) but the effort was overpowered by the 
unhealthiness of Gambia island, as well as by the determination 
of the English at Hence island to brook no competitors,(2) 
hence island, which was under the Andersons of Philpot 
Lane ^London) since 1785, had enjoyed even greater prosperity 
than the Idolos after the American War of Independence. In 
1785 and during the first five months of 1785, the hence traders 
had delivered to the Danes more than 3,000 slaves, besides which 
they sent to the English colonies nearly 4,000 (3)*
Most of the above information was provided by the French 
captain, Lajaille, who went to Sierra Leone to negotiate the 
establishment of the factory on Gambia island. The figures 
given for tne exports of the English factories of the Idolos and 
hence alone totalled 10,000 for tne year 1785-86 (4)
^1) A, Y/urie: "The uundukas of Sierra Leone", in Sierra Leone 
Studies ^hew SeriesJ Ho. 1, Dec, 1953.
(,2) P. Labarthej Vhyages au Senegal, pp.151,155,240
s .m . Golberryj voyage en Afriaue. vol. 2, p.282
^4J Ibid - That is to say, 3,000 to the Danes, 3,000 to the 
French and 4,000 to the English.
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This contrasts with the estimates of 3,500 given by matthews 
and Horris, two Liverpool representatives before the Lords* 
Committee•^1) nowever, for the purposes of this analysis, 
it is enough to know that the slave trade of the English in 
Sierra Leone was reckoned in thousands, and that the same was 
true of the Portuguese, The scale of the trade can then be 
assessed in relative rather than absolute terms. On the one hand, 
the upper Guinea coast was one of the least afflicted sections 
of the West African coast. As stated earlier, 4,000 slaves 
exported annually by the Portuguese from the Upper Guinea Coast 
measured up against 15,000 from Angola; while, according to 
Rorris, the 3,500 captives taken by the English from Sierra 
Leone supplemented by J00 from the Gambia, were to be seen 
against 10,000 per annum taken from the Gold Coast, 14,500 
from honny and new Calabar, and 13,500 from the Congo and 
Angola. On the other hand, within the context of the history 
of slaving on the upper Guinea coast, the latter part of the 
eighteenth century was a period of frightening activity.
^lj Report of the Lords of the committee, 1789 - Part 1,
1 Slaves *.
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Part II - "The Scars of the Atlantic slave trade"
Recently, there has been an attempt to revise the portrayal 
of the Atlantic slave trade as a purely destructive force in West 
Africa. It is contended that "the Portuguese slave trade began 
with violence and destruction, but soon became orderly"; it brought 
rulers manufactured goods and revenue; and in many cases the 
relationship between African and European was one of equal trading 
partners. (1) The weakness of this line of argument is that it 
calls attention to certain aspects but not to the totality of the 
Afro-European connection in which the Atlantic slave trade played 
so giant a role. For the most part, therefore, these propositions 
cannot be sustained, and have in fact been implicitly refuted in 
the earlier account of the Hispano-Portuguese slave trade and the 
discussion of the nature of Afro-European commerce on this section 
of the West African littoral.
Order, for instance, was introduced into the conduct of the 
Atlantic slave trade only in the sense that Europeans ceased direct 
raiding and turned to trade. But, the rapine and plunder, the 
organised manhunts, the kidnapping that bred more kidnapping, the
(1) The Transatlantic Slave Trade from West Africa (Centre of
African Studies, University of Edinburgh, Mimeographed Report 
of Conference held in June 1965) See "The Impact of the Slave 
Trade on West Africa" by Christopher Fyfe, pp.8l-88 and 
subsequent discussion.
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deterioration in the customary law - all these lay behind the facade 
of the relatively orderly and peaceful agreements between European 
slavers and coastal chiefs. Once the alliance was established, it 
is important to underline that the African rulers managed to maintain 
not simply equality but sovereignty, in their personal contacts with 
the Europeans. However, the commercial nexus was an entirely 
different matter. Here there could be no equality, because the 
demands of a developed system of production were imposed upon a 
society which scarcely rose above subsistence agriculture. The 
Africans displayed a weakness for and indeed an obsession with 
European commodities, and given this fatal flaw, the tragedy unfolded 
inexorably. The impression that the African society was being over­
whelmed by the involvement with the European economy was most 
strongly conveyed at points when the Africans conceded that their 
slaving activities were the consequence of the fact that nothing but 
slaves would purchase European goods. (1)
In a limited sense, the African ruling class benefited by 
obtaining European goods. On the Upper Guinea Coast, the traditional 
ruling class was partially replaced by the mulattoes and by members 
of the Mande and Fula groups, but at all times it wan the members
(1) See above, Ch.IV, p. 2.33
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of the ruling stratum who received the best cloth, (1) drank the 
most alcohol, (2) and preserved the widest collection of durable 
items for prestige purposes. (3)* It is this factor of realised 
self-interest which goes some way towards explaining the otherwise 
incomprehensible actions of Africans towards Africans.
While empathy with the African rulers is a difficult 
exercise, this is not the cnse with the Europeans. As individuals 
and as part of an economic system, they sought profits in a strictly 
definable sense, and they calculate*^ threw aside all restrictions.(k) 
In modem society, rules are drawn up to protect the members of 
possessing class from devouring each other, and even to prevent 
them from eating the workers raw; but on the Upper Guinea Coast 
and the West African littoral as a whole, capitalism paraded without
even a loin-cloth to hide its nakedness. With no restraints on
(1) See, e.g., Manuel Alvares: "Ethiopia Menor" (He describes the 
Papel chiefs as having rich silks and brocades) Also K.G.
Davies: The Royal African Company, p.176 (The point is made
that woollens were normally too expensive to use as slave 
goods, but were given to the coastal rulers as ’gifts')*
(2) See above, Ch.VII, p.
(3) P* Cultru: Premier Voyage de Sieur de la Courbe, p.232.
(He lists a large number of articles in the possession of 
the Farim Cabo, which were virtually useless except for 
purposes of ornament and display.)
(4) See above, Ch.IV, p.x^7
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either side, the confrontation between the two cultures, which 
produced the Atlantic slave trade, was neither peaceful nor 
orderly, contrary to the exploratory revision, and it proved 
entirely detrimental to African society, which was the weaker party.
The methods by which the Atlantic slave trade were conducted 
on African soil could lead to none other than destructive con­
sequences. On the basis of observations made in the Senegambia 
in 1787 and 1788 (and later confirmed in Sierra Leone) the anti­
slave trade advocate, C.5. Wadstrom, categorised the methods of 
the trade as warfare, pillage (under which he included attacks by 
kings against their subjects)} robbery (by which he meant kidnap­
ping by the Europeans), and treachery or stratagems. Of the wars 
he had this to say: "these predatory incursions depend so much 
on the demand for slaves that if in any one year there be greater 
concourse of European ships than usual, it is observed that a much 
greater number of captives from the interior parts of the country 
is brought to market the next." He also noted the sale of 
individuals for "acts of petty larceny which scarcely deserved the 
name of crimes"; the professionalism associated with slave raiding; 
and the protection extended by the ruling class to their own kin.(l)
(1) C.B. Wadstrom: Observations on the Slave Trade and a 
Description of Some Part of the Coast of Guinea during
Voyage made in 178? and 1788 (London 1789) pp.1-17» 27* 28.
£~<bo
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Thus, the methods of the slave trade were In essentials
no different in 1787 from what they were in 1686 when the Capuchins
wrote; and by 1800, given the cumulative effect of nearly three and
a half centuries of slave trading on the U.G.C. the destruction was
proportionately more marked. For one thing, the disquietude and 
disruption had been spread further inland, and for another, upon 
the coast itself conditions had deteriorated to a state of near 
anarchy.
In the 16th and early 17th centuries, the Portuguese and 
Spanish appeared to have secured most of their slaves below the 
limit of the tides on the river, but subsequently the effects of 
the Atlantic slave trade were felt further and further inland.
On the Gambia, for example, in places where Jobson had found that 
the people had had little to do with the coastal trade and were 
thus unmindful of tolls and customs, Mungo Park found them grasping 
for the petty profits which this European-generated trade allowed 
the Africans. (1) Some sixty years before Park, Hiehard Moore had 
commented on the great distance inland that the slave trade was 
pursued, with the majority of captives proceeding from the deep 
hinterland; (2) while six decades prior to that, Coelho had observed
(1) Mungo Park: Journal..1805, PP»69»73
(2) Richard Moore: "Travels into the Interior Parts of Africa", 
in Thomas Astley: A New and General Collection of Voyages 
Vol.2.
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that the Basserels on the middle Gambia were the chief victims 
of the Mandinga slave trade; (1) so that the progressive 
intensification and extension of trade along this main waterway 
is well illustrated.
South of the Gambia, the situation was quite similar.
In the latter years of the 17th century, the greatest business 
ally of the Europeans on the U.G.C. was the Farim Cabo. (2)
Below the province of Cabo or Gabu, that is, to the south of the 
Corubal, the Portuguese and Afro-Portuguese made the territory 
of the Susus into their principal purchasing zone. The Bence 
Island factor of the RAC claimed in 1703 that the Susu country 
was the "Portuguse Arcana", which was supplying most of the 
products for the coast by that date. (3) Besides, the Fulas had 
already joined the Mande as the foremost suppliers of slaves on 
the U.G.C. in the late seventeenth century, and this was even 
more marked during the Jihad.
It follows from the locale of the Fula campaigns that a 
significant proportion of captives were taken from beyond the 
Futa Djalon watershed. After 1730, the Fula and Sulima armies 
fought in Sangara and beyond, that is to say, considerable 
distances to the east of the Niger. Non-Islamicieed Mande and
(1) See above, Ch.IV^/5
(2) P. Cultru: Premier Voyage de Sieur de la Courbe, pp.252,253
(3) P.R.O.. T?0/l*f - Greenaway, 18th March 1703*
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the Kissis seem to have been the main victims of these assults.(l) 
In the latter eighteenth century, the word 'Kissi1 made its 
appearance as the name of a small river north of the Searcies. 
Certainly the Kissi tribe lived nowhere in that vicinity, but it 
is conceivable that the name arose bacause of the large number of 
Kissis who were brought to the coast at that point. The factory 
on the Idolos was well positioned, precisely because the main 
flow of slaves from the hinterland reached the coast on the rivers 
north of the Searcies. (2) A report of 1778, relating that the 
victims secured at the Idolos were in poor physical shape after 
travelling great distances in a slave coffle, (3) suggests that 
this was a pattern identical with that described by Mungo Park, 
who personally journeyed with such a coffle from beyond the Niger 
to the Gambia estuary. (4)
Although three-quarters of the slaves exported from the 
U.G.C. in the eighteenth century were said to have come from the
(1) See above, Ch. IX, f> iTJt
(2) Captives reached the coast on all the main rivers between the 
Gambia and the Searcies, but sometimes for one reason or
another, a particular river had the greatest traffic. When
John Matthews was on the coast in 1785-87* the Pongo had 
replaced the Nunez as the most important slave route. See
A Voyage to the River Sierra Leone, p.11.
(3) J* Machat: Documents, p.128.
(4) M. Park: Travels..1785-87
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interior, (1) it was on the narrow coastal strip that the impact
of the trade was most marked. For one thing, in the hustling years
of the eighteenth century, the frequency of direct European attacks
on the Africans was much greater - often in alliance with a resident
trader or a chief. Several such incidents involved North American
ships, (2) possibly because of their relative inexperience in the
trade. Besides, greater trade meant more slaving captains making
their last voyages, and these individuals were always prone to
'panyarring' a few extra victims. (3) Obviously, these depredations
took place close to the waterside.
However, as was true in the era of the Spanish registros,
what mattered moat was the setting of tribe against tribe and the
exploitation practised by the African ruling class on its own
subjects. By the latter part of the eighteenth century, the
cumulative effects of both these practices threatened to tear apart
the littoral societies in which they obtained - which meant
virtually the whole of the U.G.C. Acts of opposition to the Atlantic
(1) Report of the Lords of the Committee, 1789 - Part I, 'Slaves'
Evidence of Mr. James Penny.
(2) C.B. Wadstrom: An Essay on Colonisation, pp.76
and M. Winterbottom: An Account of the Native Africans of 
Sierra Leone, and A.M. Falconbridge: A Narrative of Two Voyages 
to the River Sierra Leone, p.35.
(3) J. Newton: Journal of a Slave Trader, p.109
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slave trade on the part of the Africans were as unsuccessful as 
they were rare. In 1720, for example, Tomba, a Baga chief, tried 
to organise opposition to the slave trade in the Pongo area. His 
alliance of a few villages inevitably failed, and he himself was 
placed on a slave ship. Obviously an indomitable individual, Tomba 
led a revolt on board ship, killing three of the crew, but paid for 
his courage with his life. (1) It is also true that the Balantas 
and the Djolas remained largely indifferent to the slave trade; and 
when raided, the Balantas retaliated with great ferocity. They not
only beat off attacks on their homes led by Afro-Portuguese from
Bissau, but they retaliated by raiding the island of Bissau for 
cattle. (2) But to greater or lesser extent, all were involved and 
all were consumed.
Labat, writing in 1728, after having gained his impression 
of the U.G.C. in the early years of that century, was struck by the 
continual round of wars, piratical expeditions and skirmishes in the 
area where the Portuguese had so long been present: namely, the 
Gambia-Geba district. He commented that"the Europeans who trade in 
this country are careful not to preach peace and union; this would 
be contrary to their interests, because their wars are solely for
(1) J. Atkins: A Voyage to Guinea, pp.42,72
A.H.U., Guin£, ma^o V - Relajao of the 2nd Nov 1778.
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the capture of slaves11. (1) While it would be impossible to prove 
that every instance of hostilities was directly motivated by the 
Atlantic slave trade, it is at least clear that all other motives 
had been subsumed by the slave trade. John Newton, on the basis 
of his experiences as a slave trader in Sierra Leone around the 
middle of the eighteenth century, was very guarded in his statements 
on this matter. He thought that it was quite unnecessary for the 
Europeans to arrive on the shore and provoke a specific casus belli, 
but he was convinced that with the cessation of the Atlantic slave 
trade the incidence of violence on the coast would decline dramat­
ically. (2) In effect, what had happened was that once the original 
impulse had been given by the European demand for slaves, the 
tragedy played itself out.
On the Malaguetta Coast, where the Manes had once trod, the 
picture in the eighteenth century was one of conflict that probably 
retained some of the elements of tribal imperialism, but these were 
submerged under the Atlantic slave trade. The coastal peoples 
raided inland to procure slaves, and then the interior peoples 
retaliated, starting a cycle of wars. The slave trader, John Atkins, 
relating the situation around 1720, attested to the fact that the 
inland nations of the Malaguetta Coast had suffered from the
(1) J. Labat: Nouvelle Relation, Vol.V, p.133
(2) J. Newton: Journal of a Slave Trader, pp.108,109*
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•panyarring1 forays of the littoral inhabitants, and in consequence 
had moved down and destroyed several towns and villages. For a 
while, trade was at a standstill, (1) but by 1728 the agent of the
R.A.C. in Sierra Leone wrote that rtthere is at present a great
number of slaves in this place, the people being at war with those 
of Bassoe where the malaguetta used formerly to be bought in plenty, 
but the people of Cetera Crew make daily inroads upon them and bring
off many slaves.” (2)
Several years later, violence from the direction of the 
Malaguetta Coast again reached Sierra Leone. It was said in 1730 
that the whole country between Mana and Sierra Leone was in a flame 
of wax. (3) The Mendes must have been involved in these hostilities. 
Nicholas Owen reported that the Konos and Bantas were among the 
victims of the slave trade as pursued in the Gallinas. (4) The 
BantsS are in fact a sub-group of the Mendes, left by the first Mane 
passage, (3) while the Kono3 were closely related to the Vais. By 
the early 19th century, both the Mendes and the Vais advanced 
towards the coast to take up the leading roles in the Atlantic slave
(1) J# Atkins: A Voyage to Guinea, p.73
(2) P.R.O., T70/1465 - Diary of Walter Charles 1728.
(3) J* Newton: Op. cit., p.23
(4) N. Owen: Journal of a Slave Dealer, p.54
(3) V* Person: ”Les Kissi et les Statuettes de Pierre”, in
Bulletin de 1*I.F.A.N., Tome XXIII; and see above, Ch.II.
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trade of the Gallinas and Cape Mount. (1)
There was a point at which even the slave traders had to 
put a brake on the coastal wars. Wadstrom’s diligent enquiries 
into the nature of the slave trade in Sierra Leone about the year 
1793 elicited the information that formerly the whites often 
encouraged •palavers1, promising presents of liquor if the 
prisoners were sold to them, and they gave ammunition to both 
parties in any war. However, by that time, f,the inhabitants being 
much diminished, and their wars interrupting remoter trade, the 
factors have endeavoured to preserve peace to secure the people 
inland a free passage down.” (2) The notorious John Ormond was 
named as one who used his influence to put a stop to hostilities 
on the coast so as to ensure the flow of the much more lucrative 
interior trade. (3) This was a tacit admission on the part of the
slave traders themselves of the chaos that the Atlantic slave trade
had brought to the coast.
To the tribal feuds there must be added the innumerable 
personal vendettas fed by the many sharp practices which Mercado 
in 1569 termed enganos (deceits) and Wadstrom in 1787 called
(1) For the Vais, see Captain Canot: Adventures of an African 
Slaver, p.302; and for the Mendes in the 19th century, see 
C. Fyfe: Sierra Leone Inheritance, section 12.
(2) C.B. Wadstrom: An Essay on Colonisation, p.77
(3) Captain Canot: Op. cit.
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"treachery or stratagems” . In the opinion of Bernardo de Andrade, 
these acts to ensnare private individuals had multiplied to such 
an extent as to 'engulf* the Africans. Though he had served for 
many years as an official of the slave trading company of Grao 
Para and Maranhao, De Andrade wrote the Portuguese Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs in 1798 urging that if the slave trade 
were replaced by other forms of enterprise, it would mean that the 
people of the Upper Guinea Coast would "put an end to their 
continuous dissensions and return to agriculture." (1)
Above all, any analysis of the impact of the Atlantic 
slave trade must take into account the fact that the coastal 
society had always been differentiated and stratified. This was 
what primarily determined the way in which external forces were 
received and internalised. When one traces the exploitation of 
the majority of the society by the dominant layer then the full 
extent of the destruction wrecked by the Atlantic slave trade on 
the society of the Upper Guinea Coast is revealed.
By the eighteenth century, the African ruling class in 
relation to its own subjects was no longer carrying out its 
functions of maintaining order and policing the state. These were 
incompatible with the mode of production which they had adopted 
in response to the lure of European goods. Their responsibilities
(1) Bernardino de Andrade: Planta da Prapa de Bissau, p.50
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for the security of the persons of their subjects had been almost 
entirely jettisoned during the centuries of supplying the European 
slave ships. Even the Poro, the greatest pillar of Sape and later 
of Mane society, was no longer a cementing force in the society, 
but simply an instrument in the hands of the slave trading chiefs;(1) 
and the same seems to have been true of the womans' organisation, the 
Bundu. (2) The active assaults of the ruling class on their 
subjects moved from the plane of perverted justice to outright man- 
stealing. In the Gambia, kings raided their own outlying villages 
under cover of darkness; (3) the sort of incident referred to by 
Clarkson, probably the best informed protagonist of his day. (4)
In reality, even the coastal ruling class had been over­
whelmed in the gross trade that they had helped to conduct. Many of 
them had been replaced by chiefs of Mande origin, often professing 
Islam, as noted earlier. (5) This was particularly true of the 
Nalus, Bagas and Temnes; while elsewhere the mulattoes had stepped 
into the breach. Where the old coastal ruling class persisted, 
usually as the headmen of petty settlements, they were as debt-
(1) See above, Ch. VIII /'/’■‘Pf,
(2) T. Winterbottom: An Account of the Native Africans of Sierra
Leone.
(3) C.B. Wadstrom: Observations on the Slave Trade, pp.7*8.
(4) Thomas Clarkson: History of the Abolition of the African
Slave Trade. (London l8o8) Vol 1, p.13
(5) See above, Ch.IX^ jQ.f'iC.
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ridden as the West Indian planters who ultimately received a large 
proportion of the slaves; and because of their indebtedness to the 
mulatto and white factors they were forced to sell their subjects 
or be sold themselves. (1)
Matters had clearly reached an extremely low ebb, when one 
of the principal means of becoming a slave was to be found guilty 
in a "sauce palaver", that is to say, to be adjudged to have been 
rude to a member of the ruling class. (2) This meant that even the 
informal rules of behaviour in relation to constituted authority 
had assumed the form of law, and were contributing to the Atlantic 
slave trade. *
Of course, the African rulers continued to protect them­
selves, even to the point where they sought the return of any noble 
who had inadvertently been shipped to the Americans. In 1792, for 
example, the king of Bissau wrote the king of Portugal demanding 
the return of the fidalgo Ijala, who had been carried in Maranhao, 
and also the recall of the official who had permitted this. (3) 
Besides, by this time, many of the rulers on the coast were Muslims,
(1) See above, Ch. VIII
(2) T. Winterbottom: An Account of the Native Africans of
Sierre Leone, p.127
(3) A.H.U., Guine', maqo X - King of Bissau, 20 June 1792; and
Petition of Bissau residents, 1793•
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and this provided further protection. (1) Conversely, the mass of 
the people were still exposed both to capture and to recapture if 
they managed to escape. In 1731* when the Portuguese signed a 
contract with a Beafada noble for the setting up of a trading 
settlement at La, on the river Geba, it included a "fugitive slave 
clause" in which the noble undertook to return all escapees. (2)
It was, therefore, the common citizens or plebeus, whose 
vulnerability was at its maximum. The Lords' Committee on the 
Atlantic slave trade had good reason to ask their witnesses whether 
the Africans "enjoy any protection from any Civil Eights they have'U3) 
For the vast majority of the people on the U.G.C. the answer was in 
the negative. Their civil rights had evaporated as the laws of 
their society had become deformed to facilitate a trade which was 
a constant threat to their existence. Under these circumstances, 
individuals had to seek their own means of security. "They never 
care to walk even a mile from home without firearms; each knows 
it is their villainies and robberies upon one another that enables 
them to carry on a slave trade with Europeans", wrote John Atkins 
in 1721. (4) Overlooking this informant's brazen inversion of
(1) See above, Ch. IX^
(2) A.H.U., Guin£, raaqo V - Copy of doagao by Tamba Ocho Nanquim,
30 June 1751-
(3) Report of the Lords of the Committee, 1789 - Part I, "Government,
Religion, Manners and Customs", question put to Robert Norris
with respect to the Gold Coast.
(4) J. Atkins: A Voyage to Guinea, p.151
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cause and effect, his testimony clearly points to a state of 
insecurity bordering on anarchy. Another graphic illustration 
of this was to be seen in the dislocation of villages in Sierra 
Leone, and their re-siting in almost inaccessible hide-outs, away 
from the main waterways and the slave raiding chiefs. (1)
In the face of the above information, it is totally mis­
leading to refer to the society of the U.G.C. at the end of the 
slave trade as 'traditional*• Indeed, it is no exaggeration to 
maintain that "the social, political and economic life of West 
Africa became reorganised to produce one result, a steady flow of 
slaves for ships anchored along the coast". (2) Yet, far too often, 
there has been a ready acceptance of reports on West Africa in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as representing certain time­
less institutions, and it is even assumed that the field studies of 
'indigenous' African societies in the twentieth century constitute 
a fundamentally unchanged pattern. In many instances, this is far 
from the truth, and the regime of law and punishment is the first 
case in point.
When a modern ethnographic survey of Sierra Leone indicates 
that "punishments formerly included" enslavement for a wide variety 
of crimes, (3) this itself needs to be placed in historical
(1) See above, Ch. VIII ^ 9
(2) D. Mannix and M. Cowley: Black Cargoes, p*32
(3) M. Mc.Culloch: Peoples of Sierra Leone, pp.24,25
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perspective rather than constituting historical evidence valid for 
an earlier period. In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
most of the tribal societies between Sierra Leone and the Gambia 
enslaved individuals locally on the basis of the same petty crimes 
which they had used to stock the slave ships. No doubt, the 
English administration of the Gambia thought it was bringing 
enlightenment to the backward natives by refusing to return slaves 
who had escaped from the Mandingas of Combo, on the left bank of 
the Gambia estuary; while the Mandinga chiefs accused the English 
of "abetting their criminals and... receiving offenders flying from 
punishment brought upon them by their own conduct". (1) However, 
one Portuguese official was able to perceive the relationship 
between the patterns of legal punishment and the Atlantic slave 
trade, drawing attention to the fact that the Djolas provided an 
exception. He wrote as follows: "The Felupes (Djolas) never made 
slaves, nor did they sell their own kind, as did their neighbours, 
and, from this fact there resulted a great difference between the 
penal morality of the one from the others: on the one hand, the
Felupes punish murderers and feticeiros by seizing their goods, 
demolishing their houses and exiling them; and for thefts, cases 
of wounding and adultery, they exact fines and compensation; - the 
Cassangas, the Banhuns and nearly all the people of the coast, 
punish everything with captivity, which in many instances embraces
(1) J.M. Gray: A History of the Gambia, PP-319,320 (Citing Lt.
Gov. Huntley of Bathurst, 23 July 1840)
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the whole family"• (1) Having placed this in the context of the 
mild penalties requested before the Atlantic slave trade had made 
its impact, nothing more need be said. (2)
The captivity referred to above was an entirely local 
matter, persisting long after the Atlantic slave trade had ended.
One of the most widely held generalisations about 'indigenous1 
African society which stands in greatest need of a close re-appraisal 
is the contention that slavery and other forms of social subjection 
prevailed on the African continent before the arrival of the 
Europeans, and facilitated the rise and progress of the Atlantic 
slave trade. Daniel Mannix has been cited earlier in this study as 
espousing this view. (3) He spelt it out as follows: "many of the 
Negroes transported to America had been slaves in Africa, born to 
captivity. Slavery in Africa was an ancient and widespread institu­
tion, but it was especially prevalent in the Sudan". (4) According 
to P.D. Rinchon, "from the earliest days of the trade, the majority 
of the Negroes were living in a state of servitude, and the native
chiefs did not have far to seek for the human merchandise". (3)
(1) H.A. Dias de Carvalho: Guin^, Apontamentos Ineditos, pp 72,73
(2) See above, Ch. IV7
(3) See above, Ch. IV^ f 197 , I 92 •
(*f) D. Mannix and M. Cowley: Black Cargoes, p.43
(3) D. Rinchon: La Traite et l'Esclavage des Congolais par les
Europ^ens (Brussels 1929) P-1&9
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A third and more judicious expression of this view comes from 
J.D. Fage. After stating that African "domestic slavery" involved 
relatively small numbers, and after making it clear that this 
institution was in no way comparable to slavery in the Americas, 
he adds that "nevertheless, the existence of domestic slavery has 
an important bearing on the development of the slave trade in West 
Africa... The presence of a slave class among the coastal peoples 
meant that there was already a class of human beings who could be 
sold to Europeans if there was am incentive to do so... So the 
coastal merchants began by selling the domestic slaves in their own 
tribes." (1) From a chronological assessment of the society of the 
U.G.C. it can be demonstrated not only that these tenets are 
inapplicable but that, on the contrary, it was the Atlantic slave 
trade which spawned a variety of forms of slavery, serfdom and 
subjection in this particular area.
Not only did the Upper Guinea Coast have a lengthy associa­
tion with the Atlantic slave trade, beginning in the 14-60's and 
extending over four centuries, but it is also a very useful 
exemplar as far as the present problem is concerned, because the 
so-called African 'slavery' was known to be widespread in this 
region during the colonial period, and emancipation was eventually 
brought about by the intervention of the metropolitan powers
(1) J.D. Fage: Introduction to the History of West Africa 
(London 1959) P»78.
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involved. Sometimes, what obtained was a quasi-feudal exploitation 
of labour by a ruling elite, who received the greater portion of 
the harvest as in the use of the rounde or "slave towns" of the 
Futa Djalon. (1) At other times, the "domestic slaves", as they 
have been categorised, were members of their masters' households. 
They could not be sold, except for serious offences; they had their 
own plots of land and or rights to a proportion of the fruits of 
their labour; they could marry; their children had rights of 
inheritance, and if born of one free parent often acquired a new 
status. Such individuals could rise to positions of great trust, 
including that of chief. (2)
Quite obviously, R.S. Rattray's well-known description of 
the Ashante 'slave', (3) which is cited in most discussions on this 
subject, (k) is fully applicable to the Upper Guinea Coast. Rattray 
was primarily concerned with the "slave child" (Odonko ba). whose 
privileges were quite different from those of their parents and 
foreparents. On the Upper Guinea Coast too the servants born in 
the household were distinguished from the individuals who were
(1) P. Marty: Islam en Guinee
(2) M. Mc.Culloch: Peoples of Sierra Leone, pp.28,29*68
(3) R.S• Rattray: Ashanti (London 1923) pp.4-0-*f3» 222,230
(4-) E.g., Stanley Elkins: Slavery, A Problem in American Institu­
tional and Social Life (New York 1963) P*96; and 
Basil Davidson: Black Mother, p.4-0 (For a full discussion 
of African 'slavery' and 'serfdom' see pp.33*^0)
*77
SLAVE TRADING 1690-1800
recruited from captives of war or from those pledged and not 
redeemed. These latter were vulnerable to sale, being exchanged 
for goods as well as serving as currency in a number of transactions 
such as marriage payments. During the latter part of the nineteenth 
century, after the Atlantic slave trade was no longer conducted 
from the Upper Guinea Coast, one of the major problems facing the 
administration of the colony of Sierra Leone was the persistence 
of the internal slave trade, mainly supplying victims to the Mande 
and the Fulas. (1) Thus, an examination of the society of the Upper 
Guinea Coast at a relatively recent date does reveal the presence 
of a category of slaves, as well as agricultural serfdom and 
personal service.
In seeking the roots of the indigenous slavery and serfdom 
of the Upper Guinea Coast, and in attempting to juxtapose these 
phenomena with the Atlantic slave trade, one is struck by the 
absence of references to local African slavery in the sixteenth or 
even the seventeenth century, when such evidence could reasonably 
be construed to mean that the institution preceded the advent of 
the Atlantic slave trade. Sometimes, the word 'slave' was indeed 
used, but so loosely as to apply to all the common people. For 
instance, the Jesuit, Alonso de Sandoval, reported that while in 
Cartagena in the early seventeenth century, a priest who came over
(1) C. Fyfe: A History of Sierra Leone, See Index, under "Slave 
Trade, internal".
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on a slave ship told him that all the talk about the injustice of 
slavery was nonsense, because all the Negroes were slaves of 
absolute kings. Sabdoval then went on to pin-point the king of 
Casanga on the river Casamance as one such absolute monarch, whose 
subjects were his slaves. (1) In this arbitrary and figurative sense, 
the word 'slave1 is equally applicable, not only to the common 
people of Europe at that time, but also to the proletariat of the 
world today.
There is only one clear instance where labour services on 
the Upper Guinea Coast were associated with the limitation of the 
privileges of free men. In Sierra Leone, at the beginning of the 
seventeenth century, when a subject was in danger in one kingdom, 
he could flee to the court of another king and place himself at the 
mercy of the latter. He became the 'slave' of that king, either 
remaining in his service or liable for sale (to the Europeans). (2)
At that time, local customs were already influenced by the presence 
of slave-buying Europeans, as well as by the arrival of the Manes 
as an alien ruling element some decades previously; but the 
essentials of the practice almost certainly preceded these two 
external factors. In 1507* the Fortuguese chronicler, Valentin 
Fernandes made a statement which could refer to nothing else:
(1) Alonso de Sandoval: Natureleza de Todos Etiopes
(2) B.R.A.H., Papeles de Jesuitas, tomo 185* No.13^6* Barreira,
l6o6.
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’’The king has no servants other than his slaves. Sometimes a 
young stranger arrives and seeks the protection of the king, who 
looks upon the young man as his own". (1)
The interlude of the Manes is itself quite instructive.
When Hawkins arrived at Sherbro island, he found that the Sapes were 
being used as the 'slaves' of the Manes to produce a wide variety 
of agricultural crops. (2) This points to the subjection which 
automatically followed conquest, but no institutionalised slavery 
or serfdom resulted in this instance, because the invaders were 
rapidly integrated and had essentially the same relations with their 
subjects as the previous rulers. What did matter was that within the 
social structure there was much greater antipathy between the rulers 
and their subjects. Sales of Sapes by the Manes are thus adequately 
explained, firstly, in terms of warfare and, secondly, in terms of 
class exploitation. (3) In any event, the Atlantic slave trade had 
started long before the Manes arrived. In so far as the society of 
the Upper Guinea Coast can be reconstructed at the moment of contact 
with the Portuguese, one can discern, at the very most, the presence 
of a small number of political clients in the households of the kings 
and chiefs of the area. If they were to have constituted the pad 
for launching the Atlantic slave trade, it would never have left the 
ground•
(1) Valentim Fernandes: La C&te Occidentale d'Afrique, p.82
(2) Hakluyt Society, No.LVII, The Hawkins Voyages
(3) See above, Ch.II, p.//£and Ch.IVj ^ .7-0/
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It is difficult to believe that any observer could possibly 
have overlooked features such as chattel slaves, agricultural serfs 
or even household servants if these were numerous and disprivileged 
enough. Several of the sixteenth and seventeenth century Portuguese 
descriptions of the Upper Guinea Coast are replete with details of 
the structure of African society on that section of the West African 
littoral; and the only distinction that they consistently emphasised 
was the one between rulers and subjects - the fidalgos and plebeus.(1) 
For the neighbouring Senegambia, Valentim Fernandes left testimony 
that the Wolof nobles had several households, each comprising a 
wife, children and 'slaves', the latter working six days for the 
mistress and one day every week for themselves. (2) Alvares de 
Almada in 159^ also referred to Fula 'slaves' ruling the Wolofs. (3) 
Both these writers dealt with the area between the Gambia and Cape 
Mount at great length, without mentioning any similar phenomena.
On matters of trade, even more than on matters of ethno­
graphic interest, the early Portuguse chroniclers were scrupulous
in recording details. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
they knew of the trade routes between the Futa Djalon and the coast, 
linking the littoral peoples with the Mande and Fula of the interior.
(1) See above, Ch.I^ /
(2) Valentim Fernandes: La C6te Occidentale d'Afrique, p.10
(3) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", pp.23**, 233-
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Yet, in enumerating the products exchanged, they never once 
mentioned or hinted that slaves were involved in this commerce 
although it was specified that the Moors purchased slaves in the 
Senegambia. (1) Cloths, pieces of dried indigo and iron bars were 
noted as being the circulating media in the barter economy of the 
Upper Guinea Coast, but never slaves in the early period. Non­
mention in such circumstances is presumptive of non-existence.
Though one can identify no African slavery, serfdom or the 
like on the Upper Guinea Coast during the first phase of European 
contact that region was one of the first sections of the West 
African coast from which slaves were exported; and the transfer of 
Africans from the Upper Guinea Cost to the Spanish Indies in the 
sixteenth century was already a significant undertaking. In part, 
this was based on inter-tribal raiding, but if any internal division 
was necessary for the initiation of the Atlantic slave trade, it 
was available not in the relationship of free vs slave, but in the 
contradiction between the nobility and the commoners.
While the view that African slavery and "domestic slavery" 
preceded and stimulated the Atlantic slave trade has been given wide 
currency, no thought has been spared for any other possible connec­
tion between the two- Was it merely coincidence that it was only 
after two and a half centuries of slave trading that the vast 
majority of the peoples of the Upper Guinea Coast were said to have.
(1) See above, Ch.VII^ <4 c ^  <-* tO
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been living in a state of subjection? Curiously enough, Mungo Park, 
though he added his authority to the pro-slavery arguments, had 
posed this question, while absolving himself from answering it.
After describing what amounted to both chattel slavery and household 
service in the Senegambia and the western Sudan, he wrote: "How far 
it is maintained and supported by the Slave Traffic which, for two 
hundred years, the nations of Europe have carried on with the 
natives of the coast, it is neither within my province, nor in ny 
power to explain." (1)
It is a striking fact that the greatest agents of the 
Atlantic slave trade on the Upper Guinea Coast, the Mande and the 
Fulas, were the very tribes who subsequently continued to handle 
the internal slave trade, and whose society came to include signifi­
cant numbers of disprivileged individuals labouring under coercion. 
The sequence of events pointed in that very direction in which Mungo 
Park had not cared to look too closely. In the first place, the 
political and religious dominance of the Mande and the Fulas over 
the littoral peoples of the Upper Guinea Coast in the eighteenth 
century was based on a mixture of motives, among which the desire 
to sell more slaves to the Europeans featured prominently. Thus 
the Atlantic slave trade can immediately be tagged as being partly 
responsible for the vassalage to which the coastal tribes were 
reduced. In the second place, the raiding of individuals for sale
(1) M. Park: Travels, pp 297*298
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to the Europeans encouraged the marauding tribes to retain numbers 
of their captives to serve their own needs. When, for example, 
the Mandinga Farim Cabo raided his neighbours to obtain captives 
for the slave ships he retained a small proportion for his own 
needs. (1)
One of the most direct connections between the Atlantic 
slave trade and the nineteenth century pattern of social stratifica­
tion and oppression on the Upper Guinea Coast lay in the fact that 
numbers of Africans were captured with a view to being sold to the 
European slavers, but they remained for greater or lesser periods 
(or sometimes for ever) in the service of their African captors.
To begin with, there was usually a time lag between capture and the 
moment when a buyer presented himself. Then, there were always 
individuals whom the Europeans rejected for one reason or another; 
while the African merchants also decided against carrying through 
the sale under certain circumstances.
De Almada related that on one occasion on which the 
Portuguese refused to buy some 'pieces' who had been kidnapped by 
Fulas, the latter killed their captives. (2) This may have occurred 
in isolated instances, but, in general, persons who were offered for
(1) P. Mateo de Anguiano: Misiones Capuchinas en Africa, Vol.2
p.136? and P. Cultru: Premier Voyage de Sieur de la Courbe
pp.250-52
(2) Alvares de Almada: "Rios de Guine", pp*274*275
\SLAVE TRADING l690-l800
sale and who were not purchased by the Europeans were utilised for 
the economic benefit of their African captors. C.B. Wadstrom, an 
activist in the movement for the colonisation of Sierra Leone, 
addressed himself to interviewing those engaged in the Atlantic 
slave trade in the area on this specific point, Firstly, there was 
the testimony of the chief of Port Loko, who affirmed that those 
captives whom the Europeans did not buy were always put to work on 
the coast. Secondly, "two other intelligent native traders 
mentioned the great number of slaves now confined on the coast for 
purchasers: one trader had no fewer than 200.•• They said that the 
slaves would certainly not be put to death; for nobody was ever put 
to death, except in war or for crimes". Further questioning by 
Wadstrom revealed that when the average price of slaves fell from 
160 bars to 120 bars, the king of the Fulas, to bring the European 
slave traders to terms, forbade his subjects to carry any slaves 
down to the coast. As a consequence of this manoeuvre, the Fula, 
Mandinga and Susu territories had become full of slaves who were 
set to cultivate rice. (1)
For the sake of safety, the captives were put to work in 
small groups. (2) Ever since the seventeenth century (and perhaps 
earlier), it had been the habit of the Mandingo Farim Cabo to
(1) C.B. Wadstrom: An Essay on Colonisation, pp.113-117* See
also J. Matthews: Voyage to the River Sierra Leone, P. 14-7
(2) C.B. Wadstrom: Op. cit., p.117-
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disperse his captives among his subjects, expecting to have them 
returned when a buyer was available. (1) Those captives thus 
became for a while literally "household slaves" of the Mandingas.
At any given moment, therefore, two of the components of the 
domestic slave population of the Upper Guinea Coast as viewed by 
observers at the end of the eighteenth century would have been, 
firstly, captives drafted into alien tribes in servile disprivileged 
positions, as by-products of the Atlantic slaving industry; and 
secondly, the real products, who were stock-piled in bond for export.
The majority of the tribes of the Upper Guinea Coast were 
active participants in the Atlantic slave trade, and most of them 
must have retained supplies of slaves for domestic consumption.
But the Mandingas, Susus and Fulas stood well to the fore - partly 
because of their own key role in the slaving operations on the Upper 
Guinea Coast, and partly because they succeeded in reducing many of 
the littoral peoples and the inhabitants of the Futa Djalon to a 
state of vassalage, under the banner of Islam. Military conquest 
and political ascendancy involved in most cases nothing more than 
the payment of tribute, but in some instances the Mande or Fula 
ruling class was directly super-imposed on the subjugated peoples.
The latter were not dispersed within individual households, but were 
grouped together in the roundes or "slave villages", which were
(1) P. Cultru: Premier Voyage de Sieur de la Courbe, p.252
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economic units producing for the benefit of the master class.
During the latter part of the eighteenth century, some of 
the Mandinga chiefs on the Upper Guinea Coast had "slave towns" 
with as many as 1,000 inhabitants. Travelling in Sierra Leone in 
1823* Major Laing found that Falaba, the capital of the Sulima Susus, 
had its own "slave town", Konkodoogor^e. Intense agricultural 
activities were carried on there, and the fields in that area were 
the best tilled and best laid out that Laing had seen in his 
travels. (1) Several other European observers, both before and 
after Laing, commented on these roundes. Matthews, for example, 
in the 17809s, noted that it was not unusual for the headmen of 
Sierra Leone to have 200 to 300 'slaves', while some of the 
Mandinga rulers had between 700 and 1,000 inhabitants in their 
"slave towns". He estimated that at least three-quarters of the 
Susus, Bagas, Bulloms and Temnes were already enslaved in their 
homelands, while the percentage was higher among the Mandingas. (2)
In the late 1820's, Canot also attested to this high proportion of 
inhabitants of the Fula and Susa countries who lived in a state of 
subjection. (3) In some instances, their status was far removed 
from slavery, but the fact remains that the social relations in the
(1) A.G. Laing: Travels, p.221
(2) J. Matthews: A Voyage to the River Sierra Leone, p.1^9
(3) Captain Canot: Adventures of an African Slaver, p.128
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society of the Upper Guinea Coast had been profoundly altered in 
the direction of disprivilege and unfreedom during the period of 
contact with the Europeans, and the Atlantic slave trade bears the 
major share of the responsibility.
It was also at the tail-end of the Atlantic slave trade 
that evidence was forthcoming about the existence of an internal 
trade in slaves, and there is every reason to believe that this was 
an accurate reflection on the date that it came into being. Captain 
Canot, who was familiar with the Upper Guinea Coast in the 1820's 
and 1830's, wrote vividly on both the Atlantic slave trade and the 
internal slave trade, implicitly linking the two. With the Atlantic 
slave trade as the main preoccupation of the Susus and the Fulas,
"a man, therefore, becomes the standard of prices. A slave is a 
note of hand that may be discounted or pawned; he is a bill of 
exchange that carries himself to his destination and pays a debt 
bodily; he is a tax that walks corporately into the chieftain's 
treasury". As far as the home market was concerned, the victims not 
only became agricultural labourers, but men were required as personal 
attendants and women as wives or concubines. (1)
While one major contribution to the rise of "domestic 
slavery" on the Upper Guinea Coast was made by the coastwards thrust 
of the interior peoples and their involvement in the slave trade, 
an equally great contribution was being made by the European forces
(1) Captain Canot: Op. cit., P.128
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acting on the littoral from the seaward side.
In the forts and factories of the Royal African Company, 
a distinction was made between "sale slaves" and "castle slaves" 
or "factory slaves". Both were acquired in the same way, but while 
the former were destined to face the Middle Passage, the latter were 
permanently retained around the forts and factories to help in the 
conduct of trade. (1) For that matter, the "sale slaves" too, had 
to work around the factories. As was the case with the African 
captors, whenever captives were kept over a period of time, it was 
imperative to ensure that they were not an intolerable economic 
burden, and as a result the attempt was made by the Boyal African 
Company to exploit them for profit even before they set sail for 
the Americas. In 1702, the Sierra Leone factor was told that, so 
long as it was compatible with security, he should use the "sale 
slaves" in useful pursuits such as clearing Tarso Island which was 
being used for agricultural purposes by the Company. (2) It would 
be surprising if they had not been doing just that previously, for 
their own benefit at least, if not for the Company. Two years later, 
the Company was informed that it was customary in the past for the 
factors to employ the Company's slaves on their private plantations.(3) 
These may well have included both "sale slaves" and "castle slaves".
(1) P.R.O. T70/1465 - Diary of Walter Charles, 1728. This mentions 
"Cayoba, a castle slave, who had been made such from a sale 
slave.
(2) P.R.O. T70/51 - To John Freeman, 4 Aug. 1702, f1.275
(3) P.R.Q T70/14 - Agent Greenaway, 18 March 1703
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The Directors took some interest in the "castle slaves”•
In 1702, they issued instructions that a Negro overseer should be 
appointed over them. They were to be converted to Christianity, 
given names, taught to speak English, and be allowed to have one 
wife (another flcastle slave”). Perhaps the most important provision 
from the Company's point of view was that the "castle slaves” should 
be taught skills to enchance their value and utility. Such workers 
were not to be sold or transported overseas except for great 
crimes. (1)
Apparently, no record remains of the number of "castle 
slaves” in the forts of York and Bence Island and their subsidiary 
factories, but in 1702, it was felt that there were too many in 
Sierra Leone, and that some should be transferred to Cape Coast 
Castle. (2) However, some years later, there was talk of shortage. 
At least, the Directors had been made to understand that it was 
cheaper to use their own slaves than to hire African servants, and 
they gave their factors authority to purchase slaves for the 
factories. (3) Walter Charles, the last of the chief factors of 
the Royal African Company in Sierra Leone, was certainly convinced 
that if the Company used their own slaves, it would be cheaper and 
more convenient; and he urged that some "castle slaves” should be 
sent to Sierra Leone from the Gambia establishments. (4) The same
(1) P.R.O. T70/51 - To John Freeman, 4 Aug 1702, f1.268
(2) P.R.O. T70/31 - To John Freeman, 1 Dec.1702 fl-310
(3) P.R.0. T70/60 - To Alexander Archibald, 3 Oct 1723» fl.45
(4) P.R.O. T70/1465 - Diary of Walter Charles, 1728.
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situation was to be found in the Portuguese trading centre of 
Cacheu, where the captain-major argued in 169^ that it cost too 
much to get the help of the Africans. (1)
Apart from the trading companies, private European traders 
also owned slaves on the coast, so that altogether the number of 
Africans bought by Europeans and remaining in servitude on the 
Upper Guinea Coast was considerable. The practice probably began 
with the arrival of Portuguese ships in the fifteenth century, 
giving rise to the term grumete, Ofeailor's slave”). As stated 
earlier, the grumete was usually a wage earner, and in many cases, 
African rulers on the Upper Guinea Coast voluntarily sent their 
children to live with the Europeans and to serve as auxiliaries in 
the coastal trade. (2) There was a somewhat similar practice in 
the nineteenth century, involving the sending of children from the 
hinterland to the colony of Sierra Leone to learn ”white man fashion” . 
However, these children were usually unpaid servants, and when they 
grew old enough to realise that they were free, they were then sold 
to the Mande and Fula traders. (3)
Some of the Africans purchased by and remaining in the 
service of the resident Europeans were little better off than slaves 
in the New World. The ”castle slaves” , like their American counter-
/K2) See above, Ch. VIII^ f*f t (+
^  (1) A.H.U.. Guine', caixa II - No.230, Minute of the Conselho,
30 Oct 169^.
(3) C. Fyfe: A History of Sierra Leone, p.270
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parts, were branded witb their owners' marks. (1) When a "castle 
slave11 committed a crime, his punishment was often brutal. In 
February 1682, the Bence Island factor reported that some of the 
"castle slaves" had stolen, and he had executed one as an example.(2) 
Escape and rebellion led to the same fate. If the "castle slave" 
was not sold, executed, or did not die an early natural death, then 
he could look forward to being freed when he was "old and useless".(3) 
With the private traders, it was equally obvious that unmitigated 
chattel slavery prevailed at times. Occasionally, the owners 
displayed those fits of sadism which afflict those who have absolute 
power over human life. When in 169^* Francisco Vaz, member of the 
prominent Afro-Portuguse trading family, cruelly disposed of his 
slaves in his Nunez emporium, the matter reached the ears of the 
Conselho Ultramarino. (4) In the latter years of the eighteenth 
century, John Ormond, thirty five years a slave trader in Baga 
territory, was notorious for amusing himself at the expense of the 
lives and limbs of his servants, in much the same way as his 
contemporaries in Saint Domingue. (5)
(1) P.R.O. T70/53 - Instructions to agent Plunkett, 9 Feb 1721
(He was sent a new branding iron.)
(2) P.R.O. T70/16 - Edmund Pierce, 21 Feb 1682, fl.27
(3) P.R.O. T70/361 - Bence Island Accounts, 1682
(if) A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa VI - Bishop of Cape Verde to the 
Conselho, 27 July 169^
(5) C.B. Wadstrom: An Essay on Colonisation, pp.8^,85*87
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The servitude directly introduced on the Upper Guinea 
Coast by the Europeans slowly assumed an African character. The 
slave owners were originally white and foreigners, but the late 
eighteenth century saw the emergence of powerful mulatto slave 
trading chiefs, who were said to own large numbers of "domestic 
slaves". Wadstrom explained that "if an African slave is impertin­
ent he is sold. The children of such are occasionally sold also.
But with the rich traders this is not common." (1) The rich traders 
to whom he referred were the mulattoes, who kept 'slaves* not only 
to serve as crews on the coastal and riverain vessels and to act 
as porters, but also to provide labour for the production of food 
and manufactures, which indirectly facilitated the Atlantic slave 
trade. These categories of labour were the basis of the towns 
owned by the Tuckers, Clevelands and Caulkers.
In the above respect, the mulatto chiefs and more so the 
Mande and Fula rulers derived concrete benefits from the Atlantic 
slave trade - not the ephemerality of consumer goods, but the 
incorporation of large supplies of labour into their hierarachy 
of production. The extensive Susu rice fields were capable of 
providing the food for the numerous slaves shipped from the Upper 
Guinea Coast in the late eighteenth century, the annual amount of
(1) Ibid: p. 117.
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rice purchased by the European traders being several hundred tons. (1) 
It is not surprising that the Mande and Fulas continued to expand 
during the nineteenth and twentieth century at the expense of the 
fragments of the coastal society left by the Atlantic slave trade. 
This, incidentally confirms to a pattern discernible elsewhere on 
the West African coast whereby the coastal peoples suffered because 
of their direct exposure to the Atlantic slave trade, while the 
tribes of the hinterland grew strong from the benefits of the same 
trade. (2) Even so, however, on the Upper Guinea Coast the advant­
ages accured to a minority ruling element in the near hinterland, 
and this barely modifies the assessment of the Atlantic slave trade 
as a totally degrading force.
Furthermore, like the colonial powers in a later era, the 
Mande and Fula ruling class found that they had to use force to 
cement their authority over those they sought to dominate. The 
agricultural serfs of the Upper Guinea Coast and its hinterland 
signalled their oppression by rebelling or escaping when the 
opportunity presented itself. The uprisings of the rimaibe of the 
Futa Djalon have already been instanced, and these were not unique.
One of the most explosive situations in the near hinterland was
(1) Report of the Lords of the Committee, 1789* - Part I,
'Produce1, Evidence of John Matthews.
(2) The Transatlantic Slave Trade from West Africa, C. Fyfes
"The Impact of the Slave Trade on West Africa", pp.8l-88
SLAVE TRADING 1690-1800
caused by a revolt against the Mandingas in 1785* (1) Availing 
themselves of a war between the Mandingas and the Susus, a large 
body of rimaibe revolted and escaped from Mandinga control, 
establishing themselves in Susu territory. When peace was restored 
between the Susus and the Mandingas, the latter resorted to sporadic 
attacks against their former vassals, who in turn retaliated by 
plundering Mandinga towns, with the tacit approval of the Susus who 
allowed them to receive supplies of arms and ammunition from the 
coast. However, after this affair had dragged on for nearly ten 
years, a disturbance arose among the serfs of the Susus, and it was 
feared that they would join forces with the deserters from the 
Mandingas, so the two ruling groups joined forces to crush the 
former Mandinga vassals after the rainy season of 1795- (2)
The local slaves, serfs and the like had every reason for 
revolting, because having been spawned by the Atlantic slave trade, 
they in turn constituted the section of the society most liable to 
be exported. Again it is from Captain Canot's account that the 
inter-relationship between the two phenomena most clearly emerges. 
When, on one occasion, Canot visited Timbo, the capital of the Futa 
Djalon, the inhabitants of Findo and Furto, two slave settlements 
on the outskirts of the city, fled in consternation on hearing that 
Canot wanted slaves. They knew that they were earmarked as the
(1) John Matthews: A Voyage to the Biver Sierra Leone, p.15^
(2) T. Winterbottom: An Account of the Native Africans of
Sierra Leone, p.15^
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first to be exported; and as it turned out, flight did them no 
good, because they were hunted by Fulas on horseback, and Canot 
was provided with his coffle to return to the water side. (1)
The village of local slaves and serfs thus became a 
warren supplying the Europeans. This was the ultimate degradation 
to which the Atlantic slave trade had brought the African society 
of the Upper Guinea Coast. Without doubt, as far as this region 
is concerned, to speak of African slavery as ancient, and to 
suggest that this provided the initial stimulus and early recruit­
ing ground for slaves exported to Europe and the Americas is to 
turn history on its head. ?/hen the European powers involved in 
the area (namely: Britain, France and Portugal), intervened to end 
slavery and serfdom in their respective colonies, they were simply 
undoing their own handiwork.
Much of the disruption caused by the Atlantic slave trade 
was slowly put to rights in the colonial period, often with the 
active help of the metropolitan powers, who were forced to remedy 
some of the chaos they had formerly encouraged, and to promote 
instead the peaceful production of primary products such as cocoa, 
palm oil and groundnuts. But the significance of the examples
(1) Captain Canot: Adventurers of an African Slaver, pp.l68, 169*
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above, relating to the code of punishment and the creation of 
new diaprivileged classes on the Upper Guinea Coast, is that they 
indicate that long after the encounter with the European slave 
traders the coastal society bore the scars to prove it. In the 
wider sphere of race relations, some of the wounds inflicted 
during that epoch are still festering.
£T?7
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Manuscript Sources 
Portugal - Since tne Portuguese were the first Europeans to 
venture along the West African coast, and since they were 
also the Ifirst to establish the rudiments of settlement and 
colonisation in the Cape Verde Islands and Upper Guinea, tne 
records generated by their activity are by far the most 
voluminous and useful for the pre-colonial period. All of 
tne early cnronicles of tne fifteenth and sixteenth Cen­
turies have supposedly been published, but much seventeenth 
and eighteenth century material is still available only in 
manuscript form.
A#H»U# - Arquivo ilistbrico ultramarino, Lisbon.
This repository contains the records of the activities 
which came within the jurisdiction of tne Portuguese Conselho 
Ultramarino. Reports from the officials in Cape Verde-Guinea 
are supplemented by letters from private traders, priests, 
and, occasionally, African rulers. These were all considered 
by tne Conselho, which advised the Portuguese crown on theBe 
matters•
Six caixas or boxes of papeis avulsos (miscellaneous 
papers) are available for the Cape Verde Islands, covering the 
period 1602-1700. These are followed by seventy-eight mapos 
or bundles of similar material up to 1846; out the eighteenth 
century records of the Cape Verde islands contain very few 
references to the mainland# por the mainland, the corres­
pondence begins fitfully in 1614 and increases in volume
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after 1640* Two caixas are available until 1700, and eleven 
mayos contain the eighteenth century records, often witn con­
siderable duplication# There are separate codices of consultas 
or minutes of the Conselho*s deliberations, but their decisions 
were usually included in the Cape Verde and the Guinea caixas 
and mayos. along with the relevant letters and reports received 
by the Conselho# Unless specifically stated to the contrary, 
all letters to the conselho were written by the governor, in 
the case of the Cape Verde correspondence, and by the captain- 
major of Cacheu, in the case of the Guinea correspondence.
On matters of ethnographic interest, tne records of
A.H.U# are of extremely limited value, and they contain 
a considerable proportion of administrative correspondence 
relating to applications for appointments, salaries, pensions, 
etc. However, they provide a basis for an understanding of 
the relations between the Portuguese and the African chiefs on 
the Upper Guinea coast, especially those around Cacheu and 
Bissau.
Bib, de Ajuda - hiblioteca de Ajuda, Lisbon
The archives of this Library contain, among other 
material relevant to the history of West Africa, an important 
iocument of the early seventeenth century, entitled MRelayoes 
do Descobrimento da Costa de Guine", and catalogued 51-VIII-25* 
This has been published in part by Luciano Cordeiros Estabele- 
cimentos e Restates Portuguezes na costa Occidental de Africa#
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The manuscript is also referred to by A.F.C. Eider: Materials fofc 
West African History in Portuguese Archives (1965); but no mention 
has been made of a description of the Upper G-uinea Coast under this 
entry* It is called "Outra rela^ao em 14 capitulos que fez Andre 
Donellas ao Uovernador e Capitao G-eral Fr, de Vaz Concellos da Cunha; 
sobre a Serra Leoa, Keys e Senhores que a habitao, e secunvezinhos, 
ritos, costumes de todas variedades de rios, portos, arvores, animais, 
aves, pexes com os proveitos que dela se tirao”. (The author’s 
preface was written on the 27 Nov 1625, apparently on the completion 
of the work.) The title speaks for itself, except that the area 
which Donellas covers is not simply modern Sierra Leone, but the 
whole coast as far north as Cape Verde. He was born in the Cape 
Verde Islands, and traded on the mainland during the third quarter 
of the sixteenth century.
A few smaller items of interest to the history of Upper G-uinea 
also appear in this Library, including consultas of the Conselho da 
India in the early seventeenth century, arid a description of the 
Cacheu-G-eba area, which is an unsigned copy but can be ascribed to 
Sebastiao Casao, & lanyado who wrote several other letters and reports 
around 1607-160b*
Biblioteca da Sociedade de G-eographia de Lisboa
This Library possesses another lengthy manuscript on Upper 
G-uinea in the early seventeenth century* It is in fact an eighteenth 
century copy of the work of a Portuguese Jesuit, Manuel Alvares: 
’’Ethiopia lienor o Descripyao G-eografica da Provincia da Serra Leoa".
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This again deals with the coast from the Gambia southwards to Cape 
Mount, and,in spite of a tendency to interpolate lengthy theological 
discussions, the author manages to pay considerable attention to the 
social and religious customs of the country where he remained for 
seven years until his death in 1616.
A.T.T. - Arftuivo Torre do Tombo. Lisbon
This, the best known of the Portuguese archives, yielded very 
little unpublished material of relevance to this study. The Cartorio 
dos Jesuita3« 304:36 contains correspondence on the question of 
establishing a seminary for Africans. Father Baltezar Barreira wrote 
from the Upper G-uinea Coast, strongly urging Santiago as the site;
"but there is little reference to the actual missionary endeavours on 
the Upper G-uinea Coast.
Spain - Because of the close cooperation between Portugal and Spain 
in conducting the Atlantic slave trade, and because of the unification 
of the two monarchies during the period 1560-1640, records concerning 
the Upper G-uinea Coast were created in Spain. Besides, there was 
considerable Spanish missionary interest in the area during the 
second half of the seventeenth century. It is in fact quite probable 
that much more material on the Upper Guinea Coast and West Africa as 
a whole is extant in Spain, but is unprocessed, especially in the 
Biblioteca Nacional. in whose catalogues ’Africa* means the Mahgreb*.
B.R.A.H.- Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la Historia. Madrid
This Library houses a large collection of Jesuit records, 
including a section relevant to Cape Verde-Guinea in Papeles Jesuitas%
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Tomo 165* My attention was drawn to this by Padre Buenaventura de 
Carrocera. Apart from reports from Baltesar Barreira, who v^ as on the 
Upper Guinea Coast from 1603 to 1612, there is a memorandum, which 
apparently proceeded from the Conselho da India, when they were con­
sidering the possibility of colonising Sierra Leone around 1610.
A.G.I. - Archivo General de las Indias, Seville
The organisation of the Hispano-Portuguese slave trade is 
brought out by the records of this well-known archive, but no 
references to the African costst as such were encountered* A small 
amount of information on the entry of slaves into Spanish Aaerica 
is buried amongst the records of the viceroyalties.
Italy - The potential contribution of Italian sources to the re­
construction of the past of the Upper Guinea Coast is based, not on 
direct contact, but on the centrality of Rome in the Catholic world.
In this connection, the Italian archives are thoroughly surveyed by 
J.R. Gray: Materials for ivest African History in Italian Archives
(1965).
A.R.S.I. - Arquivum Romanum Societatis Iesu. Rome
Here, the activities of the Jesuit missionaries on the Upper 
Guinea Coast are well documented. The Jesuits collected information 
on the region before they arrived in 1605, and one description 
forwarded to them was written by Antonio Velho Tinoco, who visited 
Sierra Leone in 1576, and was later governor of Cape Verde. The Jesuit 
acquaintance with this area was broken off in 1627 with an assessment
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entitled "Reasons why it is not worthwhile that the Company should 
remain in Cape Verdeu. Letters from the langado, Sebastiao Casao, 
form part of this Jesuit collection, along with a short letter from 
each of the three beafada kings of the Ria Grande de buoa in the 
early seventeenth century.
A.P.F. - frgKXYirc Archivio di Propaganda Fide. Rome
Uith the Jesuit missions under a different jurisdiction, 
the Sacred Congregation of the Propaganda Fide dealt primarily with 
Capuchins and Franciscans. Their records indicate that prominent 
individuals in Spain and the Spanish Capuchin order were pre-occupied 
with the Upper Guinea Coast throughout the second half of the seven­
teenth century* However, the information is most relevant not to the 
history of the African peoples of the mission field but to the 
missionary effort itself, and it has been utilised in this manner 
by Rosci Corrado: **Le Kissioni dei Cappuccini sulle Coste della 
Guinea Superiors nel Secolo XVTI", an unpublished thesis of 1937, a 
copy of which is retained in the Library of the Propaganda Fide.
A.S.V. - Archivio Begredo Vaticano. Rome
Only a few trifling items were recovered here. The main con­
nection between the Vatican and the Upper Guinea Coast lay in the 
appointment of bishops to thes. see of Cape Verde-Guinea (d. Jacobi 
Capitis Viridi), and the subsequent reports of those bishops. The 
former were simply formal instruments, while the latter were 
irregular and said little or nothing about the mainland.
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Great Britain - The Main body of British records on Sierra Leone and 
the Gambia relates to the period subsequent to the one with which 
this study deals. The earliest reports of the Sierra Leone colony 
colony established in 1767 were of some slight help, but for the most 
part, the records of the private trading companies of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries were utilised.
B.H. - British Museum. London
The only unpublished manuscript of interest was Add.Ms, 1'213t, 
"Papers relating to Sierra. Leone, 1692-1696.?..
F.R.Q. - Public Record Office. London
The records of the joint-stock companies trading to Africa 
have been utilised and described by several scholars. Letters from 
the London officials to the agents in Sierra Leone and the Gambia are 
cited in the footnotes as ’To* a given individual. All other references 
in the series "l/70" are to letters or abstracts of letters written 
by the factors on the African coast. Like the Portuguese records, 
this material seldom relates to the African scene outside of the 
context of European trade on the coast, but they are invaluable for 
the Afro-European commerce, especially for the period 1678-1726 on 
the Upper Guinea Coast.
Published Documents 
ARQUIVO das COLOMIAS, Vol.I (Coimbra 1917) - This contains two sections 
relevant to the Upper Guinea Coast, both of which are documents now 
in the A.H.li. Bee "Documentos acerca de Berra Leoa" and "Informa^oes 
da Guine' em 1777rt* The former relates to Sierra Leone in the middle of
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the eighteenth century.
BARCELQS, C.J. de Sena - Subsidies para a Historia de Cabo Verde e Guine 
(1899-1913). This is a curious work, for while undoubtedly a vast 
collection of manuscript material, the author seldom identifies the 
document cited or even the archive in which it was to be found.
BLAKE, J.W. - Europeans in West Africa. Hakluyt Society, 2nd series, No. 
LXXXVI (1942) A number of documents relevant to the Upper Guinea 
Coast in the sixteenth century are presented here in translation, 
with a valuable introduction.
BQLETIM do ARQUIVO HISIfOKICO COLONIAL. Vol. 1, 1950. After a lapse of
thirty-three years, this was another attempt to publish material 
kept in the A.IMU. (at that time still known as the Arquivo iiistorico 
Colonial. See pp. 185-222 for Cape Verde and Cacheu in the early 
seventeenth century.
BRASIO, Antonio - Monumenta Missionaria Africana. Africa Ocidental. 2nd 
series. Vol. II (1500-1569) and Vol. Ill (l569-l600) (1965). The 
editor makes it clear that he only included such material of social, 
administrative and political interest as was necessaiy to make 
meaningful the Catholic endeavours in the Cape Verde Islands and 
Guinea, but this background is amply painted in. He points out that 
there are a considerable number of errors in Barcelos* work.
DOCUMEiiTAQAO ULTRAfORIiiA PORTUGUESA. Vol. 2 (1962). This contains a few
references to Cacheu and Cape Verde, recovered from the Biblioteca 
Nacional in Madrid by the Microfilm Library of the Centro de Estudos 
Historicos Ultramarinos, Lisbon.
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jilACIIAT, J. - Documents sur lea Btablissements Franpais de l'Afrique 
Oocidentale au XVIIIe Sieole (1906). In the pre-colonial era,
France showed little interest in the area that subsequently became 
the French colony of Guinea. The above collection documents those 
activities of the French in the Senegambia which spilled over into 
the "Rivers of the South".
Contemporary Accounts 
The following are listed according to the period of events which
each describes. The editions cited are the ones used in the text, with
the well-known works being set down without comment.
MAUNY, Raymond (ed.) - Esmeraldo de Situ Qrbis, C6te occidentale d'Afrique 
du Sud Karocain au Gabon, par Duarte Pacheco Pereira, vers 1506-1506 
(Bissau 1956). This is cited in the text as Pacheco Pereira: Esmeraldo 
de Situ Qrbis.
&GH0D, Th., da MOTA, A. Texeira and MAUNY, R. - Description de la C6te 
Occidentale d ’Afrique (Senegal au Cap de Monte. Archipels) par 
Valentim Fernandes, 1506-1510 (Bissau 1951)* This is cited in the 
text as Valentim Fernandes: La C5te Occidentale d ’Afrique.
BAIAO, Antonio (ed.) - Asia de Joam de Barros, Primeira Decada (Coimbra 
1932). This is cited in the text as Joao de Barros: Asia.
THE HAt/KIHB V01AGE5, Ilakluyt Society, Mo.LVII,
MERCADO, Thomas - Tratos e Contratos de Mercaderes (Salamanca 1569)*
TAYLOR, 3.R. - The Troublesome Voyage of Captain Edward Fenton. Hakluyt 
Society, Wo.CXIII (2nd series, 1957)*
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LS BLANC, Vinoent - Les Voyages Fameux du Sieur V.L.3. (164b)* Part III, 
"Voyage de Guinee", relates to the Upper Guinea Coast around 1592* 
de ALMADA, Alvares - "Tratado Breve dos Rios de Guine", Monumenta Hissio- 
naria Africana* Africa Ocidental, 1569-1700 (2nd series, Vol.Ill, 
ed. A. Brasio). This Cape Verde mulatto trader actually wrote two 
manuscripts, one in 1f}94 and another in 1596. The editor follows 
that of 1594, indicating where the second version has alternative 
or additional material. This work is cited in the text as Alvares 
de Almada: "Rios de Guine".
PURCHAS, Samuel - Purchas his Pilgrims* Vol. II, Ch. VI (william Reeling 
in Sierra Leone, 1606) and Vol. Ill, Ch. IIII (William Finch in 
Steura Leone, 1607).
VILGAS, Artur - Relacao Anual das Coisas que Fizeram os Padres da Com- 
panhia de Jesus nas suas missoes nos anos de 1600 a 1609r pelo 
Padre Fernao Guerreiro (3 Vols, Lisbon and Coimbra, 1930-1942).
This is cited in the text as Fernao Guerreiro: Relacao Anual*
J0BS0N, Richard - The Golden Trade (1933)*
de SANDOVAL, Alonso - La Natureleza.. de Todos Btiopes (Seville 1623)* 
de SILVSIRA, Luis - Peregrinapao de Andr^ de Faro a Terra dos Gentios
(1945)*. This is the account of a Franciscan missionary who was on 
the Upper Guinea Coast in 1663-1665* It is cited in the text as 
Andre^ de Faro: Peregrinacao♦
VILLAULT, Nicholas (Sieur de la Beliefond) - Relation des Costes d’Afrique 
appellees Guinee (166$).
QGILBY, John - Africa (1670).
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PERES, Damiab - Duas Descriyoes Seiscentistas da Guine de Lemos Azevedo 
Coelho (1953)* Coelho wrote two separate descriptions; one in 1669 
and a second in 1684. They are both published in full in this edition, 
for the most part, the first version was used in this study, the 
work being cited as Leaos Coelho: Duas Descricoes da Guine.
de CARROCERA, Buenaventura - Misiones Capuchinas en Africa. Vol.2
(Madrid 1956)* This work is that of Mateo de Anguiano, who chroni­
cled the missionary endeavours of the Capuchins in the seventeenth 
century in much the same way that Fernao G-uerreiro made public the 
activities of the Jesuits; but all of Anguiano's writings were not 
published. The material on the Sierra Leone missions is introduced 
and annotated by P. Buenaventura de Carrocera, on the basis of his 
knowledge of the Portuguese, Spanish and Italian archives.
CULTRU, P. - Premier Voyage de Sieur de la Courbe fait a la Coste d lAfrique 
en f685 (1906).
BAA30T, John - A Description of the Coasts of North and South Guinea (174.6)*
LABAT, J.B. - Eouvelle Relation de l'Afrique Occidentale (1728). As Gultru 
pointed out, much of the material in Vol.IV of this work was wrongly 
attributed to Andre Brue, governor of Senegal in the early eighteenth 
century, when it was in fact written by de la Courbe after his 
voyage in 1685-1686. However, Labat adds new material relating to the 
last years of the seventeenth century and the turn of the eighteenth* 
- Voyages du Chevalier des Marchais en G-uinee*. fait en 1725*
1726 and 1727, Vol. I (1730).
LibvIiEiiCE, A.W. - A Series of Uncommon Events which befell Captain George 
Roberts (1930)* The editor's introduction to this work, first
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published in 1726, queries the assumption that the name Roberts 
was a pseudonyms, for Daniel Defoe, is alledged, and he shows quite 
clearly that tne account was factual and based on a personal visit to 
those parts.
JOHNSON, Charles - A General History of the Pirates (Ed. Arthur Hay-
wardL, 1926) This is also attributed to Defoe, but it is factually 
reliable with respect to Sierra Leone around 1720.
ATKINS, John - A Voyage to Guinea, Brasil and the West Indies (1735).
The author visited Sierra Leone in 1721.
HOTJSTOTJN, James - Some New and Accurate Observations., of the Coast of 
Guinea (1725). This was written for the benefit of the Royal 
African Company after Houston visited the Guinea Coast in 1722. 
SMITH, William - A New Voyage to Guinea (1734). The author, a surveyor 
in the employ of the Royal African Company, was sent to Africa 
in 1726. 1
m OORE, Francis - “Travels into the Inland Parts of Africa11, in Thomas
Astley: A New and General Collection of Voyages (1745).Vol.2,Ch.VI 
OWEN, Nicholas - Journal of a Slave Dealer., on tne Coast of Africa and 
America from the year 1746 to the year 1757 (Ed, Eveline Martin). 
MARTIN, H. and SPURRELL, M. - Journal of a Slave Trader, John Newton, 
1750-1754. This edition also contains Newton*s Thoughts Upon the 
African slave Trade.
PERES, Damiao - Relagao da Viagem da Fragata “Nossa Senhora da Estrella” 
a nissau em 1753 nor Antonio jose da Costa Arauao (1952).
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LABARTBH, P. - Voyage au Senegal pendant les annees 1784- et 1785. d'apres 
les Memoires de Lajaille (1802).
GOLBEREjf, S.M.X. - Fragmens d'uri Voyage en Afrique. 2 Vols (1802). He, too, 
draws on Lajaille, but his account is much fuller than that of 
Labarthe.
MATTHEWS, John - A  Voyage to the Hiver sierra Leone (1788).
V/AD3TA0M, C.B. - Observations on the Slave Trade and a Description of some 
Part of the Coast of G-uinea during a Voyage made in 1787 and 1788 
(1789).
- An Essay on Colonisation (1795).
REPORT OP THE LORDS OP THIS COMMITTEE OF COUNCIL, 1789* (hoard of Trade 
Report Relating to Trade and Foreign Plantations, 1789).
HOnTETTORE, Joshua - An Authentic Account of the late Expedition to Bulam 
on the Coast of Africa: with a Description of Sierra fieone and the 
adjacent country.(1794).
BEAVER, Philip - African Memoranda relative to an attempt to establish a 
jritish settlement on the Island of Bolama in the year 1792 (1805) *
FERES, Daraiao - Planta da Praca de Bissau e Suas Adjacentes por Bernardino 
Antonio Alvares de Andrade (1952).
PARR, Mungo ~ Travels in the Interior Districts of Africa in the Tears 
1795, 1796 and 1797 (1799).
- The Journal of a Mission to the Interior of Africa in the
Year 1805 $Ed* John Murray, 1815).
JIKTERBOTTOM, Thomas - An Account of the Native Africans rfxftiwraatxfcBgHg 
in the Neighbourhood of Sierra Leone (1803)•
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LAIii'G, A.G-. - Travels in the Timanaee, Kooranko and Soolima countries (1S25)» 
CABOT (Captain) - Adventures of an African Slaver (1926)«
HJ.S, Christopher - Sierra Leone Inheritance (196A)* This is an excellent
selection of extracts from primary materials illustrating the history 
of Sierra Leone.
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Secondary Material 
ARCIN, Andre - Histoire de la Guinee ffran^aise (1911)•
A  RESTAURACAO E 0 IMFERIO COLONIAL PORTUGUES (Agenda Geral das Golonias, 
1940).
de AZEVEDO, J.L. - 0 Marquez de Pombal e a sua Bpoca (1909)*
BAERETO, Joao - Historia da Guine (1933)*
BALltANN, II. and WESTSRMANN, D. - Les Peuples et les Civilisations de 
l'Afrique (1962).
BESTRATID-BOCAiNDB, M. - “Notes sur la Guinee Portugaise ou Senegambie 
Meridional©H, Bulletin, de la Societe de Geogr^gie de Parisa 
Tone H ,  £11 (1649)»
BUTT-Thompson, F*W* - West African Secret Societies (1929)*
GARREIRA, Antonio - Vida Social dos Manjacos (Bissau 1949).
- 0 Fundaraento dos Btnonimos na Guine" Portuguesa (19^2). 
CHAUNU, K* and P. - Seville et l*Atlantique, (Tome III, 1999).
da COSTA, J.C. - Fisiografia e Geologia da Provincia da Guine (Porto 1946)* 
de CARVALHO, H.A. Dias - Guine, Apontamentos Ineditos (1944)*
DAVIDSON, Basil - Black Mother (19&1)
DAVIES, K.G. - The Royal African Company (1937).
DINIZ, A.J. Dias - “As Tribos da Guine Portuguesa na Historiatt, Congresso 
Comemorativo do Quinto Centenario do Descobrimento da Guine, Vol. 1,
pp.241-271 (1947).
- "Cren^as e Costumes dos Indigenes da Ilha de Bissau no 
Seculo XVIII1*, Portugal em Africa, Vol, 2, No.9> pp.150-163 
DUFBI, James - Portugal in Africa (Penguin 19&2).
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